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University Press Scholarship Online. Publications Pages Publications Pages. Search my Subject Specializations: Classical, Early, and Medieval Plays and Playwrights: Underpinning the dialectical or methodological controversy between the two Madhyamaka camps lies a deeper ontological and epistemological divide implied within their theories of the two truths, and this in turn is reflected in the different methodological considerations they each deploy. So on this second view, the variation in the methods used by the two schools of the Madhyamaka are not simple differences in their rhetorical devices or pedagogical tools, they are underlain by more serious philosophical disagreements between the two.
All the theories of truth and knowledge advanced in these systems from his Madhyamaka point of view are too rigid to be of any significant use. He rejects them on the ground that from an analytic cognitive perspective, which scrutinises the nature of reality, nothing—subject and object—is found to be ultimately real since all things are rationally reduced to spatial parts or temporal moments.
Thus he proposes the view that both the subject and the object are conventionally intrinsically real as both are conventional truths, where as both are ultimately intrinsically unreal as both are empty of ultimate reality, hence emptiness alone is the ultimate reality. Particularly both schools reject ultimate intrinsic reality while positing conventional intrinsic reality.
As far as the presentation of ultimate truth is concerned both schools are in agreement—nonself or emptiness alone is the ultimate reality, and the rest—the entire range of dharmas—are ultimately empty of any intrinsic reality. Nevertheless, the two schools differ slightly on the matter related to the theory of conventional truth, specifically concerning reality or unreality of the external or physical objects on the conventional level. Denying intrinsic reality of things at the conventional level, would therefore entail the denial of their conventional existence, since it would entail the denial of the defining characteristics of the conventional reality.
The first is the conditionality argument pertaining to the four elements, according to which, all the four elements are ultimately empty of any intrinsic reality, for they all are conditioned by the causal factors appropriated for their becoming and their existence. Given that being composites and products equally apply to visible form and sound, these two reasons cannot warrant the validity of the argument justifying the thesis that a visible form is ultimately apprehended by the visual faculty.
If they did, they would equally warrant the validity of the argument justifying the thesis that a sound is ultimately apprehended by the visual faculty Dbu ma dza 65ab. And by relying on this [i. Therefore, ultimate truth is the emptiness of any intrinsic reality. The essential feature of the argument is as follows: That is, all entities must be shown, in reality, as neither singular nor plural. And therefore this argument consists of two premises:.
The premise that shows the lack of plurality is based upon the conclusion of the argument that shows the lack of singularity. It satisfies the first criterion because all instances of the subject, namely the intrinsic identities of those entities asserted by the Buddhist and non-Buddhist opponents, are instances of entities which are neither singular nor plural. There are no instances of phenomena, which lacked intrinsic identity, which are not also instances of phenomena, that are neither singular nor plural.
Thus the second and the third criteria which are mutually entailling prove the entailment of the neither one-nor many argument. And therefore the argument successfully proves that all phenomena are empty of any intrinsic reality, since they all lack any singular or plural identity. If [someone] accepts them as ultimate, what can I do for that? Why is it that all entities are defined as only conventionally real? And whatever is causally established abides in consciousness.
His chief reason for doing this is his deep mistrust of the varying degrees of metaphysical and epistemological foundationalism that these theories are committed to. Although these two theses are advanced separately, they are mutually coextensive. Let us turn to the first thesis. Conventional reality here treated as dependently arisen phenomenon , given it is causally effective, is therefore always intrinsically unreal, and hence lacks any intrinsic reality even conventionally.
Hence that which is conventionally or dependently coarisen is always conventionally or dependently arisen and strictly does not arise ultimately. As a result, far from understanding things as dependently arisen the second sense and dependently designated the third sense , ordinary beings reify them to be non-dependently arisen, and non-designated. Due to the force of this cognitive confusion, from the perspective of mundane cognitive processes of the ordinary beings, things appear real, and each phenomenon appears intrinsically real in spite of their non-intrinsic nature.
In order to illustrate this distinction, in his commentary [MBh] 6. Ordinary beings erroneously grasp all conditioned phenomena as intrinsically real, therefore things are conventionally real and thus are categories of conventional truth. For noble beings, however, because they no longer reify them as real, things are perceived as having the nature of being created bcos ma and unreal bden pa ma yin pa like the reflected image [MBh] 6. Consequently, all entities, according to this definition, satisfy the criterion of the two truths, for the definition of the two truths is one based on the two natures.
The two truths are, therefore, not merely one specific nature mirrored in two different perspectives [MBh] 6. Conventional nature entails conventional truth and ultimate nature entails ultimate truth, and given each entity is constituted by the two natures, the two truths define what each entity is in its ontological and epistemological terms. Conventional nature is defined as conventional truth because it is the domain of mundane cognitive process, and is readily accessible for ordinary beings, including mundane cognitive process of noble beings.
It is a sort of truth , while unreal and illusory in reality, it is yet erroneously and non-analytically taken for granted by mundane cognitive processes of the ordinary beings. It is this sort of truth, both real and non-illusory, that is correctly and directly found out by exalted cognitive processes of noble beings, and by analytic cognitive processes of ordinary beings.
Mundane cognitive process that is associated with the definition of conventional truth and therefore allied to the perception of unreal entities is of two kinds [M] 6. Correct cognitive process is associated with an acute sense faculty, which is not impaired by any occasional extraneous causes of misperception see below. Fallacious cognitive process is associated with a defective sense faculty impaired by occasional extraneous causes of misperception.
Consequently correct cognitive processes of both ordinary and awakened beings satisfy the epistemic standard of mundane convention, being non- deceptive by mundane standard, thus they set the standard of mundane convention; whereas fallacious cognitive processes of defective sense faculties, of both ordinary and awakened beings, do not satisfy the epistemic standard of mundane convention, and therefore, they are deceptive even by mundane standard. First, cognitive processes associated with sense faculties that are unimpaired by extraneous causes of misperception grasp the former objects, and because this kind of object fulfils realistic mundane ontological standard, it is thus real for ordinary beings, not so for the noble beings the issue to which we turn later.
Hence it is only conventionally real. Second, cognitive processes associated with sense faculties that are impaired by extraneous causes of misperception grasp conventionally unreal objects, and because this kind of object does not meet realistic mundane ontological standard, they are thus conventionally unreal. Just as illusion is partly real although partly unreal , all objects that are considered commonsensically as conventionally real, are unreal.
The major difference between the two is that a knowledge of illusion being unreal is available to mundane cognitive processes of ordinary beings where as a knowledge of unreality of conventionally real entities is not available to mundane cognitive processes of ordinary beings. Conventional reality of intrinsically real entity is rejected in [MBh] 6. Deceptive, unreal, and dependently arisen nature of conventionally real entities is beyond the grasp of mundane cognitive processes.
By contrast, deceptive, unreal and dependently arisen nature of conventionally illusory, partly unreal, entities is grasped by mundane cognitive processes. Therefore illusory objects are regarded as deceptive, and unreal by the standard of mundane knowledge, whereas, conventionally real things are regarded as nondeceptive and real by the standard of mundane knowledge. So the argument from the first tier of the illusory theory shows that mundane cognitive processes of ordinary beings fail to know illusory and unreal nature of conventionally real entities, they instead grasp them to be intrinsically real.
Here, he argues, the presence of the underlying confusion operating beneath mundane cognitive processes of the ordinary beings is the force by which ordinary beings intuitively and erroneously reify the nature of conventional entites. Hence they grasp conventional entities as intrinsically real, although they are in actual fact on a closer analysis, only non-intrinsic, unreal or illusory.
Therefore intrinsic reality is not a conventional reality and grasping things to be intrinsically real is only a confused belief, not a knowledge. If this were the case then intrinsic reality would become the ultimate nature of things. That would be absurd. Ultimate reality or emptiness , given it is causally effective, is therefore intrinsically unreal.
Therefore ultimate reality is ultimately unreal or put it differently, emptiness is ultimately empty. Third, he says that ultimate reality is the first nature of the two natures of things found by perception of reality.
Truths and Lies About Sports
This means ultimate reality is ultimate nature of all conventionally real things. For they all have an ultimate nature representing ultimate status, just as they have conventional nature representing conventional status. The analysis will demonstrate whether or not conventionally real phenomena and persons are more than what they are conventionally. Let us begin with the first. The not-self argumnent demonstrates, as we shall see, unreality of conventionally real person.
He argues, like all the Buddhist philosophers do, the notion of self or the assumption of self arises in relation to personhood. After all it is a personal identity issue. To analyse the self therefore requires us to look closely among the parts that constitute a person, and given that the conception of self is embedded in personhood which is constituted by the five aggregates, we need to examine its relation to our conception of self. Suffice it here to highlight the important relation that exists between the aggregates and the notion of self.
For the simple reason that confusion and misconceptions of self arise in relation to the aggregates, thus it is within the same framework that the realisation of nonself must emerge. This argument however is more or less a way of putting all his arguments together. The self does not own the aggregates. There is no ultimately real self that can be logically proven to exist. If it did exist it has to be found when it is subjected to these sevenfold analyses. But the self is not found either to be different from the aggregates, nor identical to the aggregates, nor to be in possession of them, nor is the self in the aggregates, nor are the aggregates in the self, nor is the self the mere composite of the aggregates; nor is the self the shape or sizes of the aggregates.
Therefore according to any of the sevenfold analysis a personal self is unreal, and empty of any intrinsic reality. Therefore, although the argument from the sevenfold analyses denies the existence of intrinsically real self or ultimately real self, the argument does not entail a denial of conventionally real self. It turns out therefore that a self is merely a convenient designation, or a meaningful label given to the five aggregates, and taken for granted in the everyday purpose as a agent.
And it is this nominal self that serves the purpose of moral agent. This nominal or conventional self is comparable to anything that exists conventionally. The understanding here is that the way in which things arise and come into existence definitively informs us about how things actually are. If entities are intrinsically real there are only two alternative ways for them to arise: If one holds that intrinsically real things arise causally, then there are only three possible ways for them to arise: P1 If intrinsic entity arise from itself it would absurdly follow that cause and effect would be identical and they would exist simultaneously.
In which case, the production of an effect would be pointless for it would be already in existence. It is thus unreasonable to assume that something already arisen might arise all over again. P3 If an intrinsic entity arises from both itself and another then both reductio ad absurdums in P1 and P2 would apply [M] 6. P4 If an intrinsic entity arises causelessly, then anything could arise from everything [M] 6. Thus it is not possible for any intrinsic entity to exist because no such entity could be causally produce either from itself or from another or both or causelessly.
It follows therefore that any entity that arises causally is not intrinsically real, hence it is dependently originated entity [M] 6. Even though they are not intrinsically real, hence remain unproduced according to the four analyses, unlike the rabbit's horn, intrinsically unreal entities are objects of mundane cognitive processes, and they arise codependently [M] — Nor do they arise out of themselves, nor from another, nor from both.
The argument from dependent arising therefore eliminates the web of erroneous views presupposing intrinsic reality. If entities are intrinsically real, then their arising could be through themselves, from another or from both, causelessly.
- Clarifying the Two Truths.
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As we have seen from a critical rational point of view, it is demonstrated that there is no ultimately real or ultimately existent entities or real self of person to be found. The two arguments do not however show that emptiness per se is empty, nor do they show that the selflessness is itself selfless.
This raises an important question: Putting the question differently: And naturally bringing about the benefit of others is enlightened activity. Without clinging to words and labels as if they were the meaning itself, Direct the mind instead to the meaning that words merely point towards. The actual mind, which is the experiencer of phenomena, is devoid of any true reality, and so, in reference to this, we say that there is no self, no sentient being, no individual, no agent and so on.
This consciousness that perceives its object is not dependent on the sense faculties. It does not originate from objects.
And it does not remain somewhere in between. It exists neither internally nor externally. When it arises it does not come from anywhere, and when it ceases it does not go anywhere. It is empty as it originates, and empty as it ceases to be. This is how it is described. Conceptualization is involvement with the desire realm, form realm or formless realm.
But non-conceptualization is not associated with any of them at all. Since no buddhahood can be observed, it too is but a name.
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The realization that there is nothing in the space-like natural condition of all phenomena which could be the object of consciousness or wisdom is the view. In the post-meditation, to gather the illusory accumulation of merit for the sake of illusory sentient beings is the action. The basic space of phenomena is beyond conceptual elaboration and inexpressible by speech or thought, In this, there is not the knowing of some object to be known. Yet still, there is said to be the practice of view and meditation, Like space viewing space or the sky meditating upon itself.
It is said that not fearing the profound meaning of emptiness but feeling inspired by it is the sign of a fortunate being who has heard and trained in the teachings before and is destined to swiftly reach awakening. Reality itself, sky-like basic space, free from any thought, When it is realized in a state of primal wisdom beyond expression, Is fundamental equality, free from speculation or deliberate activity.
This is the wisdom mind of the buddhas of the three times. To experience the conditioned phenomena of the relative, magical appearances of unity, Without accepting or rejecting them and without attachment, Is to take the wisdom mind of the buddhas into experience. Until you reach this level of mental mastery and attainment, Renounce any attachment to material possessions, And keep to isolated forests and retreats, like a wild deer. This is how to remain on the path without ever falling back. Remain without joy or sorrow, attachment or aversion and so on [7] Towards all circumstances, outer and inner, favourable and unfavourable, And every experience will assist you greatly on your path.
This is how to find stable realization into the unborn nature of phenomena. When the wisdom of realizing the sky-like nature of mind And the compassion of not forsaking illusory sentient beings Are brought together in concomitant view and activity, Great non-abiding primal wisdom will swiftly be attained. The natural radiance of emptiness can appear as anything at all. Since it is empty as it appears, appearance and emptiness are a unity. This can only be known by looking inwards.
It is within the domain of your own self-knowing awareness-wisdom. When nothing whatsoever is conceptualized, How could you possibly go astray?
The Theory of Two Truths in India (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Since mind is not a duality, Look as if there is nothing to be looked at. In fact, there is not the tiniest fraction Of something to be looked at. The nature of mind, empty and clear and beyond conceptual focus, is the genuine fundamental condition. Translated by Adam Pearcey, Rigpa Translations , , revised If you find this site useful, please consider helping us to achieve our goal of translating more classic works from the Buddhist tradition and making them freely available.
Two Truths and a Lie Ideas, Examples & Instructions
Moreover, there are two kinds of relative, the incorrect relative and the correct relative. There are three ways in which we can experience these two truths: The real nature of the relative is the real nature of the absolute. As it is said: Mind has no shape, no colour and no location.