During the onset of the crisis in Ukraine in early , Chancellor Angela Merkel and her Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, became key protagonists in Western eforts to ind a common line in brokering a political solution to the conlict. Again, attention quickly turned to Berlin, as Merkel decided to adopt a proactive and welcoming approach to the refugees and consequently led eforts to ind European solutions to the humanitarian challenges and the root causes of the migration.
Germany is duly learning how to lead on foreign and security policy matters. As the expectations heaped on Germany mount, its domestic debate is still ongoing and has to get up to speed with the new realities. How assertively can we pursue our interests in the world? Is it acceptable to act outside of the EU institutional framework?
Is the signalling of the use of military force a legitimate course of action? German and EU foreign policy are closely intertwined. Indeed, building a common EU foreign policy was to a large extent a project centred around Germany: On the other hand, German and security policy have undergone transformative experiences in the last decade, which are key to understanding how it acts now. We can roughly identify three periods. In the irst period throughout the s, Germany was preoccupied with the challenges of reuniication and faced the irst debates on the use of military force as well as alliance solidarity.
At this time, it reairmed that a reunited and sovereign Germany also wanted to be part of a strong European Union. By the end of the s, Berlin had taken decisive foreign policy decisions, one of which was the irst military combat mission in Kosovo. By the end of the decade, Germany had impressively caught up economically, while remaining weak on its foreign and security strategy.
When the refugee crisis escalated in , Germany became the most attractive destination in Europe for migrants, which, in turn, left Berlin with little choice but to lead the main eforts in inding a European and international solution to the challenge. International attention often focuses on the most visible igures. Our analysis does not deny the crucial role played by certain personalities in international diplomacy. Despite the Kollegialprinzip principle of collegiality of the cabinet and the Richtlinienkompetenz authority to set guidelines of the German chancellor, the government is far from a homogeneous actor and not without its turf wars.
Ministers possess authority over their portfolio Ressortprinzip and are interested in getting their preferences through in the debate. Controversies are further elevated in a grand coalition government like the one presiding in Germany today. It is thus logical to highlight dividing lines between ministries on certain EU policy issues. For example, the Federal Foreign Oice tends to be more enthusiastic about promoting a strong role for the EU institutions, such as its Brussels counterpart, the European External Action Service.
However, the Chancellery stresses that decisions with repercussions for national economic and security interests are irmly in the hands of heads of state and government either within or outside of the formal format of the European Council.
Aside from the executive, political parties shape the foreign policy debate in the German parliament and beyond. Foreign policy is subject to a broad debate in Germany and a contested subject between parties. While European integration is viewed positively by most parties represented in the Bundestag, views on its substance diverge, for example on the legitimacy of using military force as well as on relations with Russia. A thorough analysis of German foreign policy would not be complete without taking into account the broader mood, including business interests as well as public opinion.
Industry, for instance, has been concerned about the decaying peaceful European post-war order and the worsening business environment. Consequently, it reluctantly and only partially backed sanctions against Russia — at least for some time — even though the sanctions hurt the export business. Yet public opinion paints a much more diversified picture, not least due to the number of people with an immigrant background. The traditionally strong preference for the non-interference of Germany in international politics and security matters is another robust element in the public discourse and stands in contrast to the latest calls for Germany to shoulder more responsibility in the world.
History, and the foreign policy norms it helped to create, play a key part in understanding contemporary German foreign policy. Despite signiicant transformations in German foreign policy, such as the irst participation in a combat mission in Kosovo in and Afghanistan from onwards, these norms remain inluential. While German leadership is increasingly seen as desirable by its neighbours, Berlin has to, or is expected to, pay special attention to the European dimension.
It also adheres to the traditional key principles of its foreign and security policy, namely its European vocation and transatlantic alignment. To this end, below are four debates that are closely examined throughout the report and that will be worth following also in the future: Defined by its post-war identity, Germany has a persistent culture of military restraint. Even though the German Bundeswehr has been increasingly active in military operations abroad, for example in Kosovo in the late s as well as in Afghanistan, the use of force is often seen as the very last resort or even strictly ruled out from the start.
The abstention from the UN resolution establishing a no-fly zone over Libya in was seen as the latest stark example of this culture of restraint. The most notable German foreign policy change of recent years has occurred in its relations towards Russia. Global versus European reach: One of the stable features of German foreign policy is its European vocation. Global challenges should be approached though European solutions and, if possible, organized within the framework of the European Union.
However, the EU has not always been the most effective level for problem-solving of late. As a consequence, Berlin increasingly strives for deeper cooperation with European partners instead of deeper integration of the EU. Finally, Germany is not immune to the traditional dilemma of foreign policy actors. Values and interests often go hand in hand. For example, when Germany promotes a liberal, rule-based global order, it serves its values as well as its interests. Yet, time and again, values and interests clash.
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As Anna-Lena Kirch writes: As they state in their chapter: Yet, there is often a vagueness in the public debate as to what this leadership actually entails. Far too often the evaluation of whether or not Germany has demonstrated leadership has depended on the political viewpoint.
For example, while some commentators lamented the absence of German leadership in the Ukraine crisis as Germany refused any military engagement or weapon deliveries,8 others saw the same crisis as proof of German leadership, as Berlin led the Western response on the economic and diplomatic front. In our research, we discovered that Berlin efectively has a diversiied approach to leadership. Refraining from using military force does not automatically mean that Germany is not in the lead. Rather, it just chooses diferent means.
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While Germany is becoming more comfortable with manifesting power, we also encountered throughout our analysis more subtle — and not necessarily less efective — ways for Germany to achieve a favourable outcome, as described below. Germany possesses power resources economic or military and uses them as leverage to align others with its position. As noted throughout the report, Germany remains hesitant to use military force both because of its paciist background and because it seldom regards it as the appropriate means to achieve its objectives.
Economic power, exerted for example through sanctions, is much easier for Germany to reconcile with its paciist nature. Yet the leverage of economic means depends on the playing ield and is in some cases very limited, such as when confronted with asymmetric threats from the so-called Islamic State. German leadership is not striving to impose a certain position, but rather to mitigate conlict. Germany leads from the middle.
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European and transatlantic unity is an important goal in itself and Germany actively searches for a common approach with key partners. In the EU, the consensus with France has traditionally been a way to achieve a strong European position. However, since the last enlargement rounds and with the waning power of France, the Franco-German consensus engine is stuttering. Yet the limits to this approach are reached as soon as either no compromise is possible or the trust is gone.
As cooperation and consensus is an important feature in its strategy, Germany invests heavily in the development of institutions and norms of cooperation in and beyond the European Union. Subsequently, they allow Germany to focus on speciic aspects, such as civilian crisis management or infrastructure and intelligence support, while more risky tasks weigh on the shoulders of others.
Germany goes ahead unilaterally or with a core group of partners to set wide-reaching standards which it wants others to adopt. Germany in Europe Ithaca: Cornell University Press, , pp. Oftentimes, Germany is not actively seeking a leading role, but is pushed into this position by circumstances and the unavailability of other guiding actors. In the past, Germany has often been hesitant to ill the leadership vacuum and has sought to share the responsibility. Due to its size, geographical location and its current healthy economic state, Germany is increasingly in the default position whether it likes it or not.
Tobias Bunde examines the transatlantic partnership with the US. Germany and EU foreign policy institutions: At the same time, it kick-started the development of a European approach to foreign policy after the breakdown of the bipolar international system. Germany held a pro-integrationist position in the successive treaty reforms. Its answer to the growing number of EU member states and to a more complex external environment was deeper integration and the incremental development of a distinct EU foreign policy driven in Brussels. Germany remains committed to a strong European foreign policy, however.
Europe is still the one and only answer for German officials when asked how Germany can ensure stability in the neighbourhood and drive the agenda of a rule-based global order. Yet the idea of how a strong EU foreign policy should be organized has changed. The Ukraine crisis, as well as the conflict in Syria and the rise of ISIS, once again revealed the limits of what a Brussels- centralized foreign policy can achieve. Crisis diplomacy called for leadership and engagement that the EU institutions — lacking the foreign policy authority of member states — were unable to provide.
The greater direct involvement of Germany was particularly necessary. In this policy area Germany is breaking with its traditional integrated vision of the EU. At the same time, Germany has had to play a more active role in various international crises. Berlin continues with its leadership by institutions and shapes its own administrative setup and the EU institution in such a way that they can contribute to a stable and rule-based order. For the time being, however, this shape is intergovernmental and decentralized rather than supranational and integrated.
First, a single institutional framework for community policies such as trade and common foreign policy matters. Second, a stronger role for the community institutions, especially the European Commission, in foreign policy matters. However, even during the following Maastricht Treaty negotiations the German position was signiicantly constrained by what was politically feasible with its European partners.
Germany did not push for deeper integration at the negotiation table. Europa Union Verlag, , pp. However, the CFSP continued to be organized in a separate pillar, shielded to a large extent from Commission inluence and in full control of member states. Yet an intergovernmentalist camp, consisting inter alia of the UK, Spain and Sweden, was against any transfer of competences to the EU level. While this reform did not abolish the intergovernmental features of the CFSP, it did bring it closer to the community instruments and legally abolished the pillar structure of the EU.
It also gave the High Representative a coordinating role in the external relations of the Commission, at least on paper. When the Lisbon Treaty inally entered into force in late , Germany was notably absent in shaping the implementation of the widely ambiguous treaty. Little preparation had been done in the member states and Brussels on the question of how the EEAS should work in detail.
Germany also got of to a bad start in the race to ill the ranks of the EEAS with its diplomats. Yet other member states were performing better in organizing their network of diplomats in the service. For the irst time since Maastricht, Germany did not propose any new plans for treaty reform. With stronger Eurosceptic tendencies in other EU member states, the institutional setup achieved with the Lisbon Treaty seemed to represent what was achievable with the electorate at home and among EU partners.
Instead of further promoting the idea of a political union, even as a long-term goal, Germany focused its attention on the coordination role of the EEAS and the High Representative over all EU foreign policy instruments. Hence, the review of the EEAS caused Germany to step up its involvement in shaping the EU external action administration as it existed under the Lisbon framework. Loosely based on the experiences of the Future of Europe Group, Berlin started work on a more detailed non-paper with more in-depth suggestions for the EEAS review.
In addition, the EU delegation network should be more eicient, with a clear leadership responsibility for the Head of Delegation from the EEAS most often a member state diplomat. Consequently, the focus shifted from administrative ine- tuning of the EU structures towards crisis management. At the same time, Germany needed to get directly involved in European diplomacy, partly bypassing the newly-created institutions.
In the Ukraine crisis, for example, early diplomatic negotiation rounds in Geneva, with High Representative Catherine Ashton as the only European representative present, failed and gradually a new format with France and Germany as European counterparts was developed. Germany as a Civilian Power? EU integration as a whole can be read as an answer to a structural problem in Europe.
German power is necessary to manage the challenges of the continent, yet time and again it provokes the fear of neighbours. By transferring powers to supranational institutions in which Germany is underrepresented and smaller member states are overrepresented, the balance on the continent was supposed to be maintained.
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Yet even here Germany developed a strong commitment to deepening EU foreign policy cooperation. Representatives from academia joined the debate by arguing that 13 Steinmeier, Frank-Walter: First a unilateral efect, in the sense that Germany increasingly sought to act directly with states outside of the EU and engage in crisis diplomacy with Russia, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and many more with only loose coordination with the oicial EU structures.
Second, a multilateral efect because Germany also played a key role in bringing EU member states together, for example in the case of the Russia sanctions. In his speech in Brussels, Steinmeier outlined the main ideas: Germany is expected to lead, its foreign policy only works in and through Europe and the EU toolbox needs to be expanded within the scope of the Lisbon Treaty. Germany thus started to feel comfortable acting on its own account together with key partners such as France and the US. Macht in der Mitte. Die neuen Aufgaben Deutschlands in Europa, Hamburg: Its main results were: With the stepped-up engagement in crisis diplomacy following the Ukraine and Syria crises, the risk of failing communication or coordination with European partners grew even bigger.
Krise — Ordnung — Europa, Berlin, , available at http: More ambitious and wide-ranging ideas included the creation of a State Secretaries Committee on foreign afairs and an imperative for a European evaluation in every decision of the Cabinet. However, the Federal Foreign Oice is now also more practical and more self-conident in its outlook. It concentrates on better coordination with EU institutions and European partners, not on deeper integration towards a political union in foreign policy. It acknowledges the leadership role of Germany, which needs to be better communicated to its partners, instead of promoting a leadership role for the EU.
It is obvious that Berlin is not a unitary actor in foreign policy matters. Competition is especially pronounced during Grand Coalition governments, as the junior partner in the Federal Foreign Oice seeks a stronger proile. The division of the Chancellery and the Foreign Office has repercussions at the European level. Merkel made the case for more lexibility: Whether justiied or not, the Chancellery increasingly felt that some portfolios had to be run by able member states and backed up by European Council decisions. Strong Brussels institutions present an opportunity for the Federal Foreign Oice and represent a means of obtaining a stronger proile on European and foreign policies in general.
While the inance and interior ministries are already on safe ground in Brussels, the foreign ministry wants to extend its clout. Speech by Federal Chancellor at the opening ceremony of the 61st academic year of the College of Europe, Bruges, 2 November , available at http: A more interdependent world requires looking at a broad set of policies usually in the hands of several line ministries to forge a diplomatic solution or address international challenges. In any case, with the parameters set by the Lisbon Treaty and the crises pushing Germany into a leading position, the focus in the Federal Foreign Oice has shifted.
During the Libyan crisis in particular, Berlin was seen as not living up to its responsibility. Ever since the conlict in the Balkans and its involvement in the Iran nuclear talks together with the permanent UN Security Council members, Germany has been undergoing a process of developing a more assertive foreign policy. Previously, as a country unable or unwilling to have a strong foreign policy profile, the commitment towards deeper integration was logical.
Germany did not have to worry about losing its own international influence which had been marginal and could develop a strong foreign policy profile with its European partners, thereby not engendering too much disapproval from the pacifistic-minded German people. The well-intended outsourcing of foreign policy finally reached its limits when Germany could not avoid stepping up its engagement in Germany has to combine an active foreign policy with its inherent obligation for European cooperation. In order not to be seen as dominant in Europe, Berlin has to reach out more efectively to the other capitals.
Berlin is thus promoting a strong role for the EEAS and the High Representative including possible enhancements such as a permanent military headquarters , closer interaction among member states in the Council and on the ground amongst European embassies, as well as unanimous decision-making in the CFSP that relects the unity of the EU. In practice, Germany has constantly expressed strong principal support for the CSDP, viewing it as an important contribution to the overall process of European integration.
Faleg, More Union in European Defence: Correspondingly, the last two years have seen key igures in the German government speak out in favour of a more active German security and defence policy. However, it is questionable whether the country currently has such a vision. As in the past, Germany seems more interested in developing common structures than in relecting upon how, and to what end, these structures could be used. Ever since the Cold War period, anti-militarism and multilateralism have formed the frames of reference for all German debates about security and defence policy.
Although the inluence of both traditions is pervasive in German society, they have been weighed diferently across the political spectrum. Becker, Germany and War: Until the early s, the Basic Law had been seen to prohibit the deployment of the Bundeswehr outside the territories of the NATO allies, but in the German Constitutional Court declared that out-of-area operations in support of collective security systems — such as the UN, NATO and, potentially, the EU — were in accordance with the Basic Law.
Schnaubelt, Towards a Comprehensive Approach: First of all, due to its strong commitment to multilateralism and the European Union, Germany has been a staunch supporter of the idea of an EU security and defence policy from the very beginning. To underline its support for the Battlegroups concept, Germany agreed to participate in more Battlegroups than any other member state. While rhetorically supporting both the civilian and the military dimension of the CSDP, Germany itself has focused particularly on the civilian side of the policy as well as on the possibilities to combine civilian and military means in the framework of the so-called comprehensive approach.
However, the governments have also been able to play of the diferent pressures against each other. However, Germany has often also fended of the demands of its partners on the basis of its culture of military restraint and its preference for diplomacy and civilian means. Due to the diferences in the approaches of the two countries,24 the Franco-German axis has thus far failed to become a driving force in the area of security and defence, although Germany has continuously underlined its willingness to work with France.
In November , the country joined forces with Sweden and published a thought paper on pooling and sharing military capabilities. In the context of the eurozone crisis, the initiative managed to irmly place the concept of pooling and sharing on the EU agenda, but the practical results proved modest and Germany itself was blamed for not investing suiciently in the implementation of the concept. Between and , the German government was also more concerned about the eurozone crisis than about security and defence matters.
In a motion submitted by the Social Democratic Party to the Bundestag in October , the government was blamed particularly for its lack of commitment and for its unreliability as a partner. Why Germany limits eu hard power, fride Policy Brief no. However, security and defence policy played only a marginal role in the debates preceding the elections to the Bundestag in September Of course, many of these steps had been prepared in German administrative and political circles in advance.
While the role of military means was not highlighted by any of the speakers, all three argued that a more active German policy might require greater German military engagement. In many respects, the debate that started with the speeches in Munich resembles the debates that took place in Germany in the early s.
At present, Germany is again facing growing expectations: Ein Schlagwort, drei Lesearten, Review — Aussenpolitik weiter denken [website], http: An initial increase of 1. In January , Defence Minister von der Leyen upped the ante, proclaiming her plan to spend a total of billion euros on defence equipment by At the same time, the plan is overshadowed by a report blaming both the German defence ministry and the German defence industry for repeated failures in past procurement processes.
Promoting defence integration was mentioned by Defence Minister von der Leyen in her Munich speech as a central objective of the country. According to von der Leyen, integration would pave the way for more equal European and transatlantic burden- sharing and thereby strengthen both the EU and NATO. Unlike France and the UK, Germany plans to embed the diferent forms of bilateral cooperation and integration into a broader European framework, viewing them as the nucleus of a more integrated European defence. The initiative foresees a stronger role for the EU in enhancing the capacity of partner countries and organisations, such as the African Union, to prevent and manage crises on their own.
At the security and defence summit, Germany also presented ideas to make the EU Battlegroups more flexible and more civilian in nature. However, the domestic discussions surrounding the operations also show that the government will have to work hard to mobilise the necessary political support for its more active security and defence policy.
While the objectives set by the Christian Democratic Party in its paper are more ambitious than those of the Social Democrats, the practical measures proposed by the two parties in their papers are very similar and can thus be expected to feature, in one form or another, on the German CSDP agenda in the coming years. Both the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats also speak in favour of drafting a European white book for security and defence to complement the strategic document that is being prepared by High Representative Federica Mogherini. In order to realise these plans, Germany will, however, need strong and willing partners.
Some impulses could also be provided by the ongoing strategic relection process within the EU, to be completed by June A recent survey suggests that two-thirds of Germans are in favour of a more active German role in international politics compared to only 42 per cent in Even more strikingly, the majority of the population now also supports increases in German defence spending. It also remains to be seen whether security and defence policy will be debated in the campaigns preceding the Bundestag election of and to what extent the election will impact this policy ield.
So far, Germany has concentrated on furthering European defence integration under the umbrella of NATO and in bilateral settings. However, a major challenge for the country will be inding like-minded partners to work with. Achieving an efective and eicient ENP policy that reduces security risks for Germany and the EU and improves living conditions in the ENP countries is thus at the core of German national interest. In the recent, more politicized and crisis-driven context, Germany has engaged more visibly in the conceptional ENP review, reinforced 1 his article is to a large extent based on conidential interviews with German and eu oicials and policy analysts, which were conducted between June and December Apart from tackling pressing security needs and stabilizing the European neighbourhood, German policy-making on the ENP has always been driven by economic interests and a moral responsibility to promote European norms and values.
Naturally, the goals of security, economic welfare and democracy have been in conlict in Germany as in many other EU member states, the main question being how to apply conditionality in order to best achieve the intended results. Even prior to the big enlargement round in , the question on how to stabilize and build closer ties with the countries in the European neighbourhood had triggered a debate among EU and future EU members. Poland led an Eastern coalition together with Lithuania, Slovakia, Hungary, Sweden, Austria and Germany, which shared the conviction that, going forward, the Eastern European countries deserved special attention and support from the EU.
Germany has thus welcomed the idea of ofering countries in the European neighbourhood incentives similar 2 K. Akteure und Koalitionen, Nomos, Baden-Baden, In order to address those concerns, the ENP was extended to the Southern Mediterranean and inally included 16 countries4 when adopted by the European Council in June It became obvious that the EaP approach had failed and that Germany was misguided by the assumption that the EU-Russian Partnership for Modernization would enable a peaceful convergence between the EU and Russia.
Increased German engagement in the Southern neighbourhood While Germany has only modestly, but nonetheless constantly, been involved in the policy discourse on deining an EU approach towards the Eastern neighbourhood, its engagement in the Southern neighbourhood was for a long time reduced to bilateral diplomatic, trade and energy relations with a strong focus on the conflict between Israel and Palestine.
German governments had no strategic interest in the region as a whole and left the policy entrepreneur and leadership role to France, Italy and Spain, which have close economic and diplomatic ties to the Maghreb countries. Chancellor Angela Merkel and Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier strongly disapproved of this exclusive approach because they were afraid it might increasingly 6 I. After the protests and uprisings in the region, Germany has been among the irst EU member states to support the democratic transition movements in Tunisia and Egypt both inancially and rhetorically.
At the same time, Berlin called for and supported a joint EU response. With the refugee crisis unfolding in , Germany has further increased its engagement in the Southern Mediterranean in order to avoid further domestic and intra-European divisions, tackle the root causes of irregular migration to Europe and shift part of the crisis management burden onto the Southern neighbourhood. Accordingly, the German discourse that focused explicitly on ENP instruments was kept at a rather technical and bureaucratic level, enriched by policy recommendations from the major think tanks, universities, and political and private foundations.
Secondly, Germany is calling for stronger diferentiation of ENP policies in the form of more tailor-made, bilateral approaches towards individual ENP partner countries in order to accommodate diferent levels of ambition and capacities to reform.
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How, and if, a balance between strategic business, energy and security interests, 10 Federal Foreign Oice, Building a stronger compact with our neighbours: From the German perspective, only a stronger recognition of geographical links and awareness of power equilibriums can result in eicient policies leading to more stability in the European neighbourhood.
Fourthly, aware of past incidents of democratic backsliding in Moldova or in the Arab Spring countries, Germany has admonished a stricter adherence to conditionality with regard to the allocation of inancial resources from the European Neighbourhood Instrument ENI and the implementation of Association Agreements, DCFTAs and mobility partnerships. In the past, the mere announcement of reforms was often suicient to trigger more inancial or technical support, which weakened or even prevented sustainable reforms.
As a consequence, German policy-makers have, ifthly, renewed their assessment that the ENP was no instrument of enlargement policy. Germany welcomes the announcement to involve EU member states more closely in the shaping of ENP objectives and to replace the ENP Action Plans, which it criticized as being too rigid and unresponsive to short- term developments, with more precise and interest-based Partnership Priorities.
Further, the emphasis on an even stronger diferentiation of cooperation and association ofers is very much compatible with German interests. Some EU member states like Sweden or the Baltics have strongly criticized the idea of giving Russia in particular any kind of inluence over EaP issues. Accordingly, the principle was mentioned only with regard to limited policy areas like migration, energy and security. Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, 18 November , http: Towards a new European Neighbourhood Policy, 4 March, http: Federal President Joachim Gauck addressed this stable pillar of German foreign policy in his speech at the Munich Security Conference in In , Germany was the third biggest global export power after China and the US.
Currently, Germany meets around two-thirds of its energy consumption through imports. Like other EU member states Germany has in the past upheld diplomatic and trade relations with autocratic regimes in the Eastern and Southern neighbourhood without applying conditionality — for instance with Azerbaijan, Algeria, Morocco, Libya or Egypt. A prominent example of a conlict between transformative ENP objectives and bilateral politics and policies has been the approach of EU member states towards Southern neighbourhood countries before the Arab Spring in Many EU member states — mainly the Southern EU members but also Germany — have prioritized energy security, stability and containment of migration and terrorism over democratic values and human rights when supporting autocratic regimes, for instance in Libya, Algeria, Egypt or Tunisia.
With the failure of democratic transformation in the Southern Mediterranean after the Arab Spring, the ongoing Ukraine crisis and the unfolding refugee crisis, which is being fuelled by civil wars, terrorist networks and poverty in the Middle East and North Africa, the focus of EU foreign policy has shifted considerably towards the stability dimension of the ENP, not only in Germany but in the majority of EU member states.
In the German discourse, the conviction has prevailed that the value dimension in the ENP must not be given up and that, at the same time, the refugee crisis or other challenges to national and EU security require pragmatic responses and collaboration with strategically important neighbour states or other regional actors 24 A. However, reservations on the scaling down of ambition concerning the promotion of European values were voiced by German opposition parties in the Left party spectrum.
But the refugee crisis has also had a very strong efect on the domestic level by challenging the power equilibrium in German politics, the conlict lines running between the municipal and the federal level as well as between diferent political parties. Vocal protest against the course of the Federal Government has also come from the federal state and municipal level. In October , 26 F. De Gruyter, Berlin, , pp.
However, with regard to the ENP, the oicial German position is that the comprehensive, geographically balanced framework approach should be maintained. By Arthur Moses Harry Houdini — lived an grand existence. Born into close to poverty he turned one of many optimum paid performers of his period. He was once an entire magician who can make an elephant disappear earlier than millions of cheering enthusiasts. In later years he toured in the course of the usa giving lectures concerning the deceit of spiritualism and the pall it carried over the general public.
Any unmarried this kind of feats makes an attractive topic to an anticipating readership; the mix of all 3 makes sensational storylines even years after his demise. He used to be fearless to just accept the unknown and the idea in his personal talents to beat: A magician - an break out artist - a silent motion picture actor - first guy to fly a aircraft in Australia - and spiritualism debunker.
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