In order to defeat the insurgent, it was thought necessary to have a preponderance of force in favor of the GVN of somewhere around 10 to 1. The actual ratio for that time period was considerably less than 10 to 1 and was inclining in favor of the insurgents. To accomplish this, he said, measures to increase induction and to curtail the shocking rates of desertion would have to be found. Unfortunately, any build-up strategy was obviated by the events of late May-early June. If force ratios still were of paramount importance, then reinforcements for the GVN side would have to come from other than domestic Vietnamese sources.
The enemy side of the force ratio was open to question since historically Viet Cong strength tended to be understated. The enemy order of battle as reported on 17 March was as follows:.
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All of these figures reflected substantial increases over the previous year. After the Viet Cong had demonstrated rather bluntly that the March statistics were a trifle conservative, the order of battle was revised and on 21 July appeared as follows:. In light of subsequent information, even the above estimate, gloomy as it was, understated the enemy strength. At a quick glance, the force ratios in July were seen to be about 3. Undoubtedly the force ratios as seen in mid were far from optimum for theoretical counterinsurgency operations. The program to pacify, or extend government control over, the countryside never really recovered from the political turmoil of and early On 6 April, a MACV military spokesman gave the following answers to questions from the press after a presentation summing up the month of March Have the figures on VC control of territory and population changed appreciably?
The statistic that counts is people, and in the month of March the statistics that are here do not have percentiles. Can you give us figures on the number of people brought under government control in January and in March-or to the closest month? I'd say it was a slow gain basically in the Hop Tac area. Any place else, you've had a trade-off. Would it be a fair assumption to say that, outside of Hop Tac the government held its own? In the overall, held its own. There was no significant progress, then. The government held its own? It was a stalemate, then?
No, I wouldn't call it a stalemate. I don't consider the fact that you pacified, or asserted control over 20 additional hamlets which might house as many as six or seven thousand people a stalemate. At the same time we lost. No, you misunderstand me. In the Hop Tac area, there were gains. Although there are pacification plans in effect in all provinces except Con Son Island , there has been little significant progress; in some areas there has been an appreciable deterioration of governmental control.
Even though South Vietnamese officials report continuing progress in the high priority Hop Tac effort around Saigon, it remains to be seen whether these are more than paper achievements. To date there has been no major effort by the Viet Cong to strike at areas which are now claimed as "secure," and therefore the validity of government claims remains untested.
The Viet Cong have increased their numbers and the tempo of their operations in areas adjacent to Hop Tac and what is apparently an attempt to draw off government forces committed to this major pacification effort. The slowdown in the pace of pacification is due to several factors which include: Contributing factors were increased VC activity, especially in the I and II Corps and the administrative confusion associated with the attempted coup of 19 February.
At month's end, the pacification plans were still undergoing a review, with the result that pacification funds had not yet been released to the provinces. Even so, many province chiefs are reluctant to push forward without more specific authorization and direction from higher authorities. In the Hop Tac area consistent gains were recorded throughout the month. Some progress was seen in II Corps in pacification efforts. Contributing factors to this standstill were the GVN delay in approving provincial budgets and a continued lack of aggressiveness in operations directly supporting rural reconstruction.
There was no appreciable increase in the number of refugees this month and relief measures taken by the Minister of Social Welfare and the province chiefs appear to be progressing satisfactorily, particularly in Binh Dinh and Quang Ngai provinces. A lot of favorable things were being said about Hop Tac. Mc-George Bundy told the President in an apparently pivotal memorandum dated 7 February that although American air power would have to be used to buy time for us to break the Viet Cong hold on the countryside, the Hop Tac program offered hope for the future.
Even without the dogged optimism, it is difficult in the absence of hard data to accurately assess the real situation in the countryside in early , or to tell how much of the Hop Tac program was merely bluster and bravado. Prior to this, the II Corps, including the coastal provinces of Phu Yen and Binh Dinh and all of the highland provinces, was already in trouble. The staple food of the Vietnamese is rice, and Vietnam has in time of peace traditionally been an exporter of that commodity. The Viet Cong campaigned to control the countryside where the rice is grown and the routes of communication, land and water, over which it is moved to market.
They were so successful that by the GVN was forced to contemplate massive imports of rice in order to feed the population and help stabilize prices. To illustrate the scope of the problem, the following statistics show rice exports from the district of Thanh Phu to the capital of its province Kien Hoa, one of the richest of the provinces in the Mekong Delta:.
By early the current crop of Delta rice had already been harvested, and it was obvious that the Viet Cong were not going to allow it to reach the urban markets. The upsurge in overt enemy military activity in May and June was accompanied by a major campaign to interfere with GVN lines of communication. Highway One and the railway which parallel one another through the coastal provinces in I and II Corps were both cut in numerous places. The road from Saigon to Da Lat, over which moved much vegetable produce, was constantly harassed.
Through increased control in the agricultural producing areas, very effective harassment of the primary means of communication within the GVN, and selective application of military pressure, the Viet Cong were waging a very successful campaign aimed at grinding the economy of the GVN to a halt. There wasn't much the GVN could do about it. By June the Reserve was already so heavily committed that there was little additional combat power available to the GVN with which to influence a rapidly deteriorating situation, military and economic. The rationale that got two Marine BLT's into Da Nang in March , which was publicly announced and which caused surprisingly little outcry, was plausibly advanced on several subsequent occasions as additional troops were deployed to various locations in Vietnam.
Whether or not it was publicly offered as a rationale, the strategy of deploying troops for the security of bases was short-lived. The Marines hardly had their feet dry when several proposals were brought forward to get U. These proposals, the first of which followed close on General Johnson's return from his Vietnam inspection trip of March, were the center of much private debate in the spring and early summer of That debate went on largely behind the scene while the American public was in ignorance of the proceedings.
The strategy of security effectively became a dead letter on the first of April, but the change in strategy was not revealed publicly until the 8th and 9th of June. Westmoreland wanted to cut down some of the density of aircraft at Da Nang by moving helicopters to the strip at Phu Bai. The Marine BLT was needed to protect that strip.
Taylor cabled to Washington:. He intends to move helicopters from Da Nang to the strip and thereby reduce field congestion at Da Nang. Because of the military advantages of thus rounding out the MEB, I have no reluctance in agreeing to the merit of his recommendation which, of course, should receive the concurrence of the GVN after that of Washington.
This proposal for introducing the BLT is a reminder of the strong likelihood of additional requests for increases in U. Such requests may come from the U. All of us here are keenly aware of the GVN trained military manpower shortage which will exist throughout and which probably can be rectified only in part by an accelerated mobilization.
We will soon have to decide whether to try to get by with inadequate indigenous forces or to supplement them with Third Country troops, largely if not exclusively U. This matter was discussed with General Johnson during his recent visit who no doubt has raised it following his return to Washington. This message examines the pros and cons of such an action--specifically defined as the introduction of a U.
Such a reinforcement would allow a strengthening of military efforts in the I and II Corps areas where the situation is deteriorating and would give a boost to GVN morale, military and civilian. Likewise, it should end any talk of a possible U. This statement of the purpose of introducing a U. However, there are counter arguments on the other side of the case. The introduction of a U. It will raise sensitive command questions with our GVN allies and may encourage them to an attitude of "let the United States do it.
Finally, there is considerable doubt that the number of GVN forces which our action would relieve would have any great significance in reducing the manpower gap. It is possible to reach a conclusion with regard to the overall merit of this action without first examining in some detail the possible missions which could be assigned a U.
Dan Carlin's Hardcore History: Addendum
There are two obvious possibilities: Here, our forces could utilize their mobility and firepower effectively and make an important contribution in cutting off the growing infiltration into and through this area. For the most part, the Montagnards are friendly to the U. On the other hand, such a mission in the highlands would place our forces in an area with highly exposed lines of communication leading to the coast. Their location in this area would create serious logistic problems because of the difficulty of the movement of land transport through areas infested by the Viet Cong.
There would be problems both of reinforcement and of withdrawal because of this precariousness of land communications. Finally, the GVN may question the introduction of sizeable U. The other role which has been suggested for U. Such a disposition would have the advantage of placing our forces in areas of easy access and egress with minimum logistic problems associated with supply and maintenance.
The presence of our troops would assure the defense of these important key areas and would relieve some GVN forces for employment elsewhere. The troops would not be called upon to engage in counterinsurgency operations except in their own local defense and hence would be exposed to minimum losses. On the other hand, they would be engaged in a rather inglorious static defensive mission unappealing to them and unimpressive in the eyes of the Vietnamese.
Operating in major population areas would maximize the points of contact with Vietnamese and hence maximize the possible points of friction. The division would be badly fragmented to the extent that its command, control and supervision would be awkward. The foregoing analysis leads me to the following tentative conclusions. First, it is not desirable to introduce a U. One must make a definite determination of the numbers and types of GVN forces relieved by the introduction of the U.
Obviously, our division would make some contribution but it remains to be proved that it will be sufficient to reverse the downward trend and give such a lift to the GVN forces that they would perform better by the stimulation of the U. If the evidence of the probable effectiveness of this U. The inland mission in the highlands is clearly the more ambitious and, if well done, will make a greater contribution during the present critical period.
On the other hand, it is the more exposed and even permits one to entertain the possibility of a kind of Dien Bien Phu if the coastal provinces should collapse and our forces were cut off from the coast except by air.
The coastal enclave mission is safer, simpler but less impressive and less productive than the inland mission. The contrast of the pros and cons of the two suggests the desirability of reexamining the question to see whether the advantages of the inland disposition could not be combined in some way with the retention of a base coastal area, linked with a position inland. In any case, considerable additional study is required before we are prepared to make a recommendation either for the introduction of a division or for the assignment of its mission.
In the meantime, we should be giving much thought both in South Vietnam and in Washington as to the right course of action [if] and when this issue becomes pressing--as it shortly will. The President himself, in National Security Action Memorandum , approved the deployment of those two BLT's and at the same time, by changing the Marines' mission to include offensive operations, he ended the strategy of security.
NSAM is a pivotal document. It marks the acceptance by the President of the United States of the concept that U. It indicates as well the anxiety of the President--his decision to proceed very slowly and carefully so that U. Thus the President only approved the deployment of two Marine BLT's, although he was doubtless aware of a JCS oposal favored by the Secretary of Defense and forwarded by the Chiefs on March, which called for the deployment of a three division force, two U. At the President's request, all NSC members were admonished in NSAM not to allow the release of any premature publicity for the actions dealing with the Marines and their mission.
As a result, the change of mission was not publicized until it crept out almost by accident in a State Department release on 8 June. Nor was the change of mission clearly defined in NSAM The Marine BLT's were to be permitted more active use "under conditions to be established and approved by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State" and, of course, their new mission was subject to the approval of the GVN. During his return trip to Saigon, Ambassador Taylor sent the following cable to the State Department. If no guidance beyond language of reftel [Deptel containing the summarized guidance] is to be provided by Washington, I propose to describe the new mission to Quat as the use of Marines in a mobile counterinsurgency role in the vicinity of Da Nang for the improved protection of that base and also in a strike role as a reserve in support of ARVN operations anywhere within fifty miles of the base.
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This latter employment would follow acquisition of experience on local counterinsurgency missions. It is pretty clear, then, that the President intended, after the early April NSC meetings, to cautiously and carefully experiment with U. There was sober awareness that the North Vietnamese were not going to quit and that the U. The Rolling Thunder program, if it was going to bear any fruit at all, certainly was not going to do so in the next few months. The question, according to McNaughton, was: All three choices for remedial action so far presented had been rejected.
These choices were 1 will-breaking strikes against the DRV which risked escalation flash and were thus too risky, 2 large U. The alternatives, as described above by Mr. McNaughton, went into the National Security Council discussions which took place during the Ambassador's visit. What came out of those discussions was NSAM and the decision to proceed ahead very slowly with ground force involvement. Missing from NSAM was the elucidation of a unified, coherent strategy. Ambassador Taylor, among others, had raised the question as to whether or not Western troops could fight effectively in Vietnam.
No one could forget the French failure, and the Ambassador's reservations received due attention. Before devising a strategy for the use of U. There was time to indulge the luxury of a leisurely build-up. The situation was bad, but currently the GVN was doing a bit better, and nothing pointed to immediate collapse. The early April NSC meetings signalled the beginning of an enclave strategy. No Dien Bien Phu's would be presented for the enemy to exploit as supplies and reinforcements could be brought in with ease over sea LOC's controlled entirely by the U.
As a corollary, the U. The Secretary of Defense on 21 April told the President that 11, of the approved increase was to augment various existing forces while a further 7, were logistic troops to support "previously approved forces. It isn't entirely clear from the documents exactly what the President did have in mind for the support troop add-ons.
What is clear, however, and was made explicit in a memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 5 April was that the JCS were continuing to plan for the earliest possible introduction of two to three divisions into RVN.
The Ambassador indicated to the State Department in a cable on 12 April that he too thought the , man increase was for something more than those forces already approved. Several comments occur to me which are passed on for what they are worth. There appears to be no question about the need for the 18,, logistic build-up the Category A force recommended by General Westmoreland. The introduction of this force has been approved and should be implemented as rapidly as the elements can be moved and MACV can accept them.
I am surprised to learn from MACV that May 1 is the earliest date for the arrival of the engineer element which paces the rate of arrival of the other components. If possible, this date should be advanced. The Category A package will provide support for about 50, U. To make any significant progress toward the establishment of a logistic base to support additional forces, it will be necessary to bring in rapidly about 5, more engineers above those in Category A.
I would concur in the desirability of this reinforcement, feeling that these engineers can be very useful in SVN whether or not we ever introduce additional divisions. Taylor went on in the same cable as though he were summing up the results of the meetings which led to the NSAM:. With regard to the imminence of the need for those divisions, I do not share the fear that the I and II Corps areas are about to fall apart which is expressed in some of the traffic bearing on the logistic build-up.
In any case, if a debacle is going to take place in the next few months, the time factors developed in the logistic studies indicate that very little advance logistic preparation can be made in time. In such an unlikely contingency, U. While recognizing the importance of the current studies in developing the logistic facts of life as they bear on the reinforcement of SVN, I hope that they do not interfere with essential work in preparation for less ambitious but more probable developments. It was my understanding in Washington that, if the Marines demonstrate effectiveness in operating out of Da Nang in an offensive counterinsurgency role, other offensive enclaves may be established along the coast and garrisoned with brigade-sized contingents for employment similar to the Marines.
General Westmoreland is very anxious to establish such a force as soon as possible in the Bien Hoa-Vung Tau area. Qui Nhon is also well situated for similar purposes. I would recommend that logistic preparations be initiated at once to permit each of these two areas to receive a U.
Whatever is done for this purpose will assist in accommodating any larger forces which may be subsequently introduced. It is important that this lesser program be carried out rapidly enough to make a contribution to the situation which is now unfolding. This requires rapid action. Their landing brought the total number of U. Although security was no longer the only authorized mission for these units, it certainly was their primary mission. The Marines set about consolidating and developing their two coastal base areas, and, although they pushed their patrol perimeters out beyond their tactical wire and thereby conducted active rather than passive defense, they did not engage in any offensive operations in support of ARVN for the next few months.
As a kind of postscript to the strategy of security, it was used by General Westmoreland as justification for an attempt to get some Army ground troops on the stage in early April. Nevertheless, Westmoreland wanted a brigade in the Bien Hoa-Vung Tau area because "it was as necessary from a purely military standpoint as the deployments in the Da Nang-Phu Bai area which have already won acceptance. He also wanted a light reserve force which could be airlifted to the Central Highlands in case of emergency.
The rd, a two-battalion airborne brigade, was then located in Okinawa. What followed General Westmoreland's request of 11 April, a request that Ambassador Taylor "had noted," was a rapid-fire series of cables, proposals, and false starts which, if nothing else, indicated that Washington was well ahead of Saigon in its planning and in its anxiety. The conferees recommended the deployment of the rd and, in deference to CINCPAC's concern for his airmobile reserve, they also recommended that the rd be replaced by another brigade from CONUS as soon as practicable.
The decision to deploy the rd apparently caught the Ambassador flatfooted, for he had quite obviously not been privy to it. He cabled the State Department on the 14th and said:. This comes as a complete surprise in view of the understanding reached in Washington that we would experiment with the Marines in a counterinsurgency role before bringing in other U. This decision seemed sound to me at the time and continues to appear so.
I recommend that this deployment be held up until we can sort out all matters relating to it. Whatever was motivating those in Washington who had decided to make this deployment, the Ambassador held the trump card as he had to clear the move with the GVN before the troops could come in. The Prime Minister had not been told at this juncture about the proposed landing of more U. McNaughton to the Ambassador on 15 April. That message, which will be treated in detail in a later section, contained the following preamble: As steps to that end, we believe the following actions should be undertaken.
The documents do not reveal just exactly when Presidential sanction was obtained for the expanded scope of the above proposals. It is possible that the Ambassador may have caught the Defense Department and the JCS in a little cart-before-the-horsemanship The day following the order from the JCS to deploy the rd and the Ambassador's reclama thereto, the JCS submitted a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense in which they addressed the Ambassador's objection to the deployment and offered their own position, which was that "the U.
Whether or not the JCS wrote that memorandum with red faces, the Secretary of Defense dates approval for final deployment of the rd as of the 30th of April, which is considerably later. Even when the rd was finally ordered to deploy, it went on a temporary duty basis. It remained in that anomalous status well into the summer of , expecting any day to be recalled to Okinawa and replaced by another unit.
The troops continued to draw TDY pay, and their dependents remained at the permanent base on Okinawa instead of returning to the U. With the rd successfully held in abeyance, the principals took that issue, along with the seven points of the 15 April cable, to Honolulu, where a conference convened on 20 April and structured the outlines of the ever popular enclave strategy. The security of U. The security rationale was consistently offered, along with other reasons, to justify the further deployment of ground combat units. In fact, looking back on the force deployments which were the main subject of this paper, the JCS in November stated that 21 of the original 44 "Phase I" U.
The geography of Vietnam lends itself to enclave thinking-that is, to operations based on coastal cities and with restricted extension of lines of communication inland. The area near the coast is for the most part fairly fiat and hospitable and contains the bulk of the population. The interior is mountainous and is sparsely populated throughout. In some places the mountains come right down to the coast, but the coastal plain is well defined for most of the length of Central Vietnam.
Scattered along this coast are the mouths of numerous streams, each with a small delta which serves as an area for rice production and concentration of population, and as a focus for commercial activity. Several cities, such as Da Nang, Qui Nhon, and Nha Trang, are located contiguous with the coastal population and have good deep water anchorages for ocean-going maritime activity. All three of these cities were, in early , likely candidates for bases in an enclave strategy.
There were other areas along the coast which did not have deep water anchorages but which were, nevertheless, readily accessible for amphibious resupply from the sea. Chu Lai, little more than a sandy hamlet, and Phu Bai fell into this category and were very much a part of enclave thinking. In between the central coast and the Mekong Delta--which itself offered no good coastal access and egress and hence was never a part of any enclave strategy--was the port of Vung Tau.
Located at the end of the Cap St. Jacques peninsula and easily defended, Vung Tau was the logical alternative to the port of Saigon, access to which required a risky trip up the Saigon River from a point pot far from Vung Tau. General Johnson, Chief of Staff of the Army, brought back from his March inspection trip to Vietnam the germ of an idea to establish U. The idea is included in one of two alternatives proposed by Johnson for the deployment of a U.
The other alternative proposed the deployment of a division to the highland provinces of Kontum, Pleiku, and Darlac. Significantly, the coastal city deployment and the second alternative were the two principal contenders for the location of the 1st Cavalry Division Airmobile debated later in the year. By far the most dogged protagonist of the enclave strategy was Ambassador Taylor. He was consistent in his opposition to the initial involvement of U.
As he saw his position being eroded on that question, it would seem natural for him to have fallen back in an only slightly less conservative posture. On 18 March , in a cable already quoted in its entirety in Section II, Taylor brought up the question of the deployment of a U. While not backing either alternative at that juncture, he did say that "the coastal enclave mission is safer, simpler but less productive than the inland mission. On the other hand, it is the more exposed and even permits one to entertain the possibility of a kind of Dien Bien Phu if the coastal provinces collapse and our forces were cut off from the coast except by air.
The Ambassador received no response from Washington to the cable quoted above. He sent another one on the 27th of March in which he reminded Washington that it was high time to make some decisions concerning U. According to Taylor, there were three choices: For himself, Taylor preferred a combination of the offensive enclave plus reserve in case of an emergency. This was essentially the position that he carried into the NSC meetings in Washington of April He was shown the JCS's plan to introduce three divisions of U.
That plan, which Taylor was inclined to oppose but which had the qualified support of McNamara, was undoubtedly also a focus of discussion within the NSC. In regard to that air activity the text of the NSAM said this:. Subject to continuing review, the President approved the following general framework of continuing action against North Vietnam and Laos:. We should continue to vary the types of targets, stepping up attacks on lines of communication in the near future, and possibly moving in a few weeks to attacks on the rail lines north and northeast of Hanoi.
Air operation in Laos, particularly route blocking operations in the Panhandle area, should be stepped up to the maximum remunerative rate. The Persident approved an The President approved the deployment of two additional Marine Battalions and one Marine Air Squadron and associated headquarters and support elements. The President approved the urgent exploration, with the Korean, Australian, and New Zealand Governments, of the possibility of rapid deployment of significant combat elements from their armed forces in parallel with the additional Marine deployment approved.
NSAM sanctioned a change in mission for U. The President approved a change of mission for all Marine battalions deployed to Vietnam to permit their more active use under conditions to be established and approved by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State. This language may indicate that the President wanted to experiment very carefully with a small amount of force before deciding whether or not to accept any kind of ground war commitment.
Implicit in the size of that force and in its location was the option to quickly evacuate it, should the U. He cabled Washington on the 4th of April that he would approach Quat with a proposal that the Marines be permitted to conduct mobile operations within their TAOR's and that they be used by the RVNAF as a reserve for operations up to 50 miles from their bases. Taylor was at this juncture quite prepared to settle into a period of careful experimentation with the level of combat power fixed at four battalions.
He said in a message dated 17 April that he had about 60 days in mind as the appropriate period for the experiment, and he indicated he was chagrined by some apparent anxiety in Washington to move considerably faster. In a message also dated 17 April he questioned the Washington panic manifested in a whole panoply of "hasty and ill-conceived" proposals for the deployment of more forces.
In another message he again cautioned against precipitous action and offered the palliative that "things weren't going so badly" out there. Four Marine battalions were enough for experimentation, but not so large as to alarm the xenophobic Vietnamese. In fact, the Ambassador's sensitivity to the proclivities of the Vietnamese Prime Minister on the question of foreign troops helps explain the Embassy's footdragging during this critical period of U. Thus, the Ambassador was surprised to discover that the Marines had come ashore with tanks, self-propelled artillery, and various other items of weighty equipment not "appropriate for counterinsurgency operations.
Similarly, the decision to deploy the rd, had it been executed, would have placed Taylor in an exceedingly embarrassing position as he had not mentioned it to the GVN. From analysis of the cable traffic of early April, it appears that Taylor was the only major figure opposed to further expansion of the U. His defense was tenacious, but as proposals from Washington got progressively more radical, his patience began to wear thin. Then Taylor communicated his ire to McGeorge Bundy in a message quoted in full in Section I of this paper and in which he maintained that Quat's government had quite enough to do without the addition of more U.
The purpose was "to further experiment with US forces in the counterinsurgency role"; Sic! The phrase "to further experiment" is misleading since up to the date of this cable, there had been no U. Although this cable was well-meaning in its intent, the Ambassador was amazed by its naivete and justifiably chargrined by its impertinence. Thus was the Ambassador propelled into the conference of 20 April , only one step ahead of the Washington juggernaut, which was itself fueled by encouragement from Westmoreland in Saigon. Taylor was not opposed to the U.
He was overtaken at Honolulu. Honolulu brought the Saigon and Washington decision makers together to sanctify an expanded enclave strategy. In the preliminary discussions they agreed that:. It could take up to two years to demonstrate VC failure. It was recognized that air activity would not do the job alone. The current lull in Viet Cong activity was merely the quiet before a storm.
Dan Carlin's Hardcore History: Addendum
Going into the Honolulu Conference the level of approved U. In-country strength of 33, showed that not all the approved forces had closed. To accomplish the "victory strategy" described above, the conferees agreed that the following additional U. If approved, these recommended forces would have brought U.
If approved, these recommended forces would bring Third Country strength to a grand total of 4 maneuver battalions and 7, men. As an adjunct to the units above, the conferees mentioned, but did not recommend, the possible later deployment of:. It was decided to drop the idea of encadrement of U. Recruiting, it was agreed, was less a problem of organization and method than it was a product of the limited manpower base and competing agencies including the Viet Cong.
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