He shows with many examples that there is also much to criticize in Obama's United States Solty's main thesis is that Obama has reconstructed neoliberalism in the crisis and is now about to deepen it together with the Republicans. To a Marxist, this apparently sounds like a horrific idea However, it is by no means a superficial and broad-brush analysis. Instead, it contains multiple statistical evidence and recapitulates the recent historical developments and political events interpreting them from a Marxist perspective.
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While the attentive reader is already familiar with Solty's texts The reader of this book is asked to put in some 'work'. Yet, he or she is widely remunerated with many recognitions and inspiring thoughts - something which cannot be said to the same degree of the rest of the publications out there devoted to the same topic. Zeitschrift Marxistische Erneuerung, No. Krise und charismatische Herrschaft 2. Neoliberalismus und Evangelikalismus in den USA: Desintegration der Christlichen Rechten, Aufstieg einer evangelikalen Linken? Neuer Roosevelt oder neuer Clinton?
Die sozialen Bewegungen in der globalen Krise 5. Das Scheitern des Obama-Projekts und die Zwischenwahlen 7. Wasserstandsmeldung aus Wisconsin, September 9. Occupy Wall Street Krieg gegen einen Integrationsunwilligen? Fear and Loathing statt Hope and Change: Book pages Publisher: Argument Verlag Hamburg Publication Date: Papy Rossa Verlag Cologne. Wolfgang Fritz Haug, Ingar Solty et al. Krise und charismatische Herrschaft [The Obama Project. Crisis and Charismatic Rule] more. Supplement of "Sozialismus", Vol.
American Politics , U. Frank Deppe, Ingar Solty et al. Distel Verlag Heilbronn Publication Date: Considerations on the Political Articulation of the Global Crisis. In , the world is entering the sixth year of the global crisis. In those six years, sparked by the unfolding events, there has developed a burgeoning literature regarding the origins, conjunctures and regional manifestations of the In those six years, sparked by the unfolding events, there has developed a burgeoning literature regarding the origins, conjunctures and regional manifestations of the crisis.
In many ways, this debate evolved from long-term disputes regarding the nature of the current phase of capitalism and its periodization monopoly-finance capitalism, post-Fordism, finance driven accumulation regime, financial-market capitalism, neoliberalism, high-tech capitalism etc. However, as Magnus Ryner has pointed out, with a few notable exceptions, the debate has shed insufficient light on the political articulation of the crisis and the interrelations between the political and the economic sphere.
With regard to not only the origins of the crisis but also and particularly the viability of exit strategies from it, the struggles over hegemony occurring during the crisis are essential. Hence, complementing the Marxist and Marxian crisis debate, it is the goal of this paper to shed some light on the political articulations of the global crisis and assess the interrelations between global leadership efforts seeking exit strategies from the crisis and the hegemonic struggles underlying their agencies.
While in looking at the struggle between left and right projects of leadership references will be made to numerous core and non-core capitalist countries, the main focus will be on the two dominant actors in NAFTA and the EU, the United States and Germany, which have shaped the politics of exit strategies from the crisis in North America and the Eurozone. Jul Publication Name: Studies in Political Economy, No.
The relationship between capitalism and democracy has historically been a complicated one whose contradictions were reinforced by capitalist crises. In this context we address the following key questions: In so doing we develop our principal hypothesis concerning the crisis of democracy today: The crisis of democracy in this sense constitutes the principal impasse for sustainable exit strategies from the contemporary organic crisis.
Apr Publication Name: Left versus right projects of leadership in the global crisis more. This chapter debates the future possibilities for global order and governance by mapping a political sociology of the current global crisis, and specifically the crisis of neoliberal capitalism. It looks at the political and class The chapter considers the prospects for several sets of long-term ruling strategies e. These are explored as they are actually being developed by the different right and left agencies of global leadership, especially in the United States and in Germany.
May Publication Name: Class and Democracy in the Making of Global Capitalism] more. Die Frage stellt sich: Ist aus der heutigen Formationskrise bereits ein neuer Kapitalismus entstanden? Beitrag in der Reihe "Der Name der Zeit" zur Periodisierung des Kapitalismus und der Frage, ob aus der Krise bereits ein neuer Kapitalismustyp, ein neues Akkumulationsregime und eine neue Regulationsweise entstanden sind. Gesellschaftsanalyse und linke Praxis, Nr. How the new Constitution will depoliticize Armenian society more.
Gesellschaftsanalyse und linke Praxis. The Green New Deal, understood as a means to reestablishing US hegemony, has failed and given way to a global austerity turn. This has significant consequences for the ability of the US state to fully and hegemonically integrate China US foreign policy faces a dilemma. On the one hand the financial dependence on China rule out direct confrontation, on the other hand the perpetuation of US hegemony depends on averting that the increasing regional integration in South East Asia emerges as a challenge to the US-dominated world economy and its monetary configuration.
The US are therefore pursuing a risky strategy that seeks to achieve its goals through utilizing existing tensions, most notably around the South China Sea, in order to increase US military presence in the region. Jan Publication Name: Krieg gegen einen Integrationsunwilligen?: The article contextualizes the current NATO intervention into the Libyan civil war in the debates about the new imperialism and the crisis of global capitalism. It poses the question as to whether it can be interpreted as an act of Based on an analysis of the political economy of Libya from decolonization to the contemporary Gadhafi regime, it argues that the integration of Libya into the world order of global capitalism had already occurred as an act of free will.
Therefore other reasons must have led to the hesitant decision to go to war. Denouncing the idea of humanitarian interventions, the article argues that in the context of the global crisis mainly three goals are being pursued: Jun Publication Name: Eine "flache Welt" jW, Eine "andere Welt" jW, 2. Jan 2, Publication Name: Oct 10, Publication Name: Die Logik der imperialen Aggression: Handelsabkommen und neue Kriege: The Re-Organization of the American Empire] more.
Dec 18, Publication Name: Gesellschaftsanalyse und linke Praxis, 6: Es rappelt in der Kiste: Die Welt ist in Bewegung geraten. Es zeichnet sich immer deutlicher ab, dass sich die Politik in den entwickelten Staaten in drei Lager spaltet: Vom Gelingen und Scheitern in Krisengebieten Dialog: Das Debattenheft der Sozialistischen Linken, Nr. Arbeiterbewegungen und Globalisierung seit [Forces of Labor. Labor Movements and Globalization since ] more.
A Journey into the Middle Kingdom] more. The Role of the "West" in the "Refugee Crisis"] more. Konzerne und "Steuermoral" [Corporations and Tax Evasion] more. Oct 24, Publication Name: Er sei kein Reformer, sondern spinne die Krise weiter Er sei kein Reformer, sondern spinne die Krise weiter. Aussenpolitisch steht das Weisse Haus zur Zeit angesichts der Kriegsvorbereitungen gegen Syrien wieder ganz vorne im Rampenlicht.
Sep 4, Publication Name: Radio Dreyeckland; Zip-fm; Radio Corax. Apr 21, Publication Name: War on Terror , U. Eine neue antiimperialistische Praxis setzt eine neue Theorie des Imperialismus voraus [Transnational Anti-Imperialism: Libyen und der neue Imperialismus [Oil, Control, and Ideology. Libya and the New Imperialism] more. Social Theory, Political Theory and Marxism. This ambiguity, however, is a major asset for the later index and typology construction.
A certain methodological complication arises from the fact that the initial designers of the instrument decided in favor of a one-dimensional intensity rating: The following Table 2 summarizes these data by averaging percentages across the five antiwest and the three anti-east items separately for the two samples for each point in time, and also by showing the percentage point differences from the two types of comparisons to be found in the table.
Rather, the contrary seems true: While it appeared that the data signalled a slight closing of this gap, now points in a more negative direction again. Thus, no assimilation between the two Germanies can be registered, pointing not only—as just mentioned—to the continued saliency of the West-East dimension, but also to the fact that for the East Germans, more than for the West Germans, feelings about the role of the West Germans in the unification process constitute an important aspect of their identity construction.
Data reduction, however, first requires a look at the way the individual items statistically relate. Here the question is particularly whether—separate for the West and the East—all eight items form one unidimensional scale or not. Factor analysis has been used to answer this question results not shown here: The structure of correlations displayed in Table 3 explains why this is the case: Both in the West and in the East at all five points in time, the anti-west and the anti-east items, when separated, correlated positively and in a satisfactory magnitude among themselves, whereas the pooling of all eight items results in close to zero inter-item correlations.
Obviously, for the resulting antiwest index the range of values is o no item approved by the respondent to 5 all items approved by the respondent ; the corresponding anti-east index, because of the smaller number of items, ranges from o to 3. The resulting two indices are displayed in Tables 4 and 5 for the two samples. In , West Germans rejected the negative stereotypes the East Germans might have harbored against them, although they did so less than in Secondly, the index reinforces the observation that East Germans are much more polarized in their views than West Germans.
There is little disagreement in the East that the West Germans are guilty of mishandling the affairs of their Eastern compatriots, and there is also little disagreement among the Easterners that they are not guilty in unification matters. WZB ; voting-age population 6. This would answer the question of whether there was an identifiable political belief context behind the response patterns in the data, as contrasted with the possibility that on the individual level the responses just represent idiosyncratic reactions to day-to-day political stimuli.
Table 6 documents the construction of the typology both in the West and in the East. It does, however, serve to sharpen the contours of the findings, particularly with respect to the fact that the majority of East Germans consistently sees all fault with West Germans and hardly any with themselves. Compared to in the West, the I data shows stability, with a small decrease in the number of Positivists and an even smaller increase in the number of Negativists. By contrast, in the East the name of the game is outright externalization: If one accepts the conceptualization of inner unity as it was done in this article, then there is precious little question that the two Germanies held different viewpoints in this matter to start with, and that the seven years into a unified Germany have not produced a West-East rapprochement, at least not on the basis of the data used in this analysis and certainly not, as shown before, on the basis of other findings.
One piece of information available as a comparative yardstick across the time dimension pertains to the two sociostructural criteria of age and education. As table 7 shows, neither variable is very strongly related to the typology. Two differences between the types are nevertheless worth noting. Particularly in the West, higher education goes above average with the Positivists, and it is this type which is also by far the youngest of the four types both in the West and the East.
While one could be tempted to speculate that these characteristics make the Positivists an especially promising type for inner unity, the empirical basis for this speculation without additional pertinent data is too shaky to build a strong argument on.
Globalization, Governance and Identity
Typology of West-East German Stereotypes percentages. For this analysis, it has to be kept in mind first that in about 40 percent of the respondents in both samples could not be classified on the voting question because they either did not know or refused to answer, or indicated they would not vote.
In addition, in the West the present government received only 34 percent and in the East a 21 percent share of a potential vote. In the early summer of , there is not a single type in both parts of Germany where the conservative-liberal government can muster a majority. This is a major change certainly with the Positivists who were favoring the present coalition all along, but also for the Eastern Internalizers and the Western Externalizers. However, in the East the two types of Externalizers and Negativists, who put the blame for the problems with unification on the West Germans, are still a stronghold for the postcommunist PDS.
In sum, though, one can maintain that the differences with respect to how the process of unification is perceived, are no longer related to the partisanship of the respondents in a similarly clear-cut fashion as before. While such data was not available for the survey, the authors of this article were permitted access to three questions which were asked by the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation in the same study from which the typology was derived see Table 8.
It varies between o statistical independence and 1 perfect dependence. It only measures the degree of covariation between two variables, but does not indicate its direction. These differences, it was argued, reflect both the effects of political socialization under totalitarian rule and of context, particularly the high rate of unemployment in the East this latter point is strongly emphasized by Zelle The support of Hans-Joachim Veen and Carsten Zelle in providing access to this data is highly appreciated.
While it is not possible to derive a causal interpretation from these cross-sectional data, we can reasonably speculate that lagging acceptance of democratic rule and the favorable recollections of socialism are both welded together with a feeling that the West Germans have not done enough to make unification work in the East, as epitomized by the economic strains there. In the West, the attitudes on democracy and socialism are as in and, other than in , not very much related to leftright vote intention: By contrast, in the East these attitudes are still substantially shaped by partisan cues, not the least because there still exists a strong pds at the extreme left which crystallizes the frustrations and dissatisfactions in the new Lander regarding the unification process.
In this sense, the consolidation phase in the East has, even seven years after the transformation of the political system, not yet come to an end. Based on social-psychological identity theories, the reasons for this development have become a little clearer. The threat to the social identity of the East Germans through unification has been underestimated, and they are now reconstructing their biographies in a manner which helps them to establish a positive self image: Since the constitutional and practical logic of unification makes the West Germans the most plausible reference group for East-West comparisons, it therefore cannot come as a surprise that these comparisons for reasons of Eastern identity-building must result in a distancing process.
For one, the economic strains have increased to a point where the name of the political game is no longer the distribution of growth, but of losses in the German welfare state. The process of reaching unity has not yet fully started even in , and more changes and conflict are around the corner, not least in the light of the upcoming national election in September In addition, the analyses have shown that beyond these concrete policy strains, West Germans and East Germans also represent differences in socialization experience regarding their expectations of what a democracy is supposed to be.
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The Weimar Moment: Liberalism, Political Theology, and Law | University of Wisconsin Law School
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Zur ldentitat einer geteilten und wieder vereinten Nation. Weil, and Mary Gautier eds. Theoretical and Empirical Studies. Research on Democracy and Society, vol. Die Politik sollte nicht einem falschen Gemeinschaftsmythos folgen.
2. National Identity and Integration/Disintegration
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