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As in the second half of the 20 th century financing of political parties became a matter of public policy, in some countries agencies were established to monitor party finance.
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From the agencies such as, for example, the Federal Election Commission in the United States it is expected to support the public and politically interested media by enabling them to provide information about the flow of money in politics Nassmacher, , p. The establishment of the agency or body that will monitor party and election accounts in most of all countries is a complex task because constitution and other laws guarantee freedom of actions for political parties and thus , in a way, constrain the national authorities in the implementation of audit and other types of control over parties financial activities, so monitoring function is mostly limited to monitoring of deposits.
Only in a few exceptional cases, these bodies have investigative powers Sousa, , p. The third element important for the implementation and impact is the control and investigations: The most obvious case of public control is the proper use of public support, since there's a certain relationship of interdependence: Government or public agencies control powers can be strengthened in different ways.
In certain regulatory frameworks law gives citizens right to file an individual complaint which, in accordance with the law, will be checked by public agencies. The capacity and effectiveness of the control bodies depends on several factors. The most important factor is the body independence, for which there are three fundamental assumptions: If any of these assumptions is not met, i.
Money, Corruption, and Political Competition in Established and Emerging - Google Книги
Although the control and investigations are important elements of implementation, attention should be also paid on confidence development and initiatives with an emphasis on respect of the legal provisions, rather than on threats of punishment should be more intensively encouraged. However, it should be considered that without the threat of sanctions these instruments will lack efficiency and without sanctions in many cases they will remain only on paper Nassmacher, , p. The fourth element is enforcement and sanctions. During the enforcement public agencies and other bodies should demonstrate independence, continuous vigilance and diligence in prosecuting violations of the law, because if these conditions are not met, then it is very likely that enforcement system will not have significant impact.
It should not be forgotten that the absence of enforcement is probably more dangerous than the absence of regulation since it leads to disappointment and citizens can easily develop cynicism towards democracy, which is particularly evident today, when in most of the countries there is an evident low level of trust in political parties and politicians.
E nforcement instruments without the threat of sanctions can not achieve a satisfactory level of efficiency. For sanctioning of political finance violations different types of measures could be applied: The consequences of criminal sanctions are the hardest but they did not deterred perpetrators in those countries which have applied them for this type of violation. Perhaps the reason for the failure lies in the fact that the sanctions are applied to a limited number of cases.
Even in Germany, which has a well established sanctions system, actors in the Kohl affair and Flick affairs, with millions of German marks from suspicious origins, were not sentenced to prison sentence but were punished by exclusion from political life. Financial sanctions which are implemented in the form of fines, forfeiture of illegally acquired gains, abatement of public financial support or abatement of covering campaigning costs Sousa, , p.
However, fines cannot achieve educational impact to political parties and convince them to adopt financial integrity standards as their own views: For such violations small fines are often seen as a kind of invitation to law disregard or painless justification for violations, and increase of penalties does not mean that their credibility and effectiveness will be increased. High financial penalties could harm small and new parties, but they will not necessarily harm large, established parties who have access to significant financial resources Sousa, , p.
Administrative sanctions exist in a small number of countries and are applied mainly to collective actors, i. It can be concluded that different countries, in line with their specific characteristics, applied different regulatory solutions for party finance. It is interesting that similar instruments for party finance regulation produce different results in different political systems.
FAQs on corruption
For different efficiency of regulatory instruments between countries Sousa gives two possible explanations related to the regulatory traditions and cultural views. The first explanation is related to the regulatory tradition since it is considered that the effectiveness of the regulatory framework in every country depends on country regulatory traditions. Sousa here gives the example of United Kingdom which traditionally has, at the electoral constituency level, low election campaign cost, since the ban on the use of certain sources of finance and a limit on the amount of funds that can be spent in the election campaign.
Since , with the adoption of laws regulating party financing these measures have been applied at the national level and it is expected that this law will produce similar positive results also on the national level as it is considered that the existing regulation created a negative culture, opposite to ostentatious election campaigns, and that is supported by both party elite and the public, and that they will accept any regulatory initiative that goes in this direction Sousa, , p.
Another explanation is that the effectiveness of regulatory instruments depends on cultural attitudes about financing of political parties. Persistence of corruption in different cultural environments is a matter of attitudes and in societies where the most of the population do not observe certain behaviors within political parties, such as sponsorship or the use of public institutions resources in election campaigns, as morally wrong and even less as punishable by law, positivism of legislation will not achieve anything.
It still helps to build a relationship of transparency and trust between representatives and the represented. Sousa drew an interesting parallel with the control of nuclear weapons: Party finance regulation can not be successful if the major political parties do not adopt high standards of political behavior, including strict observance of regulation, as their own views.
Political parties can perceive short-term electoral advantage by showing to voters a real or staged commitment to fair political game, but for the success of the regulation, principled commitment is not enough, but their commitment must go beyond simple willingness to adopt laws but and also to include willingness to make these laws effective. At the end it should be stated that the prevention of abuse and influence buying can not be treated separately from the issues of party management and intra-party organization.
Political corruption
As the political parties are expected to apply high standards of transparency and accountability in the collection of donations and financial management, they should also apply these standards when deciding on appointments within the party. Fight against corruption is much wider than the party finance issue and also includes the development of responsible political parties that should necessarily apply principles of democracy and the rule of law in the party management ibid.
Challenges to Political Financing Regulation: Enforcement of political party funding regulations — Lessons from Western Europe, Conference report , , http: Conclusion, in Austin, R.
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Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns. The 'Europeanisation' of Regulatory Transparency. Queen's Papers on Europeanisation , No. Regulation and its modes, in Majone, G. The rise of statutory regulation in Europe, in Majone, G. The Rise of the Regulatory State in Britain. Parlamentary Affairs , Vol. Understanding the Regulatory State. Political Science , Vol. Regulating the Regulatory State. Parliamentary Affairs , Vol. Journal of Democracy , Vol. Narodne novine, Hrvatski pravni centar.
Expalaining Political Finance Reforms. Party Politics , Vol.
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Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for the Age of Governance. No one's rated or reviewed this product yet. Skip to main content. Money, Corruption, and Competition in Established and Emerging Democracies, edited by Jonathan Mendilow, investigates the effectiveness of public subsidization of political competition as an anti-corruption mechanism. The exponential growth of advertising and polling techniques, the need to reach wider publics, and the inability to raise commensurate funds from ordinary members confront parties with ever-increasing difficulty to budget their apparatus.
Such solutions shade into one another. An alternative resolution of the budgetary conundrum adopted by most democracies is the subsidization of political competition.