The Ashgate Research Companion to Regionalisms. Democracy and Political Change in the Third World. Multilateralism and the World Trade Organisation. The European Union and International Organizations. Facilitating the Resettlement and Rights of Climate Refugees. Global Trade and Global Social Issues. The European Union and Interregionalism. Exploring European Social Policy. Drivers of Integration and Regionalism in Europe and Asia.
The EU and Immigration Policies. Democratizing the European Union. The European Union and Global Governance. Immigration Policymaking in the Global Era. Africa in the Age of Globalisation. Enhancing good governance in sub-Saharan Africa. The European Commission and Bureaucratic Autonomy.
Fighting for Human Rights. Sustainability, Civil Society and International Governance. Partnerships, Power and Peacebuilding. Global Social Policy and Governance. The European Union in a Multipolar World. People Power in an Era of Global Crisis. New Regionalism in the Global Political Economy. Democratizing Higher Education Policy. International Politics and National Political Regimes.
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Promoting Party Politics in Emerging Democracies. Democratization Through the Looking-glass. The four case studies exclusively focus on instances where the consultation and suspension mechanisms of the last two EU-ACP agreements have been resorted to. The case s reviewed here focus on instances where the consultation and suspension mechanisms of the last two EU-ACP agreements have been resorted to. They reflect common shortcomings in the management of political dialogue and the suspension mechanism in its three stages: The cases reveal a learning curve, in particular in the way in which the consultations are conducted, as the Commission EU has gradually incorporated the lessons from experience, albeit mainly in an ad hoc manner.
The coup happened in a context of a profound crisis of governance resulting from the stand-off between the President and the Parliament over the nomination of the Prime Minister. Humanitarian aid and aid benefiting the poor were excluded from the decision. The period of suspension was established at six months, after which a new decision had to be taken to prolong the suspension. In the absence of such a decision, co-operation could resume. That is precisely what happened as France vetoed the re-conduction of the suspension in July The political crisis continued and democracy further eroded.
The Parliament was suspended and replaced by a National Reconciliation Council which promised to hold elections in the following nine months, by 31 December These were conducted in May and June and concluded on 29 July.
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A transition calendar was agreed upon, leading to the adoption of a new constitution by referendum in July and the holding of presidential and legislative lections in October and November under the supervision of an independent electoral commission. Tandja Mamadou was elected President. The EU resumed its co-operation gradually as progress in the transitional process was observed.
The Haitian case constitutes a dramatic illustration of the difficulties of cooperating with dysfunctional democracies and failed states. Since June , Haiti has been in a state of institutional paralysis, experiencing democratic decay and recurrent crises of governance. Following several postponements, the first round of the general election was held in May The remaining six members officially announced the results, unchanged, provoking an outcry within the international donor community.
The second round was nevertheless conducted on 9 July. On 25 July, the Commission asked the Council to initiate consultation with Haiti under article a. Nevertheless, presidential and senatorial elections were held on 26 November, resulting in the re-election of former president Jean Bertrand Aristide. These elections were preceded by a wave of violence and intimidation of the opposition. The EU deplored the unwillingness of Haitian authorities to establish a genuinely independent electoral commission and resolve the disputes arising from the May elections.
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Relations between the E U U and the government of Haiti are now marked by acr i y mony and mutual distrust and dislike. Ultimately, however, EU pressure was not enough. The constitution was suspended and democratic institutions dissolved. The European Commission would monitor compliance with the electoral timetable and the adoption of measures to guarantee the impartiality and credibility of the elections.
The October elections were supposed to bring a relatively smooth restoration of democracy, but things went terribly wrong. In July, a new constitution was adopted and approved by referendum but controversies regarding electoral and citizenship laws tainted the electoral process. The Supreme Court told the two most popular opposition parties that they could not present candidates and Alassane Ouattara, a former Prime Minister, was excluded from the race on the grounds of its contested nationality.
Ultimately General Guei was forced out of office by protests in October after he re following his refusal to fused to step down despite losing the elections to Laurent Gbagbo, leader of the oldest opposition party, the Front Populaire Ivoirien FPI. Another round of consultations took place on 15 February. Open and transparent local elections were held in 25 March.
However, the EU demanded a national and multiparty dialogue, national reconciliation and legal proceedings concerning human rights abuses. The resumption of full co-operation would depend on the progress achieved, pending a further review in January Eventually, the E C U normalized its cooperation.
In March , it increased its macroeconomic support to 56 million euros and adopted a million euro five-year program covering the period On 19 May , a group of armed men stormed the Parliament, taking hostage its members, the Prime Minister and forty members of the government. On 29 May, the head of the army, Commodore Frank Bainiramara, with the consent of the President who stepped aside, assumed executive power and repealed the multi-ethnic Constitution.
On 6 June, the military government outlined a plan to restore civil order, which appeared to accede to the demands of the coup plotters for the restoration of the supremacy of ethnic-Fijians in government. The armed insurrection was immediately condemned by the Presidency of the EU.
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Consultations under articles 9 and 96 of the Cotonou Convention were held with the de-facto government of Fiji. It demanded four benchmarks to be met: Nevertheless, the Council EC suspended all investment projects under the European Development Fund EDF programs until free and fair elections were held and a legitimate government ha d s assumed office. New aid commitments would be conditioned upon the progress made towards the restoration of democracy, as assessed by compliance with the benchmarks.
The Council would revoke these measures when democracy is was fully restored. Tensions between ethnic Fijians and ethnic Indians continued to escalate, however. In July , the EU threatened to tighten its sanctions.
In late August-September , parliamentary elections were held and judged relatively free and fair by international observers. The four cases illustrate the difficulties of conducting political dialogue in a consistent and systematic manner. They clearly demonstrate that the operational mechanisms within the Commission to manage these instruments have not been sufficiently been clarified. They also indicate that there is only a narrow range of circumstances in which the consultation procedure of the suspension mechanism can be invoked. In the latter cases, such as Zimbabwe, the semi-authoritarian regime resists and resents having its legitimacy contested by outside actors.
The increasing acrimony and confrontation between the regime and the EU makes it particularly difficult to apply a positive approach of support and inducement as long as the autocratic leaders remain in power. However, the legitimacy of European electoral observation is often criticized as undue interference in domestic affairs. It becomes thus urgent to devise more legitimate processes of international electoral observation, based perhaps on existing multilateral arrangements and involving existing regional organizations.
The Limits to EU Policy Formulation and Implementation Capacity Clearly, while progress has been made in recent years, E C U democracy assistance policy still lacks clarity, coherence, and consistency.
Within the Commission itself, responsibility for encouraging democracy abroad remains fragmented and divided between several directorate generals, in particular external relations, enlargement, and development assistance. The creation of the Europe Aid Co-operation Office may well enhance the management of aid but may also further complicate the translation of broad policy goals into consistent operational strategie s.
Indeed, most changes have tended to focus on procedural improvements, while limited progress has been made on the far more important issue of linking resources to strategic objectives. However, long-term democracy assistance work more often takes places within the realm of development co-operation. At the operational level, there remain thorny issues. The new system of performance-based programming process is likely to be more demanding than ever , and the EU D d elegations are likely to bear the heaviest burden. Moreover, conducting structured political dialogue and organising broadly based consultations will inevitably lengthen prolong programming.
Although this may ultimately increase the effectiveness of aid, the articulation of country strategies, the monitoring of government performance and the regular review of the quality of democratic governance are particularly challenging endeavours requiring sustained efforts and specialised skills. In order to assess democracy and governance in partner countries, the E C U is increasingly relying on quantitative performance indicators. Less attention has been given to the manner in which performance indicators are identified, specified and monitored.
The method is as important as the indicators themselves.
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The strategic planning department would support country delegations in the design of country assistance strategies and ensure the consistent application of policy guidelines. A Democracy and Government Governance Unit should perhaps be established. It would provide critical institutional support to the country delegations, which remain the central locus for conducting political dialogue in specific countries, as each case is unique. The unit would work out methods to assess democratic governance and identify the performance indicators for monitoring progress or detecting regress.
Policy research and evaluation capabilities should be dramatically enhanced. The E C U aid apparatus still lacks the research capacities of institutions such as the World Bank and encounters difficulties in setting its own agenda and having its voice heard in multilateral forums. The need for more coherent aid policies and strategies should not lead the EU to adopt the agenda of the International Financial Institutions IFIs , but rather to influence it and challenge it.
After all, the identity of E C U aid is founded on its distinctively political character and approach. But challenging the intellectual monopoly of the IFIs on aid polices and the predominance of economic approaches to development will require the E C U to enhance its credibility as an innovator and leader in development thinking.
The establishment of the Quality Support Group QSG is evidence of the current efforts at enhancing the quality of programming, but fails to address the central question of strategy and the translation of general objectives into coherent policies and consistent programmes. A systematic review of the suspension mechanism since should be conducted. It is thus essential to have a critical look at how it can be improved to better manage these politically sensitive processes. International Cooperation for Democratization London: Burnside, Craig, and David Dollar.
International Co-operation for Democratization London: Frank Cass , pp. Collier, Paul, and David Dollar. What Have We Learnt? Please select Ok if you would like to proceed with this request anyway. WorldCat is the world's largest library catalog, helping you find library materials online. Don't have an account? Your Web browser is not enabled for JavaScript. Some features of WorldCat will not be available.
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