Prevention strategies of particular salience include raising awareness among researchers and practitioners about the risk, involving researchers from universities and industry in efforts to strengthen the BWTC, creating mechanisms to consider appropriate scientific response to research with potential bioweapons application, and supporting programs that seek to employ former bioweaponeers in peaceful pursuits. Although the BWTC may have served as a partial barrier to biological weapons proliferation [ 21 ], it has been unsuccessful in preventing a number of countries from undertaking substantial programs of research and development [ 22 ].
Efforts to strengthen the treaty are now being debated [ 26 ]. It is not yet evident whether these efforts will be supported with the necessary political will, whether these efforts will make the BWTC a more useful tool in combating biological weapons proliferation [ 27 ], or how treaty verification and enforcement procedures might impact biological research in industry or in universities [ 27 , 28 ]. The ID community is vitally concerned about the likelihood and price of success of such treaty mechanisms and should participate in the development of modifications, revisions, or enhancements on the basis of a careful assessment of the threat and actions likely to prevent biological weapon proliferation.
The ID community is a logical home for new initiatives for international scientific collaboration. Efforts that seek to establish communication with and create structures that offer practical support for scientists who once researched and developed biological weapons but are now being asked to change course should be encouraged.
Existing prevention strategies are insufficient to guarantee that biological weapons will not be used.
Preventing the use of weapons of mass destruction / editor, Eric Herring. - Version details - Trove
Furthermore, it is clear that biological weapons are proliferating. Supporting a broad awareness of the perils of biological weapons will itself advance understanding of useful response measures. The ID community could take a number of additional actions that would strengthen the nation's capacity to respond to the use of a biological weapons.
ID expertise will be critical to early recognition of the diseases that would follow biological weapons use, to recommend the most rapid diagnostic procedures, to assist in the development of medical treatment strategies, to support the creation of hospital response policies, and to undertake research into new diagnostic and therapeutic interventions. ID professionals are called on every day to diagnose and treat patients with fever, pneumonia, rash, and flulike symptoms; therefore, it is the ID professional who would be among the clinicians most likely to recognize the diseases caused by biological weapons.
Professional educational and training curricula should be enhanced so that ID professionals are better capable of recognizing the diseases that would follow use of a biological weapon such as anthrax, plague, or smallpox. The perils of delayed recognition of one of these diseases, both for the patient and for the involved community, would be grave.
Fostering strong working relationships between clinically based ID professionals especially hospital epidemiologists and health department-based ID professionals is an important step toward improving the capacity to both detect and respond to bioterrorist attacks.
Preventing the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Should the recognition of an unusual disease or pattern of illnesses prompt consideration of possible biological weapon use, members of the ID community will be called on to advise upon the most rapid procedures for diagnostic confirmation of disease. In anticipation of this, ID experts should become familiar with the processes by which either the hospital laboratory or the local or state health department, in consultation with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention CDC as necessary, will perform diagnostic studies to implicate or exclude biological weapons use.
A process that establishes criteria and training measures for laboratory diagnosis of these diseases is being undertaken jointly by the Association of Public Health Laboratories and the CDC. Systems for distributing therapeutics. Should a biological weapon use be confirmed, treatment and intervention strategies for the ill and for the exposed but not yet ill will be critical. Public health agencies have begun to explore systems for emergency distribution and treatment of antibiotics and vaccines, systems that would also be useful should emergency interventions be needed for naturally occurring epidemics, such as pandemic influenza.
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The ID community should play an important role in the shaping of such efforts. Hospitals will bear the brunt of caring for the sick and dying should a biological weapon be used. Yet few hospitals are prepared to cope with even a handful of cases of a highly contagious, life-threatening disease, and few hospitals are prepared to manage even a modest surge in the numbers of seriously ill patients.
Hospital leaders should examine current policies in relation to this threat and develop new policies as appropriate. Infection control practices are but one critical component of such planning efforts. Numerous other issues are of compelling importance, such as hospital roles and authorities, prevention of disease transmission amongst staff, personnel requirements, security needs, communication both within and outside the hospital, and media interactions. ID expertise is of clear relevance to many of these issues.
The ID community already does research that seeks new strategies for diagnosis, prevention, or treatment for infectious disease. Commensurate with this, the ID community might elect to encourage and reward basic science research efforts that seek to produce novel diagnostic technologies, preventive, or therapeutic interventions for the diseases caused by biological weapons.
At the same time, ID professionals can be compelling advocates for directing increased funding or attention toward critical needs, such as substantially augmenting the smallpox vaccine reserve and the development of a second generation anthrax vaccine. It is hoped that this CID special section will serve to enhance expertise among the ID community regarding the medical and public health implications of biological weapons and provide a forum for review and scientific dialogue supporting prevention of biological weapons proliferation.
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Sign In or Create an Account. Close mobile search navigation Article navigation. Biological Weapons Cause Epidemics. Biological Weapons Are an Increasing Concern.
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Home All editions This edition , English, Book edition: London ; Portland, OR: Language English View all editions Prev Next edition 3 of 3. Also Titled The Journal of strategic studies. Other Authors Herring, Eric. Physical Description p ; 21 cm. Subjects Weapons of mass destruction. Iran and Iraq as Rational Crisis Actors: The Methodology of Mass Destruction: Can We Prevent Mass Destruction? Notes Special issue of The journal of strategic studies, vol. Includes bibliographical references and index. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest affiliated libraries.
View online Borrow Buy Freely available Show 0 more links Related resource Publisher description at http: Set up My libraries How do I set up "My libraries"? Showing of 1 reviews. Top Reviews Most recent Top Reviews. There was a problem filtering reviews right now. Please try again later. In an increasingly dangerous world, we need hard thinking about the issues of war and peace. This book, based on a Journal of Strategic Studies special issue, usefully raises the question of what these dangers are.
Henning Riecke points out that in the US government adopted a Defense Counterproliferation Initiative of three tiers: NATO adopted this aggressive strategy in Yet NATO's economic sanctions against Iraq have killed about one million people and continue killing even "if Iraq complies with its obligations concerning weapons of mass destruction", as Albright said.
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Sanctions amount to killing the hostages without hurting their captor. Instead, the Muellers recommend containment and deterrence, which would reduce suffering while still preventing Iraq from starting a war.
Biological weapons are very hard to develop, deploy and control; they have killed very few people. Machine guns killed far more people on one day on the Somme than all biological weapons in history. Chemical weapons are not unfailingly destructive. A analysis by the US Congress's Office of Technology Assessment found that a ton of Sarin nerve gas, perfectly delivered under absolutely ideal conditions over a heavily populated area against unprotected people, could cause between 3, and 8, deaths.
When Iraq used gas against Iran, died of the 27, gassed. When the terrorist group Aum Shinrikyo released Sarin in a Japanese subway in , 12 died of the 1, affected.