Such adaptation involved major disruptions of existing social systems over wide areas of the globe. Before the impact of the Industrial Revolution, European activities in the rest of the world were largely confined to: However disruptive these changes may have been to the societies of Africa, South America , and the isolated plantation and white-settler colonies, the social systems over most of the Earth outside Europe nevertheless remained much the same as they had been for centuries in some places for millennia.
These societies, with their largely self-sufficient small communities based on subsistence agriculture and home industry, provided poor markets for the mass-produced goods flowing from the factories of the technologically advancing countries; nor were the existing social systems flexible enough to introduce and rapidly expand the commercial agriculture and, later, mineral extraction required to supply the food and raw material needs of the empire builders.
The adaptation of the nonindustrialized parts of the world to become more profitable adjuncts of the industrializing nations embraced, among other things: The classic illustration of this last policy is found in India. For centuries India had been an exporter of cotton goods, to such an extent that Great Britain for a long period imposed stiff tariff duties to protect its domestic manufacturers from Indian competition.
Yet, by the middle of the 19th century, India was receiving one-fourth of all British exports of cotton piece goods and had lost its own export markets. Clearly, such significant transformations could not get very far in the absence of appropriate political changes, such as the development of a sufficiently cooperative local elite, effective administrative techniques, and peace-keeping instruments that would assure social stability and environments conducive to the radical social changes imposed by a foreign power. Consistent with these purposes was the installation of new, or amendments of old, legal systems that would facilitate the operation of a money, business, and private land economy.
Tying it all together was the imposition of the culture and language of the dominant power. The changing nature of the relations between centres of empire and their colonies, under the impact of the unfolding Industrial Revolution, was also reflected in new trends in colonial acquisitions. While in preceding centuries colonies, trading posts, and settlements were in the main, except for South America, located along the coastline or on smaller islands, the expansions of the late 18th century and especially of the 19th century were distinguished by the spread of the colonizing powers, or of their emigrants, into the interior of continents.
Such continental extensions, in general, took one of two forms, or some combination of the two: At the heart of Western expansionism was the growing disparity in technologies between those of the leading European nations and those of the rest of the world. Differences between the level of technology in Europe and some of the regions on other continents were not especially great in the early part of the 18th century.
In fact, some of the crucial technical knowledge used in Europe at that time came originally from Asia. During the 18th century, however, and at an accelerating pace in the 19th and 20th centuries, the gap between the technologically advanced countries and technologically backward regions kept on increasing despite the diffusion of modern technology by the colonial powers. The most important aspect of this disparity was the technical superiority of Western armaments, for this superiority enabled the West to impose its will on the much larger colonial populations.
Advances in communication and transportation, notably railroads, also became important tools for consolidating foreign rule over extensive territories. And along with the enormous technical superiority and the colonizing experience itself came important psychological instruments of minority rule by foreigners: Naturally, the above description and summary telescope events that transpired over many decades and the incidence of the changes varied from territory to territory and from time to time, influenced by the special conditions in each area, by what took place in the process of conquest, by the circumstances at the time when economic exploitation of the possessions became desirable and feasible, and by the varying political considerations of the several occupying powers.
Moreover, it should be emphasized that expansion policies and practices, while far from haphazard, were rarely the result of long-range and integrated planning. The drive for expansion was persistent, as were the pressures to get the greatest advantage possible out of the resulting opportunities. But the expansions arose in the midst of intense rivalry among major powers that were concerned with the distribution of power on the continent of Europe itself as well as with ownership of overseas territories.
Thus, the issues of national power, national wealth, and military strength shifted more and more to the world stage as commerce and territorial acquisitions spread over larger segments of the globe. In fact, colonies were themselves often levers of military power—sources of military supplies and of military manpower and bases for navies and merchant marines. Stages of history rarely, if ever, come in neat packages: Nonetheless, there was a convergence of developments in the early s, which, despite many qualifications, delineates a new stage in European expansionism and especially in that of the most successful empire builder, Great Britain.
As a result of the Treaty of Paris, France lost nearly all of its colonial empire, while Britain became, except for Spain , the largest colonial power in the world. In addition, the new commanding position on the seas provided an opportunity for Great Britain to probe for additional markets in Asia and Africa and to try to break the Spanish trade monopoly in South America. During this period, the scope of British world interests broadened dramatically to cover the South Pacific, the Far East, the South Atlantic, and the coast of Africa.
The initial aim of this outburst of maritime activity was not so much the acquisition of extensive fresh territory as the attainment of a far-flung network of trading posts and maritime bases. The latter, it was hoped, would serve the interdependent aims of widening foreign commerce and controlling ocean shipping routes. But in the long run many of these initial bases turned out to be steppingstones to future territorial conquests. Because the indigenous populations did not always take kindly to foreign incursions into their homelands, even when the foreigners limited themselves to small enclaves, penetration of interiors was often necessary to secure base areas against attack.
The path of conquest and territorial growth was far from orderly. It was frequently diverted by the renewal or intensification of rivalry between, notably, England, France, Spain, and the Low Countries in colonial areas and on the European continent. These contiguous colonies were at the heart of the old, or what is often referred to as the first, British Empire, which consisted primarily of Ireland, the North American colonies, and the plantation colonies of the West Indies. Great Britain harvested from its victory in that war a new expanse of territory about equal to its prewar possessions on the North American continent: The assimilation of the French Canadians, control of the Indians and settlement of the trans-Allegheny region, and the opening of new trade channels created a host of problems for the British government.
Not the least of these were the burdensome costs to carry out this program on top of a huge national debt accumulated during the war. To cope with these problems, new imperial policies were adopted by the mother country: The strains generated by these policies created or intensified the hardships of large sections of the colonial population and, in addition, disrupted the relative harmony of interests that had been built up between the mother country and important elite groups in the colonies.
Two additional factors, not unrelated to the enlargement of the British Empire, fed the onset and success of the American War of Independence — The shock of defeat in North America was not the only problem confronting British society. Ireland—in effect, a colonial dependency—also experienced a revolutionary upsurge, giving added significance to attacks by leading British free traders against existing colonial policies and even at times against colonialism itself.
But such criticism had little effect except as it may have hastened colonial administrative reforms to counteract real and potential independence movements in dependencies such as Canada and Ireland.
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Apart from reforms of this nature, the aftermath of American independence was a diversion of British imperial interests to other areas—the beginning of the settlement of Australia being a case in point. In terms of amount of effort and significance of results, however, the pursuit of conquest in India took first place. Starting with the assumption of control over the province of Bengal after the Battle of Plassey , and especially after the virtual removal of French influence from the Indian Ocean , the British waged more or less continuous warfare against the Indian people and took over more and more of the interior.
The financing and even the military manpower for this prolonged undertaking came mainly from India itself. As British sovereignty spread, new land-revenue devices were soon instituted, which resulted in raising the revenue to finance the consolidation of power in India and the conquest of other regions, breaking up the old system of self-sufficient and self-perpetuating villages and supporting an elite whose self-interests would harmonize with British rule.
In the first British Empire primarily centred on North America. By , despite the loss of the 13 colonies, Britain had a second empire, one that straddled the globe from Canada and the Caribbean in the Western Hemisphere around the Cape of Good Hope to India and Australia. The half century of global expansion is only one aspect of the transition to the second British Empire. The operations of the new empire in the longer run also reflected decisive changes in British society.
The replacement of mercantile by industrial enterprise as the main source of national wealth entailed changes to make national and colonial policy more consistent with the new hierarchy of interests. The restrictive trade practices and monopolistic privileges that sustained the commercial explosion of the 16th and most of the 17th centuries—built around the slave trade , colonial plantations, and monopolistic trading companies—did not provide the most effective environment for a nation on its way to becoming the workshop of the world.
The desired restructuring of policies occurred over decades of intense political conflict: Political opposition to this monopoly was strong at the end of the 18th century, but the giant step on the road to free trade was not taken until the early decades of the 19th century termination of the Indian trade monopoly, ; of the Chinese trade monopoly, In contrast, the issues surrounding the strategic slave trade were much more complicated.
The West Indies plantations relied on a steady flow of slaves from Africa. British merchants and ships profited not only from supplying these slaves but also from the slave trade with other colonies in the Western Hemisphere. The British were the leading slave traders, controlling at least half of the transatlantic slave trade by the end of the 18th century.
But the influential planter and slave-trade interests had come under vigorous and unrelenting attack by religious and humanitarian leaders and organizations, who propelled the issue of abolition to the forefront of British politics around the turn of the 19th century. Historians are still unravelling the threads of conflicting arguments about the priority of causes in the final abolition of the slave trade and, later, of slavery itself, because economic as well as political issues were at play: Moreover, the battle between proslavery and antislavery forces was fought in an environment in which free-trade interests were challenging established mercantilist practices and the West Indies sugar economy was in a secular decline.
The British were not the first to abolish the slave trade. Denmark had ended it earlier, and the U. Constitution, written in , had already provided for its termination in But the British Act of formally forbidding the slave trade was followed up by diplomatic and naval pressure to suppress the trade. By the s Holland, Sweden, and France had also passed anti-slave-trade laws. Such laws and attempts to enforce them by no means stopped the trade, so long as there was buoyant demand for this commodity and good profit from dealing in it.
Some decline in the demand for slaves did follow the final emancipation in of slaves in British possessions. On the other hand, the demand for slaves elsewhere in the Americas took on new life— e. Accordingly, the number of slaves shipped across the Atlantic accelerated at the same time Britain and other maritime powers outlawed this form of commerce. Additional colonies were acquired Sierra Leone, ; Gambia, ; Gold Coast, to serve as bases for suppressing the slave trade and for stimulating substitute commerce.
British naval squadrons touring the coast of Africa, stopping and inspecting suspected slavers of other nations, and forcing African tribal chiefs to sign antislavery treaties did not halt the expansion of the slave trade, but they did help Britain attain a commanding position along the west coast of Africa, which in turn contributed to the expansion of both its commercial and colonial empire. The transformation of the old colonial and mercantilist commercial system was completed when, in addition to the abolition of slavery and the slave trade, the Corn Laws and the Navigation Acts were repealed in the late s.
The repeal of the Navigation Acts acknowledged the new reality: The repeal of the Corn Laws which had protected agricultural interests signalled the maturation of the Industrial Revolution. With the new trade strategy, under the impetus of freer trade and technical progress, came a broadening of the concept of empire. It was found that the commercial and financial advantages of formal empire could often be derived by informal means.
The growing importance of informal empire went hand in hand with increased expressions of dissatisfaction with the formal colonial empire. The critical approach to empire came from leading statesmen, government officials in charge of colonial policy, the free traders, and the philosophic Radicals the latter, a broad spectrum of opinion makers often labelled the Little Englanders, whose voices of dissent were most prominent in the years between and Taking the long view, however, some historians question just how much of this current of political thought was really concerned with the transformation of the British Empire into a Little England.
Those who seriously considered colonial separation were for the most part thinking of the more recent white-settler colonies, such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand , and definitely not of independence for India nor, for that matter, for Ireland. Differences of opinion among the various political factions naturally existed over the best use of limited government finance, colonial administrative tactics, how much foreign territory could in practice be controlled, and such issues as the costs of friction with the United States over Canada.
Indeed, during the most active period of what has been presumed to be anticolonialism, both the formal and informal empires grew substantially: An outstanding development in colonial and empire affairs during the period between the Napoleonic Wars and the s was an evident lessening in conflict between European powers. Not that conflict disappeared entirely, but the period as a whole was one of relative calm compared with either the almost continuous wars for colonial possessions in the 18th century or the revival of intense rivalries during the latter part of the 19th and early 20th centuries.
Instead of wars among colonial powers during this period, there were wars against colonized peoples and their societies, incident either to initial conquest or to the extension of territorial possessions farther into the interior. Contributing to the abatement of intercolonial rivalries was the undisputable supremacy of the British Navy during these years.
The increased use of steamships in the 19th century helped reinforce this supremacy: On the whole, despite the relative tranquillity and the rise of anticolonial sentiment in Britain, the era was marked by a notable wave of European expansionism. But much of this was merely claimed; effective control existed over a little less than 35 percent, most of which consisted of Europe itself. By —that is, before the next major wave of European acquisitions began—an additional 6,, square miles 16,, square kilometres were claimed; during this period, control was consolidated over the new claims and over all the territory claimed in During the early 19th century, however, there was a conspicuous exception to the trend of colonial growth, and that was the decline of the Portuguese and Spanish empires in the Western Hemisphere.
The occasion for the decolonization was provided by the Napoleonic Wars. The French occupation of the Iberian Peninsula in , combined with the ensuing years of intense warfare until on that peninsula between the British and French and their respective allies, effectively isolated the colonies from their mother countries. During this isolation the long-smouldering discontents in the colonies erupted in influential nationalist movements, revolutions of independence, and civil wars.
The stricken mother countries could hardly interfere with events on the South American continent, nor did they have the resources, even after the Peninsular War was over, to bring enough soldiers and armaments across the Atlantic to suppress the independence forces. Great Britain could have intervened on behalf of Spain and Portugal, but it declined. British commerce with South America had blossomed during the Napoleonic Wars. The British therefore now favoured independence for these colonies and had little interest in helping to reimpose colonial rule, with its accompanying limitations on British trade and investment.
Support for colonial independence by the British came in several ways: The British forthright position on independence, as well as the availability of the Royal Navy to support this policy, gave substance to the U. Monroe Doctrine , which the United States had insufficient strength at that time to really enforce.
After some 15 years of uprisings and wars, Spain by no longer had any colonies in South America itself, retaining only the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico. During the same period Brazil achieved its independence from Portugal. The advantages to the British economy made possible by the consequent opening up of the Latin-American ports were eagerly pursued, facilitated by commercial treaties signed with these young nations.
The reluctance of France to recognize their new status delayed French penetration of their markets and gave an advantage to the British. In one liberated area after another, brokers and commercial agents arrived from England to ferret out business opportunities. Soon the continent was flooded with British goods, often competing with much weaker native industries.
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Actually, Latin America provided the largest single export market for British cotton textiles in the first half of the 19th century. Despite the absence of formal empire, the British were able to attain economic preeminence in South America. Spanish and Portuguese colonialism had left a heritage of disunity and conflict within regions of new nations and between nations, along with conditions that led to unstable alliances of ruling elite groups.
While this combination of weaknesses militated against successful self-development, it was fertile ground for energetic foreign entrepreneurs , especially those who had technically advanced manufacturing capacities, capital resources, international money markets, insurance and shipping facilities, plus supportive foreign policies. The early orgy of speculative loans and investments soon ended.
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But before long, British economic penetration entered into more lasting and self-perpetuating activities, such as promoting Latin-American exports, providing railroad equipment, constructing public works , and supplying banking networks. European influence around the globe increased with each new wave of emigration from Europe. Tides of settlers brought with them the Old World culture and, often, useful agricultural and industrial skills.
An estimated 55,, Europeans left their native lands in the years after , the product chiefly of two forces: Other factors were also clearly at work, such as the search for religious freedom, escape from tyrannical governments, avoidance of military conscription, and the desire for greater upward social and economic mobility. Such motives had existed throughout the centuries, however, and they are insufficient to explain the massive population movements that characterized the 19th century.
Unemployment induced by rapid technological changes in agriculture and industry was an important incentive for English emigration in the mids. The surge of German emigration at roughly the same time is largely attributable to an agricultural revolution in Germany, which nearly ruined many farmers on small holdings in southwestern Germany.
Under English rule, the Irish were prevented from industrial development and were directed to an economy based on export of cereals grown on small holdings. A potato blight , followed by famine and eviction of farm tenants by landlords, gave large numbers of Irish no alternative other than emigration or starvation. These three nationalities—English, German, and Irish—composed the largest group of migrants in the s.
In later years Italians and Slavs contributed substantially to the population spillover. The emigrants spread throughout the world, but the bulk of the population transfer went to the Americas, Siberia, and Australasia. The population outflow, greatly facilitated by European supremacy outside Europe, helped ease the social pressures and probably abated the dangers of social upheaval in Europe itself. The outward movement of European peoples in any substantial numbers naturally was tied in with conquest and, to a greater or lesser degree, with the displacement of indigenous populations.
In the United States , where by far the largest number of European emigrants went, acquisition of space for development by white immigrants entailed activity on two fronts: During a large part of the 19th century, the United States remained alert to the danger of encirclement by Europeans, but in addition the search for more fertile land, pursuit of the fur trade, and desire for ports to serve commerce in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans nourished the drive to penetrate the American continent.
The most pressing points of tension with European nations were eliminated during the first half of the century: The expansion of the United States, however, was not confined to liquidating rival claims of overseas empires; it also involved taking territory from neighbouring Mexico. Diplomatic and military victories over the European nations and Mexico were but one precondition for the transcontinental expansion of the United States. In addition, the Indian tribes sooner or later had to be rooted out to clear the new territory.
At times, treaties were arranged with Indian tribes, by which vast areas were opened up for white settlement. But even where peaceful agreements had been reached, the persistent pressure of the search for land and commerce created recurrent wars with Indian tribes that were seeking to retain their homes and their land. Room for the new settlers was obtained by forced removal of natives to as yet non-white-settled land—a process that was repeated as white settlers occupied ever more territory. Massacres during wars, susceptibility to infectious European diseases, and hardships endured during forced migrations all contributed to the decline in the Indian population and the weakening of its resistance.
Nevertheless, Indian wars occupied the U. The annexations during this new phase of imperial growth differed significantly from the expansionism earlier in the 19th century. While the latter was substantial in magnitude, it was primarily devoted to the consolidation of claimed territory by penetration of continental interiors and more effective rule over indigenous populations and only secondarily to new acquisitions.
On the other hand, the new imperialism was characterized by a burst of activity in carving up as yet independent areas: This new vigour in the pursuit of colonies is reflected in the fact that the rate of new territorial acquisitions of the new imperialism was almost three times that of the earlier period. Thus, the increase in new territories claimed in the first 75 years of the 19th century averaged about 83, square miles , square kilometres a year. As against this, the colonial powers added an average of about , square miles , square kilometres a year between the late s and World War I — By the beginning of that war, the new territory claimed was for the most part fully conquered, and the main military resistance of the indigenous populations had been suppressed.
Economic and political control by leading powers reached almost the entire globe, for, in addition to colonial rule, other means of domination were exercised in the form of spheres of influence, special commercial treaties, and the subordination that lenders often impose on debtor nations. This intensification of the drive for colonies reflected much more than a new wave of overseas activities by traditional colonial powers, including Russia. The new imperialism was distinguished particularly by the emergence of additional nations seeking slices of the colonial pie: Indeed, this very multiplication of colonial powers, occurring in a relatively short period, accelerated the tempo of colonial growth.
Unoccupied space that could potentially be colonized was limited. Therefore, the more nations there were seeking additional colonies at about the same time, the greater was the premium on speed. Thus, the rivalry among the colonizing nations reached new heights, which in turn strengthened the motivation for preclusive occupation of territory and for attempts to control territory useful for the military defense of existing empires against rivals.
The impact of the new upsurge of rivalry is well illustrated in the case of Great Britain. Relying on its economic preeminence in manufacturing, trade, and international finance as well as on its undisputed mastery of the seas during most of the 19th century, Great Britain could afford to relax in the search for new colonies, while concentrating on consolidation of the empire in hand and on building up an informal empire. On the other hand, the more that potential colonial space shrank, the greater became the urge of lesser powers to remedy disparities in size of empires by redivision of the colonial world.
The struggle over contested space and for redivision of empire generated an increase in wars among the colonial powers and an intensification of diplomatic manoeuvring. But, by the last quarter of that century, Britain was confronted by restless competitors seeking a greater share of world trade and finance; the Industrial Revolution had gained a strong foothold in these nations, which were spurred on to increasing industrialization with the spread of railroad lines and the maturation of integrated national markets.
Moreover, the major technological innovations of the late 19th and early 20th centuries improved the competitive potential of the newer industrial nations. The late starters, having digested the first Industrial Revolution, now had a more equal footing with Great Britain: This new industrialism, notably featuring mass-produced steel, electric power and oil as sources of energy, industrial chemistry, and the internal-combustion engine , spread over western Europe, the United States, and eventually Japan. To operate efficiently, the new industries required heavy capital investment in large-scale units.
Accordingly, they encouraged the development of capital markets and banking institutions that were large and flexible enough to finance the new enterprises. The larger capital markets and industrial enterprises, in turn, helped push forward the geographic scale of operations of the industrialized nations: Not only did the new industrialism generate a voracious appetite for raw materials, but food for the swelling urban populations was now also sought in the far corners of the world.
Advances in ship construction steamships using steel hulls, twin screws, and compound engines made feasible the inexpensive movement of bulk raw materials and food over long ocean distances. Under the pressures and opportunities of the later decades of the 19th century, more and more of the world was drawn upon as primary producers for the industrialized nations.
Self-contained economic regions dissolved into a world economy, involving an international division of labour whereby the leading industrial nations made and sold manufactured products and the rest of the world supplied them with raw materials and food. The complex of social, political, and economic changes that accompanied the new industrialism and the vastly expanded and integrated world commerce also provided a setting for intensified commercial rivalry, the rebuilding of high tariff walls, and a revival of militarism.
Of special importance militarily was the race in naval construction, which was propelled by the successful introduction and steady improvement of radically new warships that were steam driven, armour-plated, and equipped with weapons able to penetrate the new armour. The new militarism and the intensification of colonial rivalry signalled the end of the relatively peaceful conditions of the midth century. The new imperialism also represented an intensification of tendencies that had originated in earlier periods.
Thus, for example, the decision by the United States to go to war with Spain cannot be isolated from the long-standing interest of the United States in the Caribbean and the Pacific. The defeat of Spain and the suppression of the independence revolutions in Cuba and the Philippines gave substance to the Monroe Doctrine: Possession of the Philippines was consistent with the historic interest of the United States in the commerce of the Pacific, as it had already manifested by its long interest in Hawaii annexed in and by an expedition by Commodore Matthew Perry to Japan The new imperialism marked the end of vacillation over the choice of imperialist military and political policies; similar decisions to push imperialist programs to the forefront were made by the leading industrial nations over a relatively short period.
This historical conjuncture requires explanation and still remains the subject of debate among historians and social scientists. The pivot of the controversy is the degree to which the new imperialism was the product of primarily economic forces and in particular whether it was a necessary attribute of the capitalist system. Serious analysts on both sides of the argument recognize that there is a multitude of factors involved: The problem, however, is one of assigning priority to causes.
The father of the economic interpretation of the new imperialism was the British liberal economist John Atkinson Hobson. In his seminal study, Imperialism, a Study first published in , he pointed to the role of such drives as patriotism, philanthropy, and the spirit of adventure in advancing the imperialist cause.
As he saw it, however, the critical question was why the energy of these active agents takes the particular form of imperialist expansion.
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But it was rational, indeed, in the eyes of the minority of financial interest groups. The pressure of capital needing investment outlets arose in part from a maldistribution of income: Moreover, the practices of the larger firms, especially those operating in trusts and combines, foster restrictions on output, thus avoiding the risks and waste of overproduction.
Because of this, the large firms are faced with limited opportunities to invest in expanding domestic production. The result of both the maldistribution of income and monopolistic behaviour is a need to open up new markets and new investment opportunities in foreign countries. It also examined the associated features of the new imperialism, such as political changes, racial attitudes, and nationalism. The book as a whole made a strong impression on, and greatly influenced, Marxist thinkers who were becoming more involved with the struggle against imperialism.
The most influential of the Marxist studies was a small book published by Lenin in , Imperialism , the Highest Stage of Capitalism. While Hobson saw the new imperialism serving the interests of certain capitalist groups, he believed that imperialism could be eliminated by social reforms while maintaining the capitalist system. Lenin, on the other hand, saw imperialism as being so closely integrated with the structure and normal functioning of an advanced capitalism that he believed that only the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism, with the substitution of Socialism, would rid the world of imperialism.
Lenin placed the issues of imperialism in a context broader than the interests of a special sector of the capitalist class. According to Lenin, capitalism itself changed in the late 19th century; moreover, because this happened at pretty much the same time in several leading capitalist nations, it explains why the new phase of capitalist development came when it did.
This new phase, Lenin believed, involves political and social as well as economic changes; but its economic essence is the replacement of competitive capitalism by monopoly capitalism, a more advanced stage in which finance capital, an alliance between large industrial and banking firms, dominates the economic and political life of society. Competition continues, but among a relatively small number of giants who are able to control large sectors of the national and international economy.
It is this monopoly capitalism and the resulting rivalry generated among monopoly capitalist nations that foster imperialism; in turn, the processes of imperialism stimulate the further development of monopoly capital and its influence over the whole society. Like Hobson, Lenin maintained that the increasing importance of capital exports is a key figure of imperialism, but he attributed the phenomenon to much more than pressure from an overabundance of capital. He also saw the acceleration of capital migration arising from the desire to obtain exclusive control over raw material sources and to get a tighter grip on foreign markets.
He thus shifted the emphasis from the general problem of surplus capital, inherent in capitalism in all its stages, to the imperatives of control over raw materials and markets in the monopoly stage. With this perspective, Lenin also broadened the concept of imperialism. Because the thrust is to divide the world among monopoly interest groups, the ensuing rivalry extends to a struggle over markets in the leading capitalist nations as well as in the less advanced capitalist and colonial countries.
This rivalry is intensified because of the uneven development of different capitalist nations: Other forces—political, military, and ideological—are at play in shaping the contours of imperialist policy, but Lenin insisted that these influences germinate in the seedbed of monopoly capitalism. Perhaps the most systematic alternative theory of imperialism was proposed by Joseph Alois Schumpeter , one of the best known economists of the first half of the 20th century.
Unlike other critics, however, Schumpeter accepted some of the components of the Marxist thesis, and to a certain extent he followed the Marxist tradition of looking for the influence of class forces and class interests as major levers of social change. In doing so, he in effect used the weapons of Marxist thought to rebut the essence of Marxist theory. A survey of empires, beginning with the earliest days of written history, led Schumpeter to conclude that there are three generic characteristics of imperialism: They evolved from critical experiences when peoples and classes were molded into warriors to avoid extinction; the warrior mentality and the interests of warrior classes live on, however, and influence events even after the vital need for wars and conquests disappears.
But for these factors, Schumpeter believed, imperialism would have been swept away into the dustbin of history as capitalist society ripened; for capitalism in its purest form is antithetical to imperialism: Yet despite the innate peaceful nature of capitalism, interest groups do emerge that benefit from aggressive foreign conquests.
Under monopoly capitalism the fusion of big banks and cartels creates a powerful and influential social group that pressures for exclusive control in colonies and protectorates, for the sake of higher profits. But according to Schumpeter, it is an artificial graft on the more natural competitive capitalism, made possible by the catalytic effect of the residue from the preceding feudal society.
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Schumpeter argued that monopoly capitalism can only grow and prosper under the protection of high tariff walls; without that shield there would be large-scale industry but no cartels or other monopolistic arrangements. Because tariff walls are erected by political decisions, it is the state and not a natural economic process that promotes monopoly.
Therefore, it is in the nature of the state—and especially those features that blend the heritage of the previous autocratic state, the old war machine, and feudal interests and ideas along with capitalist interests—that the cause of imperialism will be discovered. The particular form of imperialism in modern times is affected by capitalism, and capitalism itself is modified by the imperialist experience. Specialized studies have produced a variety of interpretations of the origin or reawakening of the new imperialism: These reasons—along with other frequently mentioned contributing causes, such as the spirit of national and racial superiority and the drive for power—are still matters of controversy with respect to specific cases and to the problem of fitting them into a general theory of imperialism.
For example, if it is found that a new colony was acquired for better military defense of existing colonies, the questions still remain as to why the existing colonies were acquired in the first place and why it was considered necessary to defend them rather than to give them up. Similarly, explanations in terms of the search for power still have to account for the close relationship between power and wealth, because in the real world adequate economic resources are needed for a nation to hold on to its power, let alone to increase it.
Moreover, it is carried forth in the midst of a complex of political, military, economic, and psychological impulses. It would seem, therefore, that the attempt to arrive at a theory that explains each and every imperialist action—ranging from a semifeudal Russia to a relatively undeveloped Italy to an industrially powerful Germany—is a vain pursuit. But this does not eliminate the more important challenge of constructing a theory that will provide a meaningful interpretation of the almost simultaneous eruption of the new imperialism in a whole group of leading powers.
European nations and Japan at the end of the 19th century spread their influence and control throughout the continent of Asia. Russia, because of its geographic position, was the only occupying power whose Asian conquests were overland. In that respect there is some similarity between Russia and the United States in the forcible outward push of their continental frontiers. But there is a significant difference: On the other hand, the Russian march across Asia resulted in the incorporation of alien cultures and societies as virtual colonies of the Russian Empire , while providing room for the absorption of Russian settlers.
Previously, Russian influence in its occupied territory was quite limited, without marked alteration of the social and economic structure of the conquered peoples. Aside from looting and exacting tribute from subject tribes, the major objects of interest were the fur trade, increased commerce with China and in the Pacific, and land. But changes in 19th-century Russian society, especially those coming after the Crimean War —56 , signaled a new departure.
Second, the emancipation of the serfs , which eased the feudal restrictions on the landless peasants, led to large waves of migration by Russians and Ukrainians—first to Siberia and later to Central Asia. This process of acquisition and consolidation in Asia spread out in four directions: This pursuit of tsarist ambitions for empire and for warm-water ports involved numerous clashes and conflicts along the way. Russian expansion was ultimately limited not by the fierce opposition of the native population, which was at times a stumbling block, but by the counterpressure of competitive empire builders, such as Great Britain and Japan.
Great Britain and Russia were mutually alarmed as the distances between the expanding frontiers of Russia and India shortened. One point of conflict was finally resolved when both powers agreed on the delimitation of the northern border of Afghanistan. A second major area of conflict in Central Asia was settled by an Anglo-Russian treaty to divide Persia into two separate spheres of influence, leaving a nominally independent Persian nation. As in the case of Afghanistan and Persia, penetration of Chinese territory produced clashes with both the native government and other imperialist powers.
With this as a stepping-stone, Russia took over the seacoast north of Korea and founded the town of Vladivostok. But, because the Vladivostok harbour is icebound for some four months of the year, the Russians began to pay more attention to getting control of the Korean coastline, where many good year-round harbours could be found.
Attempts to acquire a share of Korea, as well as all of Manchuria, met with the resistance of Britain and Japan. Further thrusts into China beyond the Amur and maritime provinces were finally thwarted by defeat in in the Russo-Japanese War. The evolution of the penetration of Asia was naturally influenced by a multiplicity of factors—economic and political conditions in the expanding nations, the strategy of the military officials of the latter nations, the problems facing colonial rulers in each locality, pressures arising from white settlers and businessmen in the colonies, as well as the constraints imposed by the always limited economic and military resources of the imperialist powers.
All these elements were present to a greater or lesser extent at each stage of the forward push of the colonial frontiers by the Dutch in Indonesia, the French in Indochina Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia , and the British in Malaya, Burma, and Borneo. Yet, despite the variety of influences at work, three general types of penetration stand out. One of these is expansion designed to overcome resistance to foreign rule.
Resistance, which assumed many forms ranging from outright rebellion to sabotage of colonial political and economic domination, was often strongest in the border areas farthest removed from the centres of colonial power. The consequent extension of military control to the border regions tended to arouse the fears and opposition of neighbouring states or tribal societies and thus led to the further extension of control.
Hence, attempts to achieve military security prompted the addition of border areas and neighbouring nations to the original colony. A second type of expansion was a response to the economic opportunities offered by exploitation of the colonial interiors. Traditional trade and the free play of market forces in Asia did not produce huge supplies of raw materials and food or the enlarged export markets sought by the industrializing colonial powers. For this, entrepreneurs and capital from abroad were needed, mines and plantations had to be organized, labour supplies mobilized, and money economies created.
All these alien intrusions functioned best under the firm security of an accommodating alien law and order. The third type of expansion was the result of rivalry among colonial powers. When possible, new territory was acquired or old possessions extended in order either to preclude occupation by rivals or to serve as buffers for military security against the expansions of nearby colonial powers.
Where the crosscurrents of these rivalries prevented any one power from obtaining exclusive control, various substitute arrangements were arrived at: The penetration of China is the outstanding example of this type of expansion. In the early 19th century the middle part of eastern Asia Japan, Korea, and China , containing about half the Asian population, was still little affected by Western penetration. By the end of the century, Korea was on the way to becoming annexed by Japan, which had itself become a leading imperialist power.
China remained independent politically, though it was already extensively dominated by outside powers. Undoubtedly, the intense rivalry of the foreign powers helped save China from being taken over outright as India had been. China was pressed on all sides by competing powers anxious for its trade and territory: Russia from the north, Great Britain via India and Burma from the south and west, France via Indochina from the south, and Japan and the United States in part, via the Philippines from the east.
The first phase of the forceful penetration of China by western Europe came in the two Opium Wars. Great Britain had been buying increasing quantities of tea from China, but it had few products that China was interested in buying by way of exchange. And because of a rapidly increasing demand for tea in England, British merchants actively fostered the profitable exports of opium and cotton from India. In light of the economic effect of the opium trade plus the physical and mental deterioration of opium users, Chinese authorities banned the opium trade.
At first this posed few obstacles to British merchants, who resorted to smuggling. But enforcement of the ban became stringent toward the end of the s; stores of opium were confiscated, and warehouses were closed down. British merchants had an additional and longstanding grievance because the Chinese limited all trade by foreigners to the port of Canton. The Chinese capitulated in after the fleet reached the Yangtze, Shanghai fell, and Nanking was under British guns. The resulting Treaty of Nanking —the first in a series of commercial treaties China was forced to sign over the years—provided for: Other countries soon took advantage of this forcible opening of China; in a few years similar treaties were signed by China with the United States, France, and Russia.
The Chinese, however, tried to retain some independence by preventing foreigners from entering the interior of China. Western merchants sought further concessions to improve markets. The Western powers took advantage of the increasing difficulties by pressing for even more favourable trade treaties, culminating in a second war against China —60 , this time by France and England. Characteristically, the Western powers invading China played a double role: The Tientsin treaties provided, among other things, for the right of foreign nationals to travel in the interior, the right of foreign ships to trade and patrol on the Yangtze River , the opening up of more treaty ports, and additional exclusive legal jurisdiction by foreign powers over their nationals residing in China.
Treaties of this general nature were extended over the years to grant further privileges to foreigners. Furthermore, more and more Western nations—including Germany, Italy, Denmark, The Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, and Austria-Hungary—took advantage of the new opportunities by signing such treaties. By the beginning of the 20th century, some 90 Chinese ports had been opened to foreign control. While the Chinese government retained nominal sovereignty in these ports, de facto rule was exercised by one or more of the powers: In most of the treaty ports, China leased substantial areas of land at low rates to foreign governments.
Through the letters they wrote, we learn of the everyday life, hardships and challenges faced — including those encountered on a personal level. Coupled with an analysis of one Norwegian company Azania Ltd, later Krag Estates Ltd , this chapter illustrates key aspects of en- trepreneurship in colonial Africa. Bang shows that one of the main agents in NEAT, a Norwegian entrepreneur nick- named Zanzibar-Olsen, was integral to European colonial expansion in East Africa and, significantly, to the telecommunications revolution in telegrams and railways. A contrastive account of entrepreneurship is presented by Eidsvik chapter 3 , who focuses on the emergence and growth of a Norwe- gian-origin family dynasty in Knysna, South Africa.
Being involved in a number of trades, as well as politics and governance in South Africa in general, the Thesen family is a key reference point for any history of the timber trade, as well as in relation to the broader history of the Knysna region. Reiersen provides a detailed analysis of the entrepreneurship of Norwegian businessman, international strategist and architect Christian Thams, focusing on his African investments in general and the dynamics of how Madal came to be in Norwegian hands.
Bertelsen, meanwhile, seeks to show how Norwegian investments in and control over Madal were integral to Por- tuguese colonial politics. He argues that it was a form of business in which near-sovereign control was exercised on the part of companies like Madal; its extraction of monetary and other resources through tax- ation in money or goods from African subjects, for instance, assumed great proportions — and these resources were freighted out of colonial Africa on Norwegian ships. Hviding, in his introductory chapter to Norwegian seafaring in Oceania chapter 7 , highlights the copra trade and its rogue character.
China in Oceania: Reshaping the Pacific? (Dislocations) by Terence Wesley-Smith,Edgar A. Porter
Building his introduction to Nor- wegian shipping, seafaring and trade around the histories of a range of ships — from the s until well into the twentieth century — his account revolves around the adaptability and practical nature of the relatively numerous Norwegians compared to similarly sized shipping states that chose to settle in the area.
Contrary to what one might assume, Norwegians adapted very well to an early colonial and in some cases nearly pre- colonial island context, where warfare between groups and violence against merchants was not unknown. Nygaard, on the other hand, provides an analysis of a key maritime contrast between the systems of liner shipping and that of the tramp trade by comparing Swedish and Norwegian shipping to South Africa from around until World War I chapter 1. Mainly concerned with the economic and structural aspects of such shipping, as well as its sheer volume, he demonstrates how Norwegian shipping in the period was able to exploit an economic niche in the market of sailing ships — based on their knowledge of ports and conditions in colonial southern and South Africa.
As the individual chapters show, the ebbs and tides of the possibil- ities of colonial navigation varied greatly across time and space and, of course, in relation to particular areas in Africa and Oceania. These possibilities were also conditioned by political, social and economic de- velopments in Norway.
By analysing key sources, documents and actors, Angell demonstrates that the process leading up to that year was part of a period of great expansionist and nationalist orientation — and one in which the separation issue had both a colonial and a commercial side. The various chapters that now follow may be read as separate enti- ties, as each is concerned with a particular aspect of Norwegian colonial entrepreneurship. The contributors explore specific situations from the point of view of a variety of disciplines, such as history, geography and anthropology. However, while each provides a unique narrative — as tentatively outlined in the sections above — the chapters also exemplify what has been argued in this introduction as characterizing the colonial order: Seen from this perspec- tive, each author has made a contribution here towards making more complex Norwegian understandings of their past, as well as adding to the important and ever-changing field of colonial studies and history in Africa and Oceania more generally.
Thanks are ex- tended to all of these. In one version of the world systems approach, Giovanni Arrighi sees im- perialism and colonialism as integral to a globalized history of industrial- ization and capitalist transformation. As Eric Wolf [] As capitalist expansion is integral to the colonial era examined in this volume, the case studies presented here may, following Wolf, illustrate the hetero- geneity of colonial encounters, agents and dynamics.
Some scholarly work not covered here deals with what has been called the colonization by Norway, Sweden and Finland of their northern territories and the Saami and Finn indigenous peoples. More recently, Fur ; see also Kent However, going into these debates as well as postcolonial studies see, e.
Jensen that a substantial number of the sailors involved in the triangular slave trade be- tween the Danish Gold Coast and the West Indies were Norwegian, and also Danish and Swedish. Storhedstid og hensygnen Danish East India, — Era of Greatness and of Enfeeblement.
Thomasson ; see also Fur for an argument about Swedish colo- nial complicity in general. In emphasizing the multisemic nature of colonialism, however, we refrain from engaging in the recurring colonial and imperial nostalgia that has been a feature of, for instance, French academic approaches to colonial history see Cooper This is not to say that there is no record of critical approaches to colonial studies in French academia and among public intellectuals — as Stoler recognizes.
The argument made here for photographs could easily be extended to ma- terial dimensions: Interestingly, a questioning of sovereign coherence and unity may be turned on the colonial powers and their metropoles — an exercise Cooper ; see also and undertakes in an analysis of the French polity as well as Mbembe more recently. Another relevant scholarly trend looks at how colonial agents are in some current literature seen as acting predominantly out of self-interest and less out of a sense of civic duty or necessarily due to a shared sense of colo- nial or imperial ethos.
The other two main areas Falola identifies are, first, decolonization and nationalism and, second, the postcolonial state and society. Swedish Ventures in Cameroon, — Trade and Travel, People and Politics. The Geometry of Imperialism: The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times. Lineages of the Twenty-First Century. London and New York: Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter.
A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, — Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice. An Invitation to Remake History. A History of Civilizations.
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