Five Days in August: How World War II Became a Nuclear War

The book then discusses the 17 initial targets, and how they were whittled down to 5. According to production schedules, 3 more atomic bombs would have been ready in September of , and at least 7 more in December of that year. The author says that military people at that time figured several or even many atomic bombs might be necessary to get Japan to surrender.

There was a considerable lack of concern in the military about radiation from the bombs.

• The Heart of a Nurse.
• Progetto Manhattan Due (Italian Edition).
• Through These Wicked Nights (Guardians of the Night Book 2);
• Five Days in August: How World War II Became a Nuclear War by Michael Gordin.

Tokyo Rose made a broadcast about people getting ill from the effects of radiation , but some of those involved her thought she was not telling the truth. Jan 11, Will rated it it was ok. It lies in their vastly g "Even the assumption that atomic bombs were revolutionary seemed questionable immediately after the war, although not for long. It lies in their vastly greater powers of destruction, in the vastly reduced effort needed for such destruction.

A bright line was hard to distinguish. Public knowledge and fears about the atomic bomb were almost entirely channeled in these first postwar days and weeks into tremendous, almost apocalyptic fears of nuclear annihilation — all at a time when the only atomic bomb on earth was the plutonium Fat Man that was not used for a third atomic strike on Japan. The fact that all of these proposed inducements to Japanese surrender actually took place as well as the atomic bombings faded almost immediately after surrender.

Sep 05, Augustine Kobayashi rated it it was amazing. An excellent study on how contemporary planners, generals, pilots, and most of all, scientists perceived what the atomic bomb was and could do. Before the destruction of Hiroshima, there was only theory; after, the image of the totally destroyed city prevailed.

This is a frank book too, pointing out difficulties to reconstruct history of the development and the use of the atomic bombs, as accounts are never complete or accurate. What Gordin implies is that, when developing the bomb, scientists a An excellent study on how contemporary planners, generals, pilots, and most of all, scientists perceived what the atomic bomb was and could do.

What Gordin implies is that, when developing the bomb, scientists and military men thought they were merely building a more powerful weapon that might help achieve victory. In this sense, building of the atomic bomb was no different from developing tanks, battleships, radar and strategic bombers. They didn't know how much Japan might endure if atom bombs were used; so they assumed that they would have to drop more than two in the course of and With the Japanese surrender, the bomb suddenly acquired a 'special' status, not just because of its destructive power and human suffering it caused, but also because of the shock value it had on Japan.

So the question today is, is the bomb really 'special'?

The Journal of Military History

Some reader might find this book frustrating, not really answering questions and it does not deal with more humanitarian concerns with nuclear technology. It is a dry history book written by scientist and not for the weak minded. Mar 22, Duron rated it really liked it. This book called five days in August is written by Michael Gordin, changes everything you will know about the end of world war 2 and think twice about how it really ended.

When you read this book it makes you think about the true special nature of the atomic bomb in bringing about the surrender or could of been the urging of the Emperor, who did not want more of his people to die, bringing about the surrender of Japan and the close of the most lethal war in history to a close. When I was reading this book it caught my attention early on because it is about the ending of world war 2 and it involves history so it makes a perfect idea for me to read it and I would totally recommend it to any one that likes history. Oct 24, Paul marked it as to-read.

I saw this for a book discussion at the library.

Looks interesting, and concise. Evelyn led this book discussion. Martti rated it it was ok Apr 11, Evelyn rated it really liked it Jul 31, Alicia SB rated it it was ok Apr 21, Vasant Sahasrabuddhe rated it it was amazing Sep 27, Tiffany Mc rated it really liked it Jul 18, Jon Zug rated it liked it Dec 24, Claudiu Vodarici rated it really liked it Jul 13, Thad Zajdowicz rated it it was amazing Jul 16, Lisa rated it did not like it Dec 27, Lauren Leonard rated it liked it Feb 16, The text comprises seven chapters.

Curiously, I apparently missed any explanation of what five days Gordin has in mind in the title; my guess is August , the period from the Hiroshima bombing to when the Japanese considered conditional surrender. Chapter 2 sets the context of the spring of , reviews statistics of bombing missions, describes internal politicking in the US State Department, and emphasizes how the coincidence of the timing of atomic bomb development and the Potsdam Declaration rendered it a perfect shock strategy.

Chapter 3 examines the issue of target selection and corresponding military orders.

Over years of extensive reading on the history of the Manhattan Project, I do not recall ever seeing an explicit reference to the notion that two bombs would suffice; indeed, it is well-known that Hanford and Oak Ridge were capable of producing bombs on an extensive scale. This chapter also includes a brief discussion of some of the relevant scientific history and concepts, but this is marred by a number of errors: The inaugural use of the atomic [End Page ] bomb against the city of Hiroshima, on August 6, , was meant to shock the Japanese Emperor into surrender, and instill in the citizens of Japan a sense of awe so powerful as to mitigate the ignominy of defeat.

The use of a second bomb only three days later, against Nagasaki, sent the not-significant message that the Hiroshima bombing was no unique occurrence, and that the United States prospectively had many more bombs with which to carry out the "rain of ruin" threatened in the Potsdam ultimatum.

In fact, a third bomb would soon be at the ready, but the impression of an American atomic quiver full of arrows was palpably false. Fully two years after Japan's surrender, the U. But Gordin's thesis is that the shock as well as the awe of the atomic raids were perceived only in retrospect; and that in both the lead up to and the immediate aftermath of the atomic bombings, neither U.

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Accordingly, Five Days in August is a corrective to what might be called foreshortened history: As Gordin observes, correctly, "the attribution of transcendent powers to the nuclear weapon have shaped both the culture and the geopolitics of our present world…" Yet, he argues, that was not the case at the time. In the summer of , the U. Gordin is to be admired for tackling a subject that has already been the subject of numerous books, this reviewer's included, and for a thorough and thoroughly professional use of primary and secondary sources in his work.