Hence, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, can be conceived not to exist, it is not that, than which nothing greater can be conceived. But this is an irreconcilable contradiction. There is, then, so truly a being than which nothing greater can be conceived to exist, that it cannot even be conceived not to exist; and this being thou art, O Lord, our God. This version of the argument relies on two important claims. As before, the argument includes a premise asserting that God is a being than which a greater cannot be conceived.
But this version of the argument, unlike the first, does not rely on the claim that existence is a perfection; instead it relies on the claim that necessary existence is a perfection. This latter claim asserts that a being whose existence is necessary is greater than a being whose existence is not necessary. Otherwise put, then, the second key claim is that a being whose non-existence is logically impossible is greater than a being whose non-existence is logically possible. This second version appears to be less vulnerable to Kantian criticisms than the first. To begin with, necessary existence, unlike mere existence, seems clearly to be a property.
Notice, for example, that the claim that x necessarily exists entails a number of claims that attribute particular properties to x. For example, if x necessarily exists, then its existence does not depend on the existence of any being unlike contingent human beings whose existence depends, at the very least, on the existence of their parents. And this seems to entail that x has the reason for its existence in its own nature. But these latter claims clearly attribute particular properties to x. And only a claim that attributes a particular property can entail claims that attribute particular properties.
While the claim that x exists clearly entails that x has at least one property, this does not help.
Evidence for God’s Existence
We cannot soundly infer any claims that attribute particular properties to x from either the claim that x exists or the claim that x has at least one property; indeed, the claim that x has at least one property no more expresses a particular property than the claim that x exists. This distinguishes the claim that x exists from the claim that x necessarily exists and hence seems to imply that the latter, and only the latter, expresses a property. Moreover, one can plausibly argue that necessary existence is a great-making property. To say that a being necessarily exists is to say that it exists eternally in every logically possible world; such a being is not just, so to speak, indestructible in this world, but indestructible in every logically possible world - and this does seem, at first blush, to be a great-making property.
As Malcolm puts the point:. If a housewife has a set of extremely fragile dishes, then as dishes, they are inferior to those of another set like them in all respects except that they are not fragile. Those of the first set are dependent for their continued existence on gentle handling; those of the second set are not. There is a definite connection between the notions of dependency and inferiority, and independence and superiority.
To say that something which was dependent on nothing whatever was superior to anything that was dependent on any way upon anything is quite in keeping with the everyday use of the terms superior and greater. Nevertheless, the matter is not so clear as Malcolm believes. It might be the case that, other things being equal, a set of dishes that is indestructible in this world is greater than a set of dishes that is not indestructible in this world.
Is There a God?
But it is very hard to see how transworld indestructibility adds anything to the greatness of a set of dishes that is indestructible in this world. From our perspective, there is simply nothing to be gained by adding transworld indestructibility to a set of dishes that is actually indestructible. There is simply nothing that a set of dishes that is indestructible in every possible world can do in this world that can't be done by a set of dishes that is indestructible in this world but not in every other world. And the same seems to be true of God.
Suppose that an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent, eternal and hence, so to speak, indestructible , personal God exists in this world but not in some other worlds. It is very hard to make sense of the claim that such a God is deficient in some relevant respect. God's indestructibility in this world means that God exists eternally in all logically possible worlds that resemble this one in certain salient respects.
It is simply unclear how existence in these other worlds that bear no resemblance to this one would make God greater and hence more worthy of worship. From our perspective, necessary existence adds nothing in value to eternal existence. If this is correct, then Anselm's second version of the argument also fails. Even if, however, we assume that Anselm's second version of the argument can be defended against such objections, there is a further problem: Thus, the most important contemporary defender of the argument, Alvin Plantinga, complains "[a]t first sight, Anselm's argument is remarkably unconvincing if not downright irritating; it looks too much like a parlor puzzle or word magic.
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There have been several attempts to render the persuasive force of the ontological argument more transparent by recasting it using the logical structures of contemporary modal logic. One influential attempts to ground the ontological argument in the notion of God as an unlimited being. As Malcolm describes this idea:. God is usually conceived of as an unlimited being. He is conceived of as a being who could not be limited, that is, as an absolutely unlimited being.
In this conception it will not make sense to say that He depends on anything for coming into or continuing in existence. Nor, as Spinoza observed, will it make sense to say that something could prevent Him from existing. Lack of moisture can prevent trees from existing in a certain region of the earth. But it would be contrary to the concept of God as an unlimited being to suppose that anything … could prevent Him from existing. The unlimited character of God, then, entails that his existence is different from ours in this respect: Further, on Malcolm's view, the existence of an unlimited being is either logically necessary or logically impossible.
Here is his argument for this important claim.
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Either an unlimited being exists at world W or it doesn't exist at world W ; there are no other possibilities. If an unlimited being does not exist in W , then its nonexistence cannot be explained by reference to any causally contingent feature of W ; accordingly, there is no contingent feature of W that explains why that being doesn't exist. Now suppose, per reductio , an unlimited being exists in some other world W'.
If so, then it must be some contingent feature f of W' that explains why that being exists in that world. But this entails that the nonexistence of an unlimited being in W can be explained by the absence of f in W ; and this contradicts the claim that its nonexistence in W can't be explained by reference to any causally contingent feature. Thus, if God doesn't exist at W , then God doesn't exist in any logically possible world.
A very similar argument can be given for the claim that an unlimited being exists in every logically possible world if it exists in some possible world W ; the details are left for the interested reader. Since there are only two possibilities with respect to W and one entails the impossibility of an unlimited being and the other entails the necessity of an unlimited being, it follows that the existence of an unlimited being is either logically necessary or logically impossible.
All that is left, then, to complete Malcolm's elegant version of the proof is the premise that the existence of an unlimited being is not logically impossible - and this seems plausible enough. The existence of an unlimited being is logically impossible only if the concept of an unlimited being is self-contradictory. Since we have no reason, on Malcolm's view to think the existence of an unlimited being is self-contradictory, it follows that an unlimited being, i.
Here's the argument reduced to its basic elements:. Notice that Malcolm's version of the argument does not turn on the claim that necessary existence is a great-making property. Rather, as we saw above, Malcolm attempts to argue that there are only two possibilities with respect to the existence of an unlimited being: And notice that his argument does not turn in any way on characterizing the property necessary existence as making something that instantiates that property better than it would be without it.
Thus, Malcolm's version of the argument is not vulnerable to the criticisms of Anselm's claim that necessary existence is a perfection. But while Malcolm's version of the argument is, moreover, considerably easier to understand than Anselm's versions, it is also vulnerable to objection. In particular, Premise 2 is not obviously correct.
The claim that an unlimited being B exists at some world W clearly entails that B always exists at W that is, that B 's existence is eternal or everlasting in W , but this doesn't clearly entail that B necessarily exists that is, that B exists at every logically possible world. To defend this further claim, one needs to give an argument that the notion of a contingent eternal being is self-contradictory.
Similarly, the claim that an unlimited being B does not exist at W clearly entails that B never exists at W that is, that it is always true in W that B doesn't exist , but it doesn't clearly entail that B necessarily doesn't exist that is, B exists at no logically possible world or B 's existence is logically impossible. Indeed, there are plenty of beings that will probably never exist in this world that exist in other logically possible worlds, like unicorns.
For this reason, Premise 2 of Malcolm's version is questionable. Perhaps the most influential of contemporary modal arguments is Plantinga's version. Plantinga begins by defining two properties, the property of maximal greatness and the property of maximal excellence, as follows:.
Thus, maximal greatness entails existence in every possible world: Accordingly, the trick is to show that a maximally great being exists in some world W because it immediately follows from this claim that such a being exists in every world, including our own. But notice that the claim that a maximally great being exists in some world is logically equivalent to the claim that the concept of a maximally great being is not self-contradictory; for the only things that don't exist in any possible world are things that are conceptually defined in terms of contradictory properties.
There is no logically possible world in which a square circle exists given the relevant concepts because the property of being square is inconsistent with the property of being circular. Since, on Plantinga's view, the concept of a maximally great being is consistent and hence possibly instantiated, it follows that such a being, i. Here is a schematic representation of the argument:. It is sometimes objected that Plantinga's Premise 4 is an instance of a controversial general modal principle.
The S5 system of modal logic includes an axiom that looks suspiciously similar to Premise The intuition underlying AxS5 is, as James Sennett puts it, that "all propositions bear their modal status necessarily. To see that this criticism is unfounded, it suffices to make two observations. First, notice that the following propositions are not logically equivalent:. PL4 If "A maximally great being exists" is possible, then "A maximally great being exists" is necessarily true. Second, notice that the argument for Premise 4 does not make any reference to the claim that all propositions bear their modal status necessarily.
Plantinga simply builds necessary existence into the very notion of maximal greatness. Since, by definition, a being that is maximally great at W is omnipotent at every possible world and a being that does not exist at some world W' cannot be omnipotent at W' , it straightforwardly follows, without the help of anything like the controversial S5 axiom, that a maximally great being exists in every logically possible world. Indeed, it is for this very reason that Plantinga avoids the objection to Malcolm's argument that was considered above. Since the notion of maximal greatness, in contrast to the notion of an unlimited being as Malcolm defines it, is conceived in terms that straightforwardly entail existence in every logically possible world and hence eternal existence in every logically possible world , there are no worries about whether maximal greatness, in contrast to unlimitedness, entails something stronger than eternal existence.
As is readily evident, each version of the ontological argument rests on the assumption that the concept of God, as it is described in the argument, is self-consistent. Both versions of Anselm's argument rely on the claim that the idea of God that is, a being than which none greater can be conceived "exists as an idea in the understanding. But many philosophers are skeptical about the underlying assumption, as Leibniz describes it, "that this idea of the all-great or all-perfect being is possible and implies no contradiction. Let us suppose, e. Then there would be three possible beings, namely, one which combines X and Y , one which combines Y and Z , and one which combines Z and X , each of which would be such that nothing … superior to it is logically possible.
For the only kind of being which would be … superior to any of these would be one which had all three properties, X , Y , and Z ; and, by hypothesis, this combination is logically impossible. Thus, if there are two great-making characteristics essential to the classically theistic notion of an all-perfect God that are logically incompatible, it follows that this notion is incoherent. Here it is important to note that all versions of the ontological argument assume that God is simultaneously omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect.
As we have seen, Plantinga expressly defines maximal excellence in such terms. Though Anselm doesn't expressly address the issue, it is clear 1 that he is attempting to show the existence of the God of classical theism; and 2 that the great-making properties include those of omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection. There are a number of plausible arguments for thinking that even this restricted set of properties is logically inconsistent.
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For example, moral perfection is thought to entail being both perfectly merciful and perfectly just. But these two properties seem to contradict each other. To be perfectly just is always to give every person exactly what she deserves. But to be perfectly merciful is to give at least some persons less punishment than they deserve. If so, then a being cannot be perfectly just and perfectly merciful. Thus, if moral perfection entails, as seems reasonable, being perfectly just and merciful, then the concept of moral perfection is inconsistent.
The problem of divine foreknowledge can also be seen as denying that omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection constitute a coherent set. Roughly put, the problem of divine foreknowledge is as follows. If God is omniscient, then God knows what every person will do at every moment t.
To say that a person p has free will is to say that there is at least one moment t at which p does A but could have done other than A. But if a person p who does A at t has the ability to do other than A at t , then it follows that p has the ability to bring it about that an omniscient God has a false belief - and this is clearly impossible. On this line of analysis, then, it follows that it is logically impossible for a being to simultaneously instantiate omniscience and omnipotence.
Omnipotence entails the power to create free beings, but omniscience rules out the possibility that such beings exist. Thus, a being that is omniscient lacks the ability to create free beings and is hence not omnipotent. Conversely, a being that is omnipotent has the power to create free beings and hence does not know what such beings would do if they existed. Thus, the argument concludes that omniscience and omnipotence are logically incompatible.
If this is correct, then all versions of the ontological argument fail. Kenneth Einar Himma Email: Ontological Argument for God's Existence One of the most fascinating arguments for the existence of an all-perfect God is the ontological argument. Table of Contents Introduction: Is Existence a Perfection? The Non-Empirical Nature of the Ontological Arguments It is worth reflecting for a moment on what a remarkable and beautiful!
The Classic Version of the Ontological Argument a. The Argument Described St. Anselm , Archbishop of Cantebury , is the originator of the ontological argument, which he describes in the Proslogium as follows: The argument in this difficult passage can accurately be summarized in standard form: It is a conceptual truth or, so to speak, true by definition that God is a being than which none greater can be imagined that is, the greatest possible being that can be imagined.
God exists as an idea in the mind. A being that exists as an idea in the mind and in reality is, other things being equal, greater than a being that exists only as an idea in the mind. Thus, if God exists only as an idea in the mind, then we can imagine something that is greater than God that is, a greatest possible being that does exist.
But we cannot imagine something that is greater than God for it is a contradiction to suppose that we can imagine a being greater than the greatest possible being that can be imagined. Gaunilo's Criticism Gaunilo of Marmoutier, a monk and contemporary of Anselm's, is responsible for one of the most important criticisms of Anselm's argument. Gaunilo shared this worry, believing that one could use Anselm's argument to show the existence of all kinds of non-existent things: The counterexample can be expressed as follows: It is a conceptual truth that a piland is an island than which none greater can be imagined that is, the greatest possible island that can be imagined.
A piland exists as an idea in the mind. A piland that exists as an idea in the mind and in reality is greater than a piland that exists only as an idea in the mind. Thus, if a piland exists only as an idea in the mind, then we can imagine an island that is greater than a piland that is, a greatest possible island that does exist. But we cannot imagine an island that is greater than a piland.
Therefore, a piland exists. Broad puts this important point: Aquinas's Criticisms While St. As Kant puts the point: There is ample evidence of the belief and a good deal of evidence of humans attempting to provide support for that belief. The arguments or proofs that have been offered will be examined. The arguments each have their critics. None appear to be without weakness. The idea of god is one of the most fascinating ideas ever to be entertained by the mind of a human being. If there is no god then the idea of god remains as perhaps the single most important and powerful idea to have been created by the mind or minds of humans.
The idea provides a foundation for an entire perspective or way to view all of reality. The idea provides a basis for the moral foundation and the foundation for social life. The arguments offered to prove that such a being actually does exist are thus very important. The arguments have different forms and are based on different foundations. One of the most popular distinctions to make about the arguments and thus to divide them into groups is to note that there are different basis for the arguments. There are those based upon reason and those that rest on experience.
The principle arguments based upon reason are: Ontological argument - using reason alone and examining the very concept of god as a perfect being. Cosmological argument - considering the existence of the universe. Teleological argument - considering the apparent order of the universe. Those arguments to prove the existence of God based on experience are:. Revelation - humans experience the deity through an act of the deity in which the deity reveals itself. In this case the revelation is accomplished through teachings given to humans and recorded in some form of scripture or gathered into a book, a bible.
The contents of such collections are considered to contain direct instruction from the deity. Mystical Experience - an experience of union with the deity which is ineffable and noetic, a numinous experience- mystical consciousness of the "HOLY", infinite dependence , mystery, terror, bliss. The mystical experience is a particular variety of religious experience in which the subject is transformed and reports the loss of individuality, the oneness of all reality, union with the deity, the unity of the subject of the experience with the object of the experience.
The commonalities in such experience around the world is termed the consensus mysticum. It has been described by Rudolph Otto as involving an experience characterized as being tremendum et fascinans. Direct Religious Experience experience of a god or spirit or of the divine the absolute.