The book weaves together three narratives of ordinary people -- a sharecropper's wife, a surgeon and a farm worker -- making their way from the South to an uncertain future up North. During her research for the book, Wilkerson interviewed more than 1, people who made the migration from the South to Northern and Western cities.
Interestingly, many of the people who Wilkerson encountered -- who moved during the time period of to -- had no idea that they were even part of the Great Migration. But they didn't see themselves as that, partly because these decisions were individual personal decisions," she explains. There was no leader, there was no one person who set the date who said, 'On this date, people will leave the South. They made a choice that they were not going to live under the system into which they were born anymore and in some ways, it was the first step that the nation's servant class ever took without asking.
But there were actually colored windows at the post office in Pensacola, Fla. And there were white and colored telephone booths in Oklahoma. There were separate windows were white people and black people would go to get their license plates in Mississippi. And there were even separate tellers to make your deposits at the First National Bank in Atlanta. It was illegal for black people and white people to play checkers together in Birmingham. The Right of Return. Seven survived, including 'Ayn Karim west of Jerusalem , but were taken by Israeli settlers.
Palestinian Arab towns and villages depopulated during the Palestinian exodus by subdistrict. European Union United Nations. Soviet Union United Arab Republic. Diplomacy and peace proposals. Retrieved from " https: Wikipedia pages under editing restriction. Views Read View source View history. This page was last edited on 16 December , at By using this site, you agree to the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy.
Neither pro- nor anti-migration orthodoxies are spared. I appreciate this book for three other reasons as well. First, it situates the recent migration out of Zimbabwe in its proper historical context. In most of the western media, the decline of Zimbabwe dates from and is attributed to the land reforms of This book clearly situates the migration question in a generalised socio-economic decline that was underway for a decade before that.
Secondly, the authors deal with issues of social differentiation — gender, social class and ethnicity — head-on. This involves tackling in a forthright manner some ugly questions of sexual violence, racism, poor governance, corruption and discrimination within Zimbabwe, in its neighbouring states and further abroad. Thirdly, the book looks at migration from a variety of perspectives and academic disciplines. Migration is examined at its micro-, macro- and sectoral levels, using large-scale surveys and in-depth interviews, media reports and official statistics, quantitative and qualitative methods.
The result is a rich and multi-faceted set of studies that is worth spending time with. Naturally, this book will be of great interest to Zimbabweans at home and abroad, and to all others interested in the political economy of modern Zimbabwe. But this book will also be of great interest to specialists and students in migration and development studies more generally, given the quality and the incisiveness of the contributions that the authors and editors bring to the field.
I am delighted to see this fine collection in print. We extend our grateful thanks to all the contributors to this book for agreeing to provide chapters, responding quickly and generously to our editorial suggestions and showing great patience while the manuscript was being readied for publication. Our thanks to the following for their assistance with the manuscript at various stages of production: When modern states go into terminal decline or fail altogether, the predictable response of ordinary people is to get out, as soon as they can, to wherever they can go.
Following a bitter and protracted independence war, Zimbabwe made major economic and social gains in the s.
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After , however, the accelerating social, political and economic unravelling of the country led to a rush for the exits. An economy in free-fall, soaring inflation and unemployment, the collapse of public services, political oppression and deepening poverty proved to be powerful, virtually irresistible, push factors for many Zimbabweans. The transformation of Zimbabwe from breadbasket to basket-case has been a protracted process lasting well over two decades. While out-migration is a common response to socioeconomic disintegration, it can also accelerate that process, leading, in turn, to further migration.
Emigration has led to crippling skills losses in the public and private sectors in Zimbabwe over the last two decades.
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No country could experience this kind of professional brain drain without it seriously affecting the quality of education and healthcare, the productivity of the private sector or the efficiency of the public. This is something of a vicious cycle, for as the rot sets in, workloads increase and employment conditions deteriorate so more skilled people, in turn, decide to leave. Without a compensating inflow of skilled immigrants, the cycle is difficult to break. Immigration to Zimbabwe came to a virtual standstill in the s. Emigration without immigration has clearly facilitated the economic and social collapse of Zimbabwe.
Yet emigration also shapes the character and speed of decline and can sometimes, paradoxically, even slow its pace. It does this by providing people who remain behind with the remittances and other resources to survive increasingly intolerable personal circumstances. The essays in this volume focus on the connections between economic and social decline and migration since in Zimbabwe. These connections are explored from different angles and use a number of different methodologies ranging from large-scale national surveys to individual life histories. The volume also seeks to give contemporary migration movements historical depth and to place them in their regional and international context.
Historically, Zimbabwe has simultaneously been a country of in-migration and out-migration. In the last two decades of decline, it has become a place almost exclusively of out-migration. In terms of theoretical context, the volume seeks to situate the Zimbabwean case within the current high-profile international debate on the relationship between migration and development.
The introduction to this volume is divided into three sections. The first section provides a socio-demographic profile of the Zimbabwean migrant population. Then we examine some of the major themes of the contemporary international migration-development debate and relate them to the situation in Zimbabwe. Finally, the chapter summarises how the individual chapters relate to one another and to the themes of the book as a whole. Estimates of the number of Zimbabweans who have left the country in recent years vary widely — from the barely plausible to the totally outlandish.
As long as each migrant is able to support dependants in Zimbabwe, they will tend to stay where they are. In other words, but for migration there would be a great deal more migration than there has been. The earliest use of this figure dates back to ; the most recent, early What are we to make of the inference that the number of Zimbabweans in the country has not increased in six years? Does this mean that there are now well over three million or that the figure was incorrect? And if it was correct, then what is the actual number now?
To resolve this contradiction, it is helpful to know where the three million figure first came from. Tracking down their source usually reveals that they have no sound statistical basis. The Zimbabwean government has not kept any reliable statistics of departures.
South Africa, the main receiving country, can tell how many Zimbabweans enter the country legally every month and the stated purpose of entry but publishes no corresponding record of departures. In addition, there are no reliable estimates at all of how many migrants enter South Africa clandestinely. Further complicating matters is the migration behaviour of many Zimbabwean migrants within the Southern African Development Community SADC region who return home extremely frequently for periods of time.
The volume of legal cross-border traffic between Zimbabwe and South Africa has gone through several phases since Zimbabwean independence Figure 1. For most of the s, about , people crossed from Zimbabwe into South Africa each year. In the early s, with the collapse of apartheid and growing economic hardship in Zimbabwe, the numbers increased dramatically, peaking at , in Thereafter, the numbers actually fell again, reflecting the tightening of restrictions on Zimbabwean movement by the post-apartheid South African government. These restrictions gradually eased after the passage of the Immigration Act.
In , around , people crossed legally from Zimbabwe into South Africa. In the case of the United Kingdom, official immigration statistics show a recent decline in the entry of Zimbabweans from 56, in to 39, in The South African figure included 66, black and 64, white Zimbabweans. The number of black Zimbabweans in South Africa at any one time has undoubtedly increased since but by how much is uncertain.
The World Bank has estimated that in there were , Zimbabweans in South Africa although the basis for this estimation is unclear. In this volume, Makina uses a different methodology to arrive at a figure of 1,, in Whatever the precise numbers, it is clear that there has been a substantial increase in migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa since and a drop in migration to the United Kingdom. South African Department of Trade and Industry. The two data sources suggest some interesting changes in migration patterns.
For example, the proportion of Zimbabweans outside SADC seems to have increased from 33 percent to 41 percent. Since migration to the UK became more difficult, this trend — if verifiable — might suggest a greater global dispersal of Zimbabwean migrants. The UN Migrant Stock database suggests that the Zimbabwean-born diaspora was already becoming global in its distribution in Nearly 20 percent of the global migrant stock was located in Western Europe, 5 percent in North America, 4 percent in Australasia and 3 percent in the rest of Africa Table 1.
Of the jurisdictions countries and other territories reported in the database, or 86 percent have at least one Zimbabwean-born person. However, certain countries have clearly been major destinations. They include the United Kingdom 14 percent of the global stock , the United States 3. At the time of the South African Census, 52 percent of recorded Zimbabweans were in the province of Gauteng, with smaller numbers in KwaZulu-Natal 13 percent , Limpopo 12 percent and the Western Cape 9 percent Table 1.
They are legally in the country but they are certainly not on holiday. The numbers of legal entrants for work and study did increase but remained a small proportion of the total. The numbers with legal work permits increased from 3, in to 21, in , suggesting that it has become easier to legally employ Zimbabweans in South Africa since the Immigration Act was passed. However, a greater number are almost certainly working without permits. In the United Kingdom, a growing proportion of entrants were returnees coming back after a visit home rising from around 20 percent of entrants in to over 50 percent in Table 1.
This seems counterintuitive since the pressures for migration from Zimbabwe to the UK have only increased. Rather, it reflects tighter British border and visa controls by a government trying to keep Zimbabweans out, and able, much more effectively than South Africa, to actually do so. The tightening of restrictions on migration to the UK has, of course, had the perverse effect of increasing the migration pressure on neighbouring South Africa and Botswana. Traditionally, in Southern Africa, outbound migration streams were dominated by young, single, unskilled males.
There are almost as many women migrants as men; there are migrants of all ages from young children to the old and infirm; those fleeing hunger and poverty join those fleeing persecution and harassment; they are from all rungs of the occupational and socioeconomic ladder; they are highly-read and illiterate, professionals and paupers, doctors and ditch-diggers. The most recent national profile of the Zimbabwean migrant worker population was obtained in a representative household survey undertaken by SAMP in The survey confirmed the increase in migration from Zimbabwe after Table 1. Nearly three-quarters of the sample 72 percent had worked outside the country for 5 years or less and only 10 percent had been working as migrants for over 10 years.
There was no major difference between men and women, suggesting that for the vast majority of both sexes out-migration is a recent experience. In , SAMP found a very similar ratio still pertained 56 percent and 44 percent. Many more migrants were married than unmarried 58 percent versus 31 percent with another 10 percent widowed, separated or divorced Table 1.
Around a third of migrants were sons and daughters in the household, 28 percent were heads of households and another 13 percent were spouses or partners of household heads. All of this suggests a broadening and deepening of participation in migration from Zimbabwe. Demographic Profile of Migrants. The majority of migrants were relatively young 72 percent are under the age of 40 and well-educated. Less than 1 percent had no schooling and over 50 percent had a post-secondary diploma, undergraduate degree or post-graduate degree.
Migrants were employed in a wide variety of skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled jobs outside Zimbabwe. In other words, this is a generalized out-movement of people, not confined to one or two professions or sectors. Twenty percent of migrants were in the informal sector as traders, vendors, hawkers or producers. Also significant were skilled professionals 15 percent , health workers 12 percent , services 9 percent , teachers 7 percent , manual workers 6 percent and office workers 5 percent Table 1.
Over 40 percent of professional workers, service workers, managerial office workers and mineworkers were also migrants. Between 30 and 40 percent of office workers and agricultural workers were outside the country. For teachers, the proportion was 28 percent and for domestic workers 25 percent. Only in the security and military sector and in farming were there significantly more people employed inside the country than out of it. The survey also confirmed that most migrants maintain close connections with Zimbabwe. Nearly half visit their families at least once every three months. However, almost 20 percent of the migrants mostly living overseas are only able to return home once a year Table 1.
Absences from home are highly variable: Twenty percent are away for a year or longer. As several of the essays in this collection show, these patterns facilitate the flow of remittances as well as influence the channels preferred by migrants for sending money home. The developmental role of migrant remittances is central to the current international focus on the relationship between migration, poverty and development.
Very little is directed to income-earning, job-creating investment. Finally, remittances increase inequality, encourage import consumption and create dependency. If remittances were once a potential lever for sustainable livelihoods in Zimbabwe, that threshold has long ago been crossed. The vast majority of Zimbabwean households with a migrant member in the region or abroad regularly receive remittances. Cognizant of this fact, the Mugabe government tried various ruses to ensure that the state got its hands on a greater proportion of the remittance inflow.
Without the constant infusion of remittances from abroad, the economic and social collapse of Zimbabwe would have been much faster and even more catastrophic. Levels of poverty and chronic shortages of the basic necessities of life are such that remittance getting is a survival, not a development, strategy in contemporary Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean population, as has often been mentioned, is unable to feed itself, necessitating large-scale food imports.
What is sometimes forgotten is that without remittances of food and cash to purchase food, the hunger and malnutrition situation in Zimbabwe would be even more dire than it has become. Globally, skilled emigration from almost all developing countries increased substantially in the s. They include output and productivity declines; larger skill premiums that increase inequality; fiscal losses through lost tax revenue; diminished scale economies; loss of role models and spillover knowledge from most-skilled to lesser-skilled individuals; loss of entrepreneurs; and changed comparative advantage.
Tanner, however, asserts that benefits accrue more to large, relatively better-off developing countries that have deliberate labour-export policies, and to elites in these countries:. With the notable exception of Botswana, and more recently South Africa, none have pro-active immigration policies to counteract the ensuing skills crisis.
As the s progressed, and global competition for developing country skills intensified, advanced qualifications became a passport out of the country. In Southern Africa, however, male migration still predominates. Diminishing alternatives have forced Zimbabwean women from across the full range of age, skills and education levels to engage in various forms of cross-border economic activity, from informal trade to long-term formal employment.
Without reliable, regular data on levels of female migration at earlier dates, it is difficult to accurately assess the extent to which female migration has increased in either absolute or relative terms. An earlier SAMP survey in found that the ratio of male to female migration from Zimbabwe was very similar to that in In other words, in Zimbabwe unlike other countries the majority of male and female migrants are recent migrants.
This suggests that feminization of migration relates more to growing numbers and new roles rather than any sudden post surge in the importance of female versus male migration. Another important aspect of the global migration and development debate concerns the role of diasporas in the development of countries of origin. There has been a growing recognition in destination countries that diaspora individuals, groups and organizations are engaged independently in activities that have developmental aims and outcomes and that these should be encouraged and supported. Diasporas are themselves increasingly well-organised and lobbying for assistance in these activities.
By tapping the diaspora, developing countries aim to encourage remittance flows, investment and technical and scientific knowledge transfer. The oft-cited cases of India and China are particularly important in demonstrating how diasporas can contribute to investment and economic growth in countries of origin. The Zimbabwean diaspora is widely-dispersed, very young and extremely insecure. Zimbabwean diaspora organizations are increasingly common in countries such as South Africa and the United Kingdom. However, these tend to be of two kinds: Supporting struggling families at home is one thing.
Engagement in any activity that might be deemed supportive of — or co-optable by — Mugabe is not. Zimbabwean migrants within Southern Africa, but also those living outside the region, return home relatively frequently. When away they also maintain very close contact with relatives and kin still in the country.
Transnationalism first emerged as a way of describing and understanding migrant cultural identities and practices. A collection of essays published in by SAMP assessed the utility of the concept of transnationalism to contemporary African immigration to South Africa. None of the essays in that particular collection addressed the situation of Zimbabwean migrants but the thesis is now gaining increasing currency.
In fact, the crisis-driven nature of migration, and the dire situation of many people in the country, probably intensifies connectivity with home. But to what extent are Zimbabweans who have migrated embedded in the society and culture of their destination countries? The recency of much migration may suggest that it is really too soon to tell. But part of the equation is the reception they receive on arrival. Are destination countries and communities inclusive or exclusionary? The evidence suggests that Zimbabwean migrants as a whole are denigrated, devalued and marginalized especially in South Africa and the United Kingdom.
The UN has taken a strong stance on migrant rights through the controversial International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and through efforts to have the Convention ratified in more states. None of the states to which Zimbabweans prefer to migrate has ratified the Convention.
Their rights are seriously circumscribed in many states, including South Africa and the United Kingdom. The global media has ensured that no one can be unaware of the trials and tribulations of ordinary Zimbabweans under the Mugabe regime. Yet this has not translated into a great deal of sympathy for those Zimbabweans who have left the country. The world, it seems, would prefer that Zimbabweans stay home and suffer. Perhaps the most outrageous example of hostility occurred in South Africa in May , when scores of Zimbabweans, along with migrants from other African countries, were hounded out of their homes and communities by rampaging mobs.
Zimbabweans worldwide have found it extremely difficult to access refugee protection systems. In many countries where they either live beyond the margins of legality or even within them, labour market discrimination finds them struggling to make ends meet. The first two chapters in this volume provide important context for the contributions that follow.
The initial chapter by historian Alois Mlambo surveys the history of migration to and from Zimbabwe before The current debate about migration and development is notable for its superficial approach to the history of this relationship and blindness to longstanding arguments about the meaning of development. Indeed, it would be fair to say that the history of cross-border migration in Southern Africa was one of the major pre-occupations of progressive researchers in the s and s.
This is not simply a matter of acknowledging that migration has a history but also of understanding the relevance of this history in the present. The relationship between migration and development, for example, is not a new debate in Southern Africa. In one way or another, it has been a constant preoccupation of colonial and postcolonial states.
Mlambo shows that, for most of its history, Zimbabwe was primarily a destination for migrants. Prior to the nineteenth century, the Zimbabwe Plateau was peopled by migrants from the north. In the early eighteenth century, there was a wave of migrants from the south fleeing the political and economic upheavals of Zulu expansionism. In the twentieth century, following colonial conquest and extensive land expropriation, white settlers entered the country in considerable numbers. Their numbers peaked at , in but would have been even larger, says Mlambo, but for a restrictive immigration selection policy that welcomed whites from the UK and discouraged those from elsewhere.
The contemporary migration and development debate has recently discovered circular migration as if it were a new phenomenon. However, it has been the dominant form of migration in Southern Africa for many decades. Unable to secure enough labour for their farms, plantations and mines, white settlers imported unskilled black migrants from neighbouring Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. In a region well-known for the temporary nature of unskilled migration, these migrants often stayed in Zimbabwe and eventually cut their links with home.
Zimbabwe experienced other types of in-migration as well. Later it was a haven for political refugees from South Africa and Mozambique. However, as Mlambo shows, people have always found reasons to leave Zimbabwe. During the period of colonial and settler rule, almost as many settlers left as came. Between and , for example, the country received a total of , white immigrants but lost , around two-thirds through emigration.
Between and , more whites left than arrived , versus , At independence, whites who feared the loss of racial power and privilege relocated to apartheid South Africa or left the region altogether. Their numbers dropped by two-thirds in the first decade of independence and were down to less than 50, when the farm seizures began at the turn of the century.
Some black Zimbabweans worked on settler farms and mines often migrating within the country to do so but throughout the twentieth century many crossed into South Africa to work, where, despite the humiliations of apartheid, wages were generally higher. Political reasons for leaving Zimbabwe also pre-date the s. In the s, for example, many black Zimbabweans opposed to the Smith regime went into exile but returned again after independence.
Apart from historical amnesia, another major omission in the migration and development debate is any systematic consideration of internal migration and its relationship with international migration. In a volume devoted almost exclusively to international migration from Zimbabwe, it is therefore important to understand what was happening to internal migration during this period and to identify any parallels and connections with out-migration from the country. In her chapter, Deborah Potts provides an overview and analysis of internal migration trends from to the present.
During the period of white settler control, many Zimbabweans were forcibly displaced from their lands to make way for white settlement. In the s, as the independence war escalated, these restrictions broke down and migration to urban areas increased significantly. Potts sums up the pre-independence experience as follows: The s are earmarked by Potts as a decade of normality in the sense that postcolonial internal migration in Zimbabwe resembled that of most other African states after independence.
Freed of controls on their mobility, rural dwellers headed for new economic opportunity in the towns. Urbanization outpaced the delivery of employment opportunities and an informal sector took root. Most migrants felt insecure about a long-term future in the urban areas and retained close connections with their rural homes.
While the departure of disaffected whites accelerated, that of blacks came to a virtual halt. In , Mugabe recalled all Zimbabwean mineworkers in South Africa and banned any further recruiting. South Africa in the s was also in the violent death throes of apartheid and was not an appealing prospect for migrants. Two smaller towns that did continue to experience rapid growth were Mutare and Beit Bridge. Both are border towns whose growth was a function of increasing cross-border movement and informal trade with Mozambique and South Africa respectively.
None had net in-migration from internal sources, and the population of every province was growing at a rate less than the natural increase due to emigration. Potts, like other commentators, attributes decelerating urbanization and growing emigration to the devastating economic impact of World Bank-led Structural Adjustment.
The data is not yet available to show what has happened to internal migration at the national scale since The expropriation of white-owned farms forced a significant net out-migration of farmworkers, many of whom were the descendents of migrants from other countries. Those sceptical of the developmental value of migration often point to the crippling impact of skills migration from developing to developed countries. Tevera and Crush lay out two contrasting positions on brain drain causality. In other words, there would be no brain drain if conditions at home were more conducive for skilled people to stay.
A common approach to the brain drain is the compilation of large macro-scale data sets of migrant flows from which to make inferences about causality and impacts. To understand the actual migration behaviour of skilled people and the impact of migration on those who remain, such analyses obviously need to be supplemented with interview-based studies of the attitudes, perceptions and actions of actual and potential migrants. The problem here is that many studies rely on such small samples that it is hard to know how representative the opinions gleaned actually are.
The surveys discussed by Tevera and Crush are not strictly comparable since the two sample populations differ and were taken some years apart. For example, levels of discontent were notably higher amongst the student body but we cannot conclude that the students were necessarily more dissatisfied than working professionals at the time. In all likelihood, the dissatisfaction levels of those working in Zimbabwe increased considerably in the years following the survey.
If that is indeed the case, then the findings from related though not identical samples become instead a commentary on how much worse conditions became between and The two surveys revealed extreme dissatisfaction amongst the skilled residents actual and in training with a wide variety of economic and social conditions in the country. On virtually every indicator, a majority said that they were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied. Moreover, most also felt that the situation would get worse or much worse in the ensuing five years.
Comparing conditions in Zimbabwe with those in their most likely destination of emigration, their home country scored worse on every social and economic measure. These findings are extremely sobering for they are significantly more negative than those for the other countries surveyed in SADC, including South Africa which also has a major brain drain to contend with. Tevera and Crush also examine the relationship between negative attitudes and emigration intentions. Some 57 percent of the skilled professionals and 71 percent of the students had given emigration a great deal of consideration.
Sixty seven percent of the professionals said it was likely or very likely they would emigrate within five years. Seventy percent of the students said they would leave within two. The magnitude and impact of the medical brain drain from Zimbabwe has garnered much attention in the literature. The debate is an uncomfortable one.
Most would do the same in their position. Yet, at the same time, the healthcare situation for the mass of the population becomes more dire with each one who leaves their post. They found a ready market for their skills overseas, especially in the UK, and began to leave in increasing numbers.
- Linux Journal October 2012.
- Why white South Africans are coming home.
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The number of Zimbabwean health professionals registered in the UK increased from 76 in to 2, in Of these, over 80 percent were nurses. Nurses came formally through private recruiters and under their own steam. In , only 56 percent of nursing staff requirements in the Zimbabwean public health system were filled. At that time, the primary reason was movement out of the public into the private system a career move often accompanied by internal migration.
The number of nurses employed in the public sector fell by 19 percent between and , while the public sector share of nurses fell from 58 to 45 percent in even less time Internal migration from public to private, and from rural hospitals to towns, where most private practices are located was often a prelude to international migration.
The migration attitudes of in-country nursing professionals revealed in the survey showed enormous dissatisfaction with working conditions. His survey of nurses found that as many as two-thirds were considering a move to the private sector and that 71 percent were considering leaving the country. The most likely destination was the UK 30 percent , while 24 percent preferred destinations within Africa mostly South Africa followed by Botswana.
The extent of dissatisfaction in the public health sector was massive, a finding replicated in SAMP surveys. In Zimbabwe, this has never really been an option. Working conditions were so poor and continued to deteriorate. Even the most active global recruiting campaign would have had little success. In the medical sector there is no such thing as a general impact of migration. The results are felt immediately by patients and by those workers who have not yet left.
When nurses leave the public health system for the private sector or for other countries, it is not only the patients who suffer but the nurses who remain. Chikanda shows how this has produced a vicious circle in Zimbabwe. Nurses leave the country. Those who remain work longer hours, carry heavier patient loads and, particularly in rural areas, are forced into multiple roles for which they have no formal training.
Conditions become so taxing and morale so low that they too leave. Despite the increasingly global spread of the Zimbabwean diaspora, migrants congregate in certain countries and in certain places within those countries. Zimbabwean migrants there tend to be middle-class, educated professionals. The historical linkages between Zimbabwe and the United Kingdom have made this an obvious channel for skilled migrants leaving the country. The result, as Bloch points out, is that the Zimbabwean population of the UK is considerably less diverse socially and economically than that in South Africa.
Over 80 percent had jobs but almost half said they had skills and experience which were not being used in their jobs in the UK. Many were forced into the lower levels of the UK labour market. Eighty percent remit money to Zimbabwe and 19 percent elsewhere, indicating an active global diaspora network. Forty percent remit at least once a month with the amount remitted strongly correlated with income. Family livelihood needs are the main reason for remitting, though 12 percent remitted for the main purpose of buying land or property or investing in business.
Zimbabweans in the UK have strong social ties, and migrant networks provide advice about moving, accommodation and help in obtaining visas. Interest in return migration is strong, with 72 percent definitely wanting to return home.
List of Arab towns and villages depopulated during the 1948 Palestinian exodus
Only six percent definitely did not want to return to Zimbabwe in the future. Having a spouse or partner or children in Zimbabwe was a key factor influencing the desire to return. The longer people had been in the UK, and the more secure their immigration status, the lower the desire to return to Zimbabwe. The minority who definitely did not want to return to Zimbabwe emphasized the political and economic situation and the uncertain future.
Bloch also explores whether there is any interest in participating in development activities in Zimbabwe. Only six percent said they were definitely not interested. In her survey, nearly 20 percent of migrants were working as carers or care assistants.
African Hebrew Israelites of Jerusalem
Drawing on her interviews with those working in the sector, McGregor examines the role and experience of an exploited and extremely dissatisfied group of Zimbabwean migrants. Most migrants have little experience in care when they arrive in the UK and are forced into the sector only because the jobs are available and they have few alternatives: The privatisation and outcontracting of local authority residential and home care services has worsened conditions of employment in parts of the labour market, making care jobs increasingly unattractive to native workers.
Most Zimbabwean carers had little or no experience in care work prior to arriving in the UK, partly because the majority have skills or training or experience in other professions and partly because there is no care industry as such in Zimbabwe where care is the responsibility of the family.
Zimbabwean carers prefer working for clients who are more independent rather than in nursing and dementia homes. Many work for agencies supplying temporary staff to residential homes. Most were unhappy with their social life in Britain, as anti-social hours allowed them little time with family and friends. At work, friction with the permanent staff is exacerbated by the fact that the temporary staff are African or other migrants, compared to a predominantly white permanent staff.
Racist attitudes and verbal abuse from clients is also not uncommon. In addition to the racism from clients and permanent staff, the male carers complained of gender discrimination at work. At the same time, many men felt that their masculinity was challenged by jobs that were beneath them. The different responses to care work by male and female migrants, in a sector in which neither would work voluntarily, shows that the Zimbabwean diaspora experience is profoundly gendered.
This theme is taken up in the chapter by Dominic Pasura who shows how gender roles, norms and expectations in Zimbabwe have been challenged and reconfigured once migrants arrive in the UK. In the private spaces of the household, Pasura argues, gender roles and expectations brought from Zimbabwe have come under pressure, leading to intense domestic conflict and the break-up and dissolution of many marriages. The primary reason is that in the UK women have become the primary income earners in many households.
Most of the women claimed to have control over how they used their salaries, unlike in Zimbabwe. Quite apart from their new role as primary breadwinners and the financial independence this has brought, the diasporic context has led women to question basic assumptions about traditional gender roles and relations and to carve out new gendered identities. They are able to do this more successfully in Britain than in Zimbabwe, where extended families and kinship ties are central to the production and reproduction of gendered ideologies.