Commission Asks for Vigorous U. Selected Legislation in the th Congress. Urges Additional Designations and Actions.
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All of these attributes are necessary to make progress on ending the war in Sudan. In addition, because the issues in the Sudan conflict cut across different regions of the world, as well as touch on international financial markets, the envoy should have both the stature and the authority to work within and across U.
Because the situation in Sudan continues to deteriorate and its government has not taken effective steps to address any of the serious concerns of the U. If the government of Sudan demonstrates substantial, sustained, and comprehensive improvement in the human rights conditions for the people throughout the country, the U. In order to limit the Sudanese government's ability to employ food assistance as a weapon against its opponents, the U.
The government of Sudan continues to restrict access to certain areas of the country by OLS. Famine also continues and in mid-February it was reported that famine led to the displacement of 98, people in the eastern part of the country. In part because of the ongoing restrictions on access, the U. A further increase reportedly is planned for fiscal year As long as OLS is regularly prevented from reaching those in need, this shift to increasing reliance on non-OLS aid should continue. In addition, the U. Khartoum's bans on humanitarian flights apparently have the effect of limiting some non-OLS relief flights as well.
In addition to the increase in non-OLS aid, the U. This type of aid is consistent with the Commission's recommendations from last year and should be increased. However, aid should not be given to any opposition group unless it is making substantial and verifiable efforts to adhere to international human rights norms.
There are numerous reports of the escalating frequency, accuracy, and deadliness of the Sudanese government's bombing of civilian and humanitarian targets. It is unconscionable that the regime in Khartoum can engage in such flagrant violations of human rights and humanitarian law on a regular basis without significant negative reactions from governments committed to respect for religious freedom and human rights.
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They should be strengthened by a prohibiting access to U. The Commission is aware of the current debate both internationally and in the U. Unilateral economic sanctions by the U. However, it has not been established that U. They can continue, for example, to slow the rate of increase of foreign investment in Sudan and oil revenues to the Sudanese government.
One way to increase the potential effectiveness of the sanctions is to convince other economic powers to adopt similar policies. In this regard, the Commission urges the U. Current sanctions prohibit investment by U. They also prohibit transactions between U. In the absence of multilateral economic sanctions, however, preventing access to U. The Commission recommends that foreign corporations doing business with Sudan's petroleum industry be prohibited from issuing or listing its securities on U. The Commission does not lightly recommend these significant restrictions on U.
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There is a direct connection between oil production and those abuses. Foreign investment is critical to the development of Sudan's oil fields and maintaining oil revenues. Moreover, the issue of continuing economic sanctions against Sudan is one of principle as well as effectiveness. Reducing sanctions against Sudan at this time - after the Sudanese government has made no concessions but rather has increased its civilian bombings and other atrocities - would be to reward the latter for worsening behavior.
This will send the wrong message to the government of Sudan and the international community. With respect to licenses granted in and to permit U. Because a reasonable amount of time has elapsed, no further licenses should be granted, and efforts should be continued to identify alternate suppliers of this product. If the government of Sudan demonstrates substantial, sustained, and comprehensive improvement in the human rights conditions for people throughout the country, the U. There is a significant, undesirable gap in U.
In many cases, foreign companies that are doing business in Sudan can sell securities on U. It also would aid 1 U. The Commission recommends that the U. Peace negotiations under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development IGAD , have produced no significant results in the past year, and indeed no longer continue.
The Sudanese government remains publicly committed to negotiations using the framework of the Declaration of Principles DOP. Moreover, as the Commission recommended last year, the U. Humanitarian and religious groups, human rights organizations, and journalists have labored under very difficult conditions to bring to light the human suffering and human rights abuses in Sudan. Their efforts are severely hampered by the Sudanese government's restrictions on access to many parts of the country.
As a result, the full extent of the abuses being committed in Sudan is still not known. Concurrence with Qualifications to Recommendations 3 and 5 Dr. Laila Al-Marayati March 10, However, due to the dominance of the SPLA in southern Sudan, it is possible to assume that non-lethal aid to opposition forces will also fall into the hands of the SPLA which is responsible for human rights abuses that should preclude any support by the U.
In addition, the current statement by the USCIRF mentions that aid should not be given to "any opposition group unless it is making verifiable efforts to adhere to international human rights norms. At this time, no such improvements have been verified by either the U. Finally, aid to the opposition, unless to a much greater degree than heretofore applied by the U. Therefore, recommendations for assistance to opposition groups other than humanitarian aid should be considered in light of their overall effect on the civil war.
The Commission's report rightly points out that unilateral sanctions have not prevented foreign investment in Sudan, particularly in the oil industry whose revenues have enabled the Sudanese government to strengthen its position with respect to the war. While one approach is to push for broader, multilateral support and to close loopholes at least with respect to U. Therefore, in addition to the Commission's recommendations in the report, I would urge the administration to review the sanctions policy as part of an overall approach to helping solve the problems that plague Sudan at this time.
Second, if the U. Department of State, Interagency Review of U. Recent human rights reports on Sudan include Amnesty International, Sudan: Deteriorating Human Rights March 5, http: Norwegian People's Aid reported that on April 16, government forces dropped bombs near a child feeding compound. On July 28, in Akhuem in northern Bahr el-Ghazal, several bombs landed close to a Doctors Without Borders plane and near its health center, prompting the medical team to evacuate the area. Christian Solidarity International, with the assistance of black African community leaders and Arab retrievers, claims to have liberated more than 38, Sudanese slaves since See also, Country Reports , "Sudan" Internet , 4.
Oil and War in Sudan March 15, http: Some public schools excused non-Muslims from Islamic education classes. Some private schools, including Christian schools, received government-provided Muslim teachers to teach Islamic subjects, but non-Muslim students were not required to attend those classes. According to various church representatives, the government skewed its decisions on permit issuance towards mosques. The government attributed its denial of permits to the churches not meeting government population density parameters and zoning plans. Local parishioners reported that, compared to Islamic institutions, Christian places of worship were disproportionately affected by zoning changes, closures, and demolitions.
The government said places of worship that were demolished or closed lacked proper land permits or institutional registration. The government stated mosques, churches, schools, hospitals, and residences were all affected equally by the urban planning projects. In December the government issued a written notice to the Soba County Sudan Church of Christ stating it had no legal right to the land on which the church was built in In July authorities in East Nile State ordered officials overseeing land matters to issue demolition notices to 25 churches in the state.
In July authorities gave three churches in Haj Yousif in Khartoum State notice of imminent demolition, saying the churches had improper land registration documents. Residents of the area reported that multiple mosques and a government-run school within the same vicinity as the churches were not given similar notices of imminent demolition.
Pro bono legal representatives of the churches and the SCC appealed to the MGE on behalf of the churches, which all had informal documents showing the government allocated land to them for rent in the s.
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Neither the Evangelical Lutheran Church nor the Sudanese Church of Christ in Omdurman, which were demolished in October , received compensation as of the end of the year. According to authorities, the government would provide financial compensation and new land in another area of Khartoum to the Evangelical Lutheran Church and other institutions affected by rezoning. Police subsequently released three of them, reportedly upon recognizing them as members of the council. The general prosecutor initially charged the other 14 with disturbing the peace and ordered their release on bail.
Local police challenged instructions to release the group but released them three days later. Two of the convicted were members of the clergy, one was the former headmistress of the school whom the government had forcibly removed, and the remaining were senior members of SPECS. September 5, October 4, and October Suleiman strongly denied the charge. Following the October 4 raid, authorities arrested and detained for four days Suleiman, Reverend Ismail Zakaria, and seven teachers for attempting to prevent the seizure of the school. Following the October 24 raid, school officials wrote a letter to the government requesting it reconsider its decision to close the school.
After hearings on November 7 and 8, the Appeal Court for Administrative Affairs cancelled an order by the Madani commissioner calling for the closure of the school and appointment of a Muslim headmaster. The government maintained control of the property and church leaders were only permitted to use the center for administrative purposes.
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According to the SCC, the church had not received compensation and authorities prevented them from constructing a new church. The government restricted some religiously based political parties, including the Republican Brothers Party. President Bashir and other senior figures frequently emphasized the Islamic majority of the country. In September the government engaged civil society and political parties in a Community Dialogue, a forum for participation from civil society and political parties running parallel to the National Dialogue to consider future political reforms, including whether changes to the INC should be secular or based on sharia.
Authorities recurrently extended the National Dialogue from January to September, to allow for more participation from opposition groups. Some participating groups argued for strengthening the role of Islam in government and politics, while other groups called for greater secularism. Many evangelical Christian groups and other civil society groups reported not being included in either dialogue. The MGE said decisions regarding the approval and oversight of the administration of religious institutions should be considered a federal not state competency, in order to better control the activities of violent extremist groups.
Some Salafist groups reported plans to file a case against the MGE regarding the issue. The government restricted non-Muslim religious groups from operating or entering the country and continued to monitor activities and censor material published by religious institutions. The MGE said it granted a limited number of Christian missionary groups permission to engage in humanitarian activities and promote Muslim-Christian cooperation.
Some Christian churches reported authorities required them to pay or negotiate taxes on items such as vehicles, even though the government had previously granted them or their humanitarian institutions tax-exempt status. Leading officials from various churches reported the government refused to grant, or delayed renewing, work and residency visas to church employees of foreign origin, including missionaries and clergy, or to individuals it thought would proselytize in public places.
This reportedly had a particularly negative impact on the Catholic Church whose clergy are mostly of foreign origin, while most clergy of other Christian denominations are ethnically Sudanese. According to Catholic Church officials, the government tightened restrictions on the entry of foreign clergy during the year.
In rare cases when entry visas were issued, clergy often waited up to seven months before the government granted them residency permits. The government closely scrutinized those suspected of proselytizing and used administrative rationales, or other aspects of the law such as immigration status, to either deport or exert financial pressure on them.
As a result, most non-Muslim groups refrained from public proselytizing. A small number of Christian politicians, the majority of whom were members of the Coptic Church, continued to hold seats in the government. Evangelical Christian groups said that the MGE-appointed director of church affairs remained a Muslim, reporting that his policies and interests were often not in alignment with those of evangelical churches. The government allowed the SCC, an ecumenical body representing 12 member churches in Sudan and affiliated with the World Council of Churches, to engage in civic education, advocacy, peace and reconciliation, relief, and development services, either directly or through its member churches.
Government officials reported tensions between some Muslim groups. Muslims and non-Muslims said a small, growing, and sometimes vocal minority of Salafist groups continued to be a concern to them on religious grounds and because some advocated violence. Individual Muslims and Christians reported generally good relationships between Muslims and Christians at the societal level and stated that instances of intolerance or discrimination by nongovernment entities were generally considered as isolated incidents.
Because religion and ethnicity are often closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents as being solely based on religious identity. Observers stated that societal tensions based on religious beliefs figured more prominently among different Muslim groups than across different religious groups. The Sudan Inter-Religious Council, a registered nonprofit, nonpolitical organization consisting of a body of scholars, half of whom are Muslim and half Christian, was mandated to advise the MGE and sought to encourage interfaith dialogue. During the year, however, the Council was mainly inactive.
In high-level meetings, U. Department of State officials, including the U. Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom, encouraged the government to respect religious freedom and protect the rights of minority religious groups. The Special Envoy raised in high-level government meetings the nine-month detention of Hassan Abdelrahim and other clergy by the NISS without charges and urged the government to grant a fair and speedy trial. Government officials responded it was a criminal case, requiring the trial to be completed just as any other. Embassy officials met regularly with imams and Sufi clerics, and clergy and parishioners of Catholic and Protestant churches to hear their views on the religious freedom situation in the country.
Embassy officials attended religious ceremonies of different groups and underscored the importance of religious tolerance in regular meetings with leaders of Muslim and Christian groups. In one example, embassy officials regularly attended weekly hearings from August to November in the trial of Peter Jasek and associates, Pastors Kowa Shamal and Hassan Abdelrahim, and human rights activist Abdelmoneim Abdumaula.
Embassy officials also attended ongoing proceedings for the 25 Muslims charged with apostasy in and released on bail in February. Embassy officials kept in close contact with NGOs, civil society representatives, and journalists to gather their perspectives on religious freedom and to receive updates about ongoing cases. The embassy regularly utilized its social media outlets to share articles and messaging related to religious tolerance and freedom.
Often the messaging highlighted religious diversity in the United States and efforts by local communities to remain inclusive and maintain an open dialogue.