Change Management - Averting the Chaos (Lance Winslow Executive Series - Change Management)

Ulf invited me to be a consultant on a project he was conducting at the University of Uppsala on changes in Swedish life. His notion of asking a number of leading Swedish sociologists to write chapters on different aspects of everyday life struck me as a wonderful way to try to come to grips with social change. The book was eventually published as Sverige—Vardag och Struktur: I immediately saw the idea for an American book.

When I described Ulf's project to Naomi Schneider at the University of California Press, her first reaction was that they were unlikely to publish a book on Sweden. She has also been a first-rate editor. I am delighted to acknowledge my gratitude to her. It was Katherine Newman who first suggested that Herb Gans would be delighted to know about this book and could be encouraged to write a preface. My thanks to her for the suggestion and to Herb for carrying it out.

And, it goes without saying, I am grateful to all those who contributed chapters to the book, for, in nearly all cases, they not only wrote what I had hoped they would but they also read the work of others, provided suggestions, and participated actively in shaping the final form of the book. Even while recognizing how inappropriate it is to single one of them out for special mention, I feel I must acknowledge Judith Stacey's wise help as consultant and sounding-board. The contributors to the volume met twice while the project was underway, once on the West Coast and once on the East Coast.

I am grateful to both for their help in strengthening this volume. Thanks also to Dan Poor, who demonstrated superb administrative and intellectual skills in numerous ways. This book was edited during a year in which it was my wife's turn to write a book. I promised her that I would refrain from writing to give her more time. I said nothing about editing. I want to thank her for her encouragement and support during a time when she was wrestling with conundrums of her own.

And the kids were terrific. Although I have not contributed a chapter to this book, I have been involved in it nearly from the start, albeit marginally, and am therefore not the stranger who is invited to write the foreword once a book is finished. I participated in this venture principally because its purpose—to produce an empirically reasonable but also evaluative portrait of some of America toward the end of the twentieth century—is vitally important. No one can picture all of America in a single book, but the editor and the authors have covered an amazingly wide area, from the family, community, and workplace as well as the political, educational, health, leisure and other major institutions central to everyday life, all the way to the world economy—without which neither America's institutions nor everyday life can be understood anymore.

Trying to make sense of America is, and ought to be, a never-ending process, which I think can best be done by sociologists and social or cultural anthropologists, or by like-minded members of other disciplines. Journalists are also trying to make sense of America, to be sure, but unlike sociologists, who look for recurring patterns and their contexts, journalists usually have to focus on the atypical and deviant. For example, as I write this their picture of America stars street-, Wall Street-, and inside-the-Beltway criminals and features the underclass, yuppies, and the allegedly indifferent and confused generation now in its twenties, or what the Washington Post has called the "doofus generation.

This book is also important because many of its chapters are based on data gathered with "ethnographic" methods. Once a word used solely by anthropologists to describe their research method for studying small preindustrial cultures, ethnography is now becoming an umbrella term to cover fieldwork, participant-observation, and informal interviewing.

To me, it means being with and talking to people, especially those whose. This method, which I consider the most scientific for understanding social life, has been used in sociology nearly since its beginning, but in the last half century or so the discipline has been overwhelmed by quantitative researchers, who rarely talk to people or do so only to count and correlate them.

Quantitative sociologists learn something about America, too, but they are forever limited by their methods and the numbers available to them. The book is noteworthy as well because it is sociology and social anthropology sans jargon, written for the general reader as well as the specialist. It is an example of what sociology should be most of the time except when it has to be written solely for the specialist , and one way in which sociology can discharge its public responsibilities.

Finally, I think the book is important because it deals not only with America toward the end of the twentieth century but also with social change. As such, it raises or revives some questions about the study of social change that go beyond the book itself, but that make it particularly stimulating reading. These questions take off from editor Alan Wolfe's description of the authors as a third generation of post—World War II sociologists, and of me, by implication, as a member of the first generation, since I was trained right after the end of that war.

However, I studied sociology at the University of Chicago in the late s, when it was the center and virtually the sole practitioner of ethnographic research—and, incidentally, of a reflexive kind that is now, like almost everything else, called postmodern. Consequently, I am not very different in background from many of the contributors to this book, except in age, and my questions are therefore mainly temporal. Since studying a whole society, especially a continent-sized and highly diverse one like America, is immensely difficult, researchers have had to make a number of limiting assumptions, one of which is usually chronological.

This is a perfectly reasonable way of studying social change, but one question it raises is why sociologists are joining journalists in looking at social change by decades, even though decades do not seem to make major differences in how institutions work or people behave. This question is especially relevant now that the end of a millennium is near, when all kinds of people will make all kinds of observations, most of them likely to be proven wrong, about the changes that will take place because an old millennium is ending and a new one is beginning.

Still, whether and how perceptions of the new millennium will affect social life is a relevant research topic when the time comes, and therefore a possible chapter topic for a future edition of this book. Whether the past was better than the present has always been a fascinating issue, because all periods are good old days for some but not for others, which evokes the question of which past periods are good for whom and why. We all remember specific social and economic phenomena that were central to our lives, and while most white Americans may remember the s as what is now described as the era of postwar affluence, poor whites, blacks, and other racial minorities surely feel differently.

Obviously, even nonpoor whites will not be unanimous about the s, if only because different populations have different collective memories of every decade, assuming they can structure their memory by decades. I wonder for whom the s were dominated by dark days, and assume that the victims of the McCarthy witchhunts and the Korean War were in that category.

In any case, what people, even sociologists, remember from the past, is a social construction of the present, which must be studied alongside that present. Another question the book raises for me has to do with the speed of change. While comparisons with the past make the present, and change sui generis, come alive in print, in the so-called real world of the people whom sociologists study, change is often gradual. In fact, most people are less likely to see change than the consequences, good or bad, of change: Even sociologists do not always see change as easily as they write about it. Many new social phenomena have to grow for a while before they become sufficiently widespread and anchored to become visible—and to be trusted as raw material for generalizations about change.

Furthermore, reading these chapters made me wonder whether the age of the researcher could affect how he or she constructs descriptions of various social changes. Perhaps some of the changes emphasized in. For example, the corporate speculation and greed that marked the s may look very different to a young researcher than say, to a very old one who recalls the speculation and scandals that preceded the Great Depression in the late s, or to a historian specializing in the late nineteenth century, when the original robber barons still stalked the earth.

Likewise, the negative political advertising in recent elections appears fairly tame although still abhorrent to this writer, who grew up in Chicago in the s when the Democratic machine of Edward Kelly and later Richard Daley used dirty tricks which no politician today could get away with. But those political tricks were tame when compared with some of the negative political advertising in nineteenth-century America. Curiously enough, in some respects the greatest changes since the s, and earlier, have taken place in America's self-knowledge—thanks to the increase in the number of years of schooling, the expansion of feature and analytic journalism, the growth of interest in history and even the more modest growth of sociology.

For example, in , the American Sociological Association had members, virtually all invisible to the general public, whereas in it had nearly 13, As a result, the sociologists who wrote this book know far more about America's institutions and America than my colleagues and I did in the s. Consequently, I wonder whether contemporary sociologists—of any era—see their era's complexity and assume the past to have been simpler and more integrated, without taking into account that what is known about the past—any past—is always simpler than what is known about the present.

This leads also to the questions Alan Wolfe raises in the last chapter about today's lack of integration and consensus, which he calls decentering, as well as the search for various kinds of recentering. These questions are significant in part because they address old issues about the need for community in new ways and from a different angle. So far, however, not much research has been done to determine how much of what kinds of integration or consensus people want and how much they and society need to function.

Furthermore, politicians and other organizational leaders often call for integration and consensus but do so largely to create or obtain support for their own policies. I think, for example, that the White House has worked hard for a number of years and over several administrations at its own kind of recentering project: Whether it should succeed is even more important to debate, however.

Indeed, I am nervous about the general notion of society having a center, whether that center is conceptual, symbolic, or instrumental. Even if the sole purpose of the center is to help social integration, a societal center of any kind, and perhaps the metaphor itself, always seems to carry with it inegalitarian consequences for those who are not at, or associated with, the center.

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Whether the center is the carrier and protector of the society's dominant values, or of its sacred symbols and institutions, or of the economic core, those at the periphery are usually treated as being of a lower status or otherwise inferior. Consequently, I would suggest that, paraphrasing Bertolt Brecht, blessed is the society that needs no center! Someone who visited the United States in the first decade after World War II and then came back in the last decade of the twentieth century would have seen two entirely different countries.

No wonder so many Americans, politicians as well as ordinary citizens, seem bewildered by what is emerging around them. The transition to a new century marks the culmination of a major generational shift in the American social, economic, and political landscape. To the degree that any order can be imposed on a society as diverse as that of the United States, there did emerge, after the twin traumas of the Great Depression and World War II, patterns of social life that many would, with some mistaken nostalgia, later come to call "normal.

Obviously there were dissenters, first on the right during the McCarthy period, and later, in the s, on the left. Ultimately, moreover, the dissenters would make their critiques stick, and both political parties would be reshaped by them. Nonetheless a significant number of Americans came to believe that the America of the late. The election of conservative presidents, however, is a symptom of, not a solution to, radical change in the society. Despite efforts to punish flag-burning, to go back to basics in education, or to reverse gains won by racial minorities, a world in which people "know their place" simply cannot be brought back into existence.

The twenty-five-year period between the end of World War II and the end of the s will surely come to be viewed by future historians as the exception, not the rule. An affluent society in which families were supported by the husband's income and in which ever-increasing economic growth seemed to offer the solution to any problems—private or public, domestic or foreign—that might appear, no longer accords with reality, no matter how many people wish it would. Conservatism is helpless in the face of that fact, not only because talk of order at the top is a frustrated reaction to disorder at the bottom, but also because the particular conservatism that came to power in America in the s was also powered by a vision of change.

There is no party of order in America. Although politicians like to give the impression that they are in control of events, it seems clear that events are in control of them. No one planned an outcome in which children born in the s would face a radically different set of life choices than those born in the s. That contemporary family life would take on a completely different coloration from what some had proclaimed as the "natural" nuclear family of the television sit-com was as much a surprise as the decline of American power in the world, let alone the arrival on these shores of a new generation of immigrants from parts of the world that Americans—never the strongest in geography—had previously known little about.

The changes that have affected the United States over the past four decades are taking place behind our backs, appearing with their results already in place before we even have a chance to register that something has been going on. Because the reshaping of the contours of American life is not the product of any particular political agenda, or even the result of any social planner's vision, its consequences are that much more likely to be unsettling.

Caught between expectations formed in an earlier period and the realities of new political and economic forces, Americans are unsure how to respond, sometimes giving vent to populist anger, sometimes retreating into private life, at still other times voting for the most conservative candidates they can find. It is time to begin to take stock of what has been happening in this country since the days when people thought they knew what was normal. This book is an effort to do so, not so much by.

Every contributor to this book save one is a sociologist, and the one who is not is a social anthropologist. The assumption that guides our efforts is that changes of great magnitude and rapidity can only be grasped by understanding how those affected by such changes perceive them. The authors were charged to go out and listen.

The chapters that follow are their reports of what they heard. Before turning to concrete studies of how people understand their families, communities, jobs, and social institutions in a time of transition, it is worthwhile to try to set the scene by cataloging the changes that have made American society so unsettled. There are, after all, large forces at work, and their impact on people's lives will be significant.

Any attempt to catalog such forces is bound to be somewhat selective; here, nonetheless, is mine. Population shifts have produced a new demographic profile of the country. Newer regions of the United States, such as the South and West, have achieved economic and political prominence over the older cities of the Eastern Seaboard and Midwest.

Some Brooklynites know exactly the day when America changed for good—and for the worst. Moreover immigration, especially from Latin America and Asia, has also changed the literal image of what it means to be an American. Now the world, perhaps tired of waiting, has decided to engage itself in the affairs of the United States. Concomitant with demographic changes are political ones. The New Deal coalition, linking working-class and ethnic votes in the North with the solid South, can no longer automatically win presidential elections. Indeed, the important point may be that it is not the content of politics that has shifted so rapidly, but more the form, as expensive campaigns, media simplifications, and "sound bite" politics dominate the campaign strategies of both parties.

No longer are the fundamental values and culture of the society shaped by a Yankee consciousness inherited from Great Britain. A book like The Lonely Crowd , with its Weber-inspired discussion of inner-. A Protestant ethic stressing thrift, honesty, hard work, sacrifice, and community service has less currency for a country that, with each passing year, is decreasingly Protestant. While some segments of America have become "more" religious, as witnessed by the rise of fundamentalism in many forms, others have become "less" so that preachers, academics, and others charge that hedonistic utilitarianism has become America's only compelling source of ethical values.

Both upward and downward mobility seem to have increased, at least in the consciousness of most Americans. On the one hand, energy crises and inflation have raised the specter of a world without endless growth, transforming middle-classness from a "natural" condition to a matter of positional struggle. A once-existing link between status and wealth seems broken: Conditions at work have been almost completely transformed.

In part this is due to radical changes in the nature of American industrial relations, such as the decline of large manufacturing firms, the reorganization of industries, and the rise of such financing techniques as leveraged buy-outs. The stereotypical situation twenty-five years ago was one in which trade-union-conscious men left each morning for high-paying factory jobs while their wives stayed home and raised the children.

Now the men no longer belong to a union, no longer work in factories, and no longer receive high pay, while their wives, who also work probably in the service sector , earn enough to bring the family income barely up to what it was, in real dollars, a quarter century ago. America's "working man" is no longer necessarily a man. When union density was high, worker solidarity strong or at least stronger than now , and competition held at bay through monopolies and protectionism, the world of work could to some degree be shielded from the rest of society.

The reality of two-career families has changed both family ideology and family practice since the s. For some writers such changes signify family decline, while for others they represent new possibilities for the empowerment of women. Children have become contested terrain as well. On the one hand, as part of the nostalgia characteristic of the s, we seem to want to reassert the innocence of childhood. Meanwhile, young people themselves go their own way, as, of course, they always have, developing their own subcultures, markets, institutions, and rituals. Nonetheless, at least at the level of public policy, Americans seem surprised that new generations of children somehow keep making their appearance in the world.

Housing for most families has also changed radically. There may have been no more important piece of domestic legislation in postwar America than the Housing Act of , which symbolically linked home ownership with democratic ideology. Now there are more renters, more homeless, more foreclosures, more young people unable to accumulate a down payment, and more speculative profits for some.

No one knows what the future implications of these changes will be; markets have their downswings as well as their upswings, and a very recent crisis in real estate has begun to make homes affordable once more. Yet a house in America has never been merely an investment but, instead, the center of a richly textured symbolic world. Housing is just one factor in a transformation of the American economy and its relationship to the world economy. Most Americans now understand that these two economies are no longer synonymous, which forces them to confront unprecedented questions, such as whether local communities should welcome foreign investment, put controls on growth, or attempt to regulate the quality of life in their regions.

When American-based corporations are multinational while foreign-based corporations create jobs for Americans, whose economic success should Americans be cheering? The experience of the state of New Jersey—which, in its efforts to supply its troopers with cars made in America, had to reject Fords only to accept Volkswagens—will become increasingly common. Just as Europe is increasingly being integrated economically and politically, the United States may be breaking into two economies: It is a sign of the times that neither political party can tell which economy is preferable.

Americans are in a postimperial mood, without ever quite having admitted to themselves that they have given up the empire. All this changed, and rather dramatically, with the American victory over Iraq in , yet the consequences over the long run may not be that great. To be sure the victory over Iraq was in part the result of stunning diplomacy, especially the ability to keep the allied forces together despite repeated attempts to split them. And it clearly represented an overcoming of the "Vietnam syndrome," putting to rest the notion that Americans had become reluctant to use military power.

In the short run, the war in the Middle East would seem to suggest a turn back toward globalism. Yet the very success of the Bush administration in Iraq may also wind up contributing to an American withdrawal from the world. The war in some ways solidified the uniquely American belief that it is possible to obtain diplomatic objectives through violence without substantial loss of life. The brilliance of the diplomacy was matched by a lack of political objectives, not only for the Middle East but also for America's role in the post—Cold War world. As America approaches century's end, there is a clear sense that a new world order is necessary, but the fact that the first step in the new world order was the deployment of massive firepower reminiscent of the old world order does not suggest new breakthroughs.

Whatever else happens in world politics—a topic far too broad to be broached here—there is little question that, despite the victory in Iraq, Americans will be living with foreign policy uncertainty for some time. It is possible to debate whether Americans have or have not withdrawn their attention from the world, but on the question of whether they have withdrawn their attention from social problems at home, there can be no dispute: The notion that a national problem can be identified, that funds can be mobilized to address it, and that a solution for the problem would be available—the atmosphere characteristic of the Kennedy-Johnson years—no longer exists in American domestic life.

This change is deeper than a shift from reform to conservatism, from Democrats to Republicans. It represents a retreat from a spirit of can-do optimism that has characterized American life since the early nineteenth century. On the one hand, crack cocaine, AIDS, and homelessness seem to present problems of such depth and social cost as to be beyond anything ever experienced in American memory.

On the other hand, the willingness to tackle such problems—indeed, any problems—is hamstrung by a reluctance to raise taxes that would make policies possible. To the degree that these concerns overlap with race, and they do in public perception, if not always in reality, they point to a mood that has emerged among some Americans that raises questions about whether racial harmony is possible in the United States at all, and, consequently, whether it remains possible to speak of one American experience.

It is often the case that social change and technological change do not necessarily reinforce each other. The "traditional" American family and suburban home, for example, were reinforced at a time when quite untraditional new technologies, such as television and modern appliances, were altering how Americans used their time. Cottage industries are therefore returning, as highway congestion makes going to work increasingly unthinkable.

Flexible working patterns, in turn, will have consequences for families and communities. Between them, new technologies and new patterns of allocating time will combine to change how people work, how they spend their leisure time, and how they travel from one to the other.

In the absence of traditional understandings of community, Americans are creating new experiments with subcommunities. The elderly, living longer than ever before, symbolize this development, concentrating, if they have the means, in specific regions and supporting specific industries that cater to their needs. The protection of the local environment against change is the theme of political and social movements often characterized as NIMBY "not in my backyard" groups. Some new communities regulate the architectural details of the homes within them down to the color and shape of doors.

Other communities have become adept at protesting the encroachment of undesirable change. The tremendous diversity of America at the national level, it would seem, is being matched by an emphasis, often futile, on homogeneity at the local level. In part because they live and act in new ways, Americans are no longer sure how to represent reality to themselves, let alone to others. For the first time in our history, the media have become nationalized, creating the possibility of a richer national community. But with the success of chain bookstores, national newspapers, and twenty-four-hour-a-day cable news has also come a "thinning" of the reality that is represented, as if Americans had more and more information and less and less understanding.

The general pattern seems to be one characterized by an explosion of the outlets that make communication possible combined with an increasing inability to find much that is original and interesting to communicate. One can now watch the same news program anywhere in the United States—indeed, anywhere in the world—and yet still not have the context and historical understanding to make sense of the events being reported.

How Americans understand their relationships to each other has been changing as well. Although they like to think of themselves as neighborly, Americans increasingly resort to ways of resolving their disputes with each other that are more formal than a chat over a fence. The increasing litigiousness of American society, the new role of insurance companies as makers of public policy, the formalization of trust, the increasing use of binding arbitration, the rise and now fall of an interventionist judiciary, the increasing privatization of government services all represent steps away from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft.

Yet it would be foolish to lament these changes: Even as they wax nostalgic for a world they believe to be lost, Americans take steps to ensure their rights, realize their self-interests, and protect themselves against what they perceive to be the intrusive claims of community. The net result is a change in the texture of everyday life, one bound to be felt at places as diverse as the physician's waiting room, the court room, the local prison, and the suburban shopping mall.

No one, in a sense, seems to obey the rules any more. This is not meant to be part of a conservative lament that always accompanies social. It is as if the United States is caught between two moral codes, one of which no longer applies and the other of which has not yet been developed. Although they are not among the most important of American institutions, the social sciences have also been caught up in transformations that question their very existence.

There are prominent exceptions—I hope this book demonstrates that—but most work in social science seems increasingly unable to deal with changing economic, social, and political realities. The premise that the social sciences could be modeled on the value-free nature of the physical sciences has been undermined by an epistemological revolution in the "hard" sciences themselves. No longer is it possible to believe in the liberal optimism that led social scientists to accumulate inventories of findings about human behavior, in the belief that this would make for a better society.

Yet unsure of how to respond to its own crisis of meaning, the social sciences either retreat into an ever-greater empiricism or develop models of rational choice or refinements of structuralism that explain everything except how real people act. The crisis of meaning in American society exists as well among those who make the study of meaning their business.

We are, it seems, no longer the society we once were, but neither are we the society we had hoped to be. As we approach century's end, something new is emerging, helter-skelter, in our midst that bears little resemblance to any existing political, theological, or sociological model of how the world is supposed to work. These emerging patterns may constitute the prelude to a new order that we will eventually come to view as normal or it may be a period of disorder that will usher in ever greater disorder; at this point, no one knows. But if we cannot know where these changes will take us, we can at least take pictures of American life in transition.

Sociology, with its focus on real people living real lives, ought to make it possible to do so. The assumption that links the chapters of this book is that a sociological approach to American society offers a way to get a grip on a process that is undergoing rapid change. But what kind of sociological approach should it be?

When America was understood to be stable, the sociological study of America was also relatively straightforward. The s were not only self-proclaimed "golden years" for such cherished—if both short-. In textbooks dealing with American society at that time, chapters seem to write themselves: At the present time, by contrast, it would be nearly impossible to imagine any one sociologist or journalist capable of analyzing all the many ways in which American society has been transformed.

That is why I wanted to edit this book rather than write it myself. To capture the fluidity of American society in recent years, it seemed preferable to have many authors, diverse points of view, multiple methodologies, and tentative conclusions. There was a time when sociologists believed that if we did not know it all, we at least knew most of it. It would hardly do to go to the opposite extreme, as some postmodernists do, and argue that we do not, and cannot, know anything—that there is no reality out there for social science to represent. It is enough to suggest that the realities of American life are far more complex than we once imagined and to be as humble in assuming that we have discovered the truth of those realities as we are aggressive in using our tools to discover what the truth, or truths, may be.

The transformations in American society described in this book, therefore, invoke what could be called a "third generation" of sociologists. The first generation of postwar sociologists, under the influence of Talcott Parsons, tended to stress the stability of American institutions and their contribution to the overall functioning of the society.

Institutions were then seen as oppressive, their replacement by newer forms necessary as a first step toward greater liberation. They are, simply put, understood as interesting, as changing, as constantly running away from the analytic models we develop to understand them. The third generation of sociologists can be called "the new institutionalists," after the movement in economics of the s and s that wanted to look behind abstractions at the realities of economic activity in the real world.

Clearly because of the changes taking place in American. In political science, Johan Olson and James March have called for an explicit return to the focus on institutions that characterized the study of public administration a generation ago. Not surprisingly, this concern with institutions has also affected sociology: Besides the contributors to this book, one can point to a broad group of sociological investigators looking, nontechnically, at the institutions of American society with a curious eye.

What these scholars have in common is not age—though most, but not all, of the contributors to this book were born between and —but three other commitments. First, neo-institutionalism shows respect for the nitty-gritty empirical realities of social life. All these sociologists are in touch with the lived reality of America.

They are neither, to use C. Wright Mills's famous terms, abstract empiricists nor grand theorists. Ethnographic approaches, to be sure, predominate, because ethnography—with its emphasis on understanding how people themselves understand the world around them—is the unique contribution that sociology and anthropology can give to the world. But there is an important place for other forms of empirical investigation as well. Much of the new institutional scholarship, for example, is inspired by historical methods, which provide a way to get a grounding in the lived realities of institutions and how they change.

Others are not averse to statistics;. Second, each of these writers shows open-mindedness toward political issues. While each of them has taken strong positions on issues involving class, race, and gender, there is a lack of dogmatism of any form in their work, an appreciation of the unexpected. Again, to be sure, this pluralism has its bias: But each author was charged to let the data speak.

Not all of them found what their political perspectives suggested they ought to find. But although only the privileged in history got an education almost every child got to be taught one or more specific skills as was needed in the group or society such as the specifics of a life as a fisherman, farmer, carpenter, warrior etc. Although many mammals live in a family small subgroup the Human form of family life differs in many aspects: The rearing of children takes much longer, in pre-historic times probably around 10 years and in more modern times this has even increased to around 18 years or more whereas the rearing of whales, elephants or chimpanzees takes a maximum of around 5 years.

And so taking care of the elderly only became the norm when the Agricultural revolution happened some 10 kya. Early Human family life revolves around some 'property': And even though this is seen with certain mammals as well: So animals do not have social 'super' structures in which the family structure is embedded. Within the human family there is some kind of work division between males and females with males usually doing the work that requires more physical strength and the females doing the work that is necessary for rearing the children, preparing the meals and keeping the 'property'.

And within the Anatomically Modern Human family there is some kind of meal ritual: However since Homo Sapiens and most of its predecessors with their 2D: But it is quite clear that the family structure was typically embedded in a social superstructure with several layers: This goes even on beyond the community with the mega-band of around people up to the tribe of a size of around people, i.

Here we can see Human Behavioral evolution at work in that the 'constant' social superstructures became ever larger over the course of pre- history: So over the course of AMH evolution ever more layers have been put on top of the basic layers: And what we also see is that over the course of pre- history a Theme does change: So sub Themes can be very resilient. But for many people the basic social superstructures still prevails and so they choose to live culturally nearby from where they grew up. So this Theme is still 'alive' but apparantly less 'kicking'.

In their most basic form power structures constitute a kind of triangle see fig. At the next corner of the Power Triangle we find structure no. However in their book: Pygmies San in Africa. Flannery and Marcus also explain that this No-formal or equality power system evolved from our ape ancestors power structure with one alpha s , several betas and the rest gammas or followers in a group. Whereby with Homo this system evolved into one or more supernatural alphas God or Gods , several dead ancestors: However when more abundant food supplies became available hunter-gatherer groups usually created some inequality as e.

Therefore the rights and duties in an extended family or clan in hunter-gatherer societies were more or less evenly spread among its members. Men and women had different tasks and youngsters had other duties than grown-ups but no living man or woman was subservient to any other and e. And the fact that the couple is allowed to make this decision shows equality between the members and couples of group or clan.

Cosmology or Belief Cosmologies are - as far as we know - a solely Human phenomenon. Belief in a Cosmology could have come from our ape ancestors which like modern primates must have lived in groups with one alpha male, several beta's and the rest gamma's or followers. And although members of the group 'working' in Belief were not directly productive, all groups - however small - seem to have had such a function and if barely possible this function was full time. At this moment in time: Later on I will speak of Religion.

But more simple explanations have been suggested. And people who could convince others of the 'correctness' of the group's Belief and make them behave in certain ways became the first religious dignitaries, i. However shamanic practices must have existed all over the World as we can see e. However as time passed and Humans spread out Beliefs became more diverse although basic characteristics must have stayed the same such as the burial of the dead.

The strong identification of people with Belief as an important characteristic of a group made it a perfect vehicle to enlarge groups by this theme. And Christianity stayed violent even among itself and certainly towards other religions until its supremacy in the West was very obvious. However this can change when its position again becomes threatened by e. Even the current spade of violence caused by some followers of Islam can be seen in that perspective.

Belief was and Religion is never the only Theme onto which a group is formed but almost always it is part of its basic social structure probably because it differentiates, especially through rituals, clothes, food etc. Value of an individual Life. The first Human groups - one or more families without a real leader or 'Big Man' - valued an individual life if one was a member of that group or family. And even if members of other groups or families settled in a group their life usually was not under threat since their presence would improve the new groups chances of survival and certainly would increase the gene pool.

As Human groups became larger i. These social structures created a bond beyond the extended family and thereby facilitated the use of family and extended family behaviors to larger groups. In that story one of the many concubines of the King is killed simply to teach spectators discipline. So at the time the right to life concubine and the right to take life emperor was very unevenly distributed in the Chinese society. From these short stories we can deduce that the "right" to kill must have been restricted early in Human existence to members of other groups and then probably only in times of war.

This because indiscriminate killing is an immediate threat to the continued existence of the group s and mankind itself. With animals this is quite different since larger than 'one family' animal groups do not have much of a social superstructure. But the balance is delicate because under what circumstances is saving your own skin in fact murder or when is a war between groups in fact just the result of a personal fight between their leaders or other esteemed group members. A fight between "kings" or rulers is - almost automatically - a war between their groups. And creating an idea which attracts followers to create a sub group could quickly turn into a fight over almost anything and - more or less - 'legitimizes' the killing of members of the other group.

This is only explained by the fact that these examples united the group in which these acts occurred and helped the group in its struggle for survival as a large r group. The development of the 'Value of Life' from the early days with implicit rules, through explicit rules to a formal system of laws took many forms and the full length of Human evolution and is even today still going on within democracies such as the USA or more centralized societies as the PRC Peoples Republic of China.

And quite often a group or society has a relapse especially in times of civil war, e. Another aspect or subTheme in this Theme is slavery. In all historic accounts we find references to slaves, i. Human beings whose life did not have the same value as that of the citizen of the society who held them against their will. And even though this subTheme was officially ended in the 18th and 19th century in the West and the slave trade had been forbidden in China as early as the 9th century CE, economic slavery still exists today in e.

India, the USA or even the Netherlands. However one can state that a society which has abolished slavery and encoded heavy punishments in its legal system if one practices slavery is probably better off than a society who does not do much against it. So the Basic Theme: The often said most distinguishable Human trait: Whereas clothes are a unique Human phenomenon since even early Human societies in equatorial areas used some form of 'clothes' to distinguish between groups and sexes.

Ergaster - and cooking - with H. And with farming and war more advanced tools and weapons were developed and when metals were discovered the scene changed even more as a multitude of reproducible tools and weapons became available, e. So even though this Theme had a very big change in the next step in Human Behavior: Next Level Themes see 5. The change from stone tools to bronze and later copper tools created another force to form larger groups - main issue in Next Level Themes - since in smaller groups the division of work could not be as specific as in larger groups.

These latter groups thereby became stronger in number and in capabilities which multiplied the advantage over an opponent group. Especially the bigger villages or 'cities' had the advantage of having many different 'specialist' living together on a relative small area which induced a faster development of new ideas or 'flow of ideas'. In Alex Pentland words: The enlargement of groups in cities and elsewhere also stimulated the development of a more complex social structure with different rights and individual power, see e.

A possible explanation is that music is a social activity which replaces the 'grooming' found in primates. This grooming releases endorphines which helps to cope with the extra stress caused by the larger groups we live in. And community singing or making music apparently does the same: However since singing requires language which probably only started with the advent of H. Art - the creation of something without direct use - however, is probably younger than music. Only superfluous 'tools' like 'beautiful' hand axes could be older since H. Erectus or even H. In some paintings already the use of abstract symbols like squares or circles can be found and it is apparent that one, two or more abstract symbols, pictures of humans or animals means one, two and then more than two or many.

So we have the born ability to count and can improve that ability manyfold by learning. And - for certain - symbols were used to express religious ideas or power. These Next Level Themes were not thought out first and then implemented but developed in small steps and passed on from one generation to the next because their use put these groups in a noticeable advantage over other groups. The Next level Themes are: That this is still advantageous to the evolution of a species can be understood from the fact that a larger gene pool creates exponential gene variations which creates much more chances for survival of the fittest.

The larger the settled group the better the deterrent but this created the problem that the surrounding area could not support this settled group with just foraging and hunting unless its yield could be dramatically increased. The agricultural development did not come easily and required special races of fruits and e. So some say that plants like wheat were evolutionary extremely successful in domesticating humans and that the Neolithic period was not at all for the benefit of the individual H.

Domestication and herding follow quite simply from hunting but what food do you give domesticated animals like goats, sheep, pigs or cows when you want them in easily protected surroundings. So most probably the development came in small steps: This latter sequence is also supported by e.

This whole process must have been going on for thousands of years in different parts of the globe - as can be deduced from the first Neolithic developments some This enabled the development of larger settlements such as e. That this comparison between ancient Egypt and Middle American pre Columbian Societies not only holds for fertile lands and the development of Agriculture but also for conquering behavior in warfare and 'writing' is neatly shown by a comparison between the Iconography of the Narmer Palette Egypt c.

This is remarkable and shows in my opinion that the evolution of Human Group Behavior has to follow certain paths. But these paths are not irreversible a. From the above description it is clear that agriculture requires control over the land which is needed to feed the group or tribe and although the area could be much smaller as compared to the hunter-gatherer lifestyle the control must be much stronger in order to reap the benefits from earlier efforts -i.

So land had to be identified as to belong to a certain group or tribe and defended against raids by members of other groups who did not help in growing the produce or raising of the animal stocks. This demanded a central control, i. Power distribution and individual rights and duties see N3 which made Law, Economics and Taxation see N6. So the step to agriculture caused a totally different behavior and therefore the afore mentioned sub Themes -and others- had to be developed.

Religion and the History of Violence, Karen Armstrong, 5. Furthermore the combined knowledge of the group could be used to learn much more about certain aspects of life such as plants with nutritious value or healing properties because the level of existence rose above the continuous daily struggle to find food. This made a further division of labor possible whereby the disabled or elderly could be of value. One of the functions the physically less fit could perform was dealing with Belief Basic Theme.

In addition to their basic function these individuals had an interest and had the time to learn and teach a thing or two about 'medicine'. He argues that the people who built this temple needed agriculture to feed the number of people worshipping at the same time. So the idea that temples came first and large groups or clans celebrating at a temple required agriculture to feed the large gatherings is a very logical evolutionary path through which agriculture probably was developed.

So Animism was replaced by Polytheism: However to appease the gods offerings had to be given and it must have dawned upon some priests that certain plants helped the gods - and the ailments of the domesticated animals or plants - much more than certain rites. Power distribution and individual rights and duties This theme: During this era structure no. And although some people claim that pre-historic or Ice-Age Man lived in 'clans' small groups larger than the extended family that had no real inequality structure no.

And even though power structure no. What parameters did away with power structure no. They did this by claiming to have special knowledge from the alphas Gods or betas ancestors. This was a definitive break from the hunter-gatherer rule that individuals should share excess food and other excess resources generally as an insurance against bad times but also as a way to re- establish the bonds between the members of a clan.

However on the one hand with growing populations there simply were too many clansmen to share 'your' gains or products with and farming and herding on the other hand demand a certain reserve or stock to survive until the next crop or slaughter for seeds and some animals for breeding. So property rights and rules for the possession of products were developed which then demanded disputes over these possessions to be solved. For instance in famous Rulers such as: Once a family head was an established phenomenon it became necessary to rank these family heads among each other within a clan which introduced the idea of prestige and so a clan-Ruler or alpha was created who then wanted to distinguish himself against other clan-Rulers by 'expensive' power artifacts and he had to distinguish and to defend himself against internal rivalry from other family-heads betas by e.

What parameters decided which power structure no. Please note that the difference between power structure no. No formal power and power structure no. Power Sharing is subtle but significant. So Rulers had to defend their position against rivals but - at first - against reactionaries who wanted less power for the rulers power structure no. And to win people over for one model or the other almost anything was and still is used to trigger one of the basic emotions: So Alexander was lucky -as the Archemedeans before him- that at that time in history he created and used a relatively small evolutionary advantage: Socialism, Capitalism or Nationalism.

And although his view is a bit bleak Hobsbawn has a point that the notion of larger and larger group structures is apparently not easily realizable not even with the skillful or brutal use of basic emotions but nonetheless very many societal forms were tried over the course of history with the ultimate forms so far in Socialism, Capitalism and Nationalism.

He started several campaigns like 'The Flowers' Campaign to identify his opponents, 'The great Leap Forward' to show his idiotic power which led to unimaginable societal problems like famines etc. Literature examples, Medea, Hecabe, Electra and e. In this play love, jealousy and treason are magnificently exposed as main drivers for human behavior. So in Europe for two millennia or some 80 generations: This would have decreased the Change in Environment: CE and thereby the Speed of Evolution: SE because the number people per generation sits in the denominator.

As a result SE increases as the number of people in a group or society increases. In other parts of the World than Europe the same trend: This will be elaborated upon in the next chapters. In a basic group extended family a member has the right to life and the right to food and has the duty to defend the group. But as the group size increases the rights of a person increases such as e.

When a society made the transition from patrimonialism to impersonal 'shared Power' it formed so called basic institutions: However these institutions and changes therein are the result of social changes in a society, i. Shapur Shahbazi, 3rd Ed. And although some people place the development of something like 'Division of Labor' in the Basic Themes Era I see this Theme more narrowed down to 'special jobs' like pottery or baker. And evidence suggests that groups of Homo Erectus were already structured with some special functions. So we agree upon the importance of Division of Labor but not on its exact definition.

In addition Raoul Naroll showed that special functions: However more likely not earlier then shortly before the start of the Neolithic. With the development of these labor functions the further cultural need arose to develop even more specializations. And other functions included: This becomes clear from the change from the Stone Age into the Bronze Age - some years ago - and Iron Age - some to years ago - when much better tools and weapons were developed.

The first places where people lived together were -of course- camp sites. They held around 50 people - to protect against predators but especially raids by other human groups - and were already embedded in several layers of social superstructures, i. However these structures lived over a spread out area with no clear recognizable common buildings or defense hardware like walls. Only when clans, then mega-bands and then tribes started to build common 'buildings' - probably first with some belief or religious function - the step towards cities had been made.

And genetically it is clear that the downsides of living in a city: This balance was very delicate and certainly not static as can be read in the oldest epic: So like in animal or plant evolution a relative balance in one era compare with an eco-system was no guarantee for the next era major change in the eco-system when other cities peoples had shifted to a different position through new skills or new allegiances. Was then conquered by king David around a BCE who made it the 'capital' of the Jews and from then on was captured, destroyed and recaptured and rebuild an incredible number of times to become the Holy City for the three Abrahamic religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

One simple strategy to survive however is clear: So the conquering of or allegiances with neighboring regions and their peoples was a necessity thereby creating entities which can be seen as the first proto States, Countries or Empires like Sumer in c. Village, to City, to State, to Empire was not uni-directional is e. Even though the Jews could not escape from their era and had to unite under the banner of a king: Saul, David, Solomon … and live in cities like Jerusalem which required … stratification. To defend these States, Countries or Empires the same principles were used as with cities: This latter strategy probably popped up when a civilization was in fact on the retreat and would not or could not conquer the attacking people but had vast other economic resources on its hands.

When an Empire chose not to build such defenses its demise came quicker like the Persian Empire of the Archaemedeans in the 5th century BCE which built Persepolis: One reason that City- States, Countries or Empires did and still do rise and fall all the time is - again - the same as to why it took so long for cities to become the most important way of living in the first place: Another reason could be that living in a city does change the structure of the brain, i.

Furthermore it has been shown that in locus groups a pressure —like a food shortage- changes the expression of certain genes so they start swarming. Such adaptations have been found in humans as well as is described in the article: This change was inevitable because the lack of freedom in especially economic affairs made it impossible to keep up with the West in the arms and motivational race.

So none of the citizens of Russia was taking any economic risks since this was very much discouraged and only when Gorbatsjov c. However under Putin this has led to some excesses - e. And you can also see this from e. In a speech for the race bureau - part of the ministry of internal affairs - in Dr. By bulldoze over this part of the city the Apartheid regime tried to steer the social development of this multi-culture melting pot but did not succeed, I think, because once a larger group has evolved: You can suppress it though but it will pop up again as soon as the repression is slightly eased.

So Cities and Countries are the path via which Human societies develop. It is a Cities in which a certain culture starts and then spreads out. Why did culture not develop as fast through non-City based societies like the Indians in North America, the Mongolian society around the beginning of the Common Era or during the reign of Djengis Kan or the sub-Sahara African societies all through the Milennia? And for larger entities the ruler s delegated this power to other functionaries like in China a class of judges was created who were placed in the various corners of the Empire and who held court sessions as e.

The Law the rulers or their delegates judges upheld was written law to give it a sense of eternity be it - in the beginning - not an extensive set of laws. But to make it accessible throughout the country it was copied as e. With a system of Law established in a city or country the Economy could develop. Usually as a mixture of a Barter and Money economy. This because the concept of money was developed quite early in Human History: But on the one hand for larger trades a shortage of money could occur and on the other hand the very poor did not have any money, so barter trade was still a major factor until the end of the Middle Ages.

That Law can have a large influence on the Economy can be seen from the fact that e. So this idea has proved itself to be very robust to 'cheaters' and brought and brings economies much more advantages than disadvantages. Company had to be implemented differently in different societies. Economics; The decision of how and how much money was circulated was more or less done by default since money was coupled to rare shells at first and further on in history to rare and therefore precious metals. Although unpredictable fluctuations in the value of money were unwanted the system of precious metals for coins guaranteed a relative stable value of money which could not easily be influenced by a ruler, city or country which was a good thing since otherwise a ruler could pump much more shells or coins into the system and cause inflation.

This system of 'the golden standard' held out until the 20th century and therefore more than years. And it provided cities or countries with a well-accepted currency with a considerable advantage over cities or countries with a less accepted currency since they could buy more and better weapons and attract more trade which generated more money. Or in terms of Fisher's equality: T with M the total amount of money, V the circulation velocity, P the price per product and T the total amount of produce, all in one economy.

With money and thereby the Economy coupled to natural sources Humans copied nature in a very direct way. Like plants and animals our welfare was thereby directly dependent on natural resources not easily to be fiddled with by Humans. And with of the lifting of the representative value system - and effectively totally decoupling the value of money from natural resources - a lot of instability like hyperinflation was unleashed like e.

On money many books have been written but the one by Georg Simmel: And although Simmel says he did not write a Philosophy on the Economic aspects of money: And this happens again - with ever greater consequences - when public markets for derivatives were introduced in the 's.

The credit crisis of is - in my opinion - caused by this ever greater decoupling of money from its trust basis: But we had seen such instabilities long before e. Each time the idea is the same i. And as we progress in history we want the real World to be more and more 'moldable' to our imagined World s. Taxes; Every city, country or empire needs money to keep an army under arms, to build common buildings or structures like a defense wall and - the more advanced civilizations - to build roads for trade and army transport. This money has to be brought up by the citizens in the form of Taxes.

This system of a gift- economy can still be seen in non-developed countries with e. Many social unrests started with too high taxes and people objecting to them. That taxation must be based on what is perceived to be bearable can be seen from a campaign by Oxfam an NGO in in the Netherlands that taxheavens should be dismantled because -in their view- millions of people in developing countries live below the poverty line because their country cannot raise enough taxes since the multinational corporations -Starbucks in this campaign- can move their profits to taxheavens like the Netherlands.

On the side we also see that politics and taxes are one and the same as 'non-politicians' start levelling the moral ground for higher taxes to gain more power. Philosophy, Science, Games and Sports This Next Level Theme is a bit different from the other Next Level Themes since especially Philosophy does not necessarily bring a direct evolutionary advantage whereas Science only brings an advantage through its improved understanding of and control over technology and biology, Games are just for fun and Sports prepares for war but a good sportsman is not necessarily a good fighter.

Nevertheless these activities started long before the modern era as can be seen from the Greek Philosophers, Scientists and Olympic Games. And - of course - they started under the banner of other Themes, e. But gradually - with the further division of labor - these subThemes developed into their own. It is often said that Philosophy started Science since e. Although the first clear evidence of Philosophy, Science and Sports developing into separate and fully respected activities was in the ancient Greek Cities, with the disappearance of the Greek culture Philosophy and Science seemingly disappeared in Europe as a separate activities for at least some years during the Roman Empire [which was all about the Next Level Power Theme N3, see this chapter] and the Middle Ages [which were all about the Contemporary Religious Theme: Religion C2 , i.

Christianity, see next chapter]. Therefore it is fair to say the Greek culture was the starting point for this next level Theme and not e. From this fact it becomes apparent that a society has to have a certain level of wealth before the Philosophy, Science and Sports Theme emerges and e. And it was also with the Greeks that special schools for Philosophy were founded to teach the young in these ideas like the first Academy started by Plato in Athens in c. However this is very illogical since it had brought the Greek many good things like great wealth in Athens during its democratic days and e.

But on the other hand the demise of the Greek culture is not so strange since Greek Philosophers were rather rigid as e. It looks as though that this can be compared to the emergence of a new species in nature. Which compares nicely with the battle between Islam and Christianity and the very rigid approach first by Christianity and now by Islam.

However unlike Philosophy and Science the Sports subTheme was much more clearly passed on to following cultures like the Roman Empire with its focus on Power through well trained and maintained armies. But with the Romans the Sports theme became much less free riding as killing the opponent became an integral part of the 'game'. And after the Romans - during the Middle Ages - the Sports theme stayed on as an important subTheme where agile men could show their abilities in tournaments but in a much less brutal way than the Roman Games.

After the Romans i. In the West it is Religion i. Christianity which becomes the focal Theme since it had shown to be capable of withstanding the Romans with the conversion of one the last Roman Emperors: Theodosius to Christianity in the 4th century and declaring it to be the official religion. In other parts of the World, i. Olmec's and Maya's - the development during Europe's Middle Ages is comparable to the much older development with e.

So a balance with worldly powers was struck like e. And in order to keep the Church superiority every Philosophy and Scientific advancement which could derail its grip on society was suppressed as is nicely seen with e. The fact that mathematics was not used to predict the stability or strength of things can also be seen from monumental buildings which were, until the times of the Renaissance Robert Hooke and Christopher Wren started using mathematics and physics to design buildings after the great fire of London in , build according to trial and error method or what God or nature would accept although the mathematical structures: The logic behind symbolic Games is on the one hand that people such as soldiers have a way of killing time.

So symbolic Games served a purpose as well. They educated the young and elderly and were a way to find those who made clever use of the rules. And since intelligence is not necessarily coupled to strength and agility which usually decides who becomes a leader in a group, Games were a way to find and select the more intelligent members of a group. Strength and agility as such were learned and tested in Sports which prepared for war. However since hunting is served with strength and agility as well rudimentary Sports must have been present in pre-Neolithic times as well.

So even though many aspects of this Next Level Theme: Philosophy, Science, Games and Sports N7 really developed in the last Millennium before the birth of Christ their rudimentary origin is much older and can be traced to at least the beginning of N5: Philosophy, Science, Games and Sports. The modern era starts with the Renaissance in the 16th and 17th century since that is a real break with societal organizing structures i. The basis for these changes, however, was laid with the Renaissance. The fact that the Chinese had a society: But it must have served as an example to the Europeans through trade and stories.

The Renaissance in Europe came forth as a product of the enormous increase in wealth from the first worldwide trade which can be deduced from e. Of course doing away with the suppressing ideas of Christianity in the 14th and 15th century that e. But nevertheless it was an enormous break with the past with its development of ideas about society e. Be it that books cannot be read in a totally unintended way, which with storytelling is certainly possible.

This gave especially Germany a significant advantage with the development of its society and industry and consequent improvement in buildings, industry, health, population size and weapons. That Evolutionary progress in Human behavior started with the Basic Themes, through the Next Level Themes into the Contemporary Themes can also be clearly seen in the drop of the number of murders per , citizens yearly in a society: Which is comparable to normal evolution which tries to let the greatest number of the "best" genes survive through the greatest number of individual beings Please note this is not equal to the greatest number of species!

So within each of the sub Themes we actively participate we have to engage in information brokering. Quantification and Western Society, - , Alfred W. But earlier sub Themes still account for a large part of our behavior, e. Family or belonging to a Group is fulfilled homeless people will reintegrate into a further developed society. Power When for the greater part in a society the Basic Themes: In modern societies Power is contained in various new or further developed Contemporary subThemes: Since only then you need a system to coerce certain factions of a society into compliance while if not physically constrained people can go their own way in the next valley or on the other side of the river.

That Egypt did not make to the present as a leading state was caused by the rise of the Greeks and later on Rome and that China could not hold on to its early form of an impersonal state was caused by internal strive mixed with external tribes which conquered this huge empire regularly but had to adept to this impersonal state system so lost their tribal hold on society and in the end China had to succumb to the Europeans.

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Politics Politics is how to rule with a small er group over a large r group [or how to extract wealth from a large r group by a small er group]. Please note that democracy means that members of the small er ruling group come from the large r 'ruled over' group and are 'refreshed' every couple of years by some kind of elective system. So modern politicians have to include the feelings among and ideas of the general public. All variants have been and are tried out and every situation must be handled differently. Each co-management activity and method will be covered in enough detail to allow the handbook user to understand and use it.

However, it would be impossible to completely address in depth each activity and method in this publication. References and internet links will be provided for the user to obtain additional information. This handbook is written for use by the initiators and facilitators of co-management — government, change agents, community leaders and community members, as well as motivated fishers. The handbook is written to allow each partner in co-management to clearly understand their role and responsibility in the co-management process, and how to relate to the other partners in co-management.

The handbook is meant to be used to plan and implement co-management, as a reference source to specific co-management activities and as a training reference. More will be said about each partner and their roles and responsibilities in Chapter 4. This handbook is meant to support a process of community-based co-management for fisheries. As discussed, it is not a step-by-step guide. Rather, the handbook provides ideas, methods, techniques, activities, checklists, examples, questions and indicators for planning and implementing community-based co-management.

The user should become familiar with the complete process presented, think about the situation where co-management will be considered for use, and adapt the co-management process to the community. The community may just be beginning co-management or it may already be implementing a process of co-management. Some or all of the activities and methods may be relevant. Other activities and methods may need to be undertaken. When you have identified an activity or method that is appropriate, you can read more about it in the handbook and in the additional references cited.

This chapter contains a discussion of concepts and definitions about community-based co-management. Cooperative management or co-management can be defined as a partnership arrangement in which the community of local resource users fishers , government, other stakeholders boat owners, fish traders, boat builders, business. Through consultations and negotiations, the partners develop a formal agreement on their respective roles, responsibilities and rights in management, referred to as 'negotiated power'.

Co-management is also called participatory, joint, stakeholder, multi-party or collaborative management. Co-management covers various partnership arrangements and degrees of power sharing and integration of local informal, traditional, customary and centralized government management systems Fig. Fisheries co-management can be classified into five broad types according to the roles government and fishers play Sen and Nielsen, There is only minimal exchange of information between government and fishers.

This type of co-management regime is only different from centralized management in the sense that the mechanisms exist for dialogue with users, but the process itself tends to be government informing fishers on the decisions they plan to make. Mechanisms exist for government to consult with fishers but all decisions are taken by government. This type of co-management is where government and fishers cooperate together as equal partners in decision-making. Fishers advise government of decisions to be taken and government endorses these decisions. Government has delegated authority to make decisions to.

Co-management integrates local and centralized government management systems. It is generally acknowledged that not all responsibility and authority should be vested at the community level Box 2. The term 'community' can have several meanings. Community can be defined geographically by political or resource boundaries or socially as a community of individuals with common interests. For example, the geographical community is usually a village political unit the lowest governmental administrative unit ; a social community may be a group of fishers using the same fishing gear or a fisher organization.

A community is not necessarily a village, and a village is not necessarily a community. Care should also be taken not to assume that a community is a homogeneous unit, as there will often be different interests in a community, based on gender, class, ethnic and economic variations. Recently, the term 'virtual community' or 'community of interest' has been applied to non-geographically based communities of fishers. Similar to the 'social community', this is a group of fishers who, while they do not live in a single geographical community, use similar gear or target the same fish species or have a common interest in a particular fishery.

The substance of this sharing of responsibility and authority will be negotiated between community members and government and be within the boundaries of government policy. However, the key to co-management is negotiated power where the interaction of the state and non-state actors would be an important factor in defining a common and acceptable balance in sharing power and allocating responsibilities. There is no blueprint or model for co-management but rather a variety of arrangements from which to choose to suit a specific context.

Co-management should be viewed not as a single strategy to solve all problems of fisheries management, but rather as a process of resource management, maturing, adjusting and adapting to changing conditions over time. A healthy co-management process will change over time in response to changes in the level of trust, credibility, legitimacy and success of the partners and the whole co-management arrangement. Co-management involves aspects of democratization, social empowerment, power sharing and decentralization. Co-management attempts to overcome the distrust, corruption, fragmentation and inefficiency of existing fisheries management arrangements through collaboration.

Co-management is adaptive; that is, through a learning process, information is shared among partners, leading to continuous modifications and improvements in management.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Through co-management, the partners actively contribute and work together on fisheries management. They share the costs and benefits and the successes and failures. Co-management is not a regulatory technique, although regulations are used in co-management. It is a participatory management strategy that provides and maintains a forum or structure for action on empowerment, rule making, conflict management, power sharing, social learning, dialogue and communication, and development among the partners.

Co-management is a consensus-driven process of recognizing different values, needs, concerns and interests involved in managing the resource. Partnerships, roles and responsibilities are pursued, strengthened and redefined at different times in the co-management process, depending on the needs and opportunities, the legal environment, the political support, capacities of partners and trust between partners.

The establishment and operation of co-management can be complex, costly, time consuming and sometimes confusing. Research has shown that it may take 3 to 5 years to organize and initiate activities and interventions at the community level. It will also take this time for the partners to address concerns about legitimacy, trust, accountability and transparency. Co-management can be considered as a middle course between the government's concern about social efficiency and equity and local concerns for active participation and self-regulation.

Co-management involves a formal or informal agreement among partners to share power and to share the right to manage. Co-management can serve as a mechanism not only for fisheries management but also for community, economic and social development as it promotes fisher and community participation in solving problems and addressing needs. In some cases, co-management may be simply a formal recognition of a fisheries management system that already exists; some informal and customary community-based management strategies are already in place, operating side-by-side with formal state-level management strategies.

Other than fishers, stakeholders individuals, groups or organizations who are in one way or another interested, involved or affected positively or negatively by a particular action that derive economic benefit from the resource for example, boat owners, fish traders, business suppliers, police, politicians, consumers should also be considered in co-management see Chapter 4. A proper balance of representation among stakeholders will prove crucial to the success of co-management Box 2. A central question, however, is which stakeholders should. The term 'community' tends to abstract the diversity of interests among different groups of people.

For example, some 'community consultations' are mainly attended by men but the results are considered as the output of the 'community'. The invisibility of women, especially in fisheries, is disregarded because fisheries are often viewed in a limited sense, i. While women rarely fish, they play important roles in pre- and post-production activities in fisheries. The term 'stakeholders' could aggregate people too, with disregard for differential needs and interests.

Stakeholders that only include the direct users of the coastal resources is a limiting conception. The non-recognition of women as direct users because they are not fishers in the traditional sense has resulted in their limited access, participation and benefits to coastal resource management projects and similar intervention focused on fisheries.

The Philippine Fisheries Code has an initial recognition of women's interests in fisheries development and even it is limited in providing a single-seat for a women's organization in the fisheries council and still lacks an appreciation of women-specific issues in the agenda of the council. More work is definitely needed to better understand the contributions of women to fisheries. While it is useful to have representation of all stakeholders, a line must be drawn or the process will break down from the representation of too many interests. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, stakeholder analysis can help to identify those stakeholders who should be included in co-management.

This question can be partially answered by determining the spatial scale at which co-management should operate. The best opportunity for co-management seems to occur at the local or 'community' scale although national-level fisheries advisory bodies to government can also be effective. Through co-management, equity and social justice in fisheries management is sought. Equity and the equitable sharing of power among and between government, fishers and other stakeholders in a community are often thorny issues in co-management. These issues are often visible along social and economic divides in a given community, such as gender roles.

Those fishers who will receive the costs and benefits of management and regulation need to have a voice in decision-making about fisheries management. Equity and social justice is brought about through empowerment and active participation in the planning and implementation of fisheries co-management.

Responsibility means fishers have a share in the decision-making process and bear the costs and benefits of those decisions. The theme of co-management is that self-involvement in the management of the resource will lead to a stronger commitment to comply with the management strategy and regulations.

The mutuality of interests and the sharing of responsibility among and between partners will help to narrow the distance between resource managers and fishers, bringing about closer compatibility of the objectives of management. Co-management is based on common property theory Box 2. Co-management provides for the collective governance of common property resources. Common property regimes are forms of management grounded in a set of individually accepted rights and rules for the sustainable and interdependent use of collective goods.

A collective good is defined as a resource that is managed and controlled by a group of users. A common property regime is composed of a recognized group of users, a well-defined resource that the group uses and manages, and a set of institutional arrangements for use of the resource. In some situations the group may formalize the institutional arrangements with an organizational structure for management. Common property represents private property for the group of co-owners Gibbs and Bromley, Common property resources share two key characteristics Ostrom, First, these are resources for which exclusion or control of access of potential users is problematic.

Second, the supply is limited; that is, consumption by one. The literature on property rights identifies four ideal analytical types of property rights regimes:. In reality, many marine and coastal resources are held under regimes that combine the characteristics of two or more of these types. The four property rights regimes are ideal, analytical types; they do not exist in the real world. Rather, resources tend to be held in overlapping combinations of these four regimes. Strictly speaking, pure communal property systems are always embedded in state property systems and state law, deriving their strength from them.

Resource managers cannot function effectively unless they know the property rights regime they are dealing with. It is also important to make a distinction between a resource unit and a resource system. A resource unit what individuals use from the resource system such as fish is not jointly used; while the resource system itself, the fishery, is subject to joint use. Co-management is a governance arrangement located between pure state property and pure communal property regimes.

It should be noted that while state law can enforce or strengthen communal property, it might not always do so. The level of help from the state will depend on its willingness to support communal property systems. Common property regimes as collective resource management systems have been shown to develop when a group of individuals is highly dependent on a resource and when the availability of the resource is uncertain or limited Runge, If the resource problem is repeatedly experienced, such as low or no catch, and if it exists within a single community of users, the fishers are likely to develop a collective institutional arrangement to deal with the problem.

Institutional arrangements are sets of rights the fishers possess in relation to the resource and the rules that define what actions they can take in utilizing the resource. In the face of uncertainty in resource availability, fishers are more willing to group together to trade-off some benefit from individual use of the resource for the collective assurance that the resource will be used in a more equitable and sustainable manner Gibbs and Bromley, Institutions, through rights and rules, provide incentives for the group members to take certain actions to achieve a desired outcome.

Institutional arrangements require an investment of time on the members' part to build. Coordination and information activities are initial aspects of building institutions. The transaction process of developing institutions will have costs.

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These transaction costs can be defined as the costs of: For common property regimes, these costs are part of the collective decision-making process. An individual member of the group relies on reciprocal behaviour from other members of the group regarding their adherence to the agreed-upon rules for management.

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An individual's choice of behaviour in a collective action action taken by a group either directly or on its behalf through an organization in pursuit of members perceived shared interests situation will depend upon how he or she weighs the benefits and costs of various alternatives and their likely outcomes. An individual's choices are often affected by limited information which leads to uncertainty and by the level of opportunistic behaviour taking advantage of a situation in your own self-interest so as to get the benefit while bearing less of the cost that individual resource users can expect from other resource users.

Individuals also have differing discount rates the value people put on the future benefits from the resource versus today ; many poor fishers, for example, attribute less value to benefits that they expect to receive in the future, and more value to those expected in the present Ostrom, In some situations, individuals may have incentives to adopt opportunistic strategies to circumvent the rules and to obtain disproportionate benefits at the cost of others.

Three types of opportunistic behaviour may occur: Free riders holding back on one's contribution so as to get the benefit while bearing less of the cost respond to incentives to engage in other activities while other members of the group work. Corruption can occur when incentives exist for rules to be changed for an individual through, for example, the provision of illegal payments.

Rent seeking the gaining of excess profits from the resource can occur when an individual's assets, for example, property rights, increase in value through special advantages Ostrom, ; Tang, The imperative of the common property regime is to establish institutional arrangements which reduce or minimize transaction costs and counteract opportunistic behaviour. The principal problem faced by group members of a common property regime is how to organize themselves. That is, how to change from a situation of independent action to one of collective action and coordinated strategies to obtain greater joint benefits and reduce joint harm.

A sense of 'commonality', commitment and compliance must be established for the collective good. There are two broad classes of problems that must be overcome by the collective group. The first, called appropriation problems, is concerned with how to allocate the resource units i. Collective action does not occur where there is no organization that has authority to make decisions and to establish rules over the use of the resource.

Note that institutions are not organizations. Organizations operationalize institutional arrangements Bromley, There can be a variety of organizational forms for governing the resource, which may range from a government agency or enterprise to the fishers themselves. The common property regime will need to establish an agenda and goals which are to be achieved.

This may include an identification of the problem or issue to be addressed, management and adjudication. The authority system to ensure that fishers' expectations are met is normally inherent in the organization. Membership within common property regimes is not always equal. Some members may have fewer or lesser rights than others. Access to the resource, for example, may change or rotate for members through the year. Corresponding duties may or may not vary accordingly. The rights and duties of members of the group must be clearly specified.

Collective action entails problems of coordination that do not exist in other resource regimes, such as private property. In order to organize the harvesting, for example, fishers must develop rules to establish how rights are to be exercised. Rules give substance to rights, structure a situation, define the behaviour of the group's members and reduce conflict. Rules may create different incentive structures that affect cooperation or conflict among fishers Tang, The type of rules that are devised will depend upon the severity of the problem the fishers face, the level of information they possess, sociocultural traditions, the extent of the bundle of rights they hold, the level of opportunistic behaviour, and the ease with which actions can be monitored and enforced.

Rules require, permit or forbid some actions or outcome. Rules provide stability of expectations, and efforts to change rules can rapidly reduce their stability Ostrom, The institutions and rules fishers use may not always be the same as formal laws. The fishers may develop institutions and rules to meet their needs which are not legitimized by government. For institutional arrangements to be maintained over time, it is important to develop workable procedures for monitoring the behaviour of fishers, enforcing against non-conforming behaviour with sanctions, and settling conflicts.

The ease and costliness of monitoring rules devised to organize the fishing activity depend upon the physical nature of the resource, the rules-in-use and the level of conformance to the rules Ostrom, The number of times that non-conformance must be measured affects the cost of monitoring. The ease and cost of monitoring will depend upon whether the fishers can monitor compliance themselves, as they fish or through self-monitoring incentives, or if they must establish more elaborate arrangements, such as external authorities. Fishers who violate the rules need to have sanctions imposed upon them.

What constitutes an effective sanction will vary depending upon the nature of the group of fishers. In most cases, sanctions are likely to increase with the severity of the offence Ostrom, Conflicts may arise within the common property regime and between users. The intensity and frequency of conflicts are likely to be closely related to the perceived relative scarcity of the resource. Several factors can lead to conflict, including: Part of the institutional process must include a mechanism for discussing and resolving what is and is not a rule violation and how to settle the dispute.

This can be done formally or informally. In general, for monitoring and sanctions to be effective, the fisher must have a stake in institutional processes and be involved in monitoring and enforcement Townsend and Wilson, Common property regimes and their associated institutional arrangements need to be dynamic in order to adjust to new opportunities, internal growth, externalities and institutional dissonance Ostrom, Institution building is a long-term process and often is based on trial and error. Allocation rules, for example, may need to change as a result of poor compliance.

The structuring of institutions must be an ongoing process to meet the changing conditions. Whether or not local, self-governing institutions can be developed is often dependent upon governmental policies. In countries which do not recognize the rights of local community organizations or do not create opportunities for communities to organize themselves in a de facto manner, it is more difficult for fishers to successfully find solutions to collective action problems.

Many governments are not willing to give up management authority over resources or do not believe that self-governing organizations can be successful. There is no single answer for how to resolve these differences. Community-based management CBM is a central element of co-management. There is some debate over the similarities and differences between co-management and CBM.

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Community-based resource management, as explained by Korten , includes several elements: CBRM as an approach emphasizes a community's capability, responsibility and accountability with regard to managing resources. It is inherently evolutionary, participatory and locale-specific and considers the technical, sociocultural, economic, political and environmental factors impinging upon the community.

CBRM is basically seen as community empowerment for resource productivity, sustainability and equity. It starts from the basic premise that people have the innate capacity to understand and act on their own problems. It begins where the people are, i. CBCRM allows each community to develop a management strategy which meets its own particular needs and conditions, thus enabling a greater degree of flexibility and modification. A central theme of CBCRM is empowerment, specifically the control over and ability to manage productive resources in the interest of one's own family and community.

It invokes a basic principle of control and accountability which maintains that control over an action should rest with the people who bear its consequences. CBRM can be looked at in various ways. It can be a process, a strategy, an approach, a goal or a tool. A strategy for achieving a people-centered development, CBRM has a decision-making focus in which the sustainable use of natural resources in a given area lies with the people in the local communities. CBRM is an approach through which communities are given the opportunity and responsibility to manage in a sustained way the community resources, define or identify the amount of resources and future needs, and their goals and aspirations, and make decisions affecting their common well-being as determined by technical, sociocultural, economic, political and environmental factors.

It is a tool which facilitates the development of multilevel resource management skills vital to the realization of potentials of the community. Also, CBRM stands for people empowerment and achieving equity and sustainability in natural resource management. The key concepts are community, resources, management, access and control over resources, viable organizations and availability of suitable technology for resource management and utilization. It is consensus-driven and geared towards achieving a balance of interests.

The emphasis is on communities and at its core is the community organization. It is a process of governance and political decision-making and it is geared towards the formation of partnerships and power-sharing. It can be argued that CBCRM is a politically negotiated process of making decisions on the ownership, control and overall policy directions of coastal resources.

Questions of resource allocation, distribution of resource benefits and management arrangements among stakeholders will always have to be included. Moreover, CBCRMs central concern is the empowerment of groups and social actors and a sense of self-reliance at the micro-level that stimulates a more synergistic and dynamic linkage to the meso- and macro-levels.

It is maintained that power issues are central to the formation of co-management schemes. Hence, partnerships between government and communities should take careful consideration of the capacities of communities in making and sustaining these partnerships. NGOs also refer to co-management as 'scaling-up', i. The scaling-up efforts of NGOs include project replication, expansion of the geographic scale of management efforts i. The above definitions of community-based resource management show that while there are many similarities and differences between co-management and CBM, there are differences in the focus of each strategy.

These differences centre on the level and timing of government participation in the process. CBM is people-centred and community-focused, while co-management focuses on these issues plus on a partnership arrangement between government and the local community of resource users. The process of resource management is organized differently too. Co-management has a broader scope and scale than CBM with a focus both inside and outside the community.

The government may play a minor role in CBM; co-management, on the other hand, by definition includes a major and active government role. Co-management often addresses issues beyond the community level, at regional and national levels, and of multiple stakeholders, and allows these issues, as they affect the community, to be brought more effectively into the domain of the community. CBM practitioners sometimes view government as an external player and adversary, to be brought into the process only at a late stage, if at all.

This can lead to misunderstandings and lack of full support from government. Co-management strategies, on the other hand, involve government agencies, resource managers and elected officials early and equally, along with the community and stakeholders, developing trust between the participants. When CBM is considered an integral part of co-management, it can be called community-based co-management.

Community-based co-management includes the characteristics of both CBM and co-management; that is, it is people-centred, community-oriented, resource-based and partnership-based. Thus, community-based co-management has the community as its focus, yet recognizes that to sustain such action, a horizontal across the community and vertical with external to the community organizations and institutions such as government link is necessary. Community-based co-management is most often found in developing countries due to their need for overall community and economic development and social empowerment, in addition to resource management.

One variation of community-based co-management is traditional or customary co-management. Such systems are or were used to manage coastal fisheries in various countries around the world. Existing examples in Asia and the Pacific have been documented over a wide discontinuous geographical range Ruddle, Many of these systems play a valuable role in fisheries management and will be useful into the future, locally and nationally.

Traditional or customary co-management is a formal recognition of the informal systems as used, for example, in Vanuatu and Fiji. Co-management can serve as a mechanism to legally recognize and protect these traditional and customary systems and to specify authority and responsibility between the community and government. It also involves a definition of shared powers and authority.

Stakeholder-centred co-management seems to be more common in developed countries, where the emphasis is to get the users participating in the resource management process. It can best be characterized as government—industry partnership that involves user groups in the making of resource management decisions.

This category of co-management focuses on having fishers and other stakeholders represented through various organizational arrangements in management. Unlike community-based co-management, little or no attention is given to community development and social empowerment of fishers. Examples of stakeholder-centred co-management can be seen in several countries in northern Europe and North America Nielsen and Vedsmand, ; McCay and Jentoft, It should be noted that co-management and integrated coastal management ICM share many similarities such as the coordination of various stakeholders at different levels and an active role of government Christie and White, A more transparent, accountable and autonomous management system.

More economical than centralized management systems; requiring less to be spent on management administration and enforcement, in the long run. Through involvement in management, fishers take responsibility for a number of managerial functions. Makes maximum use of indigenous knowledge and expertise to provide information on the resource base and to complement scientific information for management. Improved stewardship of aquatic and coastal resources and management.

Management is accountable to local areas. Fishing communities are able to devise and administer management plans and regulatory measures that are more appropriate to local conditions. Localized solutions to local problems. By giving the fishers a sense of ownership over the resource, co-management provides a powerful incentive for them to view the resource as a long-term asset rather than to discount its future returns. Various interests and stakeholders are brought together to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the resource.

Since the community is involved in the formulation and implementation of co-management measures, a higher degree of acceptability, legitimacy and compliance to plans and regulations can be expected. Community members can enforce standards of behaviour more effectively than bureaucracies can. Increased communication and understanding among all concerned can minimize social conflict and maintain or improve social cohesion in the community. It may not be suitable for every fishing community. Many communities may not be willing or able to take on the responsibility of co-management. Leadership and appropriate local institutions, such as fisher organizations, may not exist within the community to initiate or sustain co-management efforts.

In the short-run, there are high initial investments of time, financial resources and human resources to establish co-management.