Or was Engels wrong in saying so? Does the lecturer know that Mach expressed his agreement with the head of the immanentist school, Schuppe, and even dedicated his last and chief philosophical work to him? How does the lecturer explain this adherence of Mach to the obviously idealist philosophy of Schuppe, a defender of clericalism and in general a downright reactionary in philosophy?
Why did the lecturer keep silent about "adventure" with his comrade of yesterday according to the Studies I. Is the lecturer aware that Petzoldt in his latest book has classed a number of Mach's disciples among the idealists? Does the lecturer confirm the fact that Machism has nothing in common with Bolshevism? And that Lenin has repeatedly protested against Machism? Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. In May of that year he went to London, where he spent about a month in the library of the British Museum working on material not available in Geneva.
The manuscript was completed in October and was forwarded to a secret address in Moscow, where the Zveno Publishing House undertook its printing. The proofs were read by Lenin's sister, A. Elizarova, in Moscow, then one set was sent abroad to Lenin who thoroughly checked them, noted printing errors and made a number of corrections. Part of the corrections were incorporated in the printed text; others were indicated in an important list of errata appended to the first edition of the book. Lenin had to consent to tone down some passages in the book to avoid giving the tsarist censors excuse for proscribing its publication.
Lenin insisted that the book be brought out quickly, urging that this was necessitated "not only by literary, but also by serious political considerations". The book appeared in an edition of 2, copies in May A number of writers, would-be Marxists, have this year undertaken a veritable campaign against the philosophy of Marxism. In the course of less than half a year four books devoted mainly and almost exclusively to attacks on dialectical materialism have made their appearance.
These include first and foremost Studies in [? All these people could not have been ignorant of the fact that Marx and Engels scores of times termed their philosophical views dialectical materialism. Yet all these people, who, despite the sharp divergence of their political views, are united in their hostility towards dialectical materialism, at the same time claim to be Marxists in philosophy! Engels' dialectics is "mysticism," says Berman. Engels' views have become "antiquated," remarks Bazarov casually, as though it were a self-evident fact.
Materialism thus appears to be refuted by our bold warriors, who proudly allude to the "modern theory of knowledge," "recent philosophy" or "recent positivism" , the "philosophy of modern natural science," or even the "philosophy of natural science of the twentieth century. Fideism — Lenin originally used the term popovshchina priest-lore, clericalism in his manuscript but replaced it with "fideism" to avoid the censorship. Lenin explained the term "fideism" in a letter of November 8, New Style , to A.
Lenin is referring to so-called "god-building", an anti-Marxist religious-philosophical literary trend which arose in the Stolypin reaction period among a section of the Party intellectuals, who later deviated from Marxism after the defeat of the revolution. Bazarov and others advocated the founding of a new "socialist" religion with the aim of reconciling Marxism with religion.
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Maxim Gorky was at one time associated with this group. A conference of the enlarged editorial board of Proletary condemned the "god-building" trend and declared in a special resolution that the Bolshevik faction had nothing in common with "such distortions of scientific socialism". Lenin exposed the reactionary nature of "god-building" in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism and in his letters to Gorky of February-April and November-December Yet when it comes to an explicit definition of their attitude towards Marx and Engels, all their courage and all their respect for their own convictions at once disappear.
In deed — a complete renunciation of dialectical materialism, i. This is truly "mutiny on one's knees," as it was justly characterised by one Marxist. This is typical philosophical revisionism, for it was only the revisionists who gained a sad notoriety for themselves by their departure from the fundamental views of Marxism and by their fear, or inability, to "settle accounts" openly, explicitly, resolutely and clearly with the views they had abandoned. When orthodox Marxists had occasion to pronounce against some antiquated views of Marx for instance, Mehring when he opposed certain historical propositions , it was always done with such precision and thoroughness that no one has ever found anything ambiguous in such literary utterances.
For the rest, there is in the Studies "in" the Philosophy of Marxism one phrase which resembles the truth. This is Lunacharsky's phrase: That the first half of this phrase contains an absolute and the second a relative truth, I shall endeavour to demonstrate circumstantially in the present book. At the moment I would only remark that if our philosophers had spoken not in the name of Marxism but in the name of a few "seeking" Marxists, they would have shown more respect for themselves and for Marxism.
As for myself, I too am a "seeker" in philosophy. Namely, the task I have set myself in these comments is to find out what was the stumbling block to these people who under the guise of Marxism are offering something incredibly muddled, confused and reactionary. With the exception of a few corrections in the text, the present edition does not differ from the previous one. I hope that, irrespective of the dispute with the Russian "Machians," it will prove useful as an aid to an acquaintance with the philosophy of Marxism, dialectical materialism, as well as with the philosophical conclusions from the recent discoveries in natural science.
Bogdanov's latest works, which I have had no opportunity to examine, the appended article by Comrade V. Nevsky gives the necessary information. Nevsky's article, which was given as an appendix to the second edition of Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, is omitted in the fourth Russian edition of Lenin's Works. Nevsky, not only in his work as a propagandist in general, but also as an active worker in the Party school in particular, has had ample opportunity to convince himself that under the guise of "proletarian culture" A.
Bogdanov is imparting bourgeois and reactionary views. Anyone in the least acquainted with philosophical literature must know that scarcely a single contemporary professor of philosophy or of theology can be found who is not directly or indirectly engaged in refuting materialism. They have declared materialism refuted a thousand times, yet are continuing to refute it for the thousand and first time.
All our revisionists are engaged in refuting materialism, pretending, however, that actually they are only refuting the materialist Plekhanov, and not the materialist Engels, nor the materialist Feuerbach, nor the materialist views of J. Dietzgen — and, moreover, that they are refuting materialism from the standpoint of "recent" and "modern" positivism, natural science, and so forth.
Without citing quotations, which anyone desiring to do so could cull by the hundred from the books above mentioned, I shall refer to those arguments by which materialism is being combated by Bazarov, Bogdanov, Yushkevich, Valentinov, Chernov V. Chernov, Philosophical and Sociological Studies, Moscow, The author is as ardent an adherent of Avenarius and an enemy of dialectical materialism as Bazarov and Co. I shall use this latter term throughout as a synonym for "empirio-criticist" because it is shorter and simpler and has already acquired rights of citizenship in Russian literature.
That Ernst Mach is the most popular representative of empirio-criticism today is universally acknowledged in philosophical literature, See, for instance, Dr. The materialists, we are told, recognise something unthinkable and unknowable — "things-in-themselves" — matter "outside of experience" and outside of our knowledge. They lapse into genuine mysticism by admitting the existence of something beyond, something transcending the bounds of "experience" and knowledge.
When they say that matter, by acting upon our sense-organs, produces sensations, the materialists take as their basis the "unknown," nothingness; for do they not themselves declare our sensations to be the only source of knowledge? The materialists lapse into "Kantianism" Plekhanov, by recognising the existence of "things-in-themselves," i.
Such are the arguments levelled by the Machians against materialism, as repeated and retold in varying keys by the afore-mentioned writers. In order to test whether these arguments are new, and whether they are really directed against only one Russian materialist who "lapsed into Kantianism," we shall give some detailed quotations from the works of an old idealist, George Berkeley.
This historical inquiry is all the more necessary in the introduction to our comments since we shall have frequent occasion to refer to Berkeley and his trend in philosophy, for the Machians misrepresent both the relation of Mach to Berkeley and the essence of Berkeley's philosophical line. There is a Russian translation. By sight I have the ideas of light and colours, with their several degrees and variations. By touch I perceive hard and soft, heat and cold, motion and resistance Smelling furnishes me with odours; the palate with tastes; and hearing conveys sounds And as several of these are observed to accompany each other, they come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one thing.
Thus, for example, a certain colour, taste, smell, figure and consistence having been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified by the name apple; other collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things Such is the content of the first section of Berkeley's work. We must remember that Berkeley takes as the basis of his philosophy "hard, soft, heat, cold, colours, tastes, odours," etc.
For Berkeley, things are "collections of ideas," this expression designating the aforesaid, let us say, qualities or sensations, and not abstract thoughts. It is self-evident, the philosopher concludes, that "ideas" cannot exist outside of the mind that perceives them.
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In order to convince ourselves of this it is enough to consider the meaning of the word "exist. This opinion is a "manifest contradiction," says Berkeley. The expression "collection of ideas" Berkeley now replaces by what to him is an equivalent expression, combination of sensations, and accuses the materialists of a "repugnant" tendency to go still further, of seeking some source of this complex — that is, of this combination of sensations.
I answer, an idea can be like nothing but an idea; a colour or figure can be like nothing but another colour or figure I ask whether those supposed originals, or external things, of which our ideas are the pictures or representations, be themselves perceivable or not? As the reader sees, Bazarov's "arguments" against Plekhanov concerning the problem of whether things can exist outside of us apart from their action on us do not differ in the least from Berkeley's arguments against the materialists whom he does not mention by name.
We shall presently see to what ill consequences Berkeley is referring. Let us first finish with his theoretical arguments against the materialists. Denying the "absolute" existence of objects, that is, the existence of things outside human knowledge, Berkeley bluntly defines the viewpoint of his opponents as being that they recognise the "thing-in-itself. The two fundamental lines of philosophical outlook are here depicted with the straightforwardness, clarity and precision that distinguish the classical philosophers from the inventors of "new" systems in our day.
Materialism is the recognition of "objects in themselves," or outside the mind; ideas and sensations are copies or images of those objects. The opposite doctrine idealism claims that objects do not exist "without the mind"; objects are "combinations of sensations. This was written in , fourteen years before the birth of Immanuel Kant, yet our Machians, supposedly on the basis of "recent" philosophy, have made the discovery that the recognition of "things-in-themselves" is a result of the infection or distortion of materialism by Kantianism!
The "new" discoveries of the Machians are the product of an astounding ignorance of the history of the basic philosophical trends. Their next "new" thought consists in this: Mach and Avenarius, you see, have advanced philosophical thought, deepened analysis and eliminated these "absolutes," "unchangeable entities," etc.
If you wish to check such assertions with the original sources, go to Berkeley and you will see that they are pretentious fictions. At the beginning, says Berkeley, it was believed that colours, odours, etc. In there are still wags who seriously believe Avenarius, Petzoldt, Mach and the rest, when they maintain that it is only "recent positivism" and "recent natural science" which have at last succeeded in eliminating these "metaphysical" conceptions.
These same wags Bogdanov among them assure their readers that it was the new philosophy that explained the error of the "duplication of the world" in the doctrine of the eternally refuted materialists, who speak of some sort of a "reflection" by the human consciousness of things existing outside the consciousness. A mass of sentimental verbiage has been written by the above-named authors about this "duplication. And Berkeley ridicules this "absurd" notion, which admits the possibility of thinking the unthinkable!
Here we arrive at those "ill consequences" derived from the "absurd" doctrine of the existence of an external world which compelled Bishop Berkeley not only to refute this doctrine theoretically, but passionately to persecute its adherents as enemies. How great a friend material substance has been to Atheists in all ages were needless to relate. Frankly and bluntly did Bishop Berkeley argue!
In our time these very same thoughts on the "economical" elimination of "matter" from philosophy are enveloped in a much more artful form, and confused by the use of a "new" terminology, so that these thoughts may be taken by naive people for "recent" philosophy! But Berkeley was not only candid as to the tendencies of his philosophy, he also endeavoured to cover its idealistic nakedness, to represent it as being free from absurdities and acceptable to "common sense.
Nature remains, and the distinction between realities and chimeras remains, only "they both equally exist in the mind. That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence we deny is that which philosophers [Berkeley's italics] call Matter or corporeal substance. And in doing this there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it The Atheist indeed will want the colour of an empty name to support his impiety Not without good cause did the English philosopher, Fraser, an idealist and adherent of Berkeleianism, who published Berkeley's works and supplied them with his own annotations, designate Berkeley's doctrine by the term "natural realism" op.
This amusing terminology must by all means be noted, for it in fact expresses Berkeley's intention to counterfeit realism. In our further exposition we shall frequently find "recent" "positivists" repeating the same stratagem or counterfeit in a different form and in a different verbal wrapping. Berkeley does not deny the existence of real things! Berkeley does not go counter to the opinion of all humanity! Berkeley denies "only" the teaching of the philosophers, viz. Berkeley does not deny natural science, which has always adhered mostly unconsciously to this, i.
Herein consists the knowledge of nature, which [listen to this! Let us regard the external world, nature, as "a combination of sensations" evoked in our mind by a deity. Acknowledge this and give up searching for the "ground" of these sensations outside the mind, outside man, and I will acknowledge within the framework of my idealist theory of knowledge all natural science and all the use and certainty of its deductions.
It is precisely this framework, and only this framework, that I need for my deductions in favour of "peace and religion. It correctly expresses the essence of idealist philosophy and its social significance, and we shall encounter it later when we come to speak of the relation of Machism to natural science. Let us now consider another recent discovery that was borrowed from Bishop Berkeley in the twentieth century by the recent positivist and critical realist, P.
This discovery is "empirio-symbolism. This theory of Berkeley's, which threw Fraser into raptures, is set forth by the Bishop as follows:. Of course, in the opinion of Berkeley and Fraser, it is no other than the deity who informs us by means of these "empirio-symbols. We have before us two philosophical trends in the question of causality. One "pretends to explain things by corporeal causes. The other reduces the "notion of cause" to the notion of a "mark or sign" which serves for "our information" supplied by God. We shall meet these two trends in a twentieth- century garb when we analyse the attitudes of Machism and dialectical materialism to this question.
Further, as regards the question of reality, it ought also to be remarked that Berkeley, refusing as he does to recognise the existence of things outside the mind, tries to find a criterion for distinguishing between the real and the fictitious. These latter are said to have more reality in them than the former; by which is meant that they are more affecting, orderly and distinct, and that they are not fictions of the mind perceiving them For instance, how shall we resolve the question as to whether the transformation of water into wine, of which we are being told, is real?
From this it is evident that Berkeley's subjective idealism is not to be interpreted as though it ignored the distinction between individual and collective perception. On the contrary, he attempts on the basis of this distinction to construct a criterion of reality. Deriving "ideas" from the action of a deity upon the human mind, Berkeley thus approaches objective idealism: In another work, The Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous , where he endeavours to present his views in an especially popular form, Berkeley sets forth the opposition between his doctrine and the materialist doctrine in the following way:.
But then we differ as to the kind of this powerful being. I will have it to be Spirit, you Matter, or I know not what I may add too, you know not what third nature This is the gist of the whole question; Fraser comments: Here the English Berkeleian, Fraser, approaches from his consistent idealist standpoint the same fundamental "lines" in philosophy which were so clearly characterised by the materialist Engels. In his work Ludwig Feuerbach Engels divides philosophers into "two great camps" — materialists and idealists. Engels — dealing with theories of the two trends much more developed, varied and rich in content than Fraser dealt with — sees the fundamental distinction between them in the fact that while for the materialists nature is primary and spirit secondary, for the idealists the reverse is the case.
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In between these two camps Engels places the adherents of Hume and Kant, who deny the possibility of knowing the world, or at least of knowing it fully, and calls them agnostics Frederick Engels, "Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy", Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Eng.
In his Ludwig Feuerbach Engels applies this term only to the adherents of Hume those people whom Fraser calls, and who like to call themselves, "positivists". From , that is, after Engels' death, Die Neue Zeit began systematically carrying revisionist articles. During the First World War it adhered to Kautsky's Centrist views and supported the social-chauvinists.
I , Nr. Translated from the English by Engels himself. The Russian translation in Historical Materialism St. We cannot dwell here on this remarkably correct and profound judgment of Engels' a judgment which is shamelessly ignored by the Machians. We shall discuss it in detail later on. For the present we shall confine ourselves to pointing to this Marxist terminology and to this meeting of extremes: In order to illustrate these trends with which we shall constantly have to deal in our further exposition let us briefly note the views of outstanding philosophers of the eighteenth century who pursued a different path from Berkeley.
Here are Hume's arguments. Even the animal creations are governed by alike opinion, and preserve this belief of external objects, in all their thoughts, designs, and actions But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy, which teaches us, that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception, and that the senses are only the inlets, through which these images are conveyed, without being able to produce any immediate intercourse between the mind and the object.
The table, which we see, seems to diminish, as we remove farther from it: But the real table, which exists independent of us, suffers no alteration: It was, therefore, nothing but its image, which was present to the mind. These are the obvious dictates of reason; and no man, who reflects, ever doubted, that the existences, which we consider, when we say, 'this house,' and 'that tree' are nothing but perceptions in the mind By what argument can it be proved, that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by external objects, entirely different from them, though resembling them if that be possible , and could not arise either from the energy of the mind itself, or from the suggestion of some invisible and unknown spirit, or from some other cause still more unknown to us?
How shall the question be determined? By experience surely; as all other questions of a like nature. But here experience is, and must be entirely silent. The mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connection with objects. This supposition of such a connection is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning. To have recourse to the veracity of the Supreme Being, in order to prove the veracity of our senses, is surely making a very unexpected circuit Essays and Treatises, London, , Vol.
By scepticism Hume means refusal to explain sensations as the effects of objects, spirit, etc. And the author of the introduction to the French translation of Hume, F. Pillon — a philosopher of a trend akin to Mach as we shall see below — justly remarks that for Hume subject and object are reduced to "groups of various perceptions," to "elements of consciousness, to impressions, ideas, etc. A Treatise of Human Nature, translated by Ch.
The English Humean, Huxley, who coined the apt and correct term "agnosticism," in his book on Hume also emphasises the fact that the latter, regarding "sensations" as the "primary and irreducible states of consciousness," is not entirely consistent on the question how the origin of sensations is to be explained, whether by the effect of objects on man or by the creative power of the mind. Huxley, Hume, London, , p. Hume does not go beyond sensations.
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A red rose gives us a complex impression, capable of resolution into the simple impressions of red colour, rose-scent, and numerous others" op. Hume admits both the "materialist position" and the "idealist position" p. As for the materialists, here is an opinion of Berkeley given by Diderot, the leader of the Encyclopaedists: An extravagant system which, to my thinking, only the blind could have originated; a system which, to the shame of human intelligence and philosophy, is the most difficult to combat, although the most absurd of all.
And Diderot, who came very close to the standpoint of contemporary materialism that arguments and syllogisms alone do not suffice to refute idealism, and that here it is not a question for theoretical argument , notes the similarity of the premises both of the idealist Berkeley, and the sensationalist Condillac. In his opinion, Condillac should have undertaken a refutation of Berkeley in order to avoid such absurd conclusions being drawn from the treatment of sensations as the only source of our knowledge.
In the "Conversation Between d'Alembert and Diderot," Diderot states his philosophical position thus: Suppose a piano to be endowed with the faculty of sensation and memory, tell me, would it not of its own accord repeat those airs which you have played on its keys? We are instruments endowed with sensation and memory. Our senses are so many keys upon which surrounding nature strikes and which often strike upon themselves. And this is all, in my opinion, that occurs in a piano organised like you and me.
What is this egg? A mass that is insensible until the embryo is introduced thither, and when this embryo is introduced, what is it then? An insensible mass, for in its turn, this embryo is only an inert and crude liquid. How does this mass arrive at a different organisation, arrive at sensibility and life? By means of heat. And what produces heat? Little children will laugh at you, and the philosophers will reply that if this be a machine then you too are a machine. If you admit that the difference between these animals and you is only one of organisation, you will prove your common sense and sagacity, you will be right.
But from this will follow the conclusion that refutes you; namely, that from inert matter organised in a certain way, impregnated with another bit of inert matter, by heat and motion — sensibility, life, memory, consciousness, emotion, and thought are generated. Do you understand the nature of motion any better, its existence in a body, its communication from one body to another? What, do you not see that all qualities of matter, that all its forms accessible to our senses are in their essence indivisible?
There cannot be a larger or a smaller degree of impenetrability. There may be half of a round body, but there is no half of roundness Be logical and do not replace a cause that exists and explains everything by some other cause which it is impossible to conceive, and the connection of which with the effect is even more difficult to conceive, and which engenders an infinite number of difficulties without solving a single one of them.
A hand-organ is of wood, man of flesh. A finch is of flesh, and a musician is of flesh, but differently organised; but both are of the same origin, of the same formation, have the same functions and the same purpose. The instrument endowed with the faculty of sensation, or the animal, has learned by experience that after a certain sound certain consequences follow outside of it; that other sentient instruments, like itself, or similar animals, approach, recede, demand, offer, wound, caress; — and all these consequences are associated in its memory and in the memory of other animals with the formation of sounds.
Mark, in intercourse between people there is nothing beside sounds and actions. And to appreciate all the power of my system, mark again that it is faced with that same insurmountable difficulty which Berkeley adduced against the existence of bodies. There was a moment of insanity when the sentient piano imagined that it was the only piano in the world, and that the whole harmony of the universe resided within it. This was written in And with this we shall conclude our brief historical enquiry.
We shall have more than one occasion to meet "the insane piano" and the harmony of the universe residing within man when we come to analyse "recent positivism. For the present we shall confine ourselves to one conclusion: Let us mention as a curiosity that one of these Machians, Valentinov, vaguely sensing the falsity of his position, has tried to "cover up the traces" of his kinship with Berkeley and has done so in a rather amusing manner.
On page of his book we read: When those who, speaking of Mach, point to Berkeley, we ask, which Berkeley do they mean? Do they mean the Berkeley who traditionally regards himself [Valentinov wishes to say who is regarded] as a solipsist; the Berkeley who defends the immediate presence and providence of the deity? With Berkeley the solipsist and preacher of religious metaphysics Mach indeed has nothing in common.
Diderot drew a clear distinction between the fundamental philosophical trends. Valentinov confuses them, and while doing so very amusingly tries to console us: To confound two irreconcilable fundamental trends in philosophy — really, what "crime" is that? But that is what the whole wisdom of Mach and Avenarius amounts to. We shall now proceed to an examination of this wisdom. The fundamental premises of the theory of knowledge of Mach and Avenarius are frankly, simply and clearly expounded by them in their early philosophical works.
To these works we shall now turn, postponing for later treatment an examination of the corrections and emendations subsequently made by these writers. To explain the laws of connection between sensations and ideas Psycho-physics. Vortrag, gehalten in der k. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften am This is quite clear. The subject matter of physics is the connection between sensations and not between things or bodies, of which our sensations are the image.
And in , in his Mechanik, Mach repeats the same thought: Not the things bodies but colours, sounds, pressures, spaces, times what we usually call sensations are the real elements of the world. Auflage, Leipzig, , S. About this word "elements," the fruit of twelve years of "reflection," we shall speak later. At present let us note that Mach explicitly states here that things or bodies are complexes of sensations, and that he quite clearly sets up his own philosophical point of view against the opposite theory which holds that sensations are "symbols" of things it would be more correct to say images or reflections of things.
The latter theory is philosophical materialism. For instance, the materialist Frederick Engels — the not unknown collaborator of Marx and a founder of Marxism — constantly and without exception speaks in his works of things and their mental pictures or images Gedanken-Abbilder , and it is obvious that these mental images arise exclusively from sensations. It would seem that this fundamental standpoint of the "philosophy of Marxism" ought to be known to everyone who speaks of it, and especially to anyone who comes out in print in the name of this philosophy.
But because of the extraordinary confusion which our Machians have introduced, it becomes necessary to repeat what is generally known. Auflage, Stuttgart, , S. Engels does not say that sensations or ideas are "symbols" of things, for consistent materialism must here use "image," picture, or reflection instead of "symbol," as we shall show in detail in the proper place. But the question here is not of this or that formulation of materialism, but of the opposition of materialism to idealism, of the difference between the two fundamental lines in philosophy.
Are we to proceed from things to sensation and thought? Or are we to proceed from thought and sensation to things? The first line, i. The second line, i. No evasions, no sophisms a multitude of which we shall yet encounter can remove the clear and indisputable fact that Ernst Mach's doctrine that things are complexes of sensations is subjective idealism and a simple rehash of Berkeleianism. If bodies are "complexes of sensations," as Mach says, or "combinations of sensations," as Berkeley said, it inevitably follows that the whole world is but my idea.
Starting from such a premise it is impossible to arrive at the existence of other people besides oneself: Much as Mach, Avenarius, Petzoldt and the others may abjure solipsism, they cannot in fact escape solipsism without falling into howling logical absurdities. To make this fundamental element of the philosophy of Machism still clearer, we shall give a few additional quotations from Mach's works.
If we touch S, that is, bring it into contact with our body, we receive a prick. We can see S without feeling the prick. But as soon as we feel the prick we find S on the skin. Thus, the visible point is a permanent nucleus, to which, according to circumstances, the prick is attached as something accidental. By frequent repetitions of analogous occurrences we finally habituate ourselves to regard all properties of bodies as 'effects' which proceed from permanent nuclei and are conveyed to the self through the medium of the body; which effects we call sensations In other words, people "habituate" themselves to adopt the standpoint of materialism, to regard sensations as the result of the action of bodies, things, nature on our sense-organs.
This "habit," so noxious to the philosophical idealists a habit acquired by all mankind and all natural science! Thereby, however, these nuclei are deprived of their entire sensible content and are converted into naked abstract symbols An old song, most worthy Professor! This is a literal repetition of Berkeley who said that matter is a naked abstract symbol. But it is Ernst Mach, in fact, who goes naked, for if he does not admit that the "sensible content" is an objective reality, existing independently of us, there remains only a "naked abstract" I, an I infallibly written with a capital letter and italicised, equal to "the insane piano, which imagined that it was the sole existing thing in this world.
A stupid and fruitless occupation! It is then correct that the world consists only of our sensations. In which case we have knowledge only of sensations, and the assumption of those nuclei, and of their interaction, from which alone sensations proceed, turns out to be quite idle and superfluous. Such a view can only appeal to half-hearted realism or half-hearted criticism. We have quoted the sixth paragraph of Mach's "anti-metaphysical observations" in full. It is a sheer plagiarism on Berkeley. Not a single idea, not a glimmer of thought, except that "we sense only our sensations.
By this word alone Mach betrays that "half-heartedness" of which he accuses others. For if the "assumption" of the existence of the external world is "idle," if the assumption that the needle exists independently of me and that an interaction takes place between my body and the point of the needle is really "idle and superfluous," then primarily the "assumption" of the existence of other people is idle and superfluous. Only I exist, and all other people, as well as the external world, come under the category of idle "nuclei.
It only proves that his philosophy is a jumble of idle and empty words in which their author himself does not believe. Here is a particularly graphic example of Mach's half-heartedness and confusion. This means, then, that our sensations are connected with definite processes, which take place in the organism in general, and in our brain in particular? Yes, Mach very definitely makes this "assumption" — it would be quite a task not to make it from the standpoint of natural science!
But is not this the very "assumption" of those very same "nuclei and their interaction" which our philosopher declared to be idle and superfluous? We are told that bodies are complexes of sensations; to go beyond that, Mach assures us, to regard sensations as a product of the action of bodies upon our sense-organs, is metaphysics, an idle and superfluous assumption, etc. But the brain is a body. Consequently, the brain also is no more than a complex of sensations.
It follows, then, that with the help of a complex of sensations I and I also am nothing but a complex of sensations sense complexes of sensations. First sensations are declared to be "the real elements of the world"; on this an "original" Berkeleianism is erected — and then the very opposite view is smuggled in, viz. Are not these "processes" connected with an exchange of matter between the "organism" and the external world?
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Could this exchange of matter take place if the sensations of the particular organism did not give it an objectively correct idea of this external world? Mach does not ask himself such embarrassing questions when he mechanically jumbles fragments of Berkeleianism with the views of natural science, which instinctively adheres to the materialist theory of knowledge In the same paragraph Mach writes: Does this mean that sensation is not something primary but that it is one of the properties of matter?
Mach skips over all the absurdities of Berkeleianism! From our standpoint the question is a false one. For us matter is not what is primarily given. Rather, what is primarily given are the elements which in a certain familiar relation are designated as sensations What is primarily given, then, are sensations, although they are "connected" only with definite processes in organic matter!
And while uttering such absurdities Mach wants to blame materialism "the current widespread physical notion" for leaving unanswered the question whence sensation "arises. Does any other philosophical standpoint "solve" a problem before enough data for its solution has been collected? Does not Mach himself say in the very same paragraph: The difference between materialism and "Machism" in this particular question thus consists in the following.
Materialism, in full agreement with natural science, takes matter as primary and regards consciousness, thought, sensation as secondary, because in its well-defined form sensation is associated only with the higher forms of matter organic matter , while "in the foundation of the structure of matter" one can only surmise the existence of a faculty akin to sensation. Such, for example, is the supposition of the well-known German scientist Ernst Haeckel, the English biologist Lloyd Morgan and others, not to speak of Diderot's conjecture mentioned above.
Machism holds to the opposite, the idealist point of view, and at once lands into an absurdity: This impression is a false one, because there still remains to be investigated and reinvestigated how matter, apparently entirely devoid of sensation, is related to matter which, though composed of the same atoms or electrons , is yet endowed with a well-defined faculty of sensation. Materialism clearly formulates the as yet unsolved problem and thereby stimulates the attempt to solve it, to undertake further experimental investigation.
Machism, which is a species of muddled idealism, befogs the issue and sidetracks it by means of the futile verbal trick, "element. Here is a passage from Mach's latest, comprehensive and conclusive philosophical work that clearly betrays the falsity of this idealist trick. In his Knowledge and Error we read: Mach, Erkenntnis und Irrtum , 2.
Of the rigidity of the conceptions of many modern scientists and of their metaphysical in the Marxist sense of the term, i. We shall see later that it was just on this point that Mach went astray, because he did not understand or did not know the relation between relativism and dialectics. But this is not what concerns us here. It is important for us here to note how glaringly Mach's idealism emerges, in spite of the confused — ostensibly new — terminology.
There is no difficulty, you see, in constructing any physical element out of sensations, i. Oh yes, such constructions, of course, are not difficult, for they are purely verbal constructions, shallow scholasticism, serving as a loophole for fideism. It is not surprising after this that Mach dedicates his works to the immanentists; it is not surprising that the immanentists, who profess the most reactionary kind of philosophical idealism, welcome Mach with open arms. The "recent positivism" of Ernst Mach was only about two hundred years too late.
Berkeley had already sufficiently shown that "out of sensations, i. As regards materialism, against which Mach here, too, sets up his own views, without frankly and explicitly naming the "enemy," we have already seen in the case of Diderot what the real views of the materialists are. These views do not consist in deriving sensation from the movement of matter or in reducing sensation to the movement of matter, but in recognising sensation as one of the properties of matter in motion. On this question Engels shared the standpoint of Diderot. But Mach, who constantly sets up his views in opposition to materialism, ignores, of course, all the great materialists — Diderot, Feuerbach, Marx and Engels — just as all other official professors of official philosophy do.
In order to characterise Avenarius' earliest and basic view, let us take his first independent philosophical work, Philosophy as a Conception of the World According to the Principle of the Minimum Expenditure of Effort. Prolegomena to a Critique of Pure Experience, which appeared in Bogdanov in his Empirio-Monism Bk. Bogdanov should not have believed Mach, and his assertion is diametrically opposed to the truth. On the contrary, Avenarius' idealism emerges so clearly in his work of that Avenarius himself in was obliged to admit it.
This idealist starting point of Avenarius' is universally acknowledged in philosophical literature. Of the French writers I shall refer to Cauwelaert, who says that Avenarius' philosophical standpoint in the Prolegomena I. Of the German writers, I shall name Rudolf Willy, Avenarius' disciple, who says that "Avenarius in his youth — and particularly in his work of — was totally under the spell ganz im Banne of so-called epistemological idealism. And, indeed, it would be ridiculous to deny the idealism in Avenarius' Prolegomena, where he explicitly states that "only sensation can be thought of as the existing" pp.
Here is the paragraph in full: Are there really philosophers capable of defending this brainless philosophy? Professor Richard Avenarius is one of them. And we must pause for a while to consider this defence, difficult though it be for a normal person to take it seriously. The proposition that motion produces sensation is based on apparent experience only. This experience, which includes the act of perception, consists, presumably, in the fact that sensation is generated in a certain kind of substance brain as a result of transmitted motion excitation and with the help of other material conditions e.
However — apart from the fact that such generation has never itself selbst been observed — in order to construct the supposed experience, as an experience which is real in all its component parts, empirical proof, at least, is required to show that sensation, which assumedly is caused in a certain substance by transmitted motion, did not already exist in that substance in one way or another; so that the appearance of sensation cannot be conceived of in any other way than as a creative act on the part of the transmitted motion.
Thus only by proving that where a sensation now appears there was none previously, not even a minimal one, would it be possible to establish a fact which, denoting as it does some act of creation, contradicts all the rest of experience and radically changes all the rest of our conception of nature Naturan-schauung. But such proof is not furnished by any experience, and cannot be furnished by any experience; on the contrary, the notion of a state of a substance totally devoid of sensation which subsequently begins to experience sensation is only a hypothesis.
But this hypothesis merely complicates and obscures our understanding instead of simplifying and clarifying it. However, even this bit of the remaining content of experience is only an appearance. We have purposely quoted this refutation of materialism by Avenarius in full, in order that the reader may see to what truly pitiful sophistries "recent" empirio-critical philosophy resorts. We shall compare with the argument of the idealist Avenarius the materialist argument of — Bogdanov, if only to punish Bogdanov for his betrayal of materialism!
In long bygone days, fully nine years ago, when Bogdanov was half "a natural-historical materialist" that is, an adherent of the materialist theory of knowledge, to which the overwhelming majority of contemporary scientists instinctively hold , when he was only half led astray by the muddled Ostwald, he wrote: To the first category belong the images of phenomena of the outer or inner world, as taken by themselves in consciousness Such an image is called a 'sensation' if it is directly produced through the sense-organs by its corresponding external phenomenon.
Petersburg, , P- 2I6. And a little farther on he says: And even in , when with the gracious assistance of Ostwald and Mach Bogdanov had already abandoned the materialist standpoint in philosophy for the idealist standpoint, he wrote from forgetfulness!
For every scientist who has not been led astray by professorial philosophy, as well as for every materialist, sensa tion is indeed the direct connection between consciousness and the external world; it is the transformation of the energy of external excitation into a state of consciousness. This transformation has been, and is, observed by each of us a million times on every hand. The sophism of idealist philosophy consists in the fact that it regards sensation as being not the connection between consciousness and the external world, but a fence, a wall, separating consciousness from the external world — not an image of the external phenomenon corresponding to the sensation, but as the "sole entity.
Since we do not yet know all the conditions of the connection we are constantly observing between sensation and matter organised in a definite way, let us therefore acknowledge the existence of sensation alone — that is what the sophism of Avenarius reduces itself to. To conclude our description of the fundamental idealist premises of empirio-criticism, we shall briefly refer to the English and French representatives of this philosophical trend.
Mach explicitly says of Karl Pearson, the Englishman, that he Mach is "in agreement with his epistemological erkennt-niskritischen views on all essential points" Mechanik, ed.
Pearson in turn agrees with Mach. Karl Pearson, The Grammar of Science, 2nd ed. For Pearson "real things" are "sense-impressions. Pearson fights materialism with great determination although he does not know Feuerbach, or Marx and Engels ; his arguments do not differ from those analysed above. However, the desire to masquerade as a materialist is so foreign to Pearson that is a specialty of the Russian Machians , Pearson is so — incautious, that he invents no "new" names for his philosophy and simply declares that his views and those of Mach are "idealist" ibid. He traces his genealogy directly to Berkeley and Hume.
The philosophy of Pearson, as we shall repeatedly find, is distinguished from that of Mach by its far greater integrity and consistency. Analysis of Sensations, p. Preface to Erkenntnis und Irrtum, 2nd ed. We shall have occasion to deal with the particularly confused and inconsistent philosophical views of these writers in the chapter on the new physics. We shall now proceed to examine how Mach and Avenarius, having admitted the idealist character of their original views, corrected them in their subsequent works. Such is the title under which Friedrich Adler, lecturer at the University of Zurich, probably the only German author-also anxious to supplement Marx with Machism, writes of Mach.
Adler, "Die Entdeckung der Weltelemente zu E. Adhering to an opportunist Centrist stand, it disguised its betrayal of the proletarian revolution and subservience to the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie under a mask of Leftist phraseology. One of Adler's articles has been translated into Russian in the symposium Historical Materialism. And this naive university lecturer must be given his due: At least, he puts the question point-blank — did Mach really "discover the world-elements"? If so, then, only very backward and ignorant people, of course, can still remain materialists.
Or is this discovery a return on the part of Mach to the old philosophical errors? We saw that Mach in and Avenarius in held a purely idealist view; for them the world is our sensation. In Mach's Mechanik appeared, and in the preface to the first edition Mach refers to Avenarius' Prolegomena, and greets his ideas as being "very close" sehr verwandte to his own philosophy.
Here are the arguments in the Mechanik concerning the elements: It is a matter of the connection of these elements. Neither exists separately; both exist in conjunction. Only temporarily can we neglect either. Even processes that are apparently purely mechanical, are thus always physiological" op. We find the same in the Analysis of Sensations: In another functional dependence they are at the same time physical objects" Russian translation, pp.
When we, however, consider its dependence upon the retina the elements K, L, M , it is a psychological object, a sensation" ibid. View all 3 comments. Dec 04, Bradley rated it liked it. Lenin basically knows nothing of Kant Dec 16, Erik rated it did not like it. Lenin was far from an idiot, as revealed in this polemic against the new positivism of Ernst Mach and his Russian followers.
It is, however, a disgraceful misunderstanding of Machian positivism which influenced its reception in Russia and elsewhere. It also set back materialism, which remained the crude Marxian kind, absent all nuance. Machian positivism was in reality a sophisticated kind of materialism which included mental phenomena, such as sensations, alongside physical phenomena under the Lenin was far from an idiot, as revealed in this polemic against the new positivism of Ernst Mach and his Russian followers.
Machian positivism was in reality a sophisticated kind of materialism which included mental phenomena, such as sensations, alongside physical phenomena under the heading of elements. Elements were neither physical nor mental, but more like neutral events with individual concrete qualities, when taken one by one. Grouped together they can be formed into either material objects or mental phenomena. It is a very advanced point og view which continued in William James and Bertrand Russell and even today perhaps in the work of Aussie philosopher David Chalmers. Lenin is best forgotten.
I read Lenin's Book. Lenin's "methodology" and "philosophy of nature" in this book. Jan 28, John Victor rated it it was amazing. Really cleared up a lot of the finer points of Marxist philosophy for me. Sep 16, Scott Bisset rated it really liked it. Amazing book Although doesn't go into the details and mainly criticizes, empirio-criticist i. One of the sections is titled the crisis in physics, yet it highlights ironical that those erroneous idealist Machian Instrumentist notions are the very basis of the Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.
Which very much was the thought process of Bohr and the founde Amazing book Although doesn't go into the details and mainly criticizes, empirio-criticist i. Which very much was the thought process of Bohr and the founders of the field and Materialist idealist saying that the wave function is "a mathematical abstract wavefunction" and "the wave function collapses just cause u look at it" when obviously dots would still appear on the other side of the screen even if there was no humans there. They were against trying to to postulate a external reality.
Materialism And Empirio-criticism
It's hilariously as alot of scientist today have this idealist symbolic materialists notation of thinking that symbols, maths is the key mover of the Universe when it's just a consistent axiomatic abstract simplfied approximate formalised description to try to explain reality, bought around through the development of political-economy.
This the same position of some of Machs disciples. Abit more idealist; saying that the real elements of the world are the relationships between ideas and senses. Pilot wave interpretation is the Antidote to this kind of idealist materialist brought about by the fake "mysticism" of quantum mechanics. What's even more hilarious is that so many scientists say that oh yeah the the results can be interpreted in either way but you know the scientific method is derived from philosophy and they are basically very specialised philosopher's and you know they could do debunk Copenhagen interpretation using Materialist dialectical materialism philosophical arguments but they say that's not scientific and we must stick to our science but again that's just specialisation of philosophy itself.
Quantum mechanics Itself is now in crisis. Scientist neglect of philosophy and Materialist dialectical arguments that could debunk it. Dialectics just being abstract generalized principles derived from a materialist conception of reality that accurately describe it. In fact over specialised because they're ignoring other subject matters and thinking their signs is a metaphysical Island divorce from everything else.
I'd recommend you go to Paul cockshott his YouTube channel to find out more and read more to dialectical materialism to see how this shapes heavily Marx Engels Lenin Stalin Mao and the other Marxist Leninist is key with trying to explain economics etc and socialism in a scientific way. Personally reading lucretius the order of things has really made big double down on the materialist philosophy and put dialectical materialism and marxism-lenninsm into a shaper a perspective and focus.
Sep 22, mimosa maoist added it Shelves: Really entertaining polemic, especially in the final chapter. One can hope post-leftist philosophies go the same way as neo-Kantianism. May 23, Cent rated it liked it. His usual argument simplistically lead to show how empirico-criticism misunderstood the position held by the materialists, which he traced from Marx, Engels, and even of Plekhanov. Lenin did not subject his form of Materialism into a critical examination, perhaps this flaw just highlights his theoretical inadequacy compare to Marx.
Lenin at this point was unaware of the existence of the Paris Manuscripts and other texts. Most of the passages he quoted from Marx only came from the Theses,which could not well represent Marx's thought. He also assumed that both Engels and Marx hold the same epistemological views, which is rather erroneous. One must also be cautious in reading Lenin's Materialism , especially when he merely adopts the idea simply because it is from Marx and Engels, and dismisses others because they are accused as form of bourgeois thinking.
Fer rated it it was amazing Apr 06, Phil Seletsky rated it really liked it Oct 08, Zarl Sharx rated it liked it Jan 22, Emma rated it it was amazing Aug 27, Michael Hiles rated it really liked it Apr 15, Linda Mulla rated it it was amazing Jul 28, Alejandro Dugarte rated it it was amazing Apr 28, Marcin rated it liked it Nov 23, Donal Fhearraigh rated it it was amazing Jun 21, Jacob Pointon rated it really liked it Nov 13, FatherMontaneli rated it it was amazing Apr 15, Olgun Dursun rated it it was amazing Jan 11, Anatole David rated it really liked it Feb 16, Brixton rated it liked it Dec 05, Anton rated it it was ok Apr 03, Phillip rated it liked it Sep 22, Joseph rated it liked it May 09, Caio Abramo rated it it was amazing Jul 20, There are no discussion topics on this book yet.
Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich - one of the leaders of the Bolshevik party since its formation in Led the Soviets to power in October, Elected to the head of the Soviet government until , when he retired due to ill health. Lenin, born in , was committed to revolutionary struggle from an early age - his elder brother was hanged for the attempted assassination of Czar Alexande Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich - one of the leaders of the Bolshevik party since its formation in Lenin, born in , was committed to revolutionary struggle from an early age - his elder brother was hanged for the attempted assassination of Czar Alexander III.
In Lenin passed his Law exam with high honors, whereupon he took to representing the poorest peasantry in Samara. After moving to St. Petersburg in , Lenin's experience with the oppression of the peasantry in Russia, coupled with the revolutionary teachings of G V Plekhanov, guided Lenin to meet with revolutionary groups. In April , his comrades helped send Lenin abroad to get up to speed with the revolutionary movement in Europe, and in particular, to meet the Emancipation of Labour Group, of which Plekhanov head.
After five months abroad, traveling from Switzerland to France to Germany, working at libraries and newspapers to make his way, Lenin returned to Russia, carrying a brief case with a false bottom, full of Marxist literature. The group supported strikes and union activity, distributed Marxist literature, and taught in workers education groups.
Petersburg Lenin begins a relationship with Nadezhda Krupskaya. In the night of December 8, , Lenin and the members of the party are arrested; Lenin sentenced to 15 months in prison. By , when the prison sentence expired, the autocracy appended an additional three year sentence, due to Lenin's continual writing and organising while in prison. Lenin is exiled to the village of Shushenskoye, in Siberia, where he becomes a leading member of the peasant community. Krupskaya is soon also sent into exile for revolutionary activities, and together they work on party organising, the monumental work: Lenin creates Iskra, in efforts to bring together the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, which had been scattered after the police persecution of the first congress of the party in In Lenin founded the Communist International.
In Lenin instituted the NEP. During Lenin suffered a series of strokes that prevented active work in government. While in his final year — late to — Lenin wrote his last articles where he outlined a programme to fight against the bureaucratization of the Commmunist Party and the Soviet state. Lenin died on January 21, , as a result of multiple strokes. Books by Vladimir Lenin. Trivia About Materialism and E No trivia or quizzes yet. Just a moment while we sign you in to your Goodreads account.