Human Intelligence Collection (Intelligence Series Book 1)

Two chapters cover the literature of intelligence and information sciences. Another deals with the problem of defining intelligence itself, but no conclusions are reached, and the official definition in Executive Order is ignored. The final papers explain how the intelligence requirements of an analyst differ from those of scholars and scientists and discuss the early application of computer technology to intelligence, though the material here is outdated. The Lyons Press, , pp. Reprint of second revised edition. The first edition of Craft of Intelligence was published in ; the second followed in , with additional comments on cases made public in the interim.

The current edition is identical to the second. Despite the chronological disparity, the book is an easy read and excellent introduction to the profession, as it deals with both the history and functional aspects of the topic. Beginning with intelligence in Biblical times, it is later illustrated from the author's personal experience as it surveys the field down into the s. There is a chapter on counterintelligence, a very valuable one on myths and mishaps, as well as chapters on the analysis and collection functions, intelligence and policy makers in the Cold War, and the legal aspects of espionage.

While the emphasis is on Soviet espionage, the principles are consistent with today's threats. Although Dulles went over various manuscript drafts, the book was written by a group of retired CIA officers headed by Howard Roman. It is definitely the best book on intelligence written by a committee. Compiling a comprehensive annotated bibliography is labor intensive and time consuming in any area of study.

The topic of deception compounds the problem because it is dependent on a number of overlapping fields: Barton Whaley's epic Detecting Deception , with its 2, entries covering books, magazines, journals, and various reports is a unique, extremely valuable, and often to the newcomer surprising contribution to the field. Beyond identifying works published, there are two primary benefits to be derived from the bibliography.

The first is the star-rating system assigned, , 5 being among the best contributions to deception. Perhaps more important is the second, Whaley's candid, incisive, and robust opinions; they will save the reader considerable time. The organization of the bibliography is strictly and intentionally alphabetical.

Whaley has not created a table of contents or listed books by category. This would mean multiple entries because so many books cover more than one field. It would also limit browsing, something he wishes to encourage. Many annotations include an indication of where the less well-known or more rare items may be found the "LOC" entry. Entries vary in length from a page or more to short one-paragraph statements. Second, opinions from reviewers are often quoted and cited, and related fields of interest are indicated. In all but 71 cases in which he relied on an expert in the field, Whaley examined the item himself.

This digital book has three other valuable features: Appendix A is a list of public exhibitions of fake, forged, counterfeit and otherwise deceptive documents. Appendix B lists conferences on the topics included in appendix A. If the bibliography has a weakness, it is the absence of any keywords in the entries to guide the reader. A code such as CI counterintelligence in a keyword field would focus the search to entries on the topic.

An attempt to deal with this problem appears in the section "In Lieu of an Index," but it is only partially successful. For those interested in denial and deception the Whaley bibliography is a gateway contribution, the place to start. The second edition of this introduction to the Intelligence Community was published in With all that has occurred since, it is not unreasonable to expect the third edition to be a major revision. That is what Professor Lowenthal has given us! Seventy more pages, two more chapters, numerous changes and emendations throughout the text, along with new organizations, the impact of reforms, shifting priorities, and the like.

As an introductory text, this book gives the reader an understandable functional view of the national Intelligence Community. It lays out the fundamental missions, the organizational participants, tells what they should do, how they are related, and the general constraints under which they function.

At the outset the author makes clear that he intentionally avoids the how-to details of the profession which are covered nicely elsewhere. The two new chapters deal with intelligence reform and foreign intelligence services. The former anticipates some of the difficulties foreseen in that area and since encountered in practice.

The foreign intelligence services chapter describes only five nations—Britain, France, China, Israel, and Russia—but the references list reliable Web sites that discuss the services of most other countries. All that and it is still not up-to-date as the author acknowledges; only a constantly revised digital version can accomplish that. For many years teachers and students clamored for a basic intelligence text.

Now we have it. That France provided clandestine support to the United States during the War of Independence has long been recognized by historians of the period. Working in the French government archives on the American revolution, scholar and former CIA officer James Potts found the answers among documents that had never been translated. French Covert Action in the American Revolution tells the story.

The covert action involved was against the British, not the Americans. Its purpose was to weaken Britain by helping create a power that would make it less likely that the British would make war on France. After the Declaration of Independence, the French foreign minister, the Comte de Vergennes dispatched a representative to Philadelphia to assess America's determination and the need for warmaking materials. Convinced of American resolve and the acute shortage of weapons and gunpowder, France created a "proprietary" that met these needs for the first two years of the war.

Potts shows that without this help Washington could not have sustained his army in the field until the critical battle of Saratoga, a battle won with materials supplied by France. The British were aware of what the French were doing; their secret service had penetrated the new American mission in Paris. Franklin and de Vergennes maintained the fiction that the French government was not involved.

At the same time, Deane worked with French playwright and covert action operator, Pierre-Augustine Caron de Beaumarchais to arrange supplies.

Bancroft, Franklin's secretary and an agent of the British Secret Service, reported on events, but he never could establish an official connection to the French that would justify a British military response—this despite his knowledge that the French were supporting American privateers that ravaged "English shipping… in the years before France openly entered the war" after Saratoga.

The Chevalier d'Eon, the French officer who had masqueraded as a women in the Russian and British courts, was also a British agent who tried to upset the operation by blackmailing the French over incriminating papers he had stolen. After the war, the principals did not all fare well. The secrecy arrangements were such that George Washington was unaware of the French connection, as Congress never revealed the source of his supplies. As president he refused to repay the "unofficial" debt owed the French. Beaumarchais and Deane could not document all their transactions through private lenders, some of whom didn't exist and Beaumarchais' heirs did receive some compensation in , long after his death.

Both were discredited and died in poverty. D'Eon, after being bought off by Beaumarchais, retreated to Britain, where his true gender was revealed only in death. Covert actions tend to have unintended consequences. French Covert Action in the American Revolution is a very well documented and well-told treatment of the first covert action involving the United States. University Press of Kansas, , pp.

One day in September , I walked past the office of OSS veteran Paul Hoagland and noticed that he was visibly upset—there were tears in his eyes. Observing my concern, he said that Ho Chi Minh had died. Having just returned from Vietnam, I was perplexed at his distress. The Ho that Paul described was soft-spoken, kind, polite, thoughtful, pro-American, and an effective leader, a rather different image from the one I had acquired.

Buena Vista University history professor, Dixee R. This is not the first time the relationship has been discussed by historians, but it is the first book devoted to the subject. While it might be expected that with the end of the war in view, cooperation from all anti-Japanese participants in the region would have been smooth and effective, Professor Bartholomew-Feis leaves no doubt whatever that the reality was otherwise. OSS conflicts with the colonialist French were the most frustrating, but an American naval officer was a close second, and even the British and Chinese created supply and subordination problems as they too jockeyed for advantageous postwar positions.

The anti-OSS desk barons in Washington were equal-time contributors to the dissension. The OSS and Ho Chi Minh describes these circumstances and the field operations with their limited successes, their predictable failures, and the long-term consequences. Bartholomew-Feis also tells of the differing viewpoints of the field and Washington when it came to wartime and postwar support of Ho and Indochina. The decisions were not clear cut, she argues. Many viewed him as a dedicated communist.

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Recommendations from the field, where the tendency was to obstruct if not ignore headquarters, were inconsistent. The tendency in Washington, especially after President Roosevelt died, was to take the path of least resistance and support the colonialist aspirations of wartime ally France. This policy assured French support in Europe and in the formation of the United Nations. In the event, when Ho was ignored he turned to the only other alternative, and the rest is familiar history.

In her otherwise very well documented study, Professor Bartholomew-Feis concludes with some speculation about what might have happened had US policy been otherwise. Perhaps Paul's view of Ho as a potential ally was right. Henry Holt and Company, , pp.

Human intelligence (intelligence gathering)

The book is divided into three parts: Kinzer gives examples in each part to support his proposition that regime change generally progresses as follows. First, US firms experience commercial difficulty functioning in a country. Second, they persuade the US government to apply political pressure on the country to resolve the problem in the company's favor. Third, failing political success, the United States resorts to forceful liberation or regime change and solves the immediate issue while simultaneously creating long-term, unintended, though predictable, negative consequences.

The CIA is the nefarious manager in the final two parts. Kinzer does not identify terrorism as a potential cause of necessary regime change, dismissing it as the product of "fateful misjudgment by five presidents. Kinzer's contribution is the summary of well-known covert action operations in a single volume and his attempt to establish policy links, followed by conclusions. He is less successful in accomplishing the second than the first.

If there be a common thread linking all regime-change operations, it is not apparent—not even commercial interests explain all. Likewise, his conclusion that America is "singularly unsuited to ruling foreign lands" ignores the fact that it never set out to do that. Other conclusions reflect his own views more than the data he presents, as for example, his assertion that the idea behind all the invasions he discusses is "that Americans have the right and even the obligation to depose regimes they consider evil….

No one can argue that the events Kinzer cites did not take place. But at the same time, there is no evidence that the regime changes he alleges were " simply a substitute for thoughtful foreign policy [and that] in most cases diplomatic and political approaches would have worked far more effectively. Kinzer doesn't approve of covert action but despite his best efforts, he has not succeeded in justifying its demise. No matter how elevated the position of the claimer, nothing can be reinvented!

But things can be rediscovered, and that, according to the onetime Marine and now Georgetown professor Derek Leebaert, has been the case with special operations. In To Dare and To Conquer he chronicles the origins and development of such operations from the Greeks and their Trojan horse to modern era American Special Forces units, the CIA special operations teams, and Islamist terrorists with their sacrificial passion.

In between, he covers all the major wars and confrontations traditionally described by historians in terms of battles fought by armies, navies, and air forces, supplying the lesser known contributions of special operations. He argues persuasively that while the vocabulary so common today "is barely a century old… the activities of special warfare…are as old as civilization. Special operations, he demonstrates, originate from necessity and require personnel possessing ingenuity, daring, a willingness to accept risks, and skill in the methods of special warfare.

Successful examples of special operations include the British victory in "removing Napoleon from Egypt," their role in the Boer War, Cortez's defeat of the Aztecs, their application by Britain's Long Range Desert Group in World War II, the assassination of Admiral Yamamoto in the Pacific theater of that same war, after which "the Japanese never won another naval battle," and the rapid insertion of CIA teams into Afghanistan in Special operations don't always go well, professor Leebaert writes.

Then there are the problems created by bureaucratic infighting and the conflicts between high-ranking military and civilians that resulted in the failure to follow up the opportunity to get Usama bin Laden when he was trapped in Tora Bora. To Dare and To Conquer is a vast undertaking. For those concerned with military history it offers much—often in the form of lessons not learned—on a subject not dealt with in this magnitude elsewhere.

And, atypically for historical treatments, the role of intelligence is a major factor throughout. Those concerned with this aspect of the issue have genuine reasons for concern if Professors Leebaert's assessment that our current special operations capabilities "will take much more than the declared five years, if ever, to rebuild. Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin. Basic Books, , pp. The operational material former KGB Colonel Vasili Mitrokhin brought with him from Russia in was initially viewed with skepticism by some academic critics because they could not have access to the documents cited in the endnotes.

Two approaches to this question of source validation soon put the matter to rest—one traditional, one not.

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The traditional way involved comparison with existing and newly released material in which the Mitrokhin data confirmed earlier assessments and, in other cases, filled gaps. The unusual, and to some extent unexpected, way involved interviews with people who were directly involved and who admitted their heretofore unacknowledged roles as agents. The most shocking example was the case of octogenarian Melita Norwood, the longest serving and most important female British KGB agent. When asked by the press about the claims in the book, Ms. Norwood quickly stepped forward and proudly admitted her role.

It is all true, she said, and under the same conditions, "I would do it again. I thought I had got away with it. Mitrokhin brought out so much material that it had to be published in two volumes; this is the second. The first book focused on KGB operations in the West.

This one looks at four geographic regions: In the foreword, coauthor Christopher Andrew presents new details of Mitrokhin's early life, his KGB career, the reasons for his defection, and other personal data that could not be presented while Mitrokhin was still alive. Each of the four geographic parts of the book begins with an introduction wherein Professor Andrew describes the political circumstances of the period concerned and lays out the often surprising role the KGB played in promoting Soviet foreign policy in the region.

Of particular interest is the extent and variety of KGB forgery and disinformation operations. Clearly, the Soviets intended to spread communism in third world countries as a step towards achieving their goal of a worldwide communist state—they said so unequivocally. Many of the cases are familiar from evidence collected and published by Western intelligence services. Cuba is an example, though new details are added, as for example the role of Raul Castro in gaining Soviet support. The chapters on India, on the other hand, discuss KGB support for some important Indian leaders and the extent to which the government had been penetrated.

Human intelligence (intelligence gathering) - Wikipedia

These specifics were new, at least to the Indians, and caused a major flap. Stories about how the KGB recruited political figures and influenced policy were in the local papers for weeks. There is extensive detail about KGB operations in Nicaragua and Africa, where in the late s and early s, the Soviets publicly denied attempting to apply any influence. These claims were believed by many in America.

In the case of Vietnam, where the Soviets kept a low profile, what they told the North Vietnamese left no doubt as to their long-term goals. In , KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov told the Vietnamese interior minister that "the Soviet Union is not merely talking about world revolution but is actually assisting it…. Because the imperialists realized that a reduction of international tension worked to the advantage of the socialist system. During this period, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Afghanistan were liberated.

In retrospect, it is hard to comprehend that anyone in the Soviet government really thought they were ever on the road to making the world communist. Volume one shows how hard they tried to subvert the West. Volume two leaves no doubt that the KGB made an even greater attempt to achieve this goal by subverting Third World nations. And almost until the end they believed that the world was really going their way.

The Scarecrow Press, Inc. The track record for the historical intelligence dictionary series from Scarecrow Press is mixed. The first volume on British intelligence, by Nigel West, is quite good. The second, on US intelligence, by Michael Turner, is dreadful. It has useful case summaries, but it is incomplete in surprising areas. For example, the description of the "Lillehammer incident" in Norway, where an innocent man was mistakenly assassinated, doesn't describe the incriminating data revealed by the captured assassins.

With regard to the entry on convicted Israeli spy Jonathon Pollard, Kahana fails to mention Pollard's lies about his academic record and that he had been rejected by the CIA which the Navy didn't learn about until his arrest. Nor does Kahana mention the classified material on China found in Pollard's apartment or the fact that his wife Anne had made her own approaches to the Chinese government. Kahana is candid about Pollard's operational errors and, despite claims to the contrary on 60 Minutes , states flatly that "economic motivation was of the utmost importance to Pollard.

There is a very useful chronology describing the evolution of the various Israeli intelligence services and the officers that headed them. The introduction is a valuable summary of how Israeli intelligence operates, citing missions, failures, oversight, the importance of HUMINT, and a look to the future. Overall this is a valuable reference book. Mars Press, , pp. The author was a career Mossad officer who headed the service from to The first 10 chapters concern his views on Israel's political problems since its creation and leave the reader wondering about Halvey's Mossad role.

Only in the final chapters does he describe intelligence operations in which he was involved, abortive assassination attempts in Jordan being the most important. He spends considerable space describing the problems that arise when the political masters, in his case Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, attempt to manage operations directly.

He includes comments on the organization of Mossad, other heads of state with whom the author had contact, and the difficulties of providing intelligence to the boss when it could have adverse political impact. He goes on to support the war on terror and Washington's current approach. He concludes with a depressing assessment that suggests the world has yet to see the worst that radical Islamists have to offer. Halvey leaves the impression that he has more to say. Fiction House, , pp. Brigadier Syed Tirmazi was born in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, and attended the University of the Punjab before being commissioned an artillery officer.

In the former, the subject projects emotional experiences of his own onto the interrogator, and in the latter, the interrogator will start thinking of the subject in terms of his own life experiences. There are other ways to use social science to understand interviews, in the broad sense of cooperative debriefing and hostile interrogation.

Speaking of interrogation in the law enforcement context, "There is a vast literature on interrogation Argumentation theorists have taken as their point of interest rational argumentation in which two parties reason together to try to get at the truth of a matter following collaborative rules of procedure. And the interrogation is scarcely a model of how to conduct balanced rational argumentation. Far from that, it seems to represent a coercive kind of dialogue exchange that is associated with intimidation In some cases, an interrogation becomes less coercive, if the subject begins to identify with the conceptual framework of the interrogator.

The latter can be a false Stockholm syndrome context, or it can be a case where the subject actually sees that his belief system has fallacies, and he may start to share aspects of the interrogator's mindset. With WWII Japanese prisoners who believed that the shame of capture permanently separated them from that culture, [13] and who were unable to commit suicide, [8] appeared to see themselves as now part of the interrogator's culture, and became quite cooperative.

We might note that few Japanese ever attempt to hold anything back. Being taken prisoner is not in their handbooks. No Japanese is ever taken alive. Thus, they are not drilled in the "Name- Rank- Serial No- nothing more" routine. They usually reveal everything easily without any persuasion and seem unhappy when their lack of information does not permit them to answer a specific question.

In both police and intelligence interviews, there may be bargaining, where the interrogator offers incentives for the subject to reveal information. The revealed information, especially in a HUMINT context, is not necessarily about the interrogation and also may involve persuasion of the subject to speak. Before going on to study the relationship of the interrogation to information seeking dialogue, some account must be given of other types of dialogue related to interrogation as well.

For the interrogation has a way of shifting from pure information-seeking to other types of dialogue. As an example, argumentative theory recognizes 'persuasion', in the sense meant in the persuasion dialogue, [12] with certain strategic interrogations, the interrogator might objectively question some of the practices of the subject's side. This is not done for direct elicitation of information, but to set a new context for further interrogation in which the subject might question some of his own loyalties and assumptions. In the case of the Japanese prisoners of the US, they began to operate in that new context.

Debriefing involves getting cooperating human sources to satisfy intelligence requirements, consistent with the rules, laws, and policies of the HUMINT organization. People being debriefed are usually willing to cooperate, although it is possible to obtain information through casual conversation. Debriefing may be conducted at all echelons and in all operational environments.

Types of people being interviewed include both "tasked" and "non-tasked" individuals. Tasked individuals are, in some way, part of the interviewer's organization. More formal or extensive debriefing methods are used for obtaining specialized or complex information. Other than talking to tasked personnel, there is a tendency for some HUMINT collectors to regard debriefing as a waste of time. The approach to a voluntary source needs to be quite different from that to a cooperative prisoner, especially if the interrogator has reason to believe the source is knowledgeable.

While a subject may be a volunteer, a refugee or displaced person is likely to have some of the fears and uncertainty undergone by POWs. Active listening and sympathy can pay great benefits, especially in the areas of love of family, and anger at those who made them homeless. The HUMINT collector should allow specialized or senior sources more latitude to interpose their opinions and evaluations. Prior to the meeting, collectors need to examine all available information, to have an idea of the subject's personality and motivations when beginning to talk to them.

It also may require unobtrusive observation of the subject to establish such things as patterns of activity and likes and dislikes. The closer the interview environment can be to the customary surroundings of the subject, the more comfortable and cooperative the source may be. One example of source that should have latitude are trained foreign internal defense FID or unconventional warfare UW personnel that work with local residents, or military forces, on a routine basis.

Historically, after the WWII experience of resistance leaders such as the Jedburgh teams , occurred to various commanders that soldiers trained to operate as guerillas would have a strong sense of how to fight guerillas.

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In these missions, the SOF teams lived and fought with the locals. Marine Corps Combined Action Program CAP program personnel originally in Vietnam, [15] but now in Iraq [16] and various training detachments are apt to have valuable and structured information.

In all cases, the more knowledgeable the interrogator is of the volunteer, the better the result is likely to be. Hostile interrogations may require the interviewer to maintain a higher level of control, compared to non-hostile interrogations. Additionally, admitting ignorance of a custom, and respectfully asking for explanation, can trigger a flow of information. While it takes sophistication, the best general approach to willing subjects is a planned elicitation of information, always with a specific goal in mind. The key to elicitation is the establishment of a rapport between the elicitor and the source, normally based on shared interests.

In the initial stages of an elicitation, the collector confines his conversations to innocuous subjects such as sports and social commentary. Dependent on the value of the source, the collection environment, and the security consciousness of the subject, the HUMINT specialist will then shift to a more focused topic. Once in that mode, elicit the information by continuing to ask for clarification, with questions of the form "I agree, however, what did you mean by? The focused discussion can involve mild flattery and interest in the conversation, or, in a much more delicate approach, selectively challenging statements or introducing new information to show knowledge and stimulate more responses.

As opposed to debriefing, the subject of interrogation is not necessarily cooperating with the obtaining of information by the organization. The subject is normally in custody, although the legal circumstances may be such that an uncooperative subject may be able to leave. Examples of subjects being interrogated include POWs, individuals detained by patrol as not being from the area, and a thief arrested by the civilian police. Interrogation is a skilled technique, which often involves building rapport with the subject.

In an intelligence context, interrogators should be trained specialists, although they may work with linguists and subject matter experts. Regardless of whether the interview is voluntary or involuntary, the interrogator needs to keep the initiative. To keep the initiative, the interrogator may not need to be harsh. Indeed, the many successful interrogators are formally polite within the subject's cultural traditions.

It may well be that the interrogator, after the interview, does analysis, cross-checking statements made against name indices and "wiring diagrams" of social networks. While the actual interview technique will vary with the attitude of the subject and the needs of the interviewer's service, the interrogator should develop a basic plan for the first interview. This might be put into a paper folder along with documents or copies associated with the subject, or, if available, it can go into a HUMINT database so other interrogators, analysts, cultural and language specialists, can review it.

Reviews can help plan the current interview, or give ideas to other interrogators for other interviews. How much psychological pressure to use, how many symbols of dominance are appropriate to use, require great judgment. This device will enable them to observe his poise and manner, and may often quite unsettle the subject. In this pressure-oriented technique, the interrogators should sit with their backs to the main source of light in order to obscure their faces, veil their expressions, and place a strain on the prisoner.

The subject can be placed under further strain by providing him an uncomfortable chair, say one with a polished seat and shortened front legs so that he tends to slide off it, or one with wobbly legs. The questioning location should be chosen and set up to correspond to the effect that the HUMINT collector wants to project and his planned approach techniques.

For example, meeting in a social type situation such as a restaurant may place the source at ease. Meeting in an apartment projects informality while meeting in an office projects more formality.

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Meeting at the source's home normally places him at a psychological advantage, while meeting in the HUMINT collector's work area gives the collector a psychological edge. The HUMINT collector should consider the status and level of the source, security, the workspace available, furnishings, the amount of lighting provided, and the ability to heat or cool the room as needed. Interrogation is an interaction, and, even before considering the different attitudes the subject may have, the interrogator needs to know his own style, strengths and weaknesses.

He needs to judge if he needs cultural advice, how to handle language issues, and if he needs specialist help. After extended operations, there may be a limit on how long either the HUMINT collector or source can concentrate on a given subject. If the interrogator thinks that offering incentives will help, he must decide what they are and how they are obtained. If incentives were promised in earlier interviews, the collector must know if they were delivered. If they were not, the interrogator needs to plan how the failure to deliver may interfere with any trust built, and how to correct the problem.

The HUMINT collector must decide if he will need additional support including analytical, technical, or interpreter support. BSCs are authorized to make psychological assessments of the character, personality, social interactions, and other behavioral characteristics of interrogation subjects and advise HUMINT collectors of their assessments, as needed. The basic attitude of the subject will help define the approach to the interview.

There are four primary factors that must be considered when selecting tentative approaches:. A cooperative and friendly source offers little resistance to the interrogation and normally speaks freely on almost any topic introduced, other than that which will tend to incriminate or degrade him personally. To obtain the maximum amount of information from cooperative and friendly sources, the interrogator takes care to establish and to preserve a friendly and cooperative atmosphere by not inquiring into those private affairs which are beyond the scope of the interrogation.

At the same time, he must avoid becoming overly friendly and losing control of the interrogation. While Americans might not spend time inquiring about the journey to the place of the interrogation, the health of one another's family, etc. Not following cultural norms may transform a cooperative subject into a silent one. For example, Arab cultural norms, reasonable to follow in a friendly conversation with a subject of that culture, do, often in ceremonial terms, speak of family.

Handshakes are traditional at the start and end of the meeting. A neutral and nonpartisan source is cooperative to a limited degree. He normally takes the position of answering questions asked directly, but seldom volunteers information. In some cases, he may be afraid to answer for fear of reprisals by the enemy. This often is the case in low-intensity conflict LIC where the people may be fearful of insurgent reprisals. With the neutral and nonpartisan source, the interrogator may have to ask many specific questions to obtain the information required.

A hostile and antagonistic source is most difficult to interrogate. In many cases, he refuses to talk at all and offers a real challenge to the interrogator. An interrogator must have self-control, patience, and tact when dealing with him. Inexperienced interrogators may do well to limit their interview, and pass the subject to a more senior interrogator. When handing off the subject, the next interrogator will find it very useful to have any clues why the subject is being hostile. No two interrogations are the same. Each interrogation is thus carefully tailored to the measure of the individual subject.

The standard lines of procedure, however, may be divided into four parts:. The first three steps, which emphatically do not involve torture, can be combined and called the "softening-up" process. If the subject is using a cover story, it may be broken by softening-up. For these it is necessary to provide loopholes by asking questions which let them correct their stories without any direct admission to lying". The questioning itself can be carried out in a friendly, persuasive manner, from a hard, merciless and threatening posture, or with an impersonal and neutral approach.

In order to achieve the disconcerting effect of alternation among these attitudes it may be necessary to use as many as four different interrogators playing the following roles, although one interrogator may sometimes double in two of them:. The main factor for human intelligence is getam.

This can be part of softening-up, or part of the exploitation phase. At this stage the interrogation may for example be moved to an office assigned the subject, where he might even be left alone for a few minutes to show that he is being trusted and that there is something constructive for him to do. This feeling of trust and responsibility can be very important to a broken subject, because he may now have suicidal inclinations; he must be given something to occupy his mind and keep him from too much introspection.

Which course is better will depend on the subject's character, the way he was broken, and his present attitude toward those who have been handling him. Sometimes only a fresh interrogator can get real cooperation from him. Sometimes, on the other hand, he is so ashamed of having broken that he is unwilling to expose himself further and wants to talk only to his original questioner.

And sometimes he has built up a trustful and confiding relationship with his interrogator which should not be destroyed by the introduction of another personality. The HUMINT collector adopts an appropriate persona based on his appraisal of the source but remains alert for verbal and non-verbal clues that indicate the need for a change in the approach techniques. The amount of time spent on this phase will depend mostly on the probable quantity and value of information the source possesses, the availability of other sources with knowledge on the same topics, and available time.

At the initial contact, a businesslike relationship should be maintained. As the source assumes a cooperative attitude, a more relaxed atmosphere may be advantageous. If a source cooperates, his or her motivations vary. They can range from altruism to personal gain; they may be based on logic or emotion. This does not necessarily equate to a friendly atmosphere. It means that a relationship is established and maintained that facilitates the collection of information by the HUMINT collector. The relationship may be based on friendship, mutual gain, or even fear.

If he does introduce himself, normally he will adopt a duty position and rank supportive of the approach strategy selected during the planning and preparation phase. A HUMINT collector may, according to international law, use ruses of war to build rapport with interrogation sources, and this may include posing or "passing himself off" as someone other than a military interrogator. However, the collector must not pose as—. It is imperative that they keep their tempers both now and throughout the interrogation.

The prisoner may be given the true reason for his arrest or a false one, or he may be left in doubt, according to the circumstances of the case. The interrogators must try to determine whether his usually vigorous protestations of innocence are genuine or an act, but they should not at this stage give any indication of whether they believe or disbelieve him.

A clever prisoner will try to find out how much the interrogators know; they should at all costs remain poker-faced and non-committal. The prisoner should be asked to tell his story in his own words, describe the circumstances of his arrest, give the history of some period of his life, or explain the details of his occupation. The object is to get him to talk without prompting in as much continuous narrative as possible; the more he talks the better the interrogators can assess his personality.

If the interpreter is not a regular member of the interrogator's forces, a recording, which can be reviewed by a staff linguist, can be an important part of quality control. Whether the stenographer or recorder should be concealed or visible depends on the subject's sophistication and the state of his alert. If the recording process is not evident some subjects may become careless of what they say when they see that the interrogators are not taking notes, whereas a visible recording would alert them to be more cautious.

For others, consciousness of a recording going on in full view may be unnerving, and they may betray the weak links in their stories by showing signs of distress at these points. The sound of his own voice repeating his earlier statements, particularly any with intonations of anger or distress, may make a psychological breach in his defenses. But the interrogation skill is infinitely more important than the language skill, and a good linguist should not be substituted for a good interrogator. In the absence of an interrogator who speaks the language, an interpreter should be used, preferably one with some training in interrogation techniques.

It is very important that the interpreter not only report accurately what both parties say but also reflect as faithfully as he can their inflection, tone, manner, and emphasis.