We saw earlier, especially in the example of Leontius, that anger can ally with reason, and that it is also separable from reason and the base appetites. Anger, identified earlier as perhaps the essential emotion of the spirited soul, illustrates clearly that the spirited soul is a necessary intermediate aspect, because it encompasses this ability we have to use certain emotions either for rational or irrational purposes. The insights of book 10 allow us to see that spiritedness is distinct from rationality for another reason: It is this aspect of spiritedness that allows it to ally with the appetites.
This understanding of the whole soul, and the multifaceted capabilities of spirit, will prove crucial to understanding the psychological effects of the eschatological myths. The parts of the soul are in harmony or conflict depending on whether or not reason is their overarching leader. Does appetite obey because of the compulsion of spirit, as in the stern repetition of commands, or the imposition of shame?
Also, how does our spirited self interpret and obey rationality in order to ally with it? The first piece of this explanation will allude to a discussion that already began. In fact, the three overlap with one another considerably in that they have common features.
I will therefore show that the three have the capacity to influence each other through their kinship. If the characters were sharply divided, it would be difficult or impossible to explain how they interact, let alone, to explain how they harmonize under the leadership of reason. Explaining the interaction of the three is important for at least two reasons: Here, Socrates draws an explicit parallel between the desires of the wisdom-loving, rationally- ruled philosopher, the honor-loving, spirit-ruled soldier, and the base-pleasure-loving, appetitively-ruled craftsman.
A Philosophical Commentary London: Macmillan, , Hendrik Lorenz considers this issue quite extensively and admits that the appetites have some minimal access to reason. See Lorenz, The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle Oxford: Clarendon Press, , , In Republic 9, Socrates and Glaucon explicitly agree on three kinds of desire that correspond to the three aspects of the soul.
The philosophical part, finally, loves learning. The desiring or yearning of each is a factor that underlies and unifies the whole soul. In this way, the three aspects overlap with one another and are not entirely distinct. In this way, Socrates identifies a rational, ruling capacity that is present in the higher-order desires. This irrational aspect, as I previously explained, refers both to the appetitive and spirited parts of the soul. If the irrational is capable of consorting or forming a companionship, then it is capable of some sort of discursive thought.
Thus, it is not completely accurate to describe spiritedness or the appetites as completely distinct or divorced from reason. The passages above reveal a basic discursiveness in which spirit and appetite may engage. This type of thought process is best characterized as opinion. As we know from my earlier treatment, the part that consorts with imitations is inferior and is not to be taken seriously.
However, the language he uses to describe the irrational part, which I have argued is identical to the spirited and appetitive capacities of the soul, indicates that their activity is inferior to the belief or trust of the calculating soul. As a result, Plato implies that the rationality of appetite and spirit is limited to the sort of opining that takes place at the lowest level of opinion, namely, the realm I will describe as conjecture on the simile of the Line and in the Allegory of the Cave.
In explaining that the appetitive soul shares in reason to some extent, I am entering into an ongoing debate about this issue. Some argue that the appetitive soul is completely irrational, while others argue that it shares in rationality to some degree, as noted earlier. Though many scholars point to the money-loving tendency of appetites as evidence that Plato sees them as capable of means-end reasoning, I avoid using this argument for the following reason: I believe Lorenz is correct when he points out that it is unclear whether the appetites love money as a means or as an end in itself.
In this way, they are penetrated by the rational soul. The former is a sufficient condition for leading the lower aspects, as is the latter. It is clear based on the above that reason also influences them by penetrating their very nature. Dorter and Jon Moline are particularly helpful on the topic of reason as the communicator and spiritedness as the enforcer. He points out that in commanding, reason does not change the basic constitution, or desires, of the lower parts.
His Later Ethics and Politics Oxford: For an isolated command by reason, Leontius again serves as a good example. This is important to spell out here because this study will repeatedly refer to the turning of the whole soul, in which the soul follows the lead of rationality, but also receives motivation from spiritedness and the appetites. In order to understand accurately how the latter two can follow reason and also motivate it, one must understand the interpenetration described here. As I pointed out, this interpenetration does not amount to Plato violating his basic rationale for distinguishing the three aspects, in part because they each have different objects of desire.
In the chapters that follow, we will see the interpenetration of the soul at work, as mythical imagery aids the rational soul in its efforts to lead or turn the whole soul toward the light of truth. Sometimes, indeed, the former is the case, and this is too obvious to spell out.
However, my treatment of the afterlife myths will show that the desiring capacity of reason, or the overlap of reason with spirit and appetite, allows it to use the basic constitution of the latter two for good. What exactly constitutes the turning of the whole soul?
In my analysis, I argue that the details of the account demand that the prisoner turn his whole body several times in order to ascend from one stage of the journey to the next, as he advances up the steep path of the cave, and eventually out of it. Just after his portrayal of the cave, Socrates refers to this turning of the whole body as a metaphor for the turning of the whole soul.
Another function of this section of the study involves defending the view that the Allegory of the Cave portrays an ascent to knowledge that is parallel to the simile of the Divided Line. Furthermore, my argument for parallelism is opposed to the work of Richard Robinson, who argues that the Line and the Cave are asymmetrical.
Clarendon, , Malcolm is one of many who disagree with Robinson, arguing that the Line and Cave are basically parallel. Heidegger also claims that the Cave allegory occurs in four stages or phases. As the Sun is the source of physical light, the Good is the source of the light of truth. The first, or lowest, subsection of the visible contains images, which Socrates describes as shadows and reflections, among other things. See Malcolm, 38; R. This section includes all physical objects.
Socrates and Glaucon agree that the appearances or likenesses are to the things they are like, just as the opinable is to the knowable. This type of opining is true in the sense that it achieves correspondence with physical reality, but it is nevertheless still opinion because of its limitation to the physical. In the next section, the lower subsection of the intelligible, the soul uses the animals, plants, and other objects from the previous subsection as images, while it investigates from hypotheses without reaching a first principle. Socrates then uses the example of students of geometry who use, but who do not explain or prove, various hypotheses, like figures and angles.
By the other subsection of the intelligible, I mean that which reason itself grasps by the power of dialectic. It does not consider these hypotheses as first principles but truly as hypotheses—but as stepping stones to take off from, enabling it to reach the unhypothetical first principle of everything. Having grasped this principle, it reverses itself and, keeping hold of what follows from it, comes down to a conclusion without making use of anything visible at all, but only of Forms themselves, moving on from Forms to Forms, and ending in Forms b3-c2.
Some questions remain after this simile though, like: What is involved in the ascent from one level to the next? What do these differing cognitive levels mean for our freedom, goodness, and happiness? It is these questions and others that the Allegory of the Cave answers. Behind the prisoners, the path that leads to the fire is elevated, and from it, other cave dwellers use various artifacts to cast shadows for the prisoners to see against the wall of the cave. These captives see only shadows and reflections, and their conception of truth is based purely on these appearances.
These prisoners therefore represent those who exist in a state of highly limited sense perception. This allegorical portrayal illustrates vividly the conjecture that the Line describes. Robinson argues that conjecture is analogous to the thought of mathematicians. There is a clear parallel, however, between the way appearances can lead to belief and the way in which mathematical imagery can lead to thought, as I will explain. It is this that Robinson seems to notice in his assessment.
This emotionally evocative imagery could engage not only the appetitive but also the spirited soul. For instance, erotic imagery may evoke not only our base appetite for sex, but our remembrance of our beloved, and our desire to compete for his or her approval. As my analysis of the Cave proceeds, it will become clear that this bondage metaphorically represents the way in which our bodily desires hold us back from learning when we limit our reasoning capability to the sort of conjecture that is closely associated with the body.
This occurs because perceptions of mere appearances vary quite wildly. The description of the honors and prizes awarded in the cave for shadow-prediction is a passage that highlights the extent to which any competition that is based only on conjecture is quite ridiculous. He explains that that which is nearest to us, even if it is as vague as shadows, holds us captive each day of our lives.
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I agree with him about this and appreciate the way in which his insight deepens my treatment of conjecture. Also, this specific contribution of the Cave allegory will later help us to understand what is involved in the turn back into the cave by the person who makes it out. For the fire and various artifacts to create projections in front of the prisoners, the light source and the objects must be directly, or very nearly directly, behind them.
Therefore, the only way to view the objects involves a complete, or nearly complete, degree turn, which requires that not just the head, but that the body turns around. In its observation of appearances represented by the shadows , the believing soul assimilates itself to one in the state of conjecture, but because of its point of reference, the soul in the state of belief is able to discern the truth albeit a distorted version of truth behind the appearance, unlike the conjecturing soul. This additional factor is the heavy-handed guidance of someone else.
We later learn that this helper is the philosopher, or philosopher king, who has returned to the cave. I will later argue that the Sunlight reflected on objects in the realm outside the cave represents dianoetic truth, while both the light of the Sun in the heavens and the Sun itself represents noetic truth. Even referring to philosophers in the broadest possible sense, as highly educated and knowledgeable people, does not fully address this problem. Perhaps a less literal understanding of this external force for education and freedom is viable. Maybe Plato does not delve into detail about who or what this teacher figure is because it can take many different forms: I will conclude that these four stages correspond with the four stages of cognitive accomplishment that the Line and Cave passages illustrate.
Though he describes the light of the Sun as shining outside the entrance of the cave a , this Sunlight must, at the very least, be negligible to a freed prisoner who first turns around, since any significant amount of Sunlight would have negated the sorts of projections described, and would have also enabled the prisoners to have some view of themselves and one another. Given the negligible amount of Sunlight that reaches the back of the cave, it makes sense to understand this incline—from the perspective of one at the back of the cave who has just turned around—as occluding some or all of the bright opening at the entrance of the cave.
Therefore, the light that the prisoner first sees, and that is significant enough to hurt his eyes, must be the firelight. Socrates notes that the prisoner is quite annoyed at being treated like this. He would view objects in the sky and the sky itself, but only at night, at first. As explained above, the significance of this repeated turn is that it is the transition to the outside world that firmly establishes the prisoner as turned in the right direction.
When the freed captive views things outside the cave, he progresses to viewing things outside the cave by night—that is, he advances toward a partial view of these objects. These shadows and reflections in water bear similarity to the appearances that characterize conjecture. However, the shadows and reflections, and subsequently their objects, are necessary stages of vision along the way to seeing real things in their fullness, by the full light of the Sun, in the next phase of the journey.
In other words, since the objects outside the cave and their reflections function as hypotheses or stepping stones, they represent objects like the concepts of geometry, which, according to the simile of the Line, we understand through physical representations like diagrams, or even three-dimensional manifestations that resemble these concepts. We will also use newly acquired discernment abilities, rooted in the intelligible. So, is the Line image more like a geometrical diagram or is it more like the imagery of conjecture? What about the imagery of the Cave?
Is it possible that the two involve a mixture of both kinds of imagery and that they do not proceed neatly from one to the other? Following this retreat, after all, we are able to take the difficult journey to the intelligible, due to the guidance of our educators. The myth of Er, as we will see, has more to say about the intellectual value of suffering. Earlier, prior to his description of the Divided Line, Socrates refers to the Sun by saying that what the Good is in the intelligible realm, the Sun is in the visible realm b-c. Furthermore, he says the Form of the Good gives truth to things that we know and also gives us the power to know.
For further clarification of my understanding of the turns, see appendix 2. Also, the Good, which explicitly is the cause of truth and knowledge to all things known, according to its comparison with the Sun in the earlier Sun simile, parallels the Sun image in the Allegory of the Cave, which describes it as the cause of everything outside the cave. Following our earlier discussion, this imagery implies that the Sun—the Good—also causes that which represents the Forms. The last phase of the journey out of the cave represents the noetic phase of the Line simile by including the viewing of things outside the cave by Sunlight, as well as the Sun itself.
This is because, as I indicated previously, the objects outside the cave represent Forms, as mentioned in the Line simile at b.
The prisoner now sees them in Sunlight, which represents the fact that he has an understanding of the Forms that results from his conception of the Good. The person who has progressed to this stage knows the purpose of the whole journey, including all of the objects of becoming and Being along the way. He adds that the Timaeus defends this view. I will briefly consider this facet of the Timaeus in chapter 5. Also, the freed captive does not resist as he does in the previous two transitions, and his guide no longer has a dominating presence.
Indeed, it is unclear whether or not the guide is even still present at all during this transition. What is the epistemological and metaphysical significance of this relatively smooth transition? Also, we no longer resent our freedom, as we did when we first realized the truth beyond conjecture.
Rather, the intellectual life, even in its early phases, brings us an internal, psychic harmony that we never had before. Far from being hampered by the restraints of conjecture, and its emphasis on the bodily, we are rationally dominated souls free from our enslavement to bodily urges and the darkness of ignorance. My analysis can be seen to support this interpretation. Notably, the soul is that which accesses the cognitive objects the Line describes.
Similar to this description, the soul in the intellectual realm is not only functional and hence virtuous because it does not hamper itself with overemphasis on appetites or spiritedness, but, according to the Cave allegory, in this highly rational state, it smoothly journeys through the intellectual world with reason as its ruler. I include these remarks only as a note, however, because they require further defense that would take us too far afield now, and they are not necessary to my argument about the Line, the Cave, and the turning around of the whole soul. But in the city the founders have been describing, philosophers are kings and have a better education than everyone else.
As a result, they ought to go back and live in common with the others, and when the philosophers become accustomed to seeing in darkness, their vision will be exceedingly better than those there. The founders need to compel the resisting philosophers to return to their old community and give back. The founders therefore need to teach the rulers about why they need to educate others, so that the city can be bound together in harmony.
What does it mean for the educational process that people who have reached the highest level of understanding contemplation or intelligence will not teach and compel themselves to sacrifice for the sake of helping others? What does it mean that this ethical obligation is still lacking after one reaches the summit of all knowledge? The philosopher receives his last lesson when he learns about the need to go back. Furthermore, the educated person does not come full circle in his turning around until he reaches and teaches within the deepest pit of ignorance after having reached the summit of all knowledge.
It seems likely that the ignorant will want to kill him, but will be prevented by law from doing so. If this is the case, then this is yet another factor that would make the philosopher resist this lowly job. Thus, even though they will likely not go back to being completely chained and bound in the cave, they will return to find themselves less free.
Part of this lack of freedom will likely involve the difficulty the philosopher will encounter when he tries to communicate with those whose sense of truth is highly subjective. Despite its absurdity, this honor system will be the setting in which the philosopher will have to prove his worth to those the founders charged him to educate. This set of restrictions is another factor making the educated resist the turn back in. In other words, why is the compulsion of the founders needed?
This is ultimately a question for another study. He also discusses how to educate them further once they are there. Furthermore, the chapters that follow will show how the afterlife myths may intellectually engage philosophers, despite the fact that these myths include examples of pedagogical tools for philosophers to use on others. In this way, the afterlife myths thus convey to educators that 1 the process of descending back into the cave need not be as cognitively restricting as it might have initially seemed, and 2 the learning process is never over, even for those who have reached the greatest heights of contemplation and who have descended to help others.
Socrates says about the Cave allegory: This whole image, Glaucon, must be fitted together with what we said before. The visible realm should be likened to the prison dwelling, and the light of the fire inside it to the power of the Sun. Though I have referred to the Line and Cave as parallel, they are complementary in the sense that both are needed to give a complete portrayal of reality, along with the Sun simile. Also, the Sun of the visible realm in the simile of the Line, one should liken to the fire inside the cave. This correspondence that Socrates points out corroborates the aspect of my interpretation above defending the view that the light the initially freed prisoner sees is the fire.
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These lines beg the question: I will argue here that Plato means the latter. There are two critical premises involved in my argument: The description of the last turn makes a unique contribution to the political picture that the Cave gives us. Though this last contribution of the Cave allegory echoes the ship image of Republic 6 a- a , it is nevertheless an addition to the content the Line delivers. After this journey and the adjustment process, the prisoner finally sees the light of the Sun itself.
The analysis above shows that there is an epistemological need for each step along the way, and that the details of the Cave imagery convey this. Therefore, it is in line with the immediate context of c, and also with the Allegory of the Cave, to understand the former as implying that the turning of the soul involves ascending from one state of Being to the next along the Line.
Its function must be to make explicit that the greatest height of the turning around process, or the pinnacle of the educational journey, is the Idea of the Good. The passage also makes explicit the concept that an advance in knowledge is an advance away from becoming and toward Being. One might object that the imagery of the Sun, the Line, and the Cave already established very clearly what the summit of the intellectual journey is. However, the function of c sheds further light on the turning around necessary to reach this height.
Though the imagery of the Sun, the Line, and the Cave implicitly made this point, Plato makes it here explicitly. This is not to say, however, that the turning around of the whole soul is complete once one reaches contemplation or intelligence. In the Allegory of the Cave, Plato provides us with a vivid account of the varying levels of struggle involved in the cognitive achievements that the Line describes. The prisoner certainly deserves much credit for this, but as noted above, someone or something else, which we labeled as a philosopher, compels the prisoner to turn around in both of these ways.
In the second turn, to thought, the prisoner is first compelled to see these same artifacts again, because he regresses after the first turn. Then, after being led through the difficult, winding path out of the cave the last part of the turn to thought , the prisoner first sees yet another set of imitations of things that really are, represented by the shadows and reflections he sees outside the cave, at night.
If one agrees with Socrates, that the most highly educated need to be compelled to serve in this way, then one may argue that this is a truth toward which the educated need to be led, rather, perhaps, than the truth. By showing his readers how one may reach the summit of the intellectual life only then to descend to a world of ignorance and educate others, Plato shows us how the soul may be completely turned around.
By showing us the various turns and transitions involved in this accomplishment, Plato begins to show us how to seek the truth, and even how to help others do so. However, this process is a complex one that requires further details. For instance, how does one become released from the bondage of the bodily in the first place, and rise above conjecture?
Also, chapters will each show in different ways, how the afterlife myths provide examples of the pedagogical tools that can provoke a soul to turn from one level to the next. Other questions also arise from the account of the Line and Cave above: Those who return to the cave seem to have a nearly impossible task before them. Plato provides this assistance, as the three central chapters of this study will show, in the myths of the afterlife and the soul- turning that they provoke.
This is not to say that the allegory is inaccurate, but only that its role is to point out the trials of those who journey back in, while the myths of afterlife introduce coping mechanisms for the educated who engage in this difficult labor. Therefore, even a psychagogue who operates with objects that are twice removed from what really is, may indeed lead a soul toward truth, if they practice their craft knowledgeably for this purpose. Fully defending this particular aspect of my interpretation is not essential to this dissertation and thus, is a project for another study.
In that other study, it would prove interesting to compare these layers of imitation to the account of painting and poetry in Republic In that comparison, it may become evident that painting and poetry, as copies of copies, actually can engage in productive soul-leading if practiced knowledgeably and for that purpose. My explanation will include both the criticism of imitation from the early books as well as that from book My account supports this view, though it has not yet focused squarely on this aspect of psychagogy.
We understand not only what the three aspects are individually, but how they may affect one another, and either work for or against one another. With the understanding of the turning of the whole soul we now have, we are ready to begin discussing the particular ways in which the myths of the afterlife perform their psychagogic functions. By using the myths of judgment to look more closely at the ways in which the whole soul is involved in this turning around, I will help make the case that this conversion is not limited in its being intellectual.
The turning around of the whole soul is not merely intellectual, it is intellectual in a way that involves the entirety of the subject. Though this project will not delve into the psychagogy of entire dialogues, or that which occurs beyond the dialogues, it is important to ensure that we do not proceed under the delusion that the myths of the afterlife have the power to transform souls in a lasting way singlehandedly. What Does it Mean for the Myth of Er?
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Before delving into the elaborate psychagogy that the myth of Er provokes, including the ways in which it recapitulates and expands on the philosophy from the main dialogue, I must consider the possible objection that, because Plato presents such extensive criticism of poetry in the Republic, he does not want his readers to interpret the myth of Er seriously that is, philosophically.
Rather than just banning these passages from use for children, as was initially suggested, much of this literature is either severely restricted or eliminated entirely from the city. I do not see them as simply equivalent. Janet Smith explains that we can identify myth as poetry since most ancient Greek poetry had myth as its content. Also, Platonic myth has a number of features typically considered poetic, like beautiful language, similes, metaphors, and emotional intensity. She cites d8 where Socrates says he will speak without meter since he is not a poet.
Catherine Collobert argues convincingly that Plato sees myth as poetic philosophy. He does this by carefully regulating the emotion his work evokes,6 and by producing copies that function like objects in the cave that inspire freed prisoners his readers to turn around toward the light. It is artifacts in the cave, rather than shadows, that help the prisoner in this way. The artifacts are copies of objects in the intelligible world.
Artifacts can serve in this way despite their being manipulated by puppeteers. These objects lose their manipulative effect when they are no longer viewed only by the shadows they create. Collobert is especially illuminating on this point. She argues that Platonic imagery has a philosophical model as its original, and therefore, delusion is removed from the illusions he creates.
Also, unlike the sophist, the philosopher does not conceal the distance between image and model, making the deluded viewer aware of the delusion. See Collobert, 87, 95, Collobert, 99, specifically argues that the imagery of Platonic myth is only once removed from the truth. Gary Gurtler adds a key difference between the idea of the bed, the bed, and the representation of the bed on the one hand, and the objects outside and inside the cave, on the other, saying that that there is a dynamic interrelation among the latter that is not present in the former. Academia Verlag, , I am not sure I agree with this point, but it is certainly worth considering.
As I will show, Plato consequently encourages virtue rather than vice with his depictions. Furthermore, why would he possibly want us to take it seriously? Nonetheless, if the poetry that aims at pleasure and imitation has any argument to bring forward that proves it ought to have a place in a well-governed city, we at least would be glad to admit it, for we are well aware of the charm it exercises.
But, be that as it may, to betray what one believes to be the truth is impious. Plato here makes the point emphatically that poetry can really be a good thing, if framed correctly, that is, philosophically or non-poetically. DeGruyter, , Also, Oliver, , argues, using reasoning similar to my own, that the myth of Er meets the criteria for admission into the city. Vorwerk explains that the myth of Er meets the criteria for admission to the city, in part because it does not encourage fear of death, and in part because of its philosophical grounding, through its connectedness to the dialogue.
Taking a slightly different stance from the above, D. As a result of these considerations, we may now proceed to investigate the myth of Er with philosophical earnestness, since we now know that it may be a piece of art that responds to the robust criticisms of imitation in the Republic. A Literal Interpretation 2. On the Meadow of Souls Socrates has been teaching the interlocutors about the soul in relation to justice all night, and after concluding his remarks on art, he attempts to prove the immortality of the soul.
This is the tale of a brave man named Er, who died in battle and whose corpse was relatively preserved when he and his fellow dead were picked up after ten days. Routledge, , In these ways, Platonic poetry incorporates its self-prescribed limits. Er, or Ara, was the son of Aram, and succeeded his father as king of Armenia. We feel sympathy for Er, since he was brave and was killed in battle, and we are curious about these corpses—his in particular.
Our desire to envision these corpses stems from our appetitive soul, according to the story of Leontius ea , recounted earlier chapter 1, section 1. Our feelings of sympathy for the brave soldier come from the spirited soul, since this is the part most closely associated with our thoughts and motivations related to courage and soldiering.
Regardless of any conception we may have of Socrates from sources other than the Republic, in this dialogue, he establishes himself as an authority on matters of the soul, and also as one who relentlessly pursues the truth about complex issues. Furthermore, ancient commentators seem to equate Er with Zoroaster, who was described as son of Armenios the Pamphylian. Halliwell remarks on the affinity between aspects of the myth of Er and the funerary gold lamellae, thus confirming the Bacchic-Orphic mystery religion influence on Plato here.
Erik Nis Ostenfeld Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, , The affinity between this Platonic myth and the mystery cult would have provoked many readers to take aspects of the myth as literal truths. Since Plato is intentional about this affinity, he must have written the myth knowing that some readers would interpret it this way.
Bruce Lincoln explains that the proto-Indo-Europeans either accepted a cosmology that included numerous different underworlds, or the exact location of the single underworld was up for debate. Wolfgang Biesterfield thoroughly explains the particularly Egyptian influence on Plato, indicating that Egyptian culture influenced Plato significantly with regard to general transcendentalism, cosmology, the conception of history, and the belief in the afterlife.
One other possible piece of evidence that we are meant to take the idea of post-mortem judgment seriously and literally is Laws b where, as Julius Elias points out, Plato discusses the practical benefits of the dissemination of eschatological doctrines. See Elias, Plato's Defense of Poetry, Of course, there are good reasons for not taking particular details seriously, which we will get into in my figurative reading. Allan Bloom finds it unpersuasive, but acknowledges its importance in persuading readers he says, the unphilosophical in particular , to be fearful of the consequences for injustice.
He thinks its purpose for the philosophical is to entice them to study the soul. Basic Books, , Smith, in Plato's Use of Myth as a Pedagogical Device , also juxtaposes the philosophical and unphilosophical, and I disagree with this, as I explain below fn. She also says that the very recurrence of eschatological myths in Plato is a reason to take them literally. Socrates the character says Er originally told the story. There is also a temporal distance: Socrates the narrator tells us that Socrates the interlocutor told the story yesterday a , who tells us that Er told it in the past, at a point specified only as twelve days after he died in battle b.
Plato has therefore substantially distanced this story from the reader. She says that Platonic myth, as a likely account, is a kind of argument open to revision, which leads to true opinion. She also thinks that the myths incite further dialectical investigation. Understanding the myth of Er as a likely account, in the manner I have suggested, avoids this problem, because the bodily language used to describe souls can be viewed as just another fantastic detail not to be viewed as true in its details, unlike the general truths of the myth.
Socrates then explains what Er saw in the underworld. Between them sat judges. The judged proceeded to the next phase of their journey wearing signs indicating how they have been judged, and the unjust have their deeds posted on their backs. It is vivid enough to be interesting, and vague enough to invite the hearer to fill in gaps.
In this way, the description still operates at the level of conjecture, i. I include a few here. James Adam says the daimonic place is not the aether, as Proclus says, but rather, on the surface of the earth, as described in Phaedo e. He also departs from Neoplatonic commentators naming Proclus, Damascius, and Olympiodorus , who he says locate the meadow in between heaven and earth—in the aether or sublunar area.
Vorwerk, 53, says Numenius saw the place as existing in the center of the earth. See Heidegger, Parmenides, I see all of these views as possibly accurate, but think that this particular detail is not one we are meant to nail down to an actual, physical location. Rather, with Heidegger, I simply see the daimonic place as extraordinary as well as very mysterious. They were all excited to gather together, and to conclude the long journey, but some wept as they explained their thousand years of suffering below the earth, while others gladly told of their pleasant time in the heavens.
The myth also induces the spirited soul to fear death, with its graphic portrayal of judgment and punishment explained further just below , and it uses that fear to reinforce further the rational message of the myth: Shame is a crucial emotion that the democratic and tyrannical souls lack d-e, eb , as well as those whose rational souls are relaxed by the charm of art and who express emotions they would normally be ashamed to express eb.
Vorwerk, 57, says the uncleanliness of the souls from earth is meant to indicate that their lives were heavily tied to the earthly. I find both sets of remarks to be insightful ways of establishing links between the seemingly bipartite soul highlighted in Republic 10 and the myth of Er. Gonzalez thinks Proclus suggests that heaven only satisfies one aspect of the soul—not all of it, and that the soul becomes weary after years because it cannot fully exercise its powers there.
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This implies that bodily-related powers are intrinsic to the soul. Gonzalez explains that this might be why the myth of Er blurs the distinction between soul and body by using so much bodily imagery to describe the soul. The military context of this example invites a thumotic response from the many listeners who feel strongly that those who betray armies ought to receive harsh punishment.
Also, the listener who knows that he has committed unjust deeds fearfully winces at the prospect of paying such a hefty penalty for them one day. If someone caused the death of one person, and a lifetime is roughly estimated to be a century a-b , then a thousand year penalty for that deed makes mathematical sense. At the end of a rewarding trip, one may still exhibit joy, despite the trip being over.
If anything, the exuberance of the rewarded souls is indicative of their desire to be in communion with others—to share their experiences—especially with those who could not have those experiences. This could be an indication by Plato of the inherently social, political nature of our souls. Walter Willi explains that Plato adopted Orphic, Attic, family, and state cults to conform to his dialectical inquiry. Orell Fussli, , Two recent scholars, Lincoln and Biesterfield, have much to say about influences on Plato from beyond Orphic and Pythagorean sources.
Could the intensity of the suffering perhaps make up for its relatively short duration? The next part of the account answers these questions. To illustrate these more severe penalties, Socrates discusses the tyrant Ardiaeus who killed his father and brother and also committed many additional impious deeds.
He was not even permitted to enter the meadow. As he, and other serious offenders with him, tried to go up from the earth, Socrates explains what happened: And there were savage men, all fiery to look at, who were standing by, and when they heard the roar, they grabbed some of these criminals and led them away, but they bound the feet, hands, and head of Ardiaeus and the others, threw them down, and flayed them.
Then they dragged them out of the way, lacerating them on thorn bushes, and telling every passer-by that they were to be thrown into Tartarus, and explaining why they were being treated in this way. The desire to see offenders like Ardiaeus receive their harsh deserts is strong in all of us, and this part of the myth activates the anger we have for the severely wicked. Far from encouraging our spirited soul to be affected too intensely, Plato includes this part of the story as remarks Er overheard occurring between two other souls.
In this way, the listener is even further removed from this part of the myth. As several commentators have noticed, the degree to which the hearer is removed from the account is inversely proportional to the emotional effect of that aspect of the account on the listener. Plato makes a noticeable effort here to achieve a balance between the engagement of our appetitive and spirited desires, and the activation of our calculative capacity. The imagery itself is quite fantastic; Plato does not portray many of its particulars as verifiable, though he does present the general concept of a soul living on in the afterlife and receiving punishments as probably true.
By doing this, it is clearly psychagogic. The reader might object here that if this likely account leads readers from conjectural imagery to truth at the level of belief, it might really lead them from objects thrice removed from the truth to objects merely twice removed, following my interpretation of the Cave in relation to the critique of the poets. It is a stop on the way, inciting readers to pursue a life of philosophy and we will soon see why , inciting them to understand this account more deeply, that is, figuratively, as I will explain later in this chapter.
Following this, any creation by a craftsman would be in the realm of belief, once removed from the true Forms, and any copy of their creation would be twice removed. However, as I explain in 1. This is ultimately a debate for another day. In the appeal to fear, Plato is stooping, and is thus implicitly admitting some limitation on the part of his audience, but he is doing so in order to lead us further.
One way of understanding this is as a Pascalian Wager of sorts: The myth of Er, she claims, has a lower moral tone than the rest of the Republic. I agree with Annas insofar as she points out a criticism to be taken seriously, but as a whole, my account departs from hers on the grounds that Plato does not simply revive a traditional consequentialist understanding of justice. He uses it as one element in a complex psychagogy—and is also addressing the task introduced in book 2, of explaining the good as valuable in itself and for its consequences. Socrates says the former has been done a8 , clearly implying that the latter is yet to come.
Also, as Vorwerk, , explains, in the Orphic mysteries there is a portrayal of the just being rewarded and the unjust being punished after death. However, the myth of Er criticizes this view, insofar as it seems to allow for exoneration through sacrifices. Also, Plato certainly seems to have measures in place to account for the shortcomings of either his work or his audience, especially given the lofty goals of the former.
However, we should not take this as a simple, general admission of failure for either. For them, there is imagery that meets them where they are and leads them to the next stage of their intellectual development. For those who can think with Socrates throughout the entirety of the dialogue, there is the rich philosophical content behind the imagery, which they can access more immediately than other readers. Though Annas later modifies her harshly critical stance of the myth of Er, even her revised opinions about it argue that the myth of Er adds a consequentialist understanding of justice that the Republic had not yet argued for.
Defending Plato, Halliwell contends that since the myth of Er treats justice on a cosmic, rather than an individual scale, Plato does not betray his earlier emphasis on the value of justice in itself. Aris and Phillips, , Defending Plato differently, Bloom, , thinks the myth of Er returns to a more traditional, previously-criticized way of favoring justice, because the dialogue has not demonstrated that civic virtue is worthy in itself, and Glaucon and Adeimantus are incapable of philosophical virtue.
Their eagerness and ongoing receptivity are only two of the signs that they are at least ripe for conversion to the philosophical life, if not ready and capable. Fear is allied with reason in this calculation, but it is clearly rational calculation that takes the lead and makes the judgment call. The likely account, then, does not simply encourage being good because of fear, or because of any irrational impulse taken on its own. The likely account clearly does fit this function; however, this is not all Plato is doing here in the myth of Er.
Plato is also adding more substance to the portrayal of justice as valuable in itself, as the next two sections explain. Ferrari also argues along these lines. He says that the Republic has already explained the value of justice in itself, and those who understand this philosophers can keep extrinsic rewards in their proper perspective.
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I agree that the myth of Er may add an account of the consequential value of justice to the dialogue, but I firmly disagree with the claim that book 10 is an appendix of sorts, as my argument in this chapter will show. Lieb, , favors this interpretation as well, that the myth of Er adds an account of the consequences for justice that the dialogue lacked in some way. Vorwerk, , explains that here in Republic 10, Plato returns to the theme of wages or consequences for justice after death, because the discussion of justice in itself has been completed and now a review of the rewards of justice, both in life ae5 and in death eb7 , is in place.
They also get to see the force that holds it all together: This much is clear. The exact location of the place at the middle of the light is unclear, however, as is the exact way in which the light binds the universe. The overall goal of this aspect of the likely account is not yet clear either.
I include a few notables below: Morrison explains that Plato is the first to describe the axis of the universe as a straight light. He says that in Parmenides, Empedocles, and Philolaus, the outer aether binds the universe. Also, two Orphic texts describe a surrounding envelope of aether as well as a golden loop attached to it. Thomas Heath notes that Proclus ultimately rejected this view. Heath thinks there is nothing to suggest that the souls leave the earth at all in this journey.
He suggests the possibility that the light passes through both poles of the earth, thus passing through the center of the earth, which was also considered to be the center of the universe. See Heath, Aristarchus of Samos, Given that, Richardson agrees with Adam that the light must encircle the heavens externally and provide support that way. Richardson endeavors to show that both the straight light, penetrating the axis of the universe, and the encircling light, are Pythagorean. She explains that they combined the notion of fire at the center of all and also fire encircling the sphere of the universe.
Also, she thinks that not only late Pythagoreans like Philolaus, but early ones too, maintained the idea of a central fire in the universe. The cables ran straight, and were taut, just as the straight part of the light is described. The encircling light, then, would resemble the curved hull. He suggests that Necessity is either on the surface of the earth or in it. By doing this, he explains, Plato wants us to identify the heavens in the myth of Er with the realm on the surface of the earth in the Phaedo myth. See Stewart, The Myths of Plato, I will consider this possibility in the next chapter.
Here, my position is similar to that on the daimonic place: Their rims looked circular from above, forming one united surface. The first or outside whorl had the widest circular rim, that of the sixth was second in width; the fourth was third; the eighth was fourth; the seventh was fifth; the fifth was sixth; the third was seventh; and the second was eighth.
The whole spindle turned at the same speed, but, as it turned, the inner circles gently revolved in a direction opposite to that of the whole. Of the whorls themselves, the eighth was the fastest; second came the seventh, sixth, and fifth, all at the same speed; it seemed to them that the fourth was third in its speed of revolution; the fourth, third; and the second, fifth. However, there is notable accord between Chaldean beliefs and the myth of Er, with Eudoxus of Cnidus and his knowledge of the orient as a mediator.
The act of trying to envision our universe in this way may provoke a soothing or calming feeling, countering the spiritedness roused in the previous account of punishments. Circular motion is a divine sort of motion, and its presence in all of the whorls supports the notion that the spindle, and thereby the universe, is well ordered. By leading his readers to rational comprehension of the physical mechanisms that come together to create the resplendent image of the universe, Plato once again leads us from conjecture to belief.
The eight notes come together as a harmony. As such, it is beyond the scope of a strictly literal interpretation of this myth. By leading us to this aspect of the likely account, we can see that generally, there is probably a highly-ordered, complex, colorful system of rotating stars and planets that constitutes our universe. The account conveys the message to the ancient reader that this picture is probably true in a general way, even if some, or many, details are false. See Adam and , and Heath, Alcan, , Clotho specifically aids the revolving of the outer ring, while Atropos does so for the inner ones, and Lachesis for both.
The divinity of the Fates, and their specific involvement in the revolutions of the universe, adds persuasive force to the notion that the universe is divinely ordered. By giving the Fates the role that he does, Plato harnesses popular belief in them and uses it to support his account. The rational soul who believes in the existence of the Fates, the general picture of the universe already described, and the general notion that there is an afterlife for the soul, calculates that the divine presence in the universe, as Plato describes it, is plausible.
This plausibility adds to the belief already established, thereby further supporting the likely account of punishments and rewards. The entire description of the universe reinforces the previous likely account, by showing that forces much greater than human beings play indispensable roles in supporting the mechanisms in which the post-mortem justice system is included. See Droz, Les mythes platoniciens Paris: The souls arrived at this place in the middle of the light and proceeded straight to Lachesis, who had lots and paradigms of lives in her lap d.
The god is not responsible for the choice—only the chooser. McPherran considers the possibility that the lottery here is rigged like that of book 5 a. A Critical Guide, ed. Cambridge University Press, , , Souls here in the myth of Er are getting their just deserts, but in book 5, sexual intercourse, which clearly arouses the appetitive soul, is doled out as a reward in a way the justice of which is questionable.
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The sexual lottery makes it possible for incest between brothers and sisters of the same age to occur, and children created outside the prescribed limits are hidden and not nurtured. Since we do not see problems of the same caliber occurring in the life pattern lottery, I think it is likely that the lottery of book 5 is an inferior one. After all, the gods are said to have designed the former and men clearly designed the latter. Leuven University Press, , Though I agree that this phrase seems oxy-moronic at first, the emphasis here is on the lives the souls lead, which are mortal: Compared to the divine beings mentioned in the myth, the souls addressed are ephemeral, in the sense that they undergo successive incarnations, which divine beings do not undergo.
The speaker then cast the lots so that the souls could choose and thus determine the order in which they would pick. Er was prohibited from choosing. Then, the paradigms of lives were arranged on the ground in front of them, with the number of lives far outweighing the number of souls. There were a variety of lives among the patterns available, including those of tyranny, fame, beauty, strength, and nobility, as well as lives of animals and private men. It argues that early imperial politics and Cicero's schoolroom canonization had pervasive effects on his reception, with declamation and the schoolroom mediating and even creating his memory in subsequent generations.
The way he was deployed in the schools was foundational to the version of Cicero found in literature and the educated imagination in the early Roman Empire, yielding a man stripped of the complex contradictions of his own lifetime and polarized into a literary and political symbol. Speeches for the dead: De Gruyter, [] Description Book — pages ; 24 cm.
Studies on Greek law, oratory and comedy []. Selections MacDowell, Douglas M. Douglas Maurice , author. London ; New York: The chronology of Athenian speeches and legal innovations in B. Unintentional homicide in the Hippolytos Demosthenes MacDowell - was a scholar of international renown and the articles included here cover a significant area of classical scholarship, discussing Athenian law, law-making and legal procedure, Old Comedy, comedy and law, politics and lexicography. All of these articles, published between and , bear the characteristic marks of his scholarship: Many of these essays are virtually inaccessible as they were originally published in celebratory volumes or article collections which are now out of print or difficult to find outside major libraries.
This collection of MacDowell's articles will make these works available to a broad scholarly audience, and make it easier to bring this scholarship to the classroom as part of courses in Classics, ancient history, legal history and theatre studies. The volume includes a biography of MacDowell by Christopher Carey based on the testimony of his closest colleagues and personal friends, which was presented to the British Academy. Drama and Comedy "Aristophanes and democracy" in Sakellariou, M. Farce, , Cambridge Law, institutions and oratory "The Athenian penalty of epobelia" in Harris, E.
Thur eds Symposion Rupprecht eds Symposion Vortrage zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte, Rauischholzhausen, 30 September - 3 October , , Wien "The Athenian procedure of dokimasia of orators" in Wallace, R. Gagarin eds Symposion Studies in ancient Greek history presented to M.
Hansen on his sixtieth birthday, , Copenhagen "Foreign birth and Athenian citizenship in Aristophanes" in Sommerstein, A. Vortrage zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte, Ringberg, Juli , , Koeln "Athenian laws about choruses" in Fernandez Nieto, F. Vortrage zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte, Santander, September , , Koeln "The law of Periandros about symmories" CQ 36 "The length of the speeches on the assessment of the penalty in Athenian courts" CQ 35 "Athenian laws about bribery" RIDA 30 "Love versus the law: Varia philologica et historica "Demosthenes MacDowell Index of terms Index of sources.
Nielsen Book Data Douglas M. Aristotle and Confucius on rhetoric and truth: Description Book — viii, pages: Aristotle and Rhetorical Invention: Crossing Disciplinary and Cultural Boundaries. Nielsen Book Data The current study argues that different cultures can coexist better today if we focus not only on what separates them but also on what connects them.
To do so, the author discusses how both Aristotle and Confucius see rhetoric as a mode of thinking that is indispensable to the human understanding of the truths of things or dao-the-way, or, how both see the human understanding of the truths of things or dao-the-way as necessarily communal, open-ended, and discursive. Based on this similarity, the author aims to develop a more nuanced understanding of differences to help foster better cross-cultural communication.
In making the argument, she critically examines two stereotyped views: In addition, the author relies primarily on the interpretations of the Analects by two 20th-century Chinese Confucians to supplement the overreliance on renderings of the Analects in recent comparative rhetorical scholarship.
The study shows that we need an in-depth understanding of both the other and the self to comprehend the relation between the two. Attic oratory and performance []. Description Book — x, pages ; 24 cm. An Analytical Approach The notion of performance: Aeschines 2, 3 and Demosthenes 18, 19 Constructed audience Other strategies to influence the audience Reconsidering ekphrasis through the lens of ancient theory The depiction of litigants, ethopoiia Conceptual groundwork The performative dimension of oratorical portraiture Inter-generic portraiture Hypocrisis - Delivery Script, revision and extemporisation A note on the use of ancient sources Chapter 2.
Construction and manipulation Addresses to the audience and civic community Law-court "Big Brother"! Aeschines and Demosthenes in the Theatre of Justice Political thespians in the law-court The use of quotations "He is proud of his voice": Hypocrisis of emotions Divine hypocrisis Deixis Figures of speech Embassy speeches Crown speeches Direct speech, narrative and questions Occasional aspects of hypocrisis Chapter 6. Nielsen Book Data In a society where public speech was integral to the decision-making process, and where all affairs pertaining to the community were the subject of democratic debate, the communication between the speaker and his audience in the public forum, whether the law-court or the Assembly, cannot be separated from the notion of performance.
Attic Oratory and Performance seeks to make modern Performance Studies productive for, and so make a significant contribution to, the understanding of Greek oratory. Although quite a lot of ink has been spilt over the performance dimension of oratory, the focus of nearly all of the scholarship in this area has been relatively narrow, understanding performance as only encompassing 'delivery' - the use of gestures and vocal ploys - and the convergences and divergences between oratory and theatre. Serafim seeks to move beyond this relatively narrow focus to offer a holistic perspective on performance and oratory.
Using examples from selected forensic speeches, in particular four interconnected speeches by Aeschines 2, 3 and Demosthenes 18, 19 , he argues that oratorical performance encompassed subtle communication between the speaker and the audience beyond mere delivery, and that the surviving texts offer numerous glimpses of the performative dimension of these speeches, and their links to contemporary theatre. Connecting rhetoric and Attic drama []. Levante editori, [] Description Book — pages ; 21 cm. La declamazione a Roma: Lentano, Mario, author.
Palumbo, [] Description Book — pages, 1 unnumbered page ; 22 cm. Sestante edizioni, [] Description Book — pages ; 22 cm. Die grosse Rede des Timaios, ein Beispiel wahrer Rhetorik? Schwabe Verlag, [] Description Book — pages ; 24 cm. Phaidros Zwei allgemeine Festlegungen Historischer Sokrates vs. Sokrates des Platon vs. Die wahre Rhetorik als Forschungsstand Dialektik im Phaidros: Theorie Dialektik im Phaidros: Praxis Dialektik und Rhetorik Stoffgliederung Praxis Lange oder kurze Reden?
Satura editrice, [] Description Book — viii, pages ; 24 cm. L52 Unavailable On order Request. Lukian aus Samosata und die Zweite Sophistik [].