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Heute besuchen hin und wieder neugierige Wanderer den entlegenen Bau. Nachrichten einestages Konrad Adenauer Konrad Adenauer: Er erachtete das Volk als "strohdumm". Adenauer war seiner Zeit weit vorraus. Sie wissen schon; tiefe Quellen! Nur an oberster Spitze wurde das Personal ausgetauscht. Industriebosse wollten den Kanzler bestechen. Once the long post-war growth period eased the competitive pressures on US big industry, the welfare capitalist trajectory became once again attractive for the major industrial enterprises. Is this fascinating explanation of the US-American and Swedish welfare state trajectories applicable to other cases?
How would it accommodate the German or Japanese cases, both countries which combine a relatively high degree of wage coordination and wage compression see Figure 1 with a welfare state so different from the Swedish model and, what is more, so different from each other? Japan's firm-based welfare schemes resemble in many respects the US-model of large employer welfare capitalism Esping-Andersen , whereas business coordination and wage compression are so prominent in the Japanese political economy that Japan, like Germany, is often treated as an outright counter-model to the market liberalism of the Anglo-Saxon variant Albert ; Crouch and Streeck ; Streeck and Yamamura ; Soskice Hence, we may harbour doubts whether the neat fit between wage regimes and welfare regimes so convincingly described by Swenson for the US-American and Swedish cases indeed can be generalised to other cases.
Wage compression is defined as the ratio between the median D5 and the lowest D1 income decile. Centralisation of wage-bargaining according to Iversen In this paper I consider whether Peter Swenson's historical account of the Swedish and US-American welfare state development can tell us anything about what appear at a glance to be deviant country cases.
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In particular, the early establishment of collective wage bargaining in Germany between and is compared with the establishment of collective bargaining in post-war Japan. I highlight especially the parallel establishment of collective bargaining in German manufacturing with the post-war reconstruction of the Bismarckian welfare state, and the correspondence between wage coordination Shunto-style Takanashi et al. I argue that the parallel establishment of wage regimes and welfare regimes in Germany and Japan during a high growth period was not accidental, but backs Peter Swenson's claim that employers develop a positive interest in social policy if social policy promises to stabilise wage coordination and to lower employers' 'collective-action' costs in times of economic upswing.
Full employment, domestic demand, and wage moderation in Germany.
In Germany, coordinated wage bargaining and the leadership role of the metalworkers' union IG Metall in the annual wage rounds is said to have been first established in with the so-called 'Bremen agreement'. We may ask with respect to the establishment of pattern wage bargaining in Germany: In , the German Wirtschaftswunder reached its first post-war peak. GDP growth achieved a stunning For the first time since , the labour market was almost swept clean, with unemployment fluctuating around 3 per cent during the summer and autumn.
In absolute numbers, Germany counted less than , unemployed in September as compared to more than 17 million in gainful employment. Since Germany's current account remained relatively stable but positive , the boom in the second half of the s was now driven at least as much by domestic demand as by external demand Giersch et al. In the second half of the s, Germany witnessed the onset of consumerism.
Germans began to spend the incomes they earned during the Korea-boom on consumer goods. They started to buy cars, television sets, washing machines, etc. While the Korea-boom in first half of the s allowed heavy manufacturing to prosper, the second half of the s saw the rise of German consumer good industry. Yet, in spite of de facto full employment and despite the union's official announcement to embark upon an expansionary wage policy Victor Agartz's expansive Lohnpolitik , which was designed to redistribute wealth via wage demands above the level set by productivity growth plus inflation, real unit labour costs constantly fell throughout the s, if less so in the second half of the decade see Table 1.
Table 1 The determinants of West German labour costs, annual average rates of change in per cent. This latter argument holds that the political struggle especially for co-determination in the early s meant that unions stood 'still temporarily at the wage front so as not to endanger the far more daring prospect of a thoroughly syndicalist "industrial democracy"' Giersch et al.
While it is true that the conflict over co-determination Mitbestimmung and over work councils Betriebsverfassungsgesetz had ended by and thus cannot explain the unions' continuous wage moderation in the following years, Giersch et al. These social policy issues were not only of general political relevance in the unions' manifestos, but especially the pension reform and the sick-pay law in had — in contrast to the conflict over co-determination — a direct impact on workers' social wages. In this context it is also regularly overlooked that the Bremen agreement on reducing weekly working time from 48 hours to 45 hours was 'only part of a more encompassing social policy concept' of the IG Metall Kalbitz I would argue that the mobilization of the unions for the improvement of social protection in the second half of the s made them trade real wage increases for an expansion of welfare state entitlements cf.
Eichengreen , or to put it differently: At the same time, the emphasis on social issues in the IG Metall campaigns almost 'naturally' established its leadership role within the unions' national confederation, the Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund DGB. A closer look at Table 1 reveals that the years 'in between' the struggle for co-determination and the fight for pension reform and sick pay, the years between and , were the ones in which real unit labour costs showed an upward tendency.
What was the pre-history of the conflict over working time reduction and sick pay? The IG Metall had entered the annual wage round by cancelling all collective contracts in the North Rhine-Westphalia district, by far the largest of all districts with , IG Metall members. Interestingly, the union sought to reach a different settlement for the iron and steel industry than it did for metalworking. The union wanted a moderate settlement in the more export-oriented, small-firm dominated metalworking industry and was quick to accept a moderate arbitration proposal.
At the same time, the metalworkers' union hoped to achieve a higher wage hike in the iron and steel industry, where demand was more domestic in nature and where firms were much bigger Pirker This strategy backfired badly Pirker It failed in particular because the leading union representatives in the big firms of the iron and steel sector considered the IG Metall's wage demands to be out of proportion and did not back them. Especially the Arbeitsdirektoren , union members who belonged to the board of directors in the coal, iron, and steel industry thanks to the co-determination law Montanmitbestimmung , opposed IG Metall's aggressive wage policy.
The union thus was faced with a dilemma: Yet the union also met with considerable resistance in those sectors where demand was more domestic in nature but where co-determination had infected union representatives with the virus of firm-level syndicalism or social partnership. All this coincided with workers' raised expectations concerning wage increases given the metalworkers' union's radical rhetoric in times of very tight labour markets.
While union representatives in the firms were often reluctant to embark upon IG Metall's aggressive wage policy, union members often had become more radical, as is shown by the wildcat strikes in in which from time to time even work councils and communist workers violently clashed e. The IG Metall's first response to this situation was to delegate bargaining responsibility to the firm level. But this was an even riskier strategy given the workforce's radical leanings in many firms Pirker Furthermore, IG Metall's claim for leadership within the DGB was hardly made more credible by the union stepping back from its former wage-bargaining responsibility and delegating bargaining to the firm level, in which case either radical the much feared communists or accommodative forces believers in firm-level Sozialpartnerschaft [social partnership] could undermine the union's position.
Aggressive mobilisation in support of significant welfare state expansion in the following years then became the solution to IG Metall's dilemma, as the Bremen agreement and in particular the Schleswig-Holstein metal worker strike in over sick-pay reform showed. It was to become soon clear that employers in the 'exposed sectors' of the economy favoured welfare state expansion as well because they hoped that this would weaken the upward pressure on wages in times of full employment.
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But the interest in short-term wage restraint was only the employers' initial motive to give up the fight against the substantial welfare state expansion in the second half of the s. Employers still had to learn of the beneficial side effects of the Bismarckian welfare state on wage coordination.
But insofar as the welfare state was going to become essential for the stability of medium-centralised collective bargaining and the ensuing intra -industrial wage compression, welfare state programs were more and more perceived as being in the general interest of all employers, be they in exposed or sheltered sectors of the economy see below. What was the prime economic rationale behind pattern wage bargaining?
The large firms in the Ruhr region knew that the unions had picked them in the wage round as their prime targets in the struggle for higher wages, even though the 'dual track' strategy of IG Metall had been a complete failure. While the big firms in the west clearly could afford to pay higher wages, they were not particularly eager to do so. Hence, the 'autarchic' firms in the Ruhr region Herrigel would most benefit from collective bargaining for the entire industrial sector with the export industries setting the pace, since this would lead to wages significantly below what they would have to pay if unions negotiated firm contracts Swenson , If, in turn, wage moderation in the export-oriented firms would be achieved by an increase in workers' social wages via welfare state expansion , those exposed firms and workers most vulnerable to external shocks would profit disproportionately if the welfare state would provide employers with instruments to flexibly and painlessly adjust employment to sudden shifts in demand, meaning with social programs such as short-time allowance Kurzarbeitergeld and early retirement programs.
That was exactly what Adenauer's pension reform in delivered. Insofar as industry-sector wage bargaining with a compressed wage structure was thus externally stabilised by welfare programs, the welfare state became an indispensable part of Germany's post-war economic order, both in the sense that the political mobilisation for the reconstruction of the Bismarckian welfare state temporarily helped moderate unions' wage demands, and in the sense that the welfare state, once in place, helped compensate workers from those firms that either were no longer productive enough to afford the higher social wage or had to cope with adverse external demand shocks.
The whole arrangement roughly resembled the famous Rehn-Meidner model: Uniform wages within the sector resulted in redistribution from the less productive to the more productive firms. But this redistribution was balanced by a flow of welfare-income in the reverse direction, which was spent to support those workers who lost their jobs because firms went bankrupt or because of external demand shocks. Unlike social spending programs in Sweden, however, those in Germany were passive, not active, in nature. A prominent element of the Bismarckian welfare state was to reduce the labour supply via early retirement, disability pensions, or to allow for long waiting periods in case of unemployment and to provide many opportunities for retraining.
Wage bargaining remained moderately centralised and took place at the industrial sector level. No national employer association or union umbrella organisation enjoyed, as in Sweden, sole bargaining responsibility. Moreover, the prime problem for the relevant economic agents was to coordinate interests within an industrial sector, namely between iron and steel and the metalworking industries, not between different industrial sectors.
German shipbuilding, world markets and the intra-industry compromise Both the Bremen agreement and the Schleswig-Holstein metalworkers' strike of were meant to lend credibility to IG Metall's claim to be the leading, pace-setting union among the sixteen DGB unions and to be also fully autonomous from directives of the unions' umbrella organisation. In Bremen and Schleswig-Holstein, the metal sector was dominated by shipbuilding. In the Schleswig Holstein metal sector, A closer look at shipbuilding's economic situation can explain why so much union activity occurred here in the mids.
In the early s, the demand for ships was largely domestic. The rebuilding of the German trade fleet, made possible by generous tax subsidies and by Marshall Plan funds Wend , kept employment and production levels up during the first half of the decade. Recovery had been slow for many reasons: If the year is used as a yardstick, shipbuilding had only reached 72 per cent of its pre-war production capacity by , while at that point coal mining was at per cent, the car industry at per cent and the textile industry at per cent of their pre-war levels.
Industry as a whole had reached per cent of its capacity level Albert With time, external demand became increasingly important for German shipyards. Already 48 per cent of all ships built between and had been exported, and this figure increased to 65 per cent between and Albert As early as , German shipyards were the world's second most important producer of ships Kuckuk This sector thus was especially sensible to changes in the international terms of trade and in domestic wage costs, particularly since wage costs were comparatively high in shipbuilding between 20 and 35 per cent of total production costs; Albert Shipbuilding was the seventh most important export sector if measured in terms of its contribution to the German trade surplus.
Yet, terms of trade had eroded steadily since the mids and suddenly deteriorated rapidly in While the closing of the Suez canal had led to a sharp increase in the demand for ships and in freight rates, in early , freight rates dropped significantly and literally overnight shipyards received no new ship orders. International competition turned extremely fierce, a development long foreseeable due to the advent of a new and competitive challenger: Japanese shipbuilders had increased their world market share significantly within only a short time period, from 11 per cent to 32 per cent ; see Albert In , German shipyards started to lay off workers.
Another important factor to take into consideration is that by the s all of the major German shipyards had become vertically integrated into the 'autarchic' Ruhr region's iron and steel industrial complex Leckebusch Since , Thyssen held the majority of the stocks of the Bremen Vulcan shipyard.
The Germania shipyard had been part of the Krupp concern since Stinnes owned Nordseewerke Emden and the Stumm conglomerate owned the Frerichs shipyards Leckebusch Vertical integration was supposed to help balance the business cycles via diversification see Albert Yet the vertical integration between the iron and steel industry and the ship construction industry, which was barely affected by the Allied deconcentration policy after World War II Diegmann ; Wend , meant that managers and unions had to take into account the different economic situations of both of these industries if wages were to be set uniformly for the entire 'metal' sector.
Furthermore, it is important to note that the extensive version of German co-determination was practised in the iron and steel industry Montanmitbestimmung , but not in the shipyards. Shipyards were highly unionised even by the standards of the time. In all of Schleswig Holstein, union density in the metal sector was The communist movement enjoyed a relatively strong foothold.
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In the work council elections at the Kiel Howaldswerft , the communist candidate won 50 per cent of the votes IG Metall Evidence of the radicalism of many shipyard workers is found in the extraordinary duration of the Schleswig Holstein strike, where even after fourteen weeks of strike union members still rejected a negotiation result with Given that external factors , namely the capital shortage and the Allied restrictions on production, were seen as the main obstacles towards the post-war recovery of the German shipbuilding industry, management, work councils, and local politicians formed broad coalitions and considered it to be in their common interest to put internal conflicts aside for the time being Wend This was the shipbuilding industry's economic situation in the second half of the s, when major wage increases triggered by a growing domestic demand were expected to endanger the industry's precarious international competitiveness, while a highly mobilised union membership did not want to wait any longer for its fair share of Germany's Wirtschaftswunder.
As is argued in this paper the mobilization of the metalworkers' union for welfare improvements provided a solution for its dilemma: Rallying for social issues at the same time helped establish the pace-setting role of the IG Metall and was a first step towards wage coordination. Employers began to learn about the beneficial effects of both wage moderation and wage coordination. Cartels, coordinated capitalism, and collective wage-bargaining: Again we have to step a little back in time in order to explain the rationale of wage coordination for the metal industries.
A principal problem of Germany's dual industrial structure, namely the conflict of interests between large, domestic-oriented iron and steel producers and medium-sized and export-oriented steel consumers Herrigel that in shipbuilding was solved in the s via vertical integration, had historically found a different solution in the other metalworking industries, especially the mechanical engineering, automobile, and electrical industries.
While quickly gaining in economic importance, the metalworking industry had been unable to acquire the corresponding political 'interest-group influence' until the end of because of seemingly insurmountable 'collective action' problems Feldman and Nocken For one, metalworking firms were smaller and more numerous, so that economic concentration was far less developed than in the German heavy industries of coal, steel, and iron Chandler For another, the wide span of products ranging from automobiles and machine tools to cutlery and the corresponding heterogeneity of product markets hindered effective interest aggregation and organisational unity.
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When the metalworking firms finally managed to organise themselves into the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Metallverarbeitende Industrie AVI in , the way was clear for settling the serious conflict with heavy industry via a complex contractual arrangement between the AVI and the Association of German Iron and Steel Producers Reichsverband Eisen und Stahl , the so-called AVI-agreement Nocken ; Weisbrod ; Feldman ; Hoffmann The core of the compromise between both sectors was that, on the one hand, the metalworking firms would support heavy industry's campaign for protectionist tariffs on iron and steel once the Versailles treaty provision expired in that granted the victorious nations access to the German market on a most-favoured-nation basis; while on the other hand, heavy industry agreed to compensate the metalworking firms for the difference between the high German cartel prices and the world market iron and steel prices for exported products and they supported efforts to obtain privileged access for these products especially to the French and Belgian markets.
Yet, the AVI-agreement continued to be important after World War II as business leaders reminded themselves of this successful example of inter-industry coordination. In addition, the complex but highly effective cartel agreement between the two metal sectors preserved and even reinforced the dual structure of the German metal industry, since the agreement not only halted the trend towards further vertical integration, especially the integration of the metalworking industry into the huge industrial complexes of Stinnes, Thyssen, and Krupp, but even partially reversed the trend see Feldman ; Weisbrod ; Chandler After , cartelisation was no longer available as an instrument of economic coordination.
Moreover, the profound deconcentration measures imposed by the occupation forces on heavy industry Herrigel Yet, the fact that the s marked a sharp break with both the massive vertical integration of the early s and with the cartel practices of the late s is rarely emphasised enough in the literature. In particular, scholars infrequently discuss how the 'autarchic' firms in the west and the export-industry in the south once again found a modus vivendi after the war.
It is seldom asked what replaced the cartel agreements plus compensatory side-payments in post-war Germany an exception, of course, is Herrigel Even if this data has to be interpreted with some caution, we know that the coverage and actual effectiveness of the AVI agreement was quite high, and we can be confident that the turn against cartels in the s did mark a very substantial change in the practices governing the 'regulation of competition among business' Swenson And as Peter Swenson has argued convincingly, wage coordination, as a non-self-enforcing arrangement, needed reinforcement from an outside source.
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