A utilitarian could accept the value of the virtue of kindness, but only because someone with a kind disposition is likely to bring about consequences that will maximize utility. So the virtue is only justified because of the consequences it brings about. In eudaimonist virtue ethics the virtues are justified because they are constitutive elements of eudaimonia that is, human flourishing and wellbeing , which is good in itself. Rosalind Hursthouse developed one detailed account of eudaimonist virtue ethics. Hursthouse argues that the virtues make their possessor a good human being.
Like Aristotle, Hursthouse argues that the characteristic way of human beings is the rational way: Acting virtuouslythat is, acting in accordance with reasonis acting in the way characteristic of the nature of human beings and this will lead to eudaimonia. This means that the virtues benefit their possessor. One might think that the demands of morality conflict with our self-interest, as morality is other-regarding, but eudaimonist virtue ethics presents a different picture. Human nature is such that virtue is not exercised in opposition to self-interest, but rather is the quintessential component of human flourishing.
The good life for humans is the life of virtue and therefore it is in our interest to be virtuous. It is not just that the virtues lead to the good life e. It is important to note, however, that there have been many different ways of developing this idea of the good life and virtue within virtue ethics. Philippa Foot, for example, grounds the virtues in what is good for human beings. The virtues are beneficial to their possessor or to the community note that this is similar to MacIntyre's argument that the virtues enable us to achieve goods within human practices.
Rather than being constitutive of the good life, the virtues are valuable because they contribute to it. Another account is given by perfectionists such as Thomas Hurka, who derive the virtues from the characteristics that most fully develop our essential properties as human beings. Individuals are judged against a standard of perfection that reflects very rare or ideal levels of human achievement. The virtues realize our capacity for rationality and therefore contribute to our well-being and perfection in that sense. Not all accounts of virtue ethics are eudaimonist.
Michael Slote has developed an account of virtue based on our common-sense intuitions about which character traits are admirable. Slote makes a distinction between agent-focused and agent-based theories. Agent-focused theories understand the moral life in terms of what it is to be a virtuous individual, where the virtues are inner dispositions. Aristotelian theory is an example of an agent-focused theory. By contrast, agent-based theories are more radical in that their evaluation of actions is dependent on ethical judgments about the inner life of the agents who perform those actions.
There are a variety of human traits that we find admirable, such as benevolence, kindness, compassion, etc. Finally, the Ethics of Care is another influential version of virtue ethics. Developed mainly by feminist writers, such as Annette Baier, this account of virtue ethics is motivated by the thought that men think in masculine terms such as justice and autonomy, whereas woman think in feminine terms such as caring.
These theorists call for a change in how we view morality and the virtues, shifting towards virtues exemplified by women, such as taking care of others, patience, the ability to nurture, self-sacrifice, etc. These virtues have been marginalized because society has not adequately valued the contributions of women. Writings in this area do not always explicitly make a connection with virtue ethics.
There is much in their discussions, however, of specific virtues and their relation to social practices and moral education, etc. There are many different accounts of virtue ethics. The three types discussed above are representative of the field. There is a large field, however, of diverse writers developing other theories of virtue. For example, Christine Swanton has developed a pluralist account of virtue ethics with connections to Nietzsche.
Nietzsche's theory emphasizes the inner self and provides a possible response to the call for a better understanding of moral psychology. Swanton develops an account of self-love that allows her to distinguish true virtue from closely related vices, e. She also makes use of the Nietzschean ideas of creativity and expression to show how different modes of acknowledgement are appropriate to the virtues. Historically, accounts of virtue have varied widely. Homeric virtue should be understood within the society within which it occurred.
The standard of excellence was determined from within the particular society and accountability was determined by one's role within society. Also, one's worth was comparative to others and competition was crucial in determining one's worth. Other accounts of virtue ethics are inspired from Christian writers such as Aquinas and Augustine see the work of David Oderberg.
Aquinas' account of the virtues is distinctive because it allows a role for the will. One's will can be directed by the virtues and we are subject to the natural law, because we have the potential to grasp the truth of practical judgments. To possess a virtue is to have the will to apply it and the knowledge of how to do so. Humans are susceptible to evil and acknowledging this allows us to be receptive to the virtues of faith, hope and charityvirtues of love that are significantly different from Aristotle's virtues.
The three types of theories covered above developed over long periods, answering many questions and often changed in response to criticisms. For example, Michael Slote has moved away from agent-based virtue ethics to a more Humean-inspired sentimentalist account of virtue ethics. Humean accounts of virtue ethics rely on the motive of benevolence and the idea that actions should be evaluated by the sentiments they express.
Admirable sentiments are those that express a concern for humanity. The interested reader must seek out the work of these writers in the original to get a full appreciation of the depth and detail of their theories.
Much of what has been written on virtue ethics has been in response to criticisms of the theory. The following section presents three objections and possible responses, based on broad ideas held in common by most accounts of virtue ethics. Morality is supposed to be about other people. It deals with our actions to the extent that they affect other people. Moral praise and blame is attributed on the grounds of an evaluation of our behavior towards others and the ways in that we exhibit, or fail to exhibit, a concern for the well-being of others.
Virtue ethics, according to this objection, is self-centered because its primary concern is with the agent's own character. Virtue ethics seems to be essentially interested in the acquisition of the virtues as part of the agent's own well-being and flourishing. Morality requires us to consider others for their own sake and not because they may benefit us.
There seems to be something wrong with aiming to behave compassionately, kindly, and honestly merely because this will make oneself happier. Related to this objection is a more general objection against the idea that well-being is a master value and that all other things are valuable only to the extent that they contribute to it. This line of attack, exemplified in the writings of Tim Scanlon, objects to the understanding of well-being as a moral notion and sees it more like self-interest.
Furthermore, well-being does not admit to comparisons with other individuals. Thus, well-being cannot play the role that eudaimonists would have it play. This objection fails to appreciate the role of the virtues within the theory. The virtues are other-regarding. Kindness, for example, is about how we respond to the needs of others. The virtuous agent's concern is with developing the right sort of character that will respond to the needs of others in an appropriate way.
The virtue of kindness is about being able to perceive situations where one is required to be kind, have the disposition to respond kindly in a reliable and stable manner, and be able to express one's kind character in accordance with one's kind desires. The eudaimonist account of virtue ethics claims that the good of the agent and the good of others are not two separate aims.
- WHAT IS THE SEAL OF THE SPIRIT? (Biblical Studies Series from Self Publishing Innovations - #3);
- The Writings of Ivor Browne: Steps Along the Road: The Evolution of a Slow Learner.
- Il risveglio dell’anima bambina. L’attivazione dei Codici di Cristallo (Italian Edition).
- Download options.
- Virtue Ethics | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy!
Both rather result from the exercise of virtue. Rather than being too self-centered, virtue ethics unifies what is required by morality and what is required by self-interest. Moral philosophy is concerned with practical issues. Fundamentally it is about how we should act. Virtue ethics has criticized consequentialist and deontological theories for being too rigid and inflexible because they rely on one rule or principle. One reply to this is that these theories are action guiding.
The existence of "rigid" rules is a strength, not a weakness because they offer clear direction on what to do. As long as we know the principles, we can apply them to practical situations and be guided by them. Virtue ethics, it is objected, with its emphasis on the imprecise nature of ethics, fails to give us any help with the practicalities of how we should behave. A theory that fails to be action-guiding is no good as a moral theory. The main response to this criticism is to stress the role of the virtuous agent as an exemplar.
Virtue ethics reflects the imprecise nature of ethics by being flexible and situation-sensitive, but it can also be action-guiding by observing the example of the virtuous agent. The virtuous agent is the agent who has a fully developed moral character, who possesses the virtues and acts in accordance with them, and who knows what to do by example.
Further, virtue ethics places considerable of emphasis on the development of moral judgment. Knowing what to do is not a matter of internalizing a principle, but a life-long process of moral learning that will only provide clear answers when one reaches moral maturity. Virtue ethics cannot give us an easy, instant answer. This is because these answers do not exist.
Nonetheless, it can be action-guiding if we understand the role of the virtuous agent and the importance of moral education and development. If virtue consists of the right reason and the right desire, virtue ethics will be action-guiding when we can perceive the right reason and have successfully habituated our desires to affirm its commands. Finally, there is a concern that virtue ethics leaves us hostage to luck. Morality is about responsibility and the appropriateness of praise and blame. However, we only praise and blame agents for actions taken under conscious choice.
The road to virtue is arduous and many things outside our control can go wrong. Just as the right education, habits, influences, examples, etc. Some people will be lucky and receive the help and encouragement they need to attain moral maturity, but others will not. If the development of virtue and vice is subject to luck, is it fair to praise the virtuous and blame the vicious for something that was outside of their control? Further, some accounts of virtue are dependent on the availability of external goods. Friendship with other virtuous agents is so central to Aristotelian virtue that a life devoid of virtuous friendship will be lacking in eudaimonia.
- Kant's Moral Philosophy?
- Comments (0).
- Used Car Guide: Successful Second Hand Car Buying, How to avoid Lemons at Used Car Sales, Private Sale Cars and Online Auctions.
- Novos sonhos (Bianca) (Portuguese Edition)!
- Kantian Virtue and “Virtue Ethics”.
- AWAKENING: Secrets of a Brown Eyed Girl;
- The Freak Observer (Fiction - Young Adult).
However, we have no control over the availability of the right friends. How can we then praise the virtuous and blame the vicious if their development and respective virtue and vice were not under their control? Some moral theories try to eliminate the influence of luck on morality primarily deontology.
Virtue ethics, however, answers this objection by embracing moral luck. Rather than try to make morality immune to matters that are outside of our control, virtue ethics recognizes the fragility of the good life and makes it a feature of morality. It is only because the good life is so vulnerable and fragile that it is so precious.
Many things can go wrong on the road to virtue, such that the possibility that virtue is lost, but this vulnerability is an essential feature of the human condition, which makes the attainment of the good life all the more valuable. Virtue ethics offers a radically different account to deontology and consequentialism. Virtue ethics, however, has influenced modern moral philosophy not only by developing a full-fledged account of virtue, but also by causing consequentialists and deontologists to re-examine their own theories with view to taking advantage of the insights of virtue.
The emergence of virtue ethics caused many writers to re-examine Kant's other works. Kantian virtue is in some respects similar to Aristotelian virtue. In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant stresses the importance of education, habituation, and gradual developmentall ideas that have been used by modern deontologists to illustrate the common sense plausibility of the theory. For Kantians, the main role of virtue and appropriate character development is that a virtuous character will help one formulate appropriate maxims for testing. In other respects, Kantian virtue remains rather dissimilar from other conceptions of virtue.
Differences are based on at least three ideas: First, Kantian virtue is a struggle against emotions. Whether one thinks the emotions should be subjugated or eliminated, for Kant moral worth comes only from the duty of motive, a motive that struggles against inclination. This is quite different from the Aristotelian picture of harmony between reason and desire. Second, for Kant there is no such thing as weakness of will, understood in the Aristotelian sense of the distinction between continence and incontinence.
Rejecting any form of coercion or manipulation, Habermas believes that agreement between the parties is crucial for a moral decision to be reached. It also formulates a rule by which ethical actions can be determined and proposes that ethical actions should be universalisable, in a similar way to Kant's ethics. Habermas argues that his ethical theory is an improvement on Kant's ethics. Kant distinguished between the phenomena world, which can be sensed and experienced by humans, and the noumena , or spiritual world, which is inaccessible to humans.
This dichotomy was necessary for Kant because it could explain the autonomy of a human agent: For Habermas, morality arises from discourse, which is made necessary by their rationality and needs, rather than their freedom. The social contract theory of political philosopher John Rawls , developed in his work A Theory of Justice , was influenced by Kant's ethics. To achieve this fairness, he proposed a hypothetical moment prior to the existence of a society, at which the society is ordered: This should take place from behind a veil of ignorance , where no one knows what their own position in society will be, preventing people from being biased by their own interests and ensuring a fair result.
Rawls dismissed much of Kant's dualism, arguing that the structure of Kantian ethics, once reformulated, is clearer without it—he described this as one of the goals of A Theory of Justice. He proposed that, while Kant presented human freedom as critical to the moral law, Sade further argued that human freedom is only fully realised through the maxim of jouissance.
O'Neill argues that a successful Kantian account of social justice must not rely on any unwarranted idealizations or assumption. She notes that philosophers have previously charged Kant with idealizing humans as autonomous beings, without any social context or life goals, though maintains that Kant's ethics can be read without such an idealization. Conceiving of reason as a tool to make decisions with means that the only thing able to restrain the principles we adopt is that they could be adopted by all.
If we cannot will that everyone adopts a certain principle, then we cannot give them reasons to adopt it. To use reason, and to reason with other people, we must reject those principles that cannot be universally adopted. In this way, O'Neill reached Kant's formulation of universalisability without adopting an idealistic view of human autonomy. From this model of Kantian ethics, O'Neill begins to develop a theory of justice.
About De Gruyter
She argues that the rejection of certain principles, such as deception and coercion, provides a starting point for basic conceptions of justice, which she argues are more determinate for human beings that the more abstract principles of equality or liberty. Nevertheless, she concedes that these principles may seem to be excessively demanding: In his paper The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories , philosopher Michael Stocker challenges Kantian ethics and all modern ethical theories by arguing that actions from duty lack certain moral value.
He gives the example of Smith, who visits his friend in hospital out of duty, rather than because of the friendship; he argues that this visit seems morally lacking because it is motivated by the wrong thing. After presenting a number of reasons that we might find acting out of duty objectionable, she argues that these problems only arise when people misconstrue what their duty is.
Acting out of duty is not intrinsically wrong, but immoral consequences can occur when people misunderstand what they are duty-bound to do. Duty need not be seen as cold and impersonal: She argues that, seen this way, duty neither reveals a deficiency in one's natural inclinations to act, nor undermines the motives and feelings that are essential to friendship. For Baron, being governed by duty does not mean that duty is always the primary motivation to act; rather, it entails that considerations of duty are always action-guiding.
A responsible moral agent should take an interest in moral questions, such as questions of character. These should guide moral agents to act from duty. Hegel presented two main criticisms of Kantian ethics. He first argued that Kantian ethics provides no specific information about what people should do because Kant's moral law is solely a principle of non-contradiction. To illustrate this point, Hegel and his followers have presented a number of cases in which the Formula of Universal Law either provides no meaningful answer or gives an obviously wrong answer.
Hegel used Kant's example of being trusted with another man's money to argue that Kant's Formula of Universal Law cannot determine whether a social system of property is a morally good thing, because either answer can entail contradictions. He also used the example of helping the poor: For Hegel, it is unnatural for humans to suppress their desire and subordinate it to reason. This means that, by not addressing the tension between self-interest and morality, Kant's ethics cannot give humans any reason to be moral.
Virtue Ethics
German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer criticised Kant's belief that ethics should concern what ought to be done, insisting that the scope of ethics should be to attempt to explain and interpret what actually happens. Whereas Kant presented an idealized version of what ought to be done in a perfect world, Schopenhauer argued that ethics should instead be practical and arrive at conclusions that could work in the real world, capable of being presented as a solution to the world's problems.
Because he believed that virtue cannot be taught—a person is either virtuous or is not—he cast the proper place of morality as restraining and guiding people's behavior, rather than presenting unattainable universal laws. Philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche criticised all contemporary moral systems, with a special focus on Christian and Kantian ethics. He argued that all modern ethical systems share two problematic characteristics: Although Nietzsche's primary objection is not that metaphysical claims about humanity are untenable he also objected to ethical theories that do not make such claims , his two main targets—Kantianism and Christianity—do make metaphysical claims, which therefore feature prominently in Nietzsche's criticism.
Nietzsche rejected fundamental components of Kant's ethics, particularly his argument that morality, God, and immorality, can be shown through reason. Nietzsche cast suspicion on the use of moral intuition, which Kant used as the foundation of his morality, arguing that it has no normative force in ethics. He further attempted to undermine key concepts in Kant's moral psychology, such as the will and pure reason.
Like Kant, Nietzsche developed a concept of autonomy; however, he rejected Kant's idea that valuing our own autonomy requires us to respect the autonomy of others. Under the Kantian model, reason is a fundamentally different motive to desire because it has the capacity to stand back from a situation and make an independent decision. Nietzsche conceives of the self as a social structure of all our different drives and motivations; thus, when it seems that our intellect has made a decision against our drives, it is actually just an alternative drive taking dominance over another.
This is in direct contrast with Kant's view of the intellect as opposed to instinct; instead, it is just another instinct. There is thus no self-capable of standing back and making a decision; the decision the self-makes is simply determined by the strongest drive. For an individual to create values of their own, which is a key idea in Nietzsche's philosophy, they must be able to conceive of themselves as a unified agent. Even if the agent is influenced by their drives, he must regard them as his own, which undermines Nietzsche's conception of autonomy.
Utilitarian philosopher John Stuart Mill criticised Kant for not realizing that moral laws are justified by a moral intuition based on utilitarian principles that the greatest good for the greatest number ought to be sought. Mill argued that Kant's ethics could not explain why certain actions are wrong without appealing to utilitarianism. Virtue ethics is a form of ethical theory which emphasizes the character of an agent, rather than specific acts; many of its proponents have criticised Kant's deontological approach to ethics. Elizabeth Anscombe criticised modern ethical theories, including Kantian ethics, for their obsession with law and obligation.
As well as arguing that theories which rely on a universal moral law are too rigid, Anscombe suggested that, because a moral law implies a moral lawgiver, they are irrelevant in modern secular society. He further challenges Kant's formulation of humanity as an end in itself by arguing that Kant provided no reason to treat others as means: Roman Catholic priest Servais Pinckaers regarded Christian ethics as closer to the virtue ethics of Aristotle than Kant's ethics. He presented virtue ethics as freedom for excellence , which regards freedom as acting in accordance with nature to develop one's virtues.
Initially, this requires following rules—but the intention is that the agent develop virtuously, and regard acting morally as a joy. This is in contrast with freedom of indifference , which Pinckaers attributes to William Ockham and likens to Kant. On this view, freedom is set against nature: There is no development or progress in an agent's virtue, merely the forming of habit.
This is closer to Kant's view of ethics, because Kant's conception of autonomy requires that an agent is not merely guided by their emotions, and is set in contrast with Pinckaer's conception of Christian ethics. A number of philosophers, including Elizabeth Anscombe [68] , Jean Bethke Elshtain [69] , Servais Pinckaers [70] , Iris Murdoch [71] , and the Catholic Encyclopedia [72] , have all suggested that the Kantian conception of ethics rooted in autonomy is contradictory in its dual contention that humans are co-legislators of morality and that morality is a priori.
They argue that if something is universally a priori i. On the other hand, if humans truly do legislate morality, then they are not bound by it objectively, because they are always free to change it. This objection seems to rest on a misunderstanding of Kant's views since Kant argued that morality is dependent upon the concept of a rational will and the related concept of a categorical imperative: Furthermore, the sense in which our wills are subject to the law is precisely that if our wills are rational, we must will in a lawlike fashion; that is, we must will according to moral judgments we apply to all rational beings, including ourselves.
That is, an autonomous will, according to Kant, is not merely one which follows its own will, but whose will is lawful-that is, conforming to the principle of universalizability, which Kant also identifies with reason. Ironically, in another passage, willing according to immutable reason is precisely the kind of capacity Elshtain ascribes to God as the basis of his moral authority, and she commands this over an inferior voluntarist version of divine command theory, which would make both morality and God's will contingent.
Kant and Elshtain, that is, both agree God has no choice but to conform his will to the immutable facts of reason, including moral truths; humans do have such a choice, but otherwise their relationship to morality is the same as that of God's: Kant believed that the shared ability of humans to reason should be the basis of morality, and that it is the ability to reason that makes humans morally significant. He, therefore, believed that all humans should have the right to common dignity and respect. For example, a researcher who wished to perform tests on patients without their knowledge must be happy for all researchers to do so.
Medical research should be motivated out of respect for the patient, so they must be informed of all facts, even if this would be likely to dissuade the patient. He argues that there may be some difference between what a purely rational agent would choose and what a patient actually chooses, the difference being the result of non-rational idiosyncrasies.
Although a Kantian physician ought not to lie to or coerce a patient, Hinkley suggests that some form of paternalism - such as through withholding information which may prompt a non-rational response - could be acceptable. She proposed that a woman should be treated as a dignified autonomous person, with control over their body, as Kant suggested. She believes that the free choice of women would be paramount in Kantian ethics, requiring abortion to be the mother's decision.
Cohen believes that even when humans are not rational because of age such as babies or fetuses or mental disability, agents are still morally obligated to treat them as an ends in themselves, equivalent to a rational adult such as a mother seeking an abortion. Procedure for determining whether a proposed action violates CI1: I am to do x in circumstances y in order to bring about z. I am to lie on a loan application when I am in severe financial difficulty and there is no other way to obtain funds, in order to ease the strain on my finances. Everyone always does x in circumstances y in order to bring about z.
Everyone always lies on a loan application when he is in severe financial difficulty and there is no other way to obtain funds, in order to ease the strain on his finances. The Kantian evaluation rule is this: If we get a no answer to either, we must reject the maxim and try to find another one on which to act.
This is the example we have been using in spelling out the procedure. The maxim fails because I must answer "no" to the first question: I could not rationally act on the maxim in the PSW. There are two reasons Kant states for this: Lying on a loan application would not get us anywhere in a world where everyone always lied when under similar circumstances. The second part of the test is the "contradiction in the will test.
Kant's Ethics of Virtue
The next example is supposed to illustrate a failure of this test. Here the maxim is something like the following: In order to advance my own interests, I will not do anything to help others in need unless I have something to gain from doing so. The PSW will contain a law of nature of the form: To advance his own interests, everyone always refrains from helping others in need unless he has something to gain from doing so.
Now Kant would say that there is no problem in conceiving such a PSW in fact, those of a cynical bent might think that the PSW is no different from the existing world. Applying the first question of the procedure, we see that we cannot answer no to the first question: However, according to Kant the second part of the test fails: I could not rationally choose the PSW, because "a will which resolved itself in this way would contradict itself, inasmuch as cases might often arise in which one would have need of the love and sympathy of others and in which he would deprive himself, by such a law of nature springing from his own will, of all hope of the aid he wants for himself If a maxim flunks Q1 see above then we have a perfect duty to refrain from acting on that maxim.
If a maxim flunks Q2 see above but not Q1 , then we have an imperfect duty to refrain from acting on that maxim. We have a perfect duty not to murder. This means that we must never murder under any circumstances. We have an imperfect duty to help the needy. This means that we should do so on occasion, where this does not conflict with our perfect duties. According to Kant, perfect duties duties of justice can appropriately be enforced by means of the public, juridical use of coercion, and the remainder are imperfect duties duties of virtue , which are fit subjects for moral assessment but not coercion.
Martha, as a home-service medical care volunteer, has cared for George through the final weeks of his fatal illness. Just before he died, George told Martha where a large sum of money he had accumulated was stored. Since George's illness did not affect his mental capacity, she agreed. But now that he has died, she is considering using the money to support the activities of the local Hunger Task Force, an organization that provides donated food to those who need it.
George has no surviving friends or relatives, and no one else knows about the money. He left no written will. To run this case through the CI procedure, we first need to identify Martha's maxim. To do this, we look at the description of the situation and see if we can determine which sort of principle Martha would sincerely formulate as justification of her action. Recall that all maxims can be put into the form: So we can determine the maxim by specifying what should go in for x, y and z.
Kant's Ethics of Virtue
The following substitutions seem plausible: So the three steps of the CI procedure will look like this: I am to break a deathbed promise when doing so will allow me to do much more good for humanity, in order to promote the goal of increasing human welfare. Generalize the maxim into a law of nature: Everyone always breaks deathbed promises when doing so allows him to do much more good for humanity, in order to promote the goal of increasing human welfare.
Figure out the PSW: In the PSW, it will be common knowledge that people break deathbed promises whenever they think they can do much more good for humanity. Would it be rational to adopt and act on my maxim in the PSW? No, because in the PSW no one would ask for deathbed promises, because everyone would know that they are not genuine commitments. The maxim would not be an effective policy for promoting human welfare. Since the answer to the first question is "No," Martha should not act on her maxim, since it fails the "contradiction in conception" test. The steps here are as follows: For each option, estimate the "utility" of each of its consequences.
It seems that the options Martha faces are these: Give the money to the Hunger Task Force. The following table specifies probabilities and utilities for each consequence of each option: Utility impact on human welfare.