An Assessment of the Global Impact of the Financial Crisis

This is happening but far too slowly. Africa is growing but needs more investment in productive capacity and financing for infrastructure to transform economies and create jobs in sub-Saharan Africa 35, additional jobs are needed each day to keep up with demographic challenges.

Rich country and emerging market countries including their firms can help. The UK and China have both offered more development finance to create jobs. This marks a shift from discussions a decade ago, which separated Western donors aiding mainly social sectors; Chinese involvement with weakly-governed countries in Africa; and Japan and the European Investment Bank as the major donors catering for African infrastructure. There are now more synergies among donors, with most moving to help African interests while also satisfying needs at home or using home country firms.

A Decade after the Global Financial Crisis: Are We Safer?

There is an increased appreciation that efforts to transform economies and create jobs can create widely-shared and interconnected benefits. In conclusion, there are clear lessons on how to deal with a severe crisis, including the type of diversification and the use of targeted finance. African countries need to accelerate transformation efforts in order to prepare for the next crisis. International aid efforts are increasingly supportive including support for shock facilities and for economic transformation , but there needs to be appropriate international financial regulation and greater focus on African debt.

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Short-term macro policy responses were good, but there were too few changes in long-term policies. Global debt has not diminished, little deleveraging has happened, and conditions for capital flows to African countries are still weak. International financial regulation has largely ignored African economies. Lenders should be encouraged to scale up targeted finance. Countries that diversified their exports either by product or by destination were more resilient.

Medium-term financial stability risks remain elevated, driven by high non—financial sector leverage in advanced economies and rising external borrowing in emerging markets. Although the global banking system is stronger than before the crisis, it is exposed to highly indebted borrowers as well as to opaque and illiquid assets and foreign currency rollover risks.

This GFSR also takes stock of global regulatory reform 10 years after the global financial crisis. It reviews the main precrisis failings in financial sector oversight and assesses the progress in implementation of the reform agenda designed to address these failings. It also looks at whether shifts in market structure and risks in the global financial system since the crisis have been in the direction the new regulatory agenda intended, that is, toward greater safety. It finds that the broad agenda set by the international community has given rise to new standards that have contributed to a more resilient financial system—one that is less leveraged, more liquid, and better and more intensively supervised, especially at large banks.

The forms of shadow banking more closely related to the global financial crisis have been curtailed, and most countries now have macroprudential authorities and some tools with which to oversee and contain risks to the whole financial system. The chapter also identifies areas in which consolidation or further progress is needed and warns against rolling back reforms, which might make the global financial system less safe.

Near-term risks to the global financial system, while still moderate, could increase significantly. Medium-term financial stability risks remain elevated, driven by high nonfinancial sector leverage in advanced economies and rising external borrowing in emerging market economies. Although the global banking system is stronger than before the global financial crisis, it is exposed to these highly indebted borrowers, as well as to opaque and illiquid assets and foreign currency rollover risks. Chapter 2 takes stock of global regulatory reform 10 years after the global financial crisis.

It reviews the main precrisis failings in financial sector oversight and assesses the progress in implementation of the reform agenda designed to address them. It finds that the broad agenda set by the international community has given rise to new standards that have contributed to a more resilient financial system—less leveraged, more liquid, and better and more intensively supervised, especially at large banks.

The chapter also identifies areas in which consolidation or further progress is needed, such as completing implementation of the leverage ratio and ensuring adequate toolkits for containing systemic risk. How important were global imbalances and global overheating in explaining the global meltdown? Did different pre-crisis fundamentals generate different post-crisis performances? And, how severe were the economic shocks to countries such as Korea and other emerging economies?

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Academics, students and policymakers in the fields of economics, international economics, finance, money and banking, and Asian studies will find this book to be a thought-provoking and stimulating read. The global financial crisis: Bordo and John S. Responses of the Korean economy to the global economic crisis: