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Myth did not overshadow reality on their watch. Unfortunately, Powers fails to mention the role played by Menshevik exiles in shaping American anticommunism. Key figures such as Boris I. Nicolaevesky, the editor of the New Leader , and Joseph Shaplen and Simeon Strumsky, both editors at the New York Times , worked to counter the pro-Soviet lies disseminated by much of the New York intelligentsia in the s.

One can only wonder why Powers fails to devote any attention to the pro-labor New Leader , which was one of the most influential anticommunist magazines in the United States in the s and s. Perhaps it is because the New Leader and the social democratic Menshe viks helped set the stage for the Cold War liberals. Powers is on stronger ground in discussing the inroads communism made among American intellectuals in the s.

No twist or turn of the Kremlin was too audacious for the popular front movement to follow. For example, after Sidney Hook and John Dewey exposed the fraudulence of the Moscow show trials, Corliss Lamont and 87 other fellow travelers signed an Open Letter to American Liberals declaring that the "demand for an investigation of trials carried on under the legally constituted judicial system of the Soviet Government can only be interpreted as political intervention in the affairs of the Soviet Union with hostile intent. Though the popular front was smashed on the rock of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, Soviet communism's prestige reached its high-water mark during World War II.

United States government wartime propaganda transformed Stalin's Russia into a noble ally fighting for the same goals as America's democratic allies. As usual, however, Powers goes overboard in complaining that the "war ended with a Communist Party on the ascendant, and a fellow-traveling left that had perfected the use of the brown smear against an embittered anticommunist community.

The compelling story that Powers fails to tell because it would not fit in with his depiction of neoconservatism is the emergence in the late s of a vigorous liberal anticommunism. Truman, who had himself initially harbored warm feelings toward Stalin, reversed Roosevelt's accommodationist policy toward Stalin. The administration was already in the process of adopting a confrontational policy toward the Soviet Union when George F. Kennan supplied the doctrinal buttressing in his "Long Telegram" and his July article in Foreign Affairs , which he signed "X.


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As an obscure junior officer in the Moscow embassy during World War II, Kennan had chafed at FDR's personal diplomacy with Stalin, which he viewed as based on naive and dangerous assumptions about the Soviet dictator's true intentions. Steeped in realist precepts about power, Kennan was convinced that any postwar order would have to be based on a spheres-of-influence deal rather than a utopian peace with the Kremlin.

His "X" article famously called for a "long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies"—whence the term "containment" to describe liberal policy toward the Soviet Union. Two years later, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. Schlesinger announced the arrival of a new New Deal generation free of the ideological baggage that weighed down the left: If the ADA types had played an important part in staring down the Wallacites in , they also sought to inoculate the American public against the virus of McCarthyism. Daniel Bell, Richard Hofstadter, Peter Viereck, and other leading intellectuals sought to examine the rise of what they called the "paranoid style" in their landmark The Radical Right Hofstadter and Bell argued that the rise of the radical right was largely the product of "status anxiety" and concluded that an indiscriminate anticommunism could snuff out the very liberties it professed to protect.

In Powers's hands, these insights get transmogrified into a putative "Adorno-Hofstadter-Bell theory" that McCarthyism and anticommunism were both irrational forces. But perhaps even Powers may look with a kindlier eye on the idea of a "paranoid style" on the right in light of the recent revelations about militia activity in Arizona and elsewhere.

By the late s, a few liberals, such as the founding father of historical revisionism, William Appleman Williams, began to blame the United States for the Cold War. Had the United States, so the argument went, catered to Soviet sensitivities and apprehensions, the Cold War might never have begun.

The Vietnam War gave credibility to the idea that the United States played the provocative role. Vietnam was, of course, the great failure of Cold War liberalism. A moralistic self-confidence, which had its sources in the Kennedy administration's insistence on bearing any price for freedom, ended up plunging the United States into the jungles of Vietnam. Not until mainstream liberals such as Eugene McCarthy joined the antiwar movement did liberalism begin to divorce itself from the war. It was liberals, not conservatives, who finally recognized that the war was a disaster, and liberals rather than radicals who finally turned public opinion against it.

But liberals had already inflicted a body blow to liberalism by dismissing the realist precepts of power as the fundamental ingredient in international relations. By confusing a peripheral with a vital American interest, junior Wise Men such as Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara ended up squandering the patrimony their elders had bequeathed them. The result was nothing less than the intellectual collapse of the anticommunist consensus and its replacement by a more highly polarized left and right.

One of the prime culprits was, in fact, Norman Podhoretz's Commentary , which was the first highbrow journal to begin running Cold War revisionist articles by the historians Staughton Lynd and H. Podhoretz himself summarized the results of his September symposium "Liberal Anti-Communism Revisited" by observing, "Virtually all seem to agree that the American effort to contain Communism by military means cannot be justified either politically or morally in the double context of a polycentric Communist world and an unstable underdeveloped world seething with nationalist aspirations.

By that time, what might be called a counter-counterestablishment had begun to coalesce. Alarmed by the turn of black radicals against Israel during the war as well as the publishing threat posed by the appearance of the leftist New York Review of Books , Commentary moved back to anticommunism. This was Norman Podhoretz. A t this point the reader will do well to close Powers's elephantine book with a sigh and turn to John Ehrman's The Rise of Neoconservatism.

Ehrman, a lecturer in history at George Washington University, writes in a lively and engaging manner. His book seeks to chronicle the impact on American foreign policy of Cold War liberals-turned-neoconservatives and offers a particularly penetrating account of Daniel Patrick Moynihan's intellectual odyssey. Though Ehrman does go astray at a few points, it is something of a relief to discover history rather than hagiography.

Initially, Podhoretz and his allies in the crusade against the New Left did not think of themselves as any shade of conservative. They were liberal anticommunists who looked upon the New Deal welfare state with approval. Their presidential candidate was Senator Henry M. Like Jackson, they viewed both the left and right with misgivings, attacking Henry Kissinger's detentist brand of realpolitik as defeatist and indifferent to human rights.

Tucker, Roger Starr, and Nathan Glazer. Perhaps the most influential figure was Moynihan, who first gained notoriety in with the release of an internal government report he had written about the decline of two-parent black families and a decade later caught the public spotlight as Gerald Ford's ambassador to the United Nations. Moynihan was the first U. The duty of American liberals, Moynihan argued, was to resist the depredations of Third World communist regimes: After Jimmy Carter defeated Henry M.

Jackson in the Democratic primaries, the neoconservatives turned to Moynihan as their standard-bearer. At first, Moynihan seemed to fulfill the hopes the neoconservatives reposed in him. He decried the Carter administration's failure of nerve in confronting the Soviet Union and its Third World client states. Unlike his fellow neoconservatives, Moyni han, however, refused to abandon the center for the right. Moynihan, who sensed that the Soviet empire was coming apart at the seams, began to attack Reagan administration nuclear arms policy.

Others such as Theodore Draper had already distanced themselves from the increasingly shrill edge of neoconservatism and returned to writing for the New York Review of Books. Podhoretz simply kept moving to the right: Not finding one, they embraced the Republican party and Ronald Reagan as the best alternative. Jay Winik is the court historian of neoconservatives and the Reagan era. This is not necessarily a crippling handicap. On the Brink does contain much inside information on the role that neoconservatives played in the early years of the Reagan administration.

Winik shrewdly notes that they formed a new counterestablishment and reveals the inner workings of the various Cold War organizations of the neoconservatives. His book shares the flaws of The Wise Men but lacks its stylistic sheen. On the Brink teeters precipitously as the narrative progresses. It lacks a context and suffers from a dutiful tone as it attempts to tell the story of the end of the Cold War through four figures: In his zeal to imitate The Wise Men , Winik devotes such minute attention to his characters that the reader may, for example, come away knowing more about Perle's culinary tastes than about the details of arms-control negotiations.

Nor does Winik grapple with the ideas that Kirkpatrick espoused, such as her distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes or her Moynihanian performance at the U. Instead, Winik devotes excessive time to such minor figures as Max Kampelman, transforming them into Periclean statesmen though they cannot possibly bear the narrative weight that he places upon them. Surprisingly, Winik makes scarcely any reference to Reagan and his senior advisers; Caspar Weinberger and William Casey play mere walk-on parts.

To be sure, Winik concludes that "ultimately, the vision and the triumph decisively belong to Reagan and his counterestablishment. In Winik's rendering, the neoconservatives were the main actors. R obert Gates will have none of this. At first glance, his book might appear to be an exercise in self-exculpation masquerading as memoir.

Nothing could be further from the truth. Gates may have been trained to keep secrets, but he has drawn on his three decades of government service to write a cracking good read. He keeps his eye firmly trained on the main characters and offers a potent antidote to the neoconservative version of the Cold War. Though Gates is concerned to defend the overall record of the CIA, he admits that it completely failed to foresee the massive Soviet effort to surpass the United States in strategic missile numbers and capabilities. This Soviet effort became the basis for attacks on detente by the right.

The fear was that detente was permitting the Soviet Union to gain a first-strike capability—that is, the means to wipe out enough of the American land-based missile force so that retaliation would be suicide. Yet Gates contends that the picture was more complicated: The American military buildup that did take place beginning in the mids was achieved only because new arms were sold to a hostile Congress as future bargaining chips: Another target of the right was the Helsinki Declara tion on human rights signed by the Ford administration.

Con servatives saw any agreements with communists as a sellout—"Jerry, don't go" editorialized the Wall Street Journal —but, as Gates notes, it turned out to be the Soviets who committed a historic blunder. By signing the Helsinki Declaration, the Soviet Union and its East European satellites legitimized the efforts of their own citizens and the West to push for human rights inside the Iron Curtain.

Gates has it right: We resisted it for years, went grudgingly, Ford paid a terrible price for going—perhaps reelection itself—only to discover years later that CSCE had yielded benefits to us beyond out wildest imagination. Gates, who served on Carter's NSC under Zbigniew Brzezinski, devotes much of his memoir to redressing the image of Carter as a weakling who failed to stand up to the Soviets.

Gates argues that Carter's efforts to promote human rights, support dissidents, and stir up nationalities went far beyond presidential rhetoric. Early in the administration, says Gates, Brzezinski initiated, and Carter approved, an unprecedented White House effort to attack the internal legitimacy of the Soviet government. Through his human rights policies, he became the first president since Truman to challenge directly the legitimacy of the Soviet government in the eyes of its own people.

The Soviet leaders knew the implications for them of what Carter was doing, and hated him for it. Carter's inability to reconcile the tensions among foreign policy advisors haunted him during his failed re-election bid in Whatever Carter's rhetoric on defense spending, he continued the strategic modernization program for the air-launched cruise missile, the MX, and completed the MIRVing of Minuteman missiles and the Trident ballistic missile submarine.

In addition, Carter made another crucial move that contributed to the demise of the Soviet empire: As a result of the Sino-Soviet split , tensions along the Chinese—Soviet border reached their peak in , and United States President Richard Nixon decided to use the conflict to shift the balance of power towards the West in the Cold War.

SALT I , the first comprehensive limitation pact signed by the two superpowers, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty , which banned the development of systems designed to intercept incoming missiles. These aimed to limit the development of costly anti-ballistic missiles and nuclear missiles. Meanwhile, Brezhnev attempted to revive the Soviet economy, which was declining in part because of heavy military expenditures.

Between and , the two sides also agreed to strengthen their economic ties, [74] including agreements for increased trade. Other agreements were concluded to stabilize the situation in Europe, culminating in the Helsinki Accords signed at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in Kissinger and Nixon were "realists" who deemphasized idealistic goals like anti-communism or promotion of democracy worldwide, because those goals were too expensive in terms of America's economic capabilities.

They realized that Americans were no longer willing to tax themselves for idealistic foreign policy goals, especially for containment policies that never seemed to produce positive results. Instead Nixon and Kissinger sought to downsize America's global commitments in proportion to its reduced economic, moral and political power. They rejected "idealism" as impractical and too expensive, and neither man showed much sensitivity to the plight of people living under Communism. Kissinger's realism fell out of fashion as idealism returned to American foreign policy with Carter's moralism emphasizing human rights, and Reagan's rollback strategy aimed at destroying Communism.

In the s, the KGB, led by Yuri Andropov , continued to persecute distinguished Soviet personalities such as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Andrei Sakharov , who were criticising the Soviet leadership in harsh terms. Although President Jimmy Carter tried to place another limit on the arms race with a SALT II agreement in , [] his efforts were undermined by the other events that year, including the Iranian Revolution and the Nicaraguan Revolution , which both ousted pro-US regimes, and his retaliation against Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December.

The term second Cold War refers to the period of intensive reawakening of Cold War tensions and conflicts in the late s and early s. Tensions greatly increased between the major powers with both sides becoming more militaristic. Within months, opponents of the communist government launched an uprising in eastern Afghanistan that quickly expanded into a civil war waged by guerrilla mujahideen against government forces countrywide.

By mid, the United States had started a covert program to assist the mujahideen. Distrusted by the Soviets, Amin was assassinated by Soviet special forces in December A Soviet-organized government, led by Parcham's Babrak Karmal but inclusive of both factions, filled the vacuum. Soviet troops were deployed to stabilize Afghanistan under Karmal in more substantial numbers, although the Soviet government did not expect to do most of the fighting in Afghanistan.

As a result, however, the Soviets were now directly involved in what had been a domestic war in Afghanistan. Carter responded to the Soviet intervention by withdrawing the SALT II treaty from the Senate , imposing embargoes on grain and technology shipments to the USSR, and demanding a significant increase in military spending, and further announced that the United States would boycott the Summer Olympics in Moscow.

He described the Soviet incursion as "the most serious threat to the peace since the Second World War". In January , four years prior to becoming president, Ronald Reagan bluntly stated, in a conversation with Richard V. Allen , his basic expectation in relation to the Cold War. We win and they lose. What do you think of that?

Reagan labeled the Soviet Union an " evil empire " and predicted that Communism would be left on the " ash heap of history ," while Thatcher inculpated the Soviets as "bent on world dominance. It hurt the Soviet economy, but it also caused ill will among American allies in Europe who counted on that revenue. Reagan retreated on this issue. By early , Reagan's anti-communist position had developed into a stance known as the new Reagan Doctrine —which, in addition to containment, formulated an additional right to subvert existing communist governments.

Pope John Paul II provided a moral focus for anti-communism ; a visit to his native Poland in stimulated a religious and nationalist resurgence centered on the Solidarity movement that galvanized opposition and may have led to his attempted assassination two years later. Reagan imposed economic sanctions on Poland in response. Soviet investment in the defense sector was not driven by military necessity, but in large part by the interests of massive party and state bureaucracies dependent on the sector for their own power and privileges.

Soon after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, president Carter began massively building up the United States military. This buildup was accelerated by the Reagan administration, which increased the military spending from 5. Tensions continued intensifying in the early s when Reagan revived the B-1 Lancer program that was canceled by the Carter administration, produced LGM Peacekeepers , [] installed US cruise missiles in Europe, and announced his experimental Strategic Defense Initiative , dubbed "Star Wars" by the media, a defense program to shoot down missiles in mid-flight.

After Reagan's military buildup, the Soviet Union did not respond by further building its military [] because the enormous military expenses, along with inefficient planned manufacturing and collectivized agriculture , were already a heavy burden for the Soviet economy. This act increased support for military deployment, overseen by Reagan, which stood in place until the later accords between Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev. American domestic public concerns about intervening in foreign conflicts persisted from the end of the Vietnam War.

Meanwhile, the Soviets incurred high costs for their own foreign interventions. Although Brezhnev was convinced in that the Soviet war in Afghanistan would be brief, Muslim guerrillas, aided by the US, China, Britain, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, [] waged a fierce resistance against the invasion. A senior US State Department official predicted such an outcome as early as , positing that the invasion resulted in part from a "domestic crisis within the Soviet system. It may be that the thermodynamic law of entropy has We could be seeing a period of foreign movement at a time of internal decay".

By the time the comparatively youthful Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary in , [] the Soviet economy was stagnant and faced a sharp fall in foreign currency earnings as a result of the downward slide in oil prices in the s. An ineffectual start led to the conclusion that deeper structural changes were necessary and in June Gorbachev announced an agenda of economic reform called perestroika , or restructuring.

These measures were intended to redirect the country's resources from costly Cold War military commitments to more productive areas in the civilian sector. Despite initial skepticism in the West, the new Soviet leader proved to be committed to reversing the Soviet Union's deteriorating economic condition instead of continuing the arms race with the West. In response to the Kremlin's military and political concessions , Reagan agreed to renew talks on economic issues and the scaling-back of the arms race. Talks went well until the focus shifted to Reagan's proposed Strategic Defense Initiative, which Gorbachev wanted eliminated.

East—West tensions rapidly subsided through the mid-to-late s, culminating with the final summit in Moscow in , when Gorbachev and George H. In , Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan [] and by Gorbachev consented to German reunification , [] the only alternative being a Tiananmen Square scenario. By , the Soviet alliance system was on the brink of collapse, and, deprived of Soviet military support, the communist leaders of the Warsaw Pact states were losing power. In , the communist governments in Poland and Hungary became the first to negotiate the organizing of competitive elections.

In Czechoslovakia and East Germany , mass protests unseated entrenched communist leaders. The communist regimes in Bulgaria and Romania also crumbled, in the latter case as the result of a violent uprising. Attitudes had changed enough that US Secretary of State James Baker suggested that the American government would not be opposed to Soviet intervention in Romania, on behalf of the opposition, to prevent bloodshed.

The revolutionary wave swept across Central and Eastern Europe and peacefully overthrew all of the Soviet-style communist states: East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria; [] Romania was the only Eastern-bloc country to topple its communist regime violently and execute its head of state. In the USSR itself, glasnost weakened the bonds that held the Soviet Union together [] and by February , with the dissolution of the USSR looming, the Communist Party was forced to surrender its year-old monopoly on state power.

Gorbachev's permissive attitude toward Central and Eastern Europe did not initially extend to Soviet territory; even Bush, who strove to maintain friendly relations, condemned the January killings in Latvia and Lithuania , privately warning that economic ties would be frozen if the violence continued. The Commonwealth of Independent States , created on 21 December , is viewed as a successor entity to the Soviet Union but, according to Russia's leaders, its purpose was to "allow a civilized divorce" between the Soviet Republics and is comparable to a loose confederation.

US President at that time, George H. Bush , expressed his emotions: By the grace of God, America won the Cold War. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union , Russia drastically cut military spending , and restructuring the economy left millions unemployed.

The Cold War continues to influence world affairs. The post-Cold War world is considered to be unipolar , with the United States the sole remaining superpower. Further nearly , Americans lost their lives in the Korean and Vietnam Wars. In addition to the loss of life by uniformed soldiers, millions died in the superpowers' proxy wars around the globe, most notably in Southeast Asia. However, the aftermath of the Cold War is not always easily erased, as many of the economic and social tensions that were exploited to fuel Cold War competition in parts of the Third World remain acute.

The breakdown of state control in a number of areas formerly ruled by communist governments produced new civil and ethnic conflicts, particularly in the former Yugoslavia. In Central and Eastern Europe, the end of the Cold War has ushered in an era of economic growth and an increase in the number of liberal democracies , while in other parts of the world, such as Afghanistan, independence was accompanied by state failure. During the Cold War itself, with the United States and the Soviet Union invested heavily in propaganda designed to influence the hearts and minds of people around the world, especially using motion pictures.

The Cold War endures as a popular topic reflected extensively in entertainment media, and continuing to the present with numerous post Cold War-themed feature films, novels, television, and other media. As soon as the term "Cold War" was popularized to refer to post-war tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, interpreting the course and origins of the conflict has been a source of heated controversy among historians, political scientists, and journalists. Although explanations of the origins of the conflict in academic discussions are complex and diverse, several general schools of thought on the subject can be identified.

Historians commonly speak of three differing approaches to the study of the Cold War: From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. This article is about the state of political tension in the 20th century. For the general term, see Cold war general term. For the current state of political tension, see Cold War II. For other uses, see Cold War disambiguation. For other uses, see Cold warrior disambiguation.

The Cold War — East German construction workers building the Berlin Wall , Navy aircraft patrolling a Soviet freighter during the Cuban Missile Crisis , American astronaut Thomas P. Stafford and Soviet cosmonaut Alexey Leonov shake hands in outer space , Mushroom cloud of the Ivy Mike nuclear test , ; one of more than a thousand such tests conducted by the US between and Cold war general term. Origins of the Cold War. Potsdam Conference and Surrender of Japan. Post—World War II economic expansion. Cold War — , Containment , and Truman Doctrine. The labeling used on Marshall Plan aid to Western Europe.

The red columns show the relative amount of total aid received per nation. Construction in West Berlin under Marshall Plan aid. Cominform and Tito—Stalin Split. Warsaw Pact and Hungarian Revolution of The Hungarian Revolution of China and pro-Chinese communist states.

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Culture during the Cold War. Historiography of the Cold War. Outline of the Cold War. Cold War by period. Cambridge University Press, , p. UN chief says Cold War is back". Retrieved 13 April The New York Times. Bernard Baruch coins the term "Cold War " ". Retrieved 23 August A Conflict of Empires , abstract of ch. Therefore, the continuation of cooperation and peaceful relations with its wartime allies, the United States and Great Britain, was greatly to be desired.

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Authoritarian Development and U. Washington did everything in its power to encourage and facilitate the army-led massacre of alleged PKI members, and U. This was efficacious terror, an essential building block of the neoliberal policies that the West would attempt to impose on Indonesia after Sukarno's ouster. Here's what that means for today. Retrieved 12 April Retrieved 5 June Retrieved 21 October Post Responses to Genocide. Blumenthal and Timothy L. The Legacy of Nuremberg: Civilising Influence or Institutionalised Vengeance?

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