BEYOND IRAQ: REPERCUSSIONS OF IRAQ STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION POLICIES

Note that the strategy documents released here tend to refer to 'British and global energy supplies. To this end, as Whitehall documents obtained by the Independent show, the US and British sought to privatise Iraqi oil production with a view to allow foreign companies to takeover. Minutes of a meeting held on 12 May said:. The documents added that "foreign companies' involvement seems to be the only possible solution" to make Iraq a reliable oil exporter. This, however, would be "politically sensitive", and would "require careful handling to avoid the impression that we are trying to push the Iraqis down one particular path.

Media analyses claiming lazily that there was no planning for the aftermath of the Iraq War should look closer at the public record. The reality is that extensive plans for postwar reconstruction were pursued, but they did not consider humanitarian and societal issues of any significance, focusing instead on maintaining the authoritarian structures of Saddam's brutal regime after his removal, while upgrading Iraq's oil infrastructure to benefit foreign investors. A series of news reports, for instance, confirmed how the State Department had set up 17 separate working groups to work out this post-war plan.

Iraq would be "governed by a senior US military officer The US envisaged "a broad and protracted American role in managing the reconstruction of the country The centrality of concerns about energy to Iraq War planning was most candidly confirmed eight years ago by a former senior British Army official in Iraq, James Ellery , currently director of British security firm and US defence contractor, Aegis.

The Iraq War has helped to head off what Ellery described as "the tide of Easternisation" — a shift in global political and economic power toward China and India, to whom goes "two thirds of the Middle East's oil. He went on to emphasise the strategic significance of Iraqi petroleum fields in relation to the danger of production peaks being breached in major oil reserves around the world:. Thus the only near-term potential increase will be from Iraq. Whether Iraq began "favouring East or West" could therefore be "de-stabilising" not only "within the region but to nations far beyond which have an interest.

Despite escalating instability and internal terrorism, Iraq is now swiftly reclaiming its rank as one of the world's fastest-growing exporters, cushioning the impact of supply outages elsewhere and thus welcomed by OPEC. Back in , Ellery had confirmed Allied ambitions to "raise Iraqi's oil production from 2. Thus, the primary motive of the war - mobilising Iraqi oil production to sustain global oil flows and moderate global oil prices - has, so far, been fairly successful according to the International Energy Agency.

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Eleven years on, there should be no doubt that the Iraq War was among the first major resource wars of the 21st century. It is unlikely to be the last. And How to Save It among other books. According to the review, Iraqi authorities. The adjustment process will need to be designed and implemented in a way that considers the spending pressures flowing from the war against ISIS, the internally displaced population, the vast investment needs of the country, and the parliamentary elections in The Kurdistan Region of Iraq KRI has faced economic and fiscal pressure in recent years, in spite of its reputation as a relatively attractive market and destination for investment in Iraq.

Officials from the KRG and national government reached revenue sharing and production agreements in and , but disputes over exports, the September referendum, and security have stalled their implementation. Oil produced in areas under Kurdish control, including in disputed territories, transits pipelines northwestward through Turkey and eastward via truck to Iran. Iraqi government efforts to assert control over border crossing points between the Kurdistan region in the wake of the referendum directly affect the KRI's potential for economic independence, particularly in far northwestern Iraq, where important road and pipeline infrastructure crosses into Turkey.

Budget withholdings by Baghdad since have contributed to a fiscal and economic crisis in the KRI. Public sector salaries essential to a majority of the working-age Kurdish population have been delayed for months at a time; the KRG has been unable to meet higher salary and supply costs associated with the war against the Islamic State. Billions in unpaid salaries and other public sector obligations have accrued as arrears. The fiscal crisis has contributed to intra-Kurdish political tensions, with factions splitting over the national parliament's adoption of the budget law.

Prime Minister Abadi has offered to pay the salaries of KRG public sector employees while questioning the validity of the civil service lists submitted by KRG authorities. As in the rest of Iraq, the presence of so-called "ghost employees" on KRG civil service lists has long been reported. A follow-on agreement for the renewal of the stipend arrangement has been delayed in light of Baghdad-KRG differences over the September referendum and the control of disputed territories.

Since August , the United Nations has designated the situation in Iraq as a Level Three emergency, its designation for "the most severe, large-scale humanitarian crises. Iraqi authorities and international organizations are working to assist civilians across the country, including non-Iraqi refugees and the families and communities that host and have hosted IDPs and refugees during years of conflict. Interrelated security, political, economic, social, and health challenges complicate assistance efforts and the viability of civilians' attempts to return home.

In northern Iraq, several persistent obstacles to the return and reintegration of Iraqi IDPs include ongoing conflict, a lack of security and services in cleared areas, endemic levels of unexploded ordnance, fear of reprisal, and destruction of private property and public infrastructure. Among returning individuals and their neighbors, localized tensions may flare regarding property disputes and damage, politics, economic opportunities, and accountability for alleged crimes.

National politics also may intrude, with some local communities finding themselves on the front lines of broader national and international disputes over territory, resources, and security. Human rights organizations have expressed concern about the isolation of confirmed or suspected IS family members in "rehabilitation camps," and United Nations officials have warned that individuals indirectly associated or accused of affiliation with the Islamic State may be targeted in revenge attacks.

More than , additional IDPs are present in Kirkuk Governorate, which is jointly administered by Kurdish and national forces. IOM reporting in has suggested that IDPs present in the KRI are generally positive about security and social conditions but face economic strains, limited services, unemployment, and language barriers in some areas. Members of religious and ethnic minority groups, including various Iraqi Christian communities and Yezidis, face added difficulties because their communities have been violently targeted by the Islamic State since and because they lack the resources and capacity for protection that have allowed some other groups to return home.

Minorities who previously had fled from violence elsewhere in the country to northern Iraq, including to Ninewa Governorate and the Ninewa Plain region, in some cases have suffered multiple displacements as a result of the Islamic State conflict. The relative movements of national and KRG forces in disputed territories since October have heightened the concerns of some communities, and renewed clashes between national and KRG forces could lead to deteriorating security for minority communities in some areas.

With major combat operations against the Islamic State reaching their conclusion in Iraq, officials and observers are directing greater attention toward questions of security and stability in areas retaken from the group. Concerns for the immediate future focus on defending against an expected terrorism and low level insurgent campaign by the Islamic State's surviving supporters to demonstrate their persistence. In the context of these concerns, Iraqi officials and foreign donors are supporting a range of stabilization programs designed to help communities reestablish damaged infrastructure, protect public health, provide economic opportunities, and overcome disputes that emerged or were exacerbated by the rise of the Islamic State.

More broadly, the State Department continues to warn of significant terrorism and crime risks throughout Iraq and identifies Iran-backed militias as a threat to U. Fighting has damaged formerly IS-held towns and cities, and in some cases, such as Ramadi and Mosul, large areas of key population centers have been destroyed and rendered temporarily uninhabitable. Retreating IS fighters have left behind booby-trapped houses and neighborhoods, mined essential farmland and roads with IEDs, and exploited ties with locals established during their occupation to carry out retaliatory post-withdrawal terrorist attacks.

Unexploded ordnance, corpses, and disrupted water and power infrastructure continue to delay the prompt return of displaced civilians. Destruction, damaged infrastructure, and explosive remnants of war are expected to impose costs on Iraqi communities for years to come. In spite of these challenges, some polling suggests that Iraqis broadly feel the security situation has improved since early , although terrorist attacks in Baghdad and other cities have resulted in criticism of the Iraqi government's performance and led to leadership reorganizations.

National elections planned for early are creating an environment in which security incidents and trends may take on added political significance, as leaders compete for the confidence and support of the Iraqi public. In areas of Anbar, Salah al-Din, and Ninewa governorates where the Islamic State has receded, Iraqis are working to overcome resettlement, reconstruction, service delivery, governance, and security force integration challenges. In many instances this involves simultaneously working to combat IS re-infiltration, repair damaged infrastructure, administer an overburdened criminal justice system, and root out corruption.

Reports from different communities suggest that recovery is underway, but progress is uneven and the concerns of some local groups are not being addressed by local and national authorities. Iraqi officials have emphasized the importance of securing reclaimed communities and delivering immediate assistance to restore essential services and provide employment. Complex local reconciliation efforts also may be required in areas where the rate of return lags for political or social reasons.

Struggles to overcome divisive suspicions and build trust among local populations and national groups may prove more lasting and challenging than the physical battle against the Islamic State's forces, requiring sustained commitment from Iraqis and their leaders at all levels and presenting fewer obvious opportunities for direct and effective foreign involvement. Iraq's strategic location, its potential, and its diverse population's ties to neighboring countries underlie its enduring importance to U.

At the same time, successive Administrations have sought to keep direct U. Results have been mixed. The collapse of portions of the U. Since , the United States has increased its direct involvement in Iraq in response to the Islamic State's resurgence but successive Administrations have maintained a modest military presence and favored working by, with, and through Iraq's national government and other partners.

Some sub-state groups such as the Kurdish peshmerga and Sunni militia have proven to be valuable U. Over time, some Iraqis have criticized some U. Shia figures accuse the United States of having supported the rise and resurgence of the Islamic State as an excuse to re-intervene and weaken Iraq's ties to neighboring Iran.

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Other Iraqis oppose U. These various views are rooted in competing Iraqi visions for their government and for Iraq's relations with its neighbors and other foreign governments. The Trump Administration, like its predecessors, has articulated a vision for U. Legislation before th Congress reflects the Administration's overarching commitment to work with and through Iraq's national government, while seeking to ensure or promote the protection and provision of aid to some specific sub-state groups, including Kurds, Sunni Arabs, and religious and ethnic minorities.

Congress is engaged in oversight of U. The Trump Administration's FY budget requests for Iraq continue an established pattern of proposing a mix of loan and grant assistance, in addition to U. This approach reflects legislative-executive consensus that since Iraq is a major oil exporter, it should be relatively financially self-sufficient over the long term, limiting the need for U.

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As remaining IS strongholds are retaken, policymakers are shifting toward consideration of a redefined U. Secretary of Defense Mattis reportedly has discussed terms for a continued U. The Trump Administration considers current U. It is unclear whether the Trump Administration envisions a partnership with Iraq that would allow U. As noted above, the U. As Iraqis debate issues in the run-up to planned elections, candidates seeking to strengthen their nationalist credentials or undermine rivals may grow more critical of the presence of foreign military forces, including U.

Some Iraqis, including Shia militia groups with ties to Iran, remain highly critical of the U. The United States protected Kurdish-populated areas of northern Iraq as they developed autonomous political institutions in the s, with U. From to , U. Since , the KRG, Kurdish security forces, and other subnational entities such as Sunni tribal militia have benefitted from U. As the KRG prepared for the September 25 advisory referendum on independence, latent Iraqi sensitivities about the KRG's foreign ties and activities became more pronounced.

Iraqi officials have not yet publicly expressed concern about U. Under such circumstances, the government of Iraq might seek to place limitations on the delivery of U.

Iraq: Background and U.S. Policy - theranchhands.com

To date, the United States has emphasized the importance of providing support to inclusive security forces under central government command, maintained support for forces affiliated with the KRG on these terms, and sought to preserve Iraq's political and territorial unity pursuant to its constitution.

The Trump Administration has given no public indication that this position could change. Appropriations legislation for FY P. The executive branch has obtained commitments from Iraq's government regarding sharing of the proceeds of U. In , Congress also conditionally authorized the potential provision of U. Iran's security interests continue to dictate a close interest in Iraq's regional orientation and foreign policies, and Iran's current leadership actively seeks to shape developments in Iraq for ideological and strategic reasons.

Close cultural and religious ties have linked communities in what is now Iran with predominantly Shia areas of what is now southern Iraq for centuries. Southern Iraq is home to several historical sites and shrines of importance to Shia Muslims, and transnationally prominent Shia clerics are based in Najaf, a major Shia theological center.

Iraq's Shia Arab majority shares religious ties with Iran's majority Shia population, but believers in the two countries differ in their associations with individual religious leaders and over the role of religious leaders in governing. Some Iraqi Shia embrace the Islamic Republic of Iran's velayat-e-faqih rule of the jurisprudent theory of religious governance, even though most prominent senior Iraq-based Shia clerics and their followers do not support the Iranian model.

Iranian relations with parties and leaders in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq have played a role in Iran's competition for regional influence with Turkey and in its management of its own Kurdish minority population. State-to-state confrontation characterized Iraq-Iran ties for much of the last 40 years, and the two countries fought a destructive, nearly decade-long war during the s.

Patronage relationships between the Islamic Republic of Iran and several Iraqi Shia parties and leaders date to the Saddam Hussein era, when Iran hosted and supported several Iraqi Shia oppositionists. Since Saddam's ouster in , Iran's influence in Iraq has grown through new state-to-state ties and through new and legacy partnerships with select Iraqi politicians and militia groups, not all of whom are Shia. Iran has supported armed groups in post-Saddam Iraq, including some groups that attacked and killed U.

Since , new energy production and commercial links have helped to bind the two countries, and Iran has used Iraqi fighters and territory to bolster its own support for the Asad government in Syria. Iranian leaders responded quickly to the Islamic State's summer offensive, sending weapons and advisors to Iraq while post-election leadership negotiations among Iraqis were still ongoing. Senior Iraqi officials, including Prime Minister Abadi, praise Iran for supporting Baghdad in its war against the Islamic State since , even as some also express concern about Iranian influence and support to some armed sub-state groups.

Iraqi security officials acknowledge the presence in Iraq of Iranian advisers and rhetorically equate the presence of Iranian personnel with the presence of other countries' advisors as invited and officially approved guests of the sovereign Iraqi government. To date, Prime Minister Abadi and other Iraqis have rejected requests by some Iran-linked militia leaders and fighters to formally pursue the fight against the Islamic State across Iraq's western border in Syria.

Nevertheless, a number of Iran-backed Iraqi militias have fought without the Iraqi government's permission in Syria since Prime Minister Abadi maintains an open and frank dialogue with his Iranian counterparts and welcomes approved formal Iranian security support for Iraq, but articulates a vision for Iraq that seeks positive relations with neighbors and aims at mitigating the negative effects of cross-border entanglements and regional rivalries.

The mobilization of tens of thousands of Iraqi Shia volunteers in response to a fatwa by Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani contributed directly to halting the Islamic State's rapid advance toward Baghdad, but the subsequent development and performance of volunteer militias has raised questions about their missions and future. In particular, some observers have highlighted the fact that some elements of the Popular Mobilization Forces PMF movement that organized in response to Sistani's call include Shia militias that receive or have received Iranian support.

Successive Iranian regimes have intermittently supported armed actors inside Iraq for decades, and the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran hosted, trained, and armed groups opposed to Saddam Hussein's government and actively supported armed Shia militia groups after According to the U.

The volunteer response and sacrifice embodied in the PMF movement are broadly respected among Iraqis, although some Iran-backed groups' operations and statements have exacerbated sectarian tensions. This is particularly true of those formations that have been accused of carrying out human rights abuses against Sunni civilians and Kurds. Since early , Prime Minister Abadi has pursued some administrative and legislative steps to formally subsume the PMF under the military chain of command.

In November , the Council of Representatives adopted a law calling for the integration of the PMF into Iraq's national security structure under prime ministerial command. Prime Minister Abadi has threatened to use force against groups remaining outside of state control and has denied the requests of some PMF units to play specific roles in operations against the Islamic State in places like Mosul and Tal Afar. In practice, questions remain about how successful he and the Iraqi government will be over the long term in ensuring that elements of the PMF do not evolve into unaccountable armed forces aligned with discrete sectarian communities or political parties.

As of August , U. In conjunction with reports in October that some Iran aligned militia groups were operating U. We urge the Government of Iraq to expeditiously return this equipment to the full control of the Iraqi Army. All recipients of U.

The United States has strict standards to avoid providing security assistance to designated terrorist organizations, units with close ties to Iran, or units under suspicion of committing gross violations of human rights. The Trump Administration has not continued the Obama Administration's practice of providing force deployment updates and U. The Trump and Obama Administrations have considered groups and individuals associated with the Islamic State and participating in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners to be legitimate military targets pursuant to the Authorization for the Use of Military Force against Al Qaeda P.

As discussed above, U. Unlike during the U. In August , U. Congress has appropriated billions of dollars in additional defense funding to support military operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and other countries since The United States government supports security, stabilization, governance, and humanitarian initiatives across Iraq and blends U.

Legislative provisions on Iraq enacted and proposed in the th and th Congresses reflect congressional concern about the extent to which U. With regard to both U. Select Obligations, Allocations, and Requests. Obligations data derived from U. Overseas Loans and Grants Greenbook , January Iraq Train and Equip Program: Executive branch appropriations requests and appropriations legislation.

In recent years, U. Congress has authorized the President to provide U. In coordination with the Iraqi government and pursuant to a U. The December continuing resolution P. The Administration also proposed a sale of infantry and artillery equipment for peshmerga forces that Iraq agreed to finance using a portion of its U. The specific content and timing of new announcements regarding U. As of November , U. House and Senate versions of the FY foreign operations appropriations bill would make Economic Support Fund ESF monies available for contributions to stabilization in Iraq on different terms.

Experts have warned that the Mosul Dam on the Tigris River could collapse because of a lack of maintenance, with severe consequences. The dam sits on porous soil that requires regular injections of concrete to ward off leaks and subsidence. Kurdish forces recaptured the dam and nearby villages from the Islamic State in , and national forces have reasserted control of the dam area since October Army Corp of Engineers personnel and private contractors to provide project oversight, architecture, and engineering services.

In July , the State Department noted that while Iraq had begun work to stabilize the dam, "it is impossible to accurately predict the likelihood of the dam's failing…. The latter project seeks to build the capacity of Iraqi governors, governorate councils, local officials, and ministry directorates to provide services and monitor delivery and public expenditure in support of Iraq's decentralization plans. In addition, USAID provides technical assistance to the national government and KRG to help them manage current fiscal pressures, secure financing, implement recommended reforms, and meet performance targets agreed under the IMF Standby Arrangement.

In July , U. OCHA reported that "after decades of war, the sheer volume of explosive devices renders Iraq one of the most heavily contaminated countries in the world. Since , the United States has worked to help reconstitute and support the development of Iraq's security forces, especially its military services and counterterrorism units. Since , a U. Over time, the executive branch and some Members of Congress have expressed concern about a range of governance and human rights-related issues in Iraq in annual reporting, through inter-branch correspondence, in statements in hearings and at other public events, or through the introduction of legislation and amendments for congressional consideration.

Annual congressionally-mandated executive branch reporting on human rights, international religious freedom, international narcotics control, and trafficking in persons reflects these concerns. In the th Congress, these concerns are reflected in ongoing congressional oversight efforts and legislation such as H.

The State Department reports that public sector corruption, including in some military and security agencies, is widely recognized as a problem in Iraq, and some Iraqi leaders continue to make statements pledging to improve action on the issue. According to Transparency International, corruption in public services has been enabled by weak public administration, limited state capacity to manage and account for assistance funds, and limited civil society oversight. Personnel and technical capacity problems are prevalent in many of these entities.

At the governorate level, leaders in different areas of the country, including governors, have been forced from office in amid corruption charges against them. The State Department report on human rights conditions in Iraq in concluded that "severe human rights problems were widespread," attributing most serious abuses to terrorist groups and citing "sectarian hostility, widespread corruption, and lack of transparency at all levels of government and society" as factors weakening government authority.

According to the department, sectarian tensions, corruption, and lack of governmental transparency have also undermined the Iraqi government's ability to curtail human rights abuses. State Department analysis also cites reports that Iraqi security forces, federal police, and p eshmerga have committed human rights violations, along with instances in which PMF members reportedly have killed, tortured, or kidnaped civilians.

Iraq: Background and U.S. Policy

According to the department, during , the Iraqi government investigated some alleged PMF and security forces human rights abuses but did not make the results public. The KRG established a 'High Committee to Evaluate and Respond to International Reports' to investigate alleged p eshmerga human rights violations against internally displaced persons but did not prosecute p eshmerga members.

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State Department, Iraq does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but "is making significant efforts to do so. The latest department report on trafficking in persons states that the Iraqi government's anti-trafficking law "does not prohibit all forms of human trafficking" and finds enforcement in some areas to be inadequate.

The report also notes that violence in the country "continued to severely hinder the Iraqi government's ability to combat trafficking. The department also cites reports that the Iraqi government has punished and deported some human trafficking victims who were used in sex trafficking and forced labor. According to the report, Iraqi authorities provided only limited support and cooperation to NGO efforts to assist trafficking victims. State Department reports on human rights conditions and religious freedom in Iraq have documented the difficulties faced by religious and ethnic minorities in the country for years.

In some cases, these difficulties and security risks have driven members of minority groups to flee the country or to take shelter in different areas of the country, whether with fellow group members or in new communities. Minority groups that live in areas subject to long running territorial disputes between Iraq's national government and the KRG face additional interference and exploitation by larger groups for political, economic, or security reasons. Members of diverse minority communities express a variety of territorial claims and administrative preferences, both among and within their own groups.

Some minorities in the disputed territories may prefer administrative alignment with the Kurdistan Region, while others may seek alignment with the national government. While much attention is focused on potential intimidation or coercion of minorities by majority groups, disputes within minority communities over various options also have the potential to generate tension and violence.

Members of minority groups who align themselves with Kurdish or national government entities also may seek to influence the preferences and decisions of members of their own groups through intimidation or coercion. Pursuant to a legislative directive, on March 17, , then-Secretary of State Kerry informed Congress of his determination that the Islamic State had indeed committed actions that constitute genocide against the Yezidi, Christian, and Shia Muslim communities in Iraq and Syria. He added that the Islamic State is genocidal in its ideology, and is committing crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing as well in its areas of control.

While Secretary Kerry's statement and an accompanying report from the Atrocities Prevention Board laid out evidence of atrocities and referred to the crime of genocide, the statement and report do not lay out a legal analysis of the crime of genocide as it applies to IS actions in Iraq and Syria. Secretary Kerry stated that his determination was not intended to take the place of appropriate criminal accountability measures to be taken by national authorities or a competent international criminal tribunal, but stated that the United States would continue to gather evidence of genocide and other atrocity crimes and would rely on the genocide determination as another reason to oppose and defeat the Islamic State.

Since Secretary Kerry's determination, U. On August 15, , Secretary Tillerson said,. Specific act, specific intent, specific people. Application of the law to the facts at hand leads to the conclusion ISIS is clearly responsible for genocide against Yezidis, Christians, and Shia Muslims in areas it controls or has controlled. ISIS is also responsible for crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing directed at these same groups, and in some cases against Sunni Muslims, Kurds, and other minorities. The protection of these groups — and others subject to violent extremism — is a human rights priority for the Trump administration.

We will continue working with our regional partners to protect religious minority communities from terrorist attacks and to preserve their cultural heritage. In , the State Department included Iraq on a list of countries designated "as having governmental armed forces or government-supported armed groups that recruit and use child soldiers. The State Department chose not to include Iraq on the list, although its Trafficking in Persons report notes allegations of the continued recruitment and use of child soldiers by some armed groups in Iraq.

The report recommends that Iraq "continue to make efforts to stop the recruitment and use of child soldiers by the PMF and tribal forces, hold complicit individuals accountable for child soldiering, and provide protection services to child soldiers. Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that U. Nevertheless, the presence and activities of foreign military forces in Iraq remain sensitive domestic political issues among Iraqis.

President Trump and Prime Minister Abadi have signaled their shared preference for close bilateral ties to continue beyond the current joint military campaign, and officials in both governments have discussed taking steps to more fully implement the Strategic Framework Agreement to deepen current patterns of cooperation. At the same time, the prospect of continued U.

From an Iraqi perspective, partnership with the United States may allow Iraq to consolidate and extend the improvements its security forces have made, while providing a bulwark against unwanted interference by neighboring countries or other global powers. However, controversy surrounding partnership with the United States and the opposition of some Iraqis and the government of Iran to close U.

With elections pending and the future of relations between Iraq's national government and the Kurdistan region uncertain, U. It is also possible that confrontation among Iraqis over the question of a continued U. While the Islamic State has been on the defensive in Iraq since mid and appears incapable of overcoming the range of forces arrayed against it there at present, its antecedents demonstrated a capacity for resilience and reemergence that is focusing the attention of some U.

As noted above, capacity shortfalls and corruption in national and local government in Iraq remain problematic, with security forces also facing significant capability and management gaps. Iraq's fiscal resources are constrained, stabilization and reconstruction needs are daunting, and more robust reform efforts may prompt opposition from entrenched interests.

Addressing these challenges may require persistence and sacrifice from Iraqis, and the ability of U. Having recaptured most areas that had been overrun and occupied by the Islamic State since , Iraqis and their U. Military coordination among different forces has contributed to success against the Islamic State but has not guaranteed political accommodation among the victors. The roles played and actions taken by various Iraqi forces and political actors in the run up to spring election may reshape relationships that are important for the country's stability and, by extension, important to U.

Prominent considerations in this regard may include:. Members of Congress and U. Recent confrontations between the national government and Kurdish forces in disputed territories implicates these issues directly and may complicate the continuation of prevailing patterns of assistance.

Iraq invasion was about oil

Overall, it seems reasonable to expect that Iraqis will assess and respond to U. The United States recognizes Iraq as an independent state, while acknowledging the League of Nations mandate relationship between Iraq and the United Kingdom. Axis sympathizers depose Hashemite regent. United States provides commercial American aircraft to the British for use in moving reinforcements during the Anglo-Iraqi War. Baghdad Pact established by Turkey, Iraq, Great Britain, Pakistan, and Iran in order to work together militarily, politically, and economically against Soviet influence in the Middle East.

The United States maintained observer status in the BP. President Eisenhower, in a statement to a joint session of Congress, states that the United States will provide economic or military aid to allied countries in the Middle East facing Soviet aggression. King Faysal II of Iraq is executed following a military coup ending the monarchy. Marines land in Lebanon to secure its pro-U.

Iraq withdraws from the Baghdad Pact, reestablishes diplomatic relations with the U. R, and accepts Soviet military assistance. The United States rescinds assistance. Belgium serves as the protecting power for U. The United States provides covert military support to Kurdish insurgents in Iraq in partnership with the Shah of Iran.

The Carter Administration imposes export controls on Iraq as a country that has "repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.

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Israeli forces strike the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak using U. The Reagan Administration removes Iraq from list of countries not supporting U. Reagan Administration reaches consensus on policy toward Iran-Iraq war. Donald Rumsfeld visits Baghdad as a presidential envoy and meets with Saddam Hussein.

The Reagan Administration imposes controls on the export of chemical weapons precursors and dual use technologies to Iraq. Interests Section in Baghdad is upgraded to Embassy status. Bush demands that Iraq remove its military forces and deploys U. Embassy in Baghdad closes. Iraq severs diplomatic relations with the United States. Security Council Resolution states that Iraq should accept the international supervision of the destruction of its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles that have a kilometer range. In addition, a monitoring regime will be put in place to confirm Iraqi compliance.

Operation Southern Watch begins, securing a no fly zone south of the 32 nd parallel in Iraq. Operation Desert Strike launched in response to Iraqi incursion into Kurdish-held north during Kurdish infighting. Southern Watch no-fly zone extended to 33 rd parallel. United States directs drawdown of Defense Department funds to support a Turkish-led Peace Monitoring Force to monitor a ceasefire between Kurdish parties in northern Iraq.

Congress adopts the Iraq Liberation Act P. The United States and United Kingdom carry out Operation Desert Fox, a four day air and missile strike operation targeting Iraqi military and government installations following disputes with Iraq over weapons inspections. Congress considers legislation S.

Investing in Iraq Through Reconstruction of 7 Cities

Security Council adopts Resolution giving weapons inspectors new authorities. President Bush issues ultimatum demanding that Saddam Hussein leave Iraq and informs Congress of his decision that the use of force is required. Baghdad headquarters is bombed, killing 22 people. Congress enacts supplemental appropriations in S. Institute of Peace P. The bipartisan Study Group, proposed by Hon. Frank Wolf and others in late , had been launched in March and released its report in December The United States deploys additional military forces to Iraq as part of the "surge" plan to combat the Iraqi insurgency and help stabilize the country.

Congress enacts a supplemental appropriations act establishing benchmarks for assessing progress in Iraq P. Barack Obama is elected President having pledged to end the U. President Obama directs the deployment of additional U. Islamic State forces besiege the Sinjar region of northwestern Iraq, killing and kidnapping thousands of Yezidis.

President Obama directs the U. Iraq formally requests foreign military assistance to defeat the Islamic State. Congress authorizes and appropriates funds for a new train and equip program for Iraqi forces engaged in the fight against the Islamic State. President Donald Trump is inaugurated. The Trump Administration includes Iraq in an executive order preventing refugees from being admitted into the United States and suspends visas for days.

Prime Minister Abadi visits Washington. Iraqi officials declare victory in their battle to regain control of the northern city of Mosul after a nine month battle with support from U. Kurdistan Regional Government administers advisory referendum on independence. Iraqi forces retake Kirkuk and surrounding oil fields. Kurdish forces are pushed back to borders. Iraqis retake Al Qaim and remaining population centers of western Anbar province, set May date for elections. Foreign Military Sales to Iraq, Potential value of proposed Foreign Military Sales may not match value of actual agreements reached or deliveries made.

Participants were asked—"Do you want the Kurdistan region and the Kurdistani areas [disputed areas] outside the administration of Kurdistan region to become an independent state? Some observers suggested that those who chose not to participate, including some ethnic Arab and Turkmen, may have boycotted in opposition. In late July, Iraqi authorities announced the legal registration of some PMF fighters from the PMF's Al Abbas Combat Division under the law, but subsequent independent reports have questioned the commitment of other Iran-aligned Popular Mobilization Commission leaders subordinating their own forces to military command.

A Transitional Administrative Law developed by the Governing Council and signed in March served as the supreme law during the transitional period. In January , elections were held for a Transitional National Assembly, which drafted the constitution approved in November See Khalil Osman, Sectarianism in Iraq: Policy , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].

In November , the U. Article 24 of the Security Agreement stated that "all U. Defense Department reports to Congress in judged that Iraqi forces would not meet several U. Martin Dempsey, Iraqi authorities had privately requested U. However, in June 25 correspondence with the U. Secretary-General, Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari stopped short of publicly calling for military intervention and asked the international community to assist Iraq "by providing military training, advanced technology and the weapons required to respond the situation" in a manner that fully respected Iraq's sovereignty.

In a September 20 letter to the President of the U. By June 30, President Obama had authorized the deployment of U. President Obama announced impending U. Reuters, "Baghdad's bloody protests mark resumption of Shi'ite power struggle," February 15, According to the State Department's report on human rights in Iraq, "From to , the [Iraqi] Government's efforts to crush the [Kurdish] rebellion militarily resulted in approximately 8, deaths, many of them civilians killed indiscriminately by chemical weapons in Talabani served as Iraq's president from and suffered a debilitating stroke in