From a more epistemological standpoint, value pluralism also relates to the modern attitude of the humanists of the sixteenth century, an attitude that was more sceptical, tolerant and concerned with the practical aspects of human existence than that resulting from the more systematic theorization of Cartesian philosophy and the scientific revolution of the following century, both of which influenced current moral thought. Berlin himself warns that there is no logical link between them.
The Berlinian path leads us to the existence or not of some kind of normative priority for liberty — previously defined — in political liberalism. This approach has been criticized in several ways; I will mention two. Charles Taylor has emphasized difficulties in the conceptual separation between negative and positive liberties, even when we consider more sophisticated ver- sions of negative liberty exercise concept than that of the mere absence of inter- ference from outside sources opportunity concept.
In the opportunity concept of freedom an individual is considered free regardless of what he or she does in that sphere. It is included in the classical Hobbes and Bentham approaches. In the exercise concept, freedom is linked to some activated human capacity, such as autonomy or self-rule. Here, the lack of outside interference is just a condition of freedom but not a sufficient requirement.
Following a path similar to that taken by John Stuart Mill, Taylor defends a qualitative approach to what practices deserve a higher moral status in any consideration about freedom. Noninterference is not a workable discriminatory criterion among negative liberties. Negative and positive liberties cannot but interfere in education, for example. Moreover, negative liberties are also diverse and incommensurable and can be ordered and combined in different ways. By the same token, it is not possible to maintain that liberal democracy is the only legitimate model of political organization; it is simply one of many.
So, strictly speaking, it would be a matter of choosing between liberalism and value plural- ism. Although in the- oretical terms we cannot have a conclusive defence of the priority of negative lib- erties and perhaps a clear criteria of demarcation , they can be usually presented as the moral and internally potentially agonic basic layer of liberal politics. A second question is whether there are models of political organization apart from liberal democracy that are able to ensure the kind of individual free- dom represented by dissidence and diversity.
This question is more empirical than logical. There are different positions and internal dissidence in all cultures. It seems that it is not legitimate to use culture to justify the repression of inter- nal dissidence. Authors such as Taylor and Gray and Bhikhu Parekh are right to urge us to pay attention to certain values and ways of life that are ignored by liberal tradition. Many display moral virtues that liberalism is blind to or barely sees, and their presence is not only acceptable but desirable in democracies that show more normative and institutional sensitivity to cultural and national plu- ralism.
In any case, value pluralism is a perspective that 1 warns about the inter- nal plural and agonistic nature of morality and politics that Kantist, Utilitarian and other monist theories try somewhat to avoid I think uselessly ; 2 emphasizes that legitimizing criteria in politics are not related always to a universal and non- contextual moral perspective but sometimes to some particular and contextual ethical perspective; and in which 3 these legitimizing criteria are based not only on values — even when functional values such as efficiency and stability are included — but also on partial collective interests and particular cultural identities.
The conclusion to this second question is that it is more difficult to be per- suaded of the practical possibility of pluralism and dissidence within regimes in which negative individual freedom, even in its opportunity concept, and an exit from the dominant ways of life of a society are not guaranteed. Value pluralism highlights the fact that liberal democracies repre- sent a historical, institutional and practical sedimentation of institutions, pro- cedural rules and decision-making processes that have shown their practical compatibility with those objectives.
In any case, defenders of political liberal- ism tend to be less arrogant when value pluralism is adopted than when monist and fully rank-ordered pluralist theories are adopted. Legitimizing Poles in Liberal Democracies Legitimizing normativity is not just about the morality of values. On the other hand, these same theories interpret in a different way, marginalize or fail completely to take into account the questions, concepts, values and insti- tutional references defended by rival theories. Each pole synthesizes a general type of questions, concepts, epistemological and practical interests, values and goods, identities, institutions and references that the theories usually develop and combine in different ways.
The majority of the edges of the pyramid illustrate the tensions between two poles — for example, the classic clash between the liberal and democratic nor- mative perspectives, which has been developed in some of the political theories of the last two centuries. Moreover, in multinational polities, there will be an unavoid- able competitive coexistence between different values and national identities that will make any normative synthesis impossible. This kind of pluralism is related to the sense of self-esteem and self-respect of the individuals who share the same democracy i.
This is a question that, as Berlin also argued, liberalism might incorporate into its theory and put into practice through the pluralization of its normative and institutional bases. Value Pluralism and Multinational Federalism No doctrine which inspires a movement or a party has ever to my knowledge been refuted by argument — it expires as a result of changes in the world Isaiah Berlin, to Nora Beloff, Whether federalism is a promising road to take to achieve the political accom- modation of national pluralism within a democracy remains an open question.
However, there are few empirical cases of multina- tional federations and almost none are free from structural problems. Canada, India and Spain, to mention only three, have yet to achieve a satisfactory consti- tutional articulation that is acceptable to all parties in, respectively, Quebec, Kashmir and Punjab, and the Basque Country and Catalonia. This is in spite of the doses of constitutional asymmetry built into some of these cases. The existence of other kinds of federal agreements confederations, federacies, associated states, etc.
Although it is important to bear in mind that the logic of federalism is appli- cable not only to federations, in this section and following on from earlier work, I will concentrate on the case of multinational liberal-democratic federations. The key point here is to deal with these federations from the perspective of value pluralism in order to first point out some of the reasons why these feder- ations find it difficult to accommodate national pluralism within the same democratic polity, and to then comment on potential institutional reforms within them.
This is the model that I call plural federalism. Two Concealments of Classic Federalism Multinational federations are currently facing what may be summed up as a liberal, democratic and national challenge to achieve polity-building. This chal- lenge must tackle the implicit conceptual and institutional biases associated with the statist and nationalist monism usually present in democratic federa- tions. The question, in short, is whether it is possible to combine, in the same federation, the perspective of a federal union of different national collectives and the more confederal perspective that tends to predominate in the national constituent units.
This question cannot be answered in abstract terms; we must refer to institutional practice and case analysis. Although this affects the federations more than federalism itself, the situation of federations may, I believe, be described in terms of the overshadowing or concealment of their internal logic. The history of modern federations is the history of two concealments of classic federalism. As the consequences for fed- eralism of the second concealment have received ample comment, I will deal briefly with the first. Even though the contribution of contemporary federations to the process of state-building sometimes based on previous confederations has been usually regarded as an alternative to the process of creation of centralized states — first with absolutism and then with democratic Jacobinism — federations still share a centralization process with these states that is incorporated into the idea of a common or general authority that demands loyalty from all the individuals within a fixed territory.
This in turn defines, first, the notion of subject and, subsequently, that of citizen. In federations it is true that sovereignty and gov- ernment become plural when faced with the monism of the sovereignty of the king or the people in centralized states.
How much this phenomenon affects each federation is an empirical question, but it is of crucial importance for multinational federations. In descriptive terms, a multinational federation means not only that there are a number of different nations within a polity; it also indicates, in a value plural- ist vein, that these nations have their own ways of interpreting history, valuing their languages, customs and traditions, or understanding what is or should be their political, economic and cultural role in the present and future.
These interpretations are likely to be different from those of other national collectives within the polity. They will all be plural, but their plurality will not be identical. Rather than centralization, which as we know is open to a wide range of practical interpretations, this partial evaporation of classic federalism is the product of state political unity. This first concealment of classic federalism by the state or, in other words, this statist swing of federalism by a number of federations based on the unity of a territorial demos, is present in the main conceptions of contemporary lib- eralism and federalism.
This problem has yet to be resolved by traditional liberalism and constitutionalism. Naturally, the above does not imply the assimilation of federal state-building processes into the processes of centralized state-building, nor does it ignore the important differences that exist between the two processes and the possible repercussions for the practical functioning of the political system or the politi- cal culture of a given collective. In fact, as has been widely recognized, the processes represent two conceptions of democracy: Nor does the above imply any dismissal of the teachings of comparative poli- tics on the instability of confederations in contemporary times.
This kind of pluralism is the product of characteristics and relations related to the history, culture, territory and, above all, power of these collectives. Inevitably, and also unlike other cultural movements, both majority and minority national collectives are the product of processes of nation-building that to a certain extent will have to compete with each other when they try to make collective decisions within the same territory division of powers, use of political symbols, institutions, presence in the inter- national arena, languages, national holidays, educational curricula, etc.
From the beginning, fewer things will be left off the political agenda and the dia- logue between the different parties will not be based on deductive theories that display theoretical biases and a lack of information regarding the most relevant aspects of specific political legitimacy. In this way, for example, the legitimacy of collective liberty will not be the exclusive preserve of the state as a collective subject. These units may display a form of symmetry when they aspire to state-building and nation-building that goes beyond that which federations have enjoyed until the present.
There are obviously other basic values and principles of a legitimizing nature the dif- ferent interpretations of political equality, respect for minorities, constitution- alism, etc. It will then be necessary, if it is possible in federations, to adopt some kind of balanced solution based on procedures that reflect the accommodation of the national pluralism of the polity. This is a question that affects the three basic aspects that, in my opinion, make up an adequate federal accommodation of multinational polities — in other words, the three basic aspects of plural federalism: These three aspects also highlight the relationship between collective nega- tive and positive liberties in federations that conform to the model of plural federalism.
At this stage it would be appropriate to consider some of the conclusions drawn from the analyses of comparative federalism. Comparative politics shows us, first of all, that multinational federations have normally been reluc- tant to permit explicit recognition of national pluralism in their constitutional agreements.
In fact, this recognition is less common in these federations than the regulation of high degrees of self-government in some federated units. The reason for this may be related to the monism that is a feature of the statist and nationalist conception of the polity in contemporary federal tradition. Citizenship is not available at the same cultural price, in terms of self-esteem and self-image, for all the citizens of the federation.
Moreover, in some cases Canada, Spain the hegemonic nationalisms of the federation tend to deny their plurinational character in favour of a pluricultural and plurilinguistic conception of a federation that is often considered uninational. In this sense, and from the perspective of value pluralism, I believe that the explicit constitu- tionalization and institutionalization of a politics of recognition of national plu- rality is the first element for the accommodation of this kind of society.
Berlin himself pointed out that national- ism springs, quite often, from a sense of outraged and wounded human dignity and from the desire for recognition. It cannot, therefore, be assimilated into the distribution of a system of freedoms or material resources. The second point that comparative politics shows us is that minority nations have achieved a variety of levels of self-government. This affects the regulation of collective negative freedom in the federation. In spite of the difficulty of pro- ducing uncontroversial and comparable indices of the level of noncentraliza- tion and decentralization of different federations, the results of comparative studies and case studies show a lesser gradient for multinational federations in the differences of self-government than for federations in general.
The same results also show higher levels of constitutional asymmetry. However, a federated self-government, which in this case is a federated national self-government, should have sufficient symbolic, institutional, legislative, executive, judicial and financial resources to proceed to a set of hegemonic liberal-democratic policies of nation-building. This includes responsibilities, for example, in the spheres of foreign affairs or, if applicable, immigration policy, which in most federations has not been conceded.
It will not otherwise be possi- ble to ensure the correct treatment of the collective freedom within the federation. The rules of participation and the possibility of changing them also represent manifestations of the collective freedom of national units in federations. Participation in the union may be achieved through various classical tech- niques and institutions of federalism: On the other hand, constitutional reform on the initiative of the different national collectives and, above all, the right to self-determination represent a bigger rupture for federations, taking into account the aversion of federal constitutionalism toward the concept of national pluralism and toward the self-determination right for any collective other than the state itself.
However, although the debate of recent years on the right of self-determination has produced arguments of a mainly functional nature, based on the stability and the governance of the system, this debate also seems to indicate that there is no definitive normative argu- ment that discourages the regulation of this right in multinational federations including secession clauses. The Secession Reference also established the need for a series of procedural rules that do not impede the development of the reform process a simplified amending procedure.
In this way, in accordance with the Reference, the mere existence of a series of self-governments and federal agreements cannot be seen as sufficient guarantee and expression of the democratic freedom of a multinational collective. This all seems to indicate that it is probably not a good idea that the basic rules of democratic states affecting collectives, including federal collectives, be the same for both uninational and multinational liberal democracies. This issue has sometimes been rejected by traditional democratic constitutionalism when interpreting notions of freedom, equality and pluralism, and when it arbitrarily equates the democratic polity with a single national demos.
In fact, the Reference established the legitimacy of the right of self-determination for the peoples of a multinational federation. We can say, moreover, that this right is regulated from a federal rather than from a nationalist perspective: So, what is needed in multinational federations is a new form of constitutionalism in which the right to self-determination embod- ies the collective freedom of the national groups both in its negative aspect of the defence of the collective personality and in its positive aspect of participation in a general decision-making process that may result in different constitutional results following negotiation with the other members of the federation.
This does not question the potential virtues of federalism in multinational democracies. That is why it is crucial to ensure equality among the negotiating parties. The linguistic and normative pluralism of the negotiation, the different logics or types of rationality that govern the normative questions and issues associated with governance, and the different uses of the language that is involved in the negotiation mean that the agreements reached will inevitably be of the modus vivendi type, at least partially, even when the legitimizing language, rights, institutions and processes are strictly liberal-democratic.
The answers will also be plural and never definitive. Nevertheless, in this way it is possible to safeguard an interpretation of collective freedom that is closer to national pluralism and to the logic of the kind of federalism concealed by contemporary federations. Nowadays, as I said, the question of whether federal solutions are suitable for achieving a political accommodation of multinational societies remains unan- swered.
Nevertheless, if comparative federalism teaches us anything it is the desirability of establishing normative and institutional frameworks that are appropriate for each specific case. But in order to do this it is also desirable to overcome the conceptual and practical barriers and biases that the combination of traditional political liberalism and federalism has created in contemporary constitutionalism.
From a theoretical standpoint, I believe that adopting a per- spective of value pluralism makes it easier to find ways to establish a political accommodation of national pluralism in contemporary liberal democracies. Therefore, I think it would be accurate to say of Berlin what Nelson Riddle, who in arranged the songs of George Gershwin for a recording by Ella Fitzgerald, said of the New York composer: The debate in recent years between political for more; others, the have-nots, lack means of liberalism and cultural pluralism, among other livelihood This refers to the classic discussion on the ing with heterogeneous values, interests and incomparability, incommensurability and incom- identities.
Even if we accept that justice is the patibility of values. I do not develop this point main objective in the public arena — which is by here. See Raz , ch. See other criticisms of monist and culturally 2. An example of the contrast between these two pluralist positions as partial and incoherent in intellectual strategies may be found in the debate Gray , ch. In this latter work the author says: Information about Berlin and his work is speaking world, as a doctrine stressing the contin- available at www. Not surprisingly it 4.
Berlin insists that monism is at the base of any faces acute structural difficulties getting these extremism: The classical refer- differences back into its views of man and poli- ence is Berlin Obviously, here we would need to try to establish some kind of rank-ordering of human 6. Value pluralism is perfectly compatible with certainly not a systematic thinker. In his theory partial orderings of values and goods established there is a constant lack of determination about for specific subjects and contexts.
This is one mation within specific cultures and a Kantian of the potential functions for practical processes perspective where values are similar to the cate- of deliberative democracy. However, I think it more helpful to talk 8. Normative values our terrified sympathy. Shakespeare surmised and criteria are semantically closer to a Kantian the guilty imaginings we share with Macbeth, general perspective than to a universal one. I have who is Mr Hyde to our Dr Jekyll Clearly the developed this point in Requejo a, ch. Crowder , Weinstock He also perspective than rival meta-conceptions when insists that Hobbes did not necessarily need to one has to take decisions about questions related defend an absolutist perspective in order to to cultural and national pluralism.
This would maintain peace, in contrast with C. However, the practical starting point should society and the state. See Gray , ch. This is something more See also Oakeshott Given the mainly theoretical nature of this goal — solidarity, justice, social harmony, equali- paper, this question is not answered directly ty — by telling ourselves that these other goals are here. I offer a more institutional analysis in internal to the definition of freedom, properly Requejo , a, b, b and forth- understood This kind of fudging goes back to coming See also Moreno Hilary Putnam pointed This paper deals only with the inevitability of pluralism and not its desirability in present-day Think, for example, of the analyses of feder- democracies.
For treatment of this issue, see alism as an instrumental, subsidiary, transitory Parekh , chs. Depending on the values, questions and so on under consideration, we may also place the Statism is a position that is also present in theories, the political players, the discourse and liberalism and most minority nationalisms. See so forth on the pyramid like a topographical Guibernau and Hutchinson , Canovan map. Nevertheless, to take value pluralism as the , Miller , Norman , Tamir most promising metapolitical perspective in It would be inconsistent to deduce approach: Values and their agonistic relationships etc.
It is likely that such a practice would intro- are historical. As Colin Walters ism and the rule of law, attempt to avoid. This does not prevent one from recommend- McKim and McMahan , Moore and ing caution regarding possible conclusions about Buchanan See also Tully , Gagnon multinational federalism given the small number and Rocher , Beiner , McRoberts of existing cases in comparative politics of mixed , MacCormick , Kymlicka , peoples, as well as the biases and mutual differ- Kymlicka and Norman , Gibbins and ences displayed by the majority of theoretical Laforest See Requejo forthcoming This right of self-determination has been partly overshadowed by the Clarity Act bill C- Berlin points out that 20, adopted by the federal government in June the feeling of belonging to a nation is totally nat- This act interprets in a non-value-plural- ural and cannot be condemned or criticized in ist and debatable way the requirements of clarity itself.
Simeon and Conway , Stepan , with the insistence on the value of the equality of Linz According to Elster, when the parties are a cies and liberal-democratic federalism respectively. An exception is Ethiopia, whose constitution argumentation and strict negotiation — as well as states: In this latter case, argu- similar customs, mutual intelligibility of lan- mentation would appear to be decisive when dis- guage, belief in a common or related identity, cussing the existence or not of deficiencies in the and who predominantly inhabit an identifiable recognition of the national pluralism of the fed- contiguous territory.
Multinational democracies need a more of the elites in power at the time. In the former, the ethics of individ- This position implies the predominance of ual and collective dignity must be accommodated the principle of equality between national with the ethics of individual and collective nation- groups when one is attempting to guarantee al diversity.
See Taylor and Gagnon For an , Agranoff From the Canadian Supreme Court Assymetry in Federal States.
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State University of New York Press, Four Essays on Liberty. Two Studies in the History of Ideas. Studies in Ideas and Their History. The Sense of Reality: Federalism in the European Community and the United States. Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, The Invention of the Human. Nationhood and Political Theory. Cape Town and Dordrecht: Juta and Martinus Nijhoff, University of Alabama Press, The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, Gagnon and James Tully. Goods, Virtues and Diversity in the Liberal State. Two Faces of Liberalism.
Polity Press-Blackwell Publishers, Guibernau, Montserrat, and J. Politics in the Vernacular. Citizenship in Diverse Societies. Instituto Juan, March The Morality of Nationalism. National Self-Determination and Secession. Siglo XXI Editores, Roger Gibbins and Guy Laforest. Perspectives from Anglophone Canada, ed. Hobbes on Civil Association. Cultural Diversity and Political Theory. The Morality of Freedom. Ethics in the Public Domain.
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Tres i Quatre, A Revision of Citizenship in Plurinational States. Fossas and Ferran Requejo. The Legitimacy of Plural and Asymmetrical Federalism: Cambridge University Press, b. Johns Hopkins University Press forthcoming Democracy and National Pluralism. Some Notes on a National Neurosis. Princeton University Press, New York Review of Books, The Challenge of Many Nationalities. The Hidden Agenda of Modernity. University of Chicago Press, Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity.
Comparing Federal Systems, 2nd ed. Language, Culture, Community, and the Canadian Constitution. Previously seen as antithetical to liberal values — the same liberal values that were so often dis- regarded and violated in the twentieth century — nationalism was more or less seen as the dark side of contemporary politics. Yet, the liberalization of most Western societies did not prompt the dissolution of nationalism as a sentiment of belonging to a multi cultural and political community. Countries such as Canada, Belgium, Spain, the United Kingdom and Russia are all facing chal- lenges from minority nations.
The collapse of multinational countries in central and eastern Europe prompted the return of nations and nationalism in that part of the globe. Although this will not concern me here, an exhaustive analysis of the contem- porary resurgence of nationalism would need to include some considerations on the forms of nationalism displayed by nation-states or majority nations. Liberal nationalists argue that the nation provides the background against which stable liberal institutions can endure and flourish. The feeling of belonging to a nation would also foster the soli- darity and cohesion required for anchoring redistributive justice.
The liberal-nationalist position triggered many responses and, one could say, reduced the reflection on nationalism to the narrow yet important debate on the logical compatibility of liberalism and nationalism as two principled categories. Leading some comparative analyses and reworking the theories of nationalism elaborated by scholars such as Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson and Anthony Smith, a host of social scientists have revealed dimensions of nationalism that have not been thoroughly explored by political theorists.
We know that, despite their disagreements, the pioneers of the study of nationalism all maintain that nationalism is the movement that endeavours to link the nation and the state. As we know, Gellner believes that nationalism is a fully modern phenomenon driven by the complex and sophisticated division of labour characteristic of industrial societies. In contradistinction, Smith maintains that nationalism has deep roots in the premodern world.
Nations and nationalism would thus rather emerge from the belief in a shared ancestry and common ethnic descent. Smith nevertheless concurs with Gellner on the idea that, in modern times, the nation and the state must be inextricably linked. The study of non-fully sovereign nations in the West has revealed the inadequacy of the Gellnerian paradigm. Whilst national minorities such as Quebec, Catalonia, Flanders and Scotland remain fiercely attached to a notion of self-determination, the creation of a nation-state is not seen by these peo- ples as the necessary pathway to normality, maturity and modernity.
Minority nations themselves often face demands for recognition, autonomy or for the maintenance of the status quo from internal minorities. Nationalism under these conditions is not antitheti- cal to shared sovereignty. They operate in soci- eties in which citizens have abandoned exclusive notions of identity and can sustain multiple identities at the same time.
This gives a new meaning both to the idea of the nation and to the nationalist project.
Now that some political philosophers have shown that liberalism and nationalism stand in an agonic but nonaporetic relationship, or at least that practical synthesis between the two is possible, and now that some social scien- tists have demonstrated that the new nationalisms are not necessarily incon- gruous and anachronistic under conditions of globalization, a third step remains to be made. One could argue, however, that the fact of deep pluralism has not suffi- ciently altered the traditional ways of thinking about the nation as both a polit- ical community and a source of identity.
As I will try to argue, this is only one important dimension of the nation. Understandings of the nation have always revolved around that idea of com- monness. This is, of course, due to the powerful homogenizing and unifying capacity of the nation since the nineteenth century. In effect, the nation has turned peasants, workers, immigrants and so on into national subjects.
This process of homogenization is, however, rarely fully suc- cessful. An epistemic breach has been opened in the reflections on identity and difference in the past decade. In other words, difference is intrinsic to identity or identity always contains a trace of alterity. The descendants of French Canadians, which some sovereignist leaders like to see as a uniform group, live with differences of sexuality, gender, generation, political allegiance, lifestyle, class and profession.
However, if the nation was, with the great religions, the most efficient system of hierarchizing, subsuming and suppressing multiplicity,20 it is not clear that it can or should, under our present conditions, hold on to that role and status.
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Globalization encourages the multiplication and dissemination of the axes of collective iden- tifications. The either local, transnational or supranational character of prob- lems faced by citizens stimulates investment in communities of action other than the nation. This is not to say that the nation has definitively or necessarily lost its preferential status as a marker of identity and its structuring capacity. It is rather to argue that we cannot assume that the nation is always capable of sub- suming alternative sources of identity.
We are witnessing the desanctification and reconfiguration of the nation, not its supercession.
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The nation reveals, in its ambivalent and vacillating representation, an ethnography of its own claim to being the norm of social contemporaneity. There is a rift between the pluralized life- worlds of national subjects and the representation s of the nation as a self- identical site. Groups within the nations make use of these power relations to hegemonize dis- courses and practices, to impose narratives and to discard others.
Hence, for instance, the propensity of a particular trend among Quebec nationalists to defend a uniform and Jacobin conception of citizenship. The voices from the margins, Bhabha continues, act as reminders of the ambivalent character of national identities: The nation remains, despite its constitutive ambivalence, a powerful source of collective identification. A sizable majority of the diverse citizens of Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland, with all their identity-related dif- ferences and similarities, recognize themselves as Quebecers, Catalans and Scots.
National identities, even those defined as highly homoge- neous, always include an intractable element of ambivalence, dissonance and dissensus. This dilation of the trace of difference within the nation under con- ditions of globalization does not only eventuate in the increasing multicul- turalization of contemporary societies.
Undoubtedly, citizens of diverse ethno-cultural backgrounds have to find ways of living together within the same political community. But, moreover, and more importantly for any attempt to think differently about the national imaginary, difference also per- vades the boundaries of communities based on common ethnicity, culture or language.
As I already pointed out, diverse class, sexual, gender, generational, religious and political identities cut across and intersect with the cultural identity shared by francophones from Quebec. These dif- ferent layers of diversity are irreconcilable with essentialist interpretations of national identity. National identity is aspectival: The character of a national identity is internally contested and changes over time: What resists these tribula- tions, I want to argue, is the will to self-determination understood in the con- text of the attenuated and deflationary notion of sovereignty discussed earlier.
A feeling of belonging to a national community, as the nationalisms of Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland tend to show, is maintained and heightened not by focusing on a consensual identity to defend but by the incessant participation of, and interaction between, diverse citizens who disagree over the rules and substance of the political association. This attachment to popular sovereignty or collective self-determination, rather than definitive agreement on a set of rights or on a shared identity, is the main facet of this new imaginary of belonging. The way of seeing national identity and nationalism sketched out above suggests that the liberal-nationalist argument that unity and stability depend in the final analysis on a shared national iden- tity needs to be revised.
What holds Americans together together, despite their lack of common values, is the fact that they share an identity as Americans. Shared identities are said to be founded on a collective memory and on common visions for the future. But these sources of identity, even in a mononational community, are themselves contested and debated by citizens interpreting history differently and cherishing discrepant ideas of the common good.
Of course, American citizens can defend conflicting interpretations of the past, narratives of identity and political visions and yet still identify themselves as Americans. But can this common identification account for social unity, stability and co- operation? Much more needs to be done to ground that hypothesis. Is a shared national identity, even when hotly debated, always sufficient to prevent frag- mentation?
It did not seem to be the case in Belgium, as a pan-Belgian identity preceded the consolidation of Flemish and Walloon identities. Moreover, as Kymlicka recognizes, the liberal-nationalist position is inade- quate in the case of multinational states wherein the shared national identity is the source of much debate and instability. Turning to Charles Taylor, Kymlicka wonders whether stability in multinational settings lies in the respect for and affirmation of deep diversity, that is in the acceptance that there is a plurality of ways of belonging to the larger community such as feeling attached to Spain through Catalan identity.
This argument makes a great deal of sense. But lib- eral nationalists still have to explain why a shared national identity, albeit lived and interpreted differently, cannot ground stability and solidarity in multina- tional associations. After all, Spanish and Canadian identities are recognized and affirmed, to varying degrees, by a majority of Basques and Catalans and Quebecers respectively.
Is the counterfactual argument, that people can only identify with a single national identity, implicit in the liberal-nationalist position? But what is it that holds nations together if it is not, at least in the first instance, a shared national identity? Political theorists and scientists tend to link stability and cohesion to social har- mony.
Yet, for a variety of reasons, such as the reasonable pluralism of world views and of schemes of interpretation heightened by cultural diversity , the limits and fallibility of the faculty of judgment the burdens of judgment , and the persistence of unequal power relationships and real-time constraints, con- sensual resolutions of political debates are scarce and, at best, provisional. In line with the argument sketched out above, it is worth exploring the possibility that social integration does not depend on consensual agreement over controversial political issues, such as the substance of a shared national identity, for instance, but more fundamentally on the continuous activity of reworking the political community.
Agreement over basic rights, constitutional essentials, dispute- resolution procedures, conceptions of the common good or the substance of a shared identity can facilitate and consolidate social co-operation and stability, but cannot be considered sine qua non preconditions. The democratic process of exchanging reasons and visions with others not only spurs the capacity to develop a reflexive stance toward our own judgments and to see the association from a plurality of perspectives, but it also, as a by- product, cultivates a thin or second-order form of belonging that can withstand punctual disagreement on substantive or procedural matters.
The bonds created through participation are thin also because they can be severed by repeated setbacks or by permanent bias in the procedure of public delibera- tion. When minorities and dissenters cannot effectively partake in the game or when the rules of the game are biased against them, they regroup in other loci of opinion- and will-formation and imagine ways of either transforming or destabilizing the wider political community.
Social integration under circumstances of pluralism and disagreement would thus lie, as the argument goes, in the ongoing possibility of challenging prevailing decisions and political stabilizations. Citizens who disagree with each other or with public officials can still identify with the community insofar as they can voice their dissent and initiate new rounds of public deliberation. Tully presents this argument: Citizens develop a sense of identification with the principles and the association to which they are applied not because a consensus is reached, or is on the horizon, but precisely because they become aware that, despite its current imperfections and injustices, the association is nonetheless not closed but open to this form of democratic freedom.
It is a free association. This legitimacy-conferring aspect of citizen partici- pation generates the unique kind of solidarity characteristic of constitu- tional democracies in the face of disagreement, diversity and negotiation. Social integration, understood as the threshold of stability and co-operation required for ensuring peaceful co- existence, rests in the final analysis on the processual and gamelike character of democratic politics.
Decision-making is an unavoidable moment of politics, but it is a moment that almost unavoidably produces exclusion and injustice. To take an example, when the conversation is going, as it is now, Aboriginal peoples in Quebec do not attempt to destabilize the state of Quebec. Yet, as the age of the nation-state comes to a close which is not to say that nations and nation-states are withering away , infranational and transnational sites of political deliberation and action are proliferating.
Groups and minority nations that have been excluded or marginalized within nation- states are regrouping, entering into processes of will- and opinion-formation and challenging the sovereignty of the state. Environmental, financial, migration and security problems that disregard national borders have forced the creation of transnational public fora. The nation-state is, therefore, one pre-eminent and distinct political space among others. Conclusion The aim of this paper was to shed some light on an elided aspect of national- ism, not to provide a normative theory of nationalism.
The differences between various nations and nationalisms might be as important as the similarities between them. Quebec, Catalan and Scottish nationalists disagree on what constitutes their respective nations and on what kind of nationalism they should promote. If an important major- ity of nationalists from these three countries are devoted to a civic, inclusive and pluralist conception of the nation,43 countertrends are also being voiced. Ethnicism, xenophobia, assimilationism and the evilization of the Other inside and outside have not vanished from some of the nationalist discourses of small and big nations all over the world.
Yet, now that a number of scholars are trying to show that nationalism does not stand in an aporetic relation with both liberal values and political frame- works founded on shared sovereignty, the tension between national identity and diversity needs to be re-evaluated. Nations such as Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland, which simultaneously constitute majorities within their boundaries and minorities within wider states or federations, should be seen not as stan- dard cases capable of explaining any minoritarian form of nationalism, but rather as laboratories for the experience of this new symbolic and dynamic form of nationalism.
Scholars must explore how nations, as plurivocal and dissensual communities of conversation, self-interpretation and self- determination, can articulate collective action, social co-operation and common belonging with internal difference and enduring political disagreement. Brubaker , Laitin Tamir , Kymlicka and Miller Balibar , Anderson For further developments on the liberal nationalism debate, see, among others, Weinstock Karmis and Maclure , Nootens See Keating , Brubaker , Guibernau , and Calhoun , This does not mean that each and every The point is 5.
See also Guibernau , Castells and Dieckhoff This new meaning, I believe, cannot be captured Most nations, as Ignatieff objectivist view, which holds that people feel himself now recognizes, are made of both civic they belong together because they really share and ethnic elements. The German constitution, various features together, such as culture, reli- for instance, includes various civic dispositions — gion, language, understandings of the past and even if Germany is usually used as a trope for the projects for the future.
But what is missing from ethnic nation. Public institu- ferent ways by J. Mill, Renan, Anderson and tions are never fully culturally blind. For a nuanced and Seymour However, for some worthwhile noting that a subjectivist position noticeable exceptions, see Tully , a , does not have to deny that a nation actually Hedetoft and Bhabha Wieviorka , Amselle This emphasis on self-rule is particularly See the chapters gathered in Gagnon I am referring here to the process that led to and Tully Much more needs to be done for grounding essay on the politics of recognition, but should, I this thesis on stability.
For a more detailed but believe, have been emphasized more Keating , Guibernau in this volume. For such an attempt, see Norman Karmis and Gagnon Keating , Carens Imagined Communities, 2nd edition, revised and extended. London and New York: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. University of Minnesota Press, The Location of Culture. Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. Open University Press, The Information Age II: The Power of Identity.
Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century. Harvard University Press, Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox. Cornell University Press, The Ethos of Pluralization. Political Communities in a Global Age. Stuart Hall and Paul Du Gay. Journeys into the New Nationalism. Karmis, Dimitrios, and Jocelyn Maclure. Karmis, Dimitrios, and Alain-G. Nations against the State: Plurinational Democracy in a Post-Sovereign World.
Kymlicka, Will, and Christine Straehle. A Critical Review of Recent Literature. The Challenge of Pluralism. Social Integration in Conditions of Diversity. A Nation within a Nation.
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New York and Oxford: Canadian and Comparative Perspectives, eds. Michelmann and David Smith. Belonging and Identity, eds. Ulf Hedetoft and Mette Hjort. University of Minnesota Press, a. Should Ethnicity Be Privileged? I first sketch the theoretical framework that can support such political recognition and then discuss some of the objections to political recognition that have been raised from a liberal perspective. As I understand it, politics of recognition must trans- late into constitutionally entrenched collective rights, and this can coherently be done within a liberal framework as long as the approach is inspired by polit- ical liberalism.
My hope is that by answering those objections, I can pave the way for a liberal theory of collective rights. Political Liberalism as a Theoretical Framework The liberal framework that I use here is that of political liberalism, that is, the view according to which liberalism must avoid any commitment to compre- hensive theses in metaphysics. Nations also have an institu- tional identity quite apart from representing themselves as ethnic, civic, cultural, socio-political2 or diasporic. The crucial point is that our institutional identity must be understood as distinct from our metaphysical identity, and this entails, among other things, that we must distinguish between institutional and moral identi- ties.
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