Treatise 8: God’s Grace (Faith Seeking Understanding Book 1)

The book's presentation of traditional doctrine in freshly contemporary ways, its concern to hear and critically engage new voices in theology, and its creative and accessible style have kept it one of the most stimulating, balanced, and readable guides to theology available. This second edition of Faith Seeking Understanding features improvements from cover to cover. Besides updating and expanding the entire text of the book, Migliore has added two completely new chapters. The first, "Confessing Jesus Christ in Context," explores the unique contributions to Christian theology made by recent theologians working in the African American, Asian American, Latin American, Hispanic, feminist, womanist, and mujerista traditions.

The second new chapter, "The Finality of Jesus Christ and Religious Pluralism," addresses the growing interest in the relationship of Christianity to other religions and their adherents. Migliore's three delightful theological dialogues are followed by a new appendix, an extensive glossary of theological terms, making the book even more useful to students seeking to understand the history, themes, and challenges of Christian belief.

Paperback , pages. Published June 14th by William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company first published To see what your friends thought of this book, please sign up. To ask other readers questions about Faith Seeking Understanding , please sign up.

Be the first to ask a question about Faith Seeking Understanding. Lists with This Book. What an amazing theological entry point. We just completed a spiritual journey through FSU as a church and oh, how enriching it was to locate ourselves within a theological framework in community. Feb 23, Matthewfryeinsightbb. This book is a good read for those who want to understand some of the basic principles and beliefs of Christianity. Many major topics are covered, examining multiple approaches to those topics, and giving criticism. The focus of the book, rightly describing Christianity, is on a Christ centered belief system, where the causes for the poor, the discriminated, and alienated are held at high importance.

Reading and understanding the material was easy, as it was organized and presented in a user-fri This book is a good read for those who want to understand some of the basic principles and beliefs of Christianity. Reading and understanding the material was easy, as it was organized and presented in a user-friendly format. There was a nice mixture of common words along with religious terminology, which again, aids in understanding.

With this said, it is not a quick read as the material is hefty. All in all, I learned a lot from this book, and the author did not seem to present too much bias, that is, until the last chapter. I cannot make up my mind concerning the chapter of eschatology. I liked the unique approach that was taken, which went beyond defining views such as amillenillism, post-tribulational, and such. The main focus of the chapter was a discussion on the basic, universal Christian hopes and reaction to those hopes. But I am also really troubled with this last chapter, as he readily dismisses those who believe in the Rapture, but does not give any explanation to defend his argument.

Then, he talks about essential symbols of Christianity, such as hell, questions them, and states that they are only symbolic, and should not be taken literal. I was very discerned by this. I almost knocked the book down to a four-star rating on this one rough chapter. Ultimately, if you want to learn, through unbiased explanation, the basic beliefs behind Christianity, and how it should be conducted, this is a good book. But if you are looking to expand you knowledge about specific books of the Bible, or about apocalyptic beliefs, this book does not aid in these areas.

Aug 13, Pamela rated it it was amazing. The first theology text I read all the way through and enjoyed while I learned, and I am not saying that because I am friends with the author. I read it before the Presbyterian ordination exams in ish, and really loved it. I have often said that this subject needs two courses. But those are too large for single courses. But in the case of a single course introduction, one is really strapped to find good smaller introductions. Thomas and Wondra's Introduction to Christian Theology, a more liberal Anglican introduction, which the course I teach currently uses, is well researched, but often skips right into very abstract topics without giving a simple overview of the doctrinal basics.

An Introduction is good, but it is like sipping wine through a fire house, cramming so much in such a small space. Finding Daniel Migliore's Faith Seeking Understanding, especially this newer addition, has deeply impressed me. Migliore is able to present topics in a succinct yet comprehensive manner. He is ecumenically minded and global-minded. His theology displays a sensitivity to Black and South American liberation theology, feminism, and Asian theological conversations that are often ignored by mainstream western, male-dominated theology.

His chapter on dialogue with other religions, notably Judaism and Islam, is just the thing that needs to be in an introduction. Migliore is a good writer that gives a certain richness to topics that are often very dry. I don't know what I would have done differently. I am not the master Migliore clearly is. I thought his section on the atonement was a bit too short for how important the topic is. On every chapter, there was, of course, much more he could have gone into, but A good introduction delivers substance but does not overload.

It wets the proverbial whistle, which Migliore definitely does. Each chapter informs the reader, but also invites them in deeper. Aug 02, Andrew rated it really liked it. Easily the best 'introduction to theology' that I've ever read. Having taught the class myself once or twice in years past, I would unquestionably use this book again -- even in an environment where English is a second language. Jan 17, Ray rated it it was ok Recommended to Ray by: I have to wonder if the folks who wrote the first reviews read the same text that I did!

This was my basic text for an intro. He is classically trained, very disiplined, and a real gentleman. But, as this book demonstrates, he can't be termed a great theologian. While he claims to be a Barthian, and he does use Barth's categories, he would not be recognized as such by Barth. He might be described as more a "string of pearls" t I have to wonder if the folks who wrote the first reviews read the same text that I did!

He might be described as more a "string of pearls" thinker -- he takes things he likes from a variety of contradictory sources, with no apparent anchor or controling principle.

1. Faith Seeking Understanding: An Introduction to Christian Theology by Daniel L. Migliore!
2. The Black Dragons.
3. Start Losing Weight - 7 Days Diet Plan!

What you get is more of a "mood" than a tangible response to God's voice in Scripture. This is a very weak, very inconsistent, very frustrating work. I hardly ever score things poorly on Amazon, but I had to comment on this when I saw the other glowing reviews. There are all kinds of good theology texts, both to the "left" and to the "right" of Migliore. Louis Berkof, for example, is a classic that is clear and helpful. Dec 26, Michaelpatrick Keena rated it did not like it Shelves: Reading this book is as refreshing as drinking from a muddy river. This neo-orthodox writer is promoted as major defender of the Reformed Church and Christian orthodoxy.

Occasionally backing Biblical soundness, Migliore undermines the very Word he is describes and investigates. I have read better from the papers used to line the bottom of parrot cages Mar 02, Kate Wester rated it did not like it. An ok introduction into systematic theology. Migliore offers up a kind of Christocentric liberation theology. Like some liberation theology, it occasionally paints in broad brushes and lacks discretion. Migliore definitely wants to have his cake and eat it too. But this rhetorical mo An ok introduction into systematic theology. Often I will look to sell books after class, but this one I will keep and I have even jotted some things down that might be good to explore in sermons.

In fact, I have quoted from this book in a sermon already. Migliore's writing is quite beautiful and is also well organized. I like the use of numbered points with italicized statements. It makes the book easy to work through and digest. He presents a lot of information on different theologies around key doctrines, discusses weaknesses and streng Often I will look to sell books after class, but this one I will keep and I have even jotted some things down that might be good to explore in sermons.

He presents a lot of information on different theologies around key doctrines, discusses weaknesses and strengths of them, and presents his improvements upon them. Improvements might be a strong term, but I'll leave it there. May 16, Sparowhawke rated it really liked it. The impetus for reading this book came after listening to a thought-provoking sermon, one that drew on a more contemporary view of Reformed theology.

I was curious to learn more and asked the preacher for suggested readings. He lent me his copy of this book the version , which he had read while in seminary. The cover quotes a review that describes the book as "[a]n ideal primer," but the author presupposes that the reader already has a primary knowledge of the subject. The discussions, ther The impetus for reading this book came after listening to a thought-provoking sermon, one that drew on a more contemporary view of Reformed theology.

The discussions, therefore, too often come across as more conclusory than foundational. Perhaps that is inevitable in a textbook intended to survey in one semester a subject about which other writers discuss in voluminous treatises, but the evident gaps and unsupported assertions made this less than a fully satisfying read. That is not to say, however, that the book failed to serve the purpose for which I read it. The following quotation from ad 2 is important for certain things we will discuss later: Thomas gives his own account of the ordering of doctrines from the most central downward.

The two chief doctrines are the Trinity since participation in the life of the Trinity constitutes "eternal life" for us and the Incarnation since it is through Christ's human nature that we are empowered to participate in eternal life. By starting with them, we can include the others, both those pertaining to the order of nature e.

Thomas's reply to the objection that the formulation of creeds is inappropriate: So in order to elicit the truth of the faith from Sacred Scripture, one needs long study and practice, which are not attainable by everyone who needs to know the truth of the faith.

For most of them are busy with other affairs and cannot spend their time studying. So it was necessary to gather together a clear summary from the sayings of Sacred Scripture that would be proposed for everyone to believe. Thomas argues that it is reserved ultimately to the Pope to formulate the creeds of the faith, at least in the sense of approving as creeds of the faith formulas that have been proposed by councils or even by individuals.

Note, also, ad 2, where St. Thomas says that subsequent councils can formulate new creeds, consistent with those formulated by previous councils, in order to meet the challenge posed by new heresies. In sense a "cogitating with assent" does not express a complete account of faith, since then someone would have faith even when he contemplates what he has understanding of intellectus: But sense b does capture the precise nature of faith.

For i the act of faith involves assent simultaneously with the cogitation , whereas in intellectus and scientia the cogitation i. So an act of faith involves both firm adherence to one part and continuous inquiry unterminated by any evident seeing of the truth. That is, one who has faith with respect to a given object firmly assents to that object without seeing its truth clearly. In ad 1 St. Thomas clarifies this by pointing out that the 'inquiry' associated with faith does not aim to demonstrate the object of faith, but rather to look into those things that lead one to the assent of faith.

In other words, what one looks into are indications of the trustworthiness of the revelation that a given object is, though not evident, worthy of one's assent. And in ad 3 St. Thomas makes explicit what has to this point has been implicit: This question explores St. Augustine's invocation of the threefold relation that the act of faith has to God as its object: This last--or perhaps a combination of a and c --is what Pope John Paul has in mind when he talks of the act of faith as an act of "entrusting oneself to God. In ad 3 St. Thomas flat-out denies that non-believers believe that God exists and is such-and-such in the same sense that believers do.

The reason is that they do not know God in the intimate way revealed through the act of faith in the articles of the Catholic Faith. For instance, the best that non-believers can do is to prove the existence of God under some such description as 'First Cause' or, at best, 'Perfect Being'. But this is to think of God in a way that falls far short of the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation, wherein God is seen in three persons: Thomas concludes, "[Non-believers] do not truly believe that God exists, since as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 9, when it comes to simple entities, the only defect in knowing them lies in not grasping them at all.

What, if anything, must be explicitly held on faith? This is the topic of the next four articles. The objections in art. In his reply St. Thomas distinguishes what is properly and per se the object of faith and that which is related to the object of faith as a consequence. It is the former, rather than the latter, that falls under the precepts associated with the virtue of faith. To wit, that which makes one a happy or flourishing human being is the per se object of faith--these are the articles of the Faith--whereas everything handed down in Sacred Scripture is related to faith as a consequence e.

Only the former must be held explicitly. In reply to the objections, St. Thomas claims that 'ought' does not imply 'can' if we limit 'can' to what is in our power without the help of grace. When God gives someone the grace to assent to the articles of the faith, this is a function of his mercy, whereas when he withholds this grace because of our sinfulness, this is a function of his justice. Thomas explains this further in art. By the same token, simple believers who have been misled by heretics should not be blamed for this as long as they do not hold to the false teachings obstinately.

Is faith in Christ necessary for salvation art. Yes, but in different ways according to the diverse circumstances that human beings find themselves in. After the sin of the first parents, all who made sacrifices, both before and after the Law, foreshadowing Christ's sacrifice knew implicitly or explicitly that the anointed one of God would come to save us from our sins.

Thomas puts it in ad 3: For even though they did not have explicit faith in him, they nonetheless had implicit faith in divine providence, believing that God would deliver mankind in whatever way pleased him, and that he would have revealed the truth to some.

Treatise on Faith

Something similar holds for the doctrine of the Trinity art. Later on--and especially in the missionary fervor of the 15th and 16th centuries, these claims of St. Thomas would be carefully reexamined. The two relevant doctrines are salvation through Christ alone and God's universal salvific will.

Thomas seems to leave room for a kind of implicit faith on the part of non-believers who are simple and believe in God's sovereignty. See also 10,4 ad 3 below. But the issue is murky. These articles ask about the meritoriousness of faith, and they are absolutely essential for our understanding of the affective element involved in the act of faith. The objections in article 9 "Is the act of faith meritorious? Thomas spends the bulk of the article replying to them. I'll get to them in a moment.

The thing to be clear about is that the act of faith is voluntary, proceeding from free choice: But to have faith is itself an act of intellect assenting to divine truth at the command of the will, which is moved by God through grace. And so it is subject to free choice as referred to God. Hence, the act of faith is capable of being meritorious.

The first objection is that charity, which is our participation in the very life and happiness of the Holy Trinity, is the principle of merit; but the act of faith--at least the very first one--precedes the infusion of the virtue of charity and so cannot itself be meritorious. Note that not every morally upright free act is meritorious.

We merit only because of God's gratuitous initiative in transforming us by grace into his children, members of his divine family. Thomas's reply is that the act of faith is like a material disposition that precedes the last form induced by an efficient cause. In the present case, faith is a disposition effected by God that prepares us for his intended effect, viz. It is true that the subject of a form cannot act in the power of that form before it has the form, and to this extent the objection is on the mark.

However, once charity has been effected in the soul by God, then an act of faith can be meritorious. The second objection is that because acts of knowing scientifically scire and acts of adopting opinions opinare are not meritorious, acts of faith--which fall in between these two--are not meritorious, either. Thomas agrees that since the assent of knowing scientifically is not voluntary, it is not itself meritorious.

Nonetheless, it can be meritorious to will the actual consideration of something that is known, since it is within our power to will or not to will to give our consideration to a particular object. Opinions by definition do not involve firm assent and hence do not proceed from a "perfect" will. Thus, such assent does not seem to have much by way of merit, even though, once again, the actual consideration of objects of opinion can be meritorious if done for love of God.

The third objection goes like this: When one assents with faith to some object, he does this either in the presence of some cause that is sufficient to induce his assent or he does it without such a cause; if with a sufficient cause, then the act is not meritorious because it is not free; if without a sufficient cause, then the act does not seem to be meritorious, either--presumably, because in such a case the act is foolish.

Thomas replies that one who assents by faith has sufficient in the sense of 'enough of a' reason, since he is induced to make the act by "the authority of divine doctrine confirmed by miracles. Article 10 goes into this last point a bit more deeply. Shouldn't it be the case that the stronger the arguments adduced for the doctrines of the faith, the less meritorious the act of faith itself is? Thomas begins by saying, "The act of faith can be meritorious insofar as it is subject to the will not only with respect to the use but also with respect to the assent.

Unlike the case of scientia , where 'the use' of the intellect, i. He then explains that there are two ways in which human reasons adduced in favor of the faith are related to the will:. In the first or antecedent way, someone would not will to believe at all--or at least would not will to believe with promptitude--unless he were induced by human reasons.

This does indeed diminish the meritoriousness of the act of faith, just as an antecedent passion diminishes the praiseworthiness of a virtuous act. Thomas makes clear that one's readiness to believe on God's authority would add merit even if one had a demonstrative proof of the preambles. For in such a case one would promptly believe even in the absence of the proof. However, in the second way, human reasons are consequent to the willing to believe. For instance, when someone has a prompt will to believe, he loves the truth he believes and thinks about it and asks whether there are human, as well as divine, reasons to believe it.

Here human reasons not only do not diminish merit but even add to it. Thomas first invokes a general principle concerning the relation between a virtue and its proper exterior acts: For instance, fasting is by its species directed to the end of abstinence Thomas points out that fortitude may be a per accidens rather than per se cause of a confession of faith in virtue of removing an obstacle such as fear or embarrassment.

And in ad 2 he points out that faith, mediated by a supernatural act of love, is a cause of the acts of other virtues by commanding them rather than, as in the case of its own proper acts, by eliciting them directly and without mediation.

Treatise on Faith

In ad 2 St. Thomas acknowledges the distinction between those who are charged with teaching the Faith and refuting errors and those who are not so charged. Nonetheless, under certain conditions everyone will have an obligation to confess the Faith openly. Still, in ad 3 St. Thomas acknowledges that there might be circumstances in which a public confession of Faith would upset nonbelievers without benefiting either believers or the Faith itself. And in such circumstances it would not be praiseworthy to give a public confession of Faith.

On the other hand, there will also be circumstances in which a profession of Faith is called for even if it perturbs nonbelievers. As we have already seen, the proper act of faith is an act of the intellect that is determined to its object by the command of the will. So the act of faith is ordered both a to the object of the will, which is the good, and b to the object of the intellect, which is the true. Each of the theological virtues has God for its end and its object.

The object of the act of faith is the First Truth insofar as it is not seen, i. So the First Truth is related to the act of faith in the manner of an end that is unseen. Consequently, this end is hoped for "the substance of things hoped for". And it is in this way that the First Truth is the object of the will, i. On the other hand, the relation of the object of the act of faith to the object of the intellect is that it is an "argument" argumentum of things that are not evident.

For an argument is something that induces the intellect to adhere to some truth. In this case, it is the authority of God which prompts the intellect of the believer to adhere to things that it does not see clearly. Thomas sums up his discussion by proposing the following formal definition: This article focuses on the proper immediate ontological subject of faith, and helps us to better understand the interplay between the cognitive and affective dimensions of the act of faith.

Even though faith involves will and volition, as we have seen, it is properly an intellectual virtue having the true as its object, and hence it has the intellect as its immediate subject. Still, because the assent of the intellect is prompted by the command of the will, both principles need to be well-disposed in order for the act of faith to be perfect. Thomas's example of the act of sawing a piece of wood--both principles, the saw and the one who uses it, need to be well-disposed in order for the act to be 'perfect'.

Also note the analogy he draws between reason and the passions, on the one hand, and the will and the intellect, on the other. Just as both the passions and reason need to be habituated in their own right prudence is the relevant virtue in the case of reason in order for, say, an act of courage to be perfect, so too, it is not enough just for our intellective appetite to desire and command an act of faith; our intellect must be well disposed--that is, open to receiving God's word--as well.

This good disposition is the habit of faith itself. This is a common enough phenomenon with regard to all acts of faith in general. There is often something we sincerely want to take on someone's word but find it difficult to because of various "intellectual" obstacles or objections. We want to avoid gullibility, but by the same token, we want to avoid a pathological mistrust in the word and character of others. Recall Augustine's intellectual difficulties with the Catholic Faith. Part of his intellectual problem had to do with disordered affections for instance, his initial disdain for Sacred Scripture , but part of it was his genuine inability to see the possible truth of certain doctrines.

In any case, the object of the act of faith is the First-truth-qua-hidden and so faith is a properly intellectual virtue, even though it intimately involves affective considerations. Those considerations come to the fore in the next article. Charity is the 'form' of faith in the sense of prompting and providing motivation for the exercise of the virtue of faith.

As with every other action, the act of faith takes one species from its object and one from its end or motive see notes on ST , , and like every other action by one who has God's gift of habitual grace, the motive for acts of faith is the supernatural love of God, or charity. The next question is about the relationship between faith formed by charity and faith not formed by charity, which is how the relevant habit exists in one who has, through sin, repudiated the filial relationship with God established by the gift of grace. Is it the same virtue or habit that was once formed and is now unformed.

This is an important question for the life of the believer, since it describes one dimension of the condition of a believer who has turned his back on God through serious mortal sin. At least at the beginning of the state of mortal sin, the sinner seems to have the very same disposition to acts of faith. This is especially clear in the case of one who repents of his sin almost immediately. Thomas accepts this datum of experience and holds that the very same infused habit which was previously formed can become unformed through sin. In doing so, he rejects a the opinion that formed and unformed faith are distinct habits infused separately by God as appropriate to the believer's condition, and b the opinion that formed and unformed faith are distinct habits always present in the believer, the one operative only in the state of grace and the other operative only in the state of mortal sin.

Still, in article 5 St. Thomas makes clear that unformed faith does not count as a virtue, because by definition "a virtue is a kind of perfection. The next three articles concern faith's status as a virtue. Formed faith is a virtue because it is a habit that is invariably the principle of a good act. The habit of formed faith invariably gives rise to a good act, because through it the intellect is invariably and infallibly guided toward its object, the true, and the will affected by charity is invariably directed toward its authentic final end, union with God, and as such commands the assent of the intellect.

But just as the habit of a passion is, though moderate, not a virtue unless it is directed by prudence, so too unformed faith is not a virtue because it is not motivated by charity. Thomas also makes the distinction between the virtue of faith on the one hand and the gifts of knowledge and understanding on the other. First, as we learn in art.

Second, the object of faith includes both eternal and temporal matters, the latter insofar as they relate to something eternal. On the other hand, the gift of knowledge is concerned specifically with temporal matters, since this gift is a disposition to respond quickly to the Holy Spirit's promptings to see particular temporal affairs from the perspective of faith, whereas the gift of understanding is a similar disposition to respond quickly to the Holy Spirit's promptings to discern eternal matters, and most especially what does and does not belong to the despotism of faith.

Questions of this form often give very interesting descriptions of the relations among the virtues. The first thing to understand--and this is clear if one reads the treatise on virtue very carefully--is that from the perspective of faith the only virtues in an unqualified sense are the theological virtues and infused moral virtues. This is because only these virtues order us properly toward our genuine final end of filial union with God.

With this in mind, it is easy to understand St. Thomas's claim that faith is properly speaking the first of the virtues. Note the claim that "natural cognition cannot attain to God as the object of that beatitude that [the virtues of] hope and charity tend toward. On the other hand, there are fixed acquired dispositions virtues in the improper sense that prepare the way for faith--e. Notice, by the way, that in ad 5 St. Thomas distinguishes the disposition of will required for an initial act of faith from the disposition of the will viz.

The next article gives St. Thomas the opportunity to distinguish two different types of certitude. In other places he characterizes this as a distinction between certitude of adherence and certitude of evidentness. The first type derives from the cause of the cognition: Thomas asserts unabashedly that because God is a more reliable source of truth than our natural cognitive faculties, the certitude of faith is greater than the certitude of the natural intellectual virtues of intellectus understanding of evident first principles , scientia grasp of conclusions evidently derived from evident principles , and sapientia wisdom combining the other two.

The idea, articulated in ad 2, is this: We all know what it is like to be in a position where it is better to trust the word of an expert than our own grasp of a particular matter. That is, even though I might not be able to grasp fully the matter at hand, I can be more certain of the truth concerning that matter if I trust someone who knows.

In the matters of faith especially as regards the mysteries of the faith, which in principle surpass our grasp by natural reason I am always in this position in the present life. Thomas puts it in ad 2: On the other hand, what faith does not give is the evidentness that is possible with respect to objects proportioned to our intellects. This is why "cogitation" is not terminated by an act of faith, as it is with acts of intellectus and scientia.

Nonetheless, the light of faith is like the sun compared to the watt light bulb of our cognitive faculties. Hence, faith is more trustworthy than intellectus and scientia. Of course, this does not preclude considerations, of the sort raised by Locke, about our ability to identify sources of cognition worthy of our trust and about the degree of assent we should give them. It is clear, however, that on St. Thomas's view our degree of assent does, and should, in the case of faith exceed even our certitude about the created mediators used by God to convey his revelation.

We are, after all, talking about the faith of the martyrs. More on this later in the course. Even the demons have the habit identified with faith, though in them this habit is not a virtue. For their wills are not directed to the good. Instead, they are practically compelled to assent to the mysteries of the faith by the various evident signs of the trustworthiness of God's revelation, even though they are displeased by this. Thomas makes clear that this habit is not a "gift of grace. The next article is interesting, given the times we live in and also for the further light it sheds on the notion of the formal object of faith.

It asks whether a heretic who rejects one article of the faith can have unformed faith with regard to other articles. To put it tersely, St. Thomas's answer is no. His argument is a simple and, to my mind, effective one. The formal object of faith is the First Truth "as manifested in Sacred Scripture and the teaching of the Church," so that in the act of faith one is assenting to whatever is so manifested "as an infallible rule.

Thomas puts it, "he is adhering to his own will" instead.

At best, then, such a person is of the opinion that certain other doctrines are true. But this is not faith, not even unformed faith, because it lacks the fundamental stance of faith, which is to assent to whatever it is that God has revealed. In the last article of this question, St. Thomas discusses both the quantitative and qualitative extent of faith.

As for the quantitative extent of faith, there are two points. Since every believer has the same formal object of faith--viz. However, some have a more explicit, sophisticated, or profound grasp of some doctrines, and so in this respect there can be differences among believers. Now for the qualitative extent, or intensity, of faith.

In his treatment of virtue in general, St. Thomas noted that one person or subject may participate in a given virtue to a greater degree than another. Likewise, here he notes that in the case of faith such participation has two elements, one intellectual i. In this article he provides a few more details about the causes of faith. First of all, we must be informed of what it is that God wants us to assent to by faith. This can happen either immediately by a direct revelation or much more commonly through the mediation of teachers and preachers of the faith, but in both cases God is the principal cause.

Second, we must assent to that which is revealed, and this requires internal principles. Thomas rejects the heresy of the Pelagians, according to which human free choice is the sole cause of our initial interior preparation for faith, so that all we need from God is to be informed of what specifically we are to assent to. Thomas asserts that God is the principal cause even of our preparedness to assent, since in the assent of faith we are elevated "beyond our nature.

Here we broach the mystery of grace and freedom, about which much ink has been spilled in the history of Christian theology. Furthermore, even unformed faith is a gift from God, although it lacks charity. For unformed faith, as we saw above, is an intellectual habit by which we assent to God's revelation, despite the fact that we lack, at least for the time being, the love of God which should move us to the act of faith. It is faith prescinding from charity that causes servile fear and faith with charity that causes filial fear.

In reply to the objection obj. Thomas has this to say: But when it is quickened by charity, then it is incompatible with any kind of impurity, because 'charity covereth all sins' Prov. As for understanding, we must first distinguish natural understanding intellectus from the supernatural gift of understanding, even though there is a root meaning in common, viz.

Consequently, we need an added power of insight that brings our natural power to fulfillment. This is the gift of understanding. Thomas makes this more explicit: For we reason by proceeding from things that are understood, and discursive reasoning is completed when we arrive at an understanding of what we were previously ignorant of. Thus, what we reason to discursively proceeds from something previously understood. But the gift of grace does not proceed from the natural light of reason; rather, it is added to that light and, as it were, perfects it.

This addition is called 'understanding' rather than reason, because the added light is related to what is supernaturally known in the way that the natural light is related to those things that we know as first principles. Further, the gift of understanding is compatible with faith, even though the notion of understanding implies insight and comprehension, whereas faith implies that what is assented to is in some sense not comprehended. Thomas draws two distinctions. The first is between the central mysteries of the faith e.

The second distinction is between perfect and imperfect understanding. There are lots of everyday examples of this sort of thing, many having to do with interpersonal relationships.

See a Problem?

Thomas agrees with the objectors that we cannot have perfect understanding of the central mysteries of the faith, though we can have such understanding in principle of some truths subordinate to them the preambles of the faith. On the other hand, we can have imperfect understanding of them; that is, we can understand that we should not back away from them just because we do not see how they cohere with external appearances.

And it is clear that this sort of imperfect understanding is compatible with the epistemic limitations involved in faith. In the next article, St. Thomas argues that the gift of understanding is not just theoretical or speculative but also practical, at least in the sense that the theoretical truths which are its primary object provide the stable framework within which we live our lives and carry out our good works, since our works are ordered to the end of union with God and regulated by the eternal law, which guides us toward that end.

1. Faith Seeking Understanding: An Introduction to Christian Theology.
2. The Politics of Practical Reason: Why Theological Ethics Must Change Your Life (Theopolitical Visions Book 10).
3. Life Patterns the Secret to Emotional Freedom.
4. .
5. Les Portes de Québec T1: Faubourg Saint-Roch (French Edition)?
6. Ludwig II.: Das phantastische Leben des Königs von Bayern (German Edition).

But our knowledge of our final end and of the eternal law is theoretical knowledge that provides a framework within which practical reason operates. Thomas next claims that the gift of understanding is had by everyone in the state of grace. For to be in the state of grace is, first and foremost, to have charity, i.

But some understanding of the truth about God and salvation is necessary in order for us love God and seek our salvation. Thomas makes clear that this level of understanding, which is common to all in the state of grace, does not mean that every such person understands fully plene the mysteries of the faith. Well, just what do they understand beyond those things that are absolutely necessary for salvation?

Thomas replies as follows: Conversely, and this is again important for grasping the interplay of affective and cognitive elements in faith, no one who is not in the state of grace has the gift of understanding. As the objections point out, this seems contrary to appearances. First of all, there are those who seem to have a relatively deep understanding of the deposit of faith and yet lack the will to follow it.

Again, in the Gospels we hear of people who have prophesied in Christ's name which, presumably, takes understanding , but whom the Lord will disown on the day of judgment. More generally, we have already seen that it is possible to have the habit of faith without habitual grace unformed faith. So why hold that the gift of understanding is had only by those in the state of grace? Thomas first recalls the nature of a gift of the Holy Spirit. It is a disposition to respond expeditiously to the promptings of the Holy Spirit.