The time has now come to think more boldly and creatively about ways to generate additional revenue for multilateral peace and security activities. There are several possibilities that deserve to be explored more fully in this context. First, there are activities that benefit in a general way from a peaceful international environment. These include international travel, telecommunications, international financial transactions and the activities of transnational corporations. Over the years, various schemes for direct surcharges or fees on these activities have been proposed.
Some of these proposals seem quite practical, while others may appear somewhat far-fetched. A direct surcharge on international air travel, which is regulated by the IATA, or on international telecommunications, which is regulated by the ITU, could generate considerable revenue which would be relatively easy to collect.
The levels of surcharge do not have to be exorbitant. Such was the situation with the Suez Canal during the crisis of The Panama Toll is an analogous arrangement that has existed in a peacetime context. Following the opening of the Panama Canal in , a toll was levied on all international vessels navigating the canal, a practice which continues today. More recently, the use of the sea lanes and seaports in the Gulf were greatly affected during the Iran-Iraq War of and in the Gulf crisis of Why not consider the feasibility of obtaining a contribution for the United Nations from the commercial users of these facilities?
A third category could be special contributions that may be sought from some of the peacekeeping recipient countries, the direct beneficiaries of the operations. This category may also include states which, for reasons of special historical, political or economic association, have a particular interest in the restoration of peace in a conflict area.
There have already been some ad-hoc examples of this kind of contribution. These ad-hoc arrangements need to be developed into a more systematic framework for seeking special contributions from some of the beneficiary countries, especially those with strong revenue bases. In order to explore more fully the various options on extra-governmental funding, Member States should first be prepared to modify a kind of ideological prejudice that has conditioned discussions of this matter: This position cannot be sustained in the long run.
However, it must be recognized that Member States have legitimate concerns that need to be addressed in any discussion of extra-governmental sources of revenue. Of particular significance in this regard are the concerns about loss of control over decision-making and derogation from collective intergovernmental responsibility for peace and security activities. The recent experience of the OAU may be of some relevance here. Traditionally all the activities of the OAU have been supported through a system of assessed contributions from member states. In the discussion leading to the establishment of the new OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, a controversial issue arose as to whether the OAU should solicit and accept financial contributions from funding sources outside Africa for the operation of the Mechanism.
Was there not a danger that outside contributions would compromise the independence of the OAU and expose its agenda to external manipulation? After a difficult debate, the decision was made in favour of accepting such contributions. This decision was accompanied, however, by a carefully defined policy to ensure transparency and control over contributions to the OAU. So far this innovation has worked well, affecting neither the primacy of member states in these matters nor their control over the new Mechanism.
The OAU experience would seem to demonstrate that it is at least possible, through clearly designed policies and procedures, to meet the legitimate concerns of Member States. It must be emphasized, moreover, that the idea of extra-governmental funding is not meant to supplant, but rather to supplement, governmental sources of revenue. It is appropriate that governments should bear the primary financial responsibility for the peace and security activities of the United Nations; this corresponds with their political responsibility in this area.
Reforming the Security Council Any discussion of the evolving peace and security agenda of the United Nations must take account of the growing demand for reform of the Security Council. Although there is so far no agreement on the scope, formula and timetable for reform, there is no doubt about the strength of the movement for change. Any reform project should seek to achieve four key objectives: These objectives translate into several themes of reform.
The first theme of reform is the need to clarify the scope of the Security Council's mandate. Under the UN Charter the Security Council is entrusted with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the dominant concern was understandably over threats of cross-border aggression. This concern translated directly into the central mandate of the Security Council. In the past, therefore, the notion of a "threat to international peace and security" was generally understood to encompass an act of inter-state aggression or a breach of the peace.
By contrast, the preoccupation of the international community today is with the rampant breakdown of peace and security within state borders. A survey by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SIPRI in , for example, recorded 34 major armed conflicts in the world in that year - all of them situations of internal strife. In response to this, a more expansive interpretation of the concept of a threat to international peace and security has emerged, with a number of measures being adopted by the Security Council. Recent examples of situations which have been determined by the Council to constitute threats to international peace and security include: It remains open to debate whether all of these situations fall truly within the meaning of a threat to international peace and security as envisaged in the Charter.
If the Security Council is to remain relevant, it must adapt to this new reality by developing a more progressive interpretation of what constitutes a threat to international peace and security. It must embrace a pragmatic response. But the legitimacy of the Security Council would suffer if its practice was seen to depart too radically from the explicit stipulations of the Charter. For the immediate term, this dilemma underscores the importance for the Security Council to seek to build broad-based international support for its decisions.
If the present trend continues, however, it may well raise the issue of amending the UN Charter to take account of the preponderance of intra-state conflicts and their ramifications. Another issue relating to the scope of the Security Council mandate concerns non-military aspects of security. A broader understanding of threats to security is emerging. At its first summit meeting on 31 January , the Security Council declared, "The absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure international peace and security.
The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security. The United Nations membership as a whole, working through the appropriate bodies, needs to give the highest priority to the solution of these matters. The second theme of reform concerns the restructuring of the membership of the Security Council. Two developments in particular have given impetus to this movement: In this context, there is broad agreement that the re-emergence of Japan and Germany as major powers deserves special recognition.
But there is less common ground as to what constitutes appropriate recognition. Should they assume permanent seats in the Council? If so, with or without the right of veto? It would be difficult, however, to accord a special status to Japan and Germany without at the same time addressing the issue of overall balance in the composition of the Council. This may entail the creation of a new category of membership - they may be called "tenured" or "standing" members. Such members would occupy their seats for an extended period of time, but less than permanently say years , with provision for re-election or rotation.
The crucial point is that the selection of tenured members should combine the need for both regional and global representation. Regional representation would, in the first place, be a response to the concern about the "Northern" dominance of the present Council, a situation that would be further compounded by any dispensation for Japan and Germany. Equally important, this would provide a constructive opportunity for promoting good "regional citizenship", since election to a tenured regional seat would necessarily depend on the goodwill and support of members of a particular region.
Although this in itself would not stop the emergence of regional hegemony, it could provide a powerful incentive against overbearing behaviour. Selection to global tenured seats, on the other hand, would be through direct election by the General Assembly from an open slate of candidates. This exercise would be designed to promote "good citizenship" at a broader level, by recognizing significant contributions to the work of the United Nations and, in particular, to its peace and security activities. Whatever formula for recomposition may be adopted in the end, it is important that the composition of the Security Council not be set in stone.
It will be necessary to review any new arrangement on a periodic basis, perhaps every 10 to 15 years, in order to ensure that the Council membership reflects the evolving power relations in the world. The third theme of reform is about the right and use of veto power. There is a general reluctance to extend veto entitlement to new members. In addition, there is disquiet about the unbounded use of existing veto powers. A formal move to curtail this power would lead to a direct confrontation with the five permanent members, all of whom are likely to oppose any formal modification of their present prerogative.
For the foreseeable future, therefore, it would be more practical to encourage self-restraint, while exercising peer pressure. In recent years a trend has set in for an occasional rather than a trigger-happy use of the veto that was prevalent during the Cold War era. Since the beginning of , the veto has been used only three times: In the period between and , an average of six vetoes were cast each year, as compared to a total of three over the last four years.
This is a positive trend that needs to be encouraged and strengthened through peer pressure by the general membership of the United Nations. One such device could be a declaration by the General Assembly expressing concern about the use of the veto and providing a guideline to narrow the range of issues on which the veto may apply. The veto should be a defence mechanism to be used in extremis , only when a truly vital interest of a permanent member is at stake.
The fourth theme of reform relates to the need for more transparency and broader participation in the work of the Council. The challenge is how to achieve this objective without compromising the equally important goal of ensuring prompt and effective action. There are two areas where the work of the Council could be improved in this respect. The first area of concern relates to the fact that the Security Council remains the only major decision-making body of the United Nations which does not have a channel of communication for receiving information, ideas and proposals from independent non-official sources.
In other activities of the organization, notably in the humanitarian, economic, environmental, social and cultural spheres, the input of NGOs is now well developed and accepted. There is no reason why the peace and security sector should remain an exception. The presidency of the Council could be the initial focal point of communication. The president could receive information from, and hold informal audience with, representatives of civil society and independent public figures.
To avoid opening a floodgate, the interaction would have to be selective, restricted initially to organizations and public figures with known "track records" and credibility, and who have specific contributions to make to issues under consideration by the Council. This arrangement could be extended gradually, by invitation, to include informal audiences with the Council as a whole, whenever this is judged to be useful. The other area of concern in this regard is the need to broaden the base of participation by the wider UN membership in the decision-making process of the Council.
After all, the authority of the Security Council derives from the special responsibility conferred upon it by the membership of the United Nations as a whole; the 15 members of the Council act on behalf of the entire members of the organization. Several measures could help reduce the present sense of exclusion felt by the general membership. First, more opportunities should be accorded to the wider UN membership to provide substantive inputs before final decisions are made by the Security Council on important questions.
In addition to the frequent informal consultations, which are private and held behind closed doors, the Council should make it a practice to schedule some special open sessions as a means for wider consultations. Second, the Security Council needs to develop a more systematic method for consulting Member States which are likely to be especially affected by measures under consideration.
Recently a process of consultation with troop-contributing countries has been instituted, but this practice needs to be broadened and deepened. Third, there is a need to develop a better briefing system that would provide all members of the Council, especially some of the non-permanent members with limited independent means, the essential elements they need for making informed decisions. This could be organized by the Secretariat.
It is also necessary to improve the briefing system between the Council and the rest of the UN membership. The idea is to ensure that relevant information is readily available to all concerned. The fifth theme concerns the credibility of the Security Council in relation to its own decisions. There is a growing dissonance between the flow of resolutions from the Council and developments on the ground. The work of the Council is driven by the speed of events, public pressure to "do something" and contradictory pulls from different political quarters. This sometimes results in a lack of coherence and inadequate attention to the provision of resources and means necessary for the implementation of the Council's resolutions.
The experience over the former Yugoslavia has particularly highlighted this problem. Since the Security Council adopted some 80 resolutions concerning the situation in the former Yugoslavia. Some of these resolutions appeared to contradict each other, while others did not relate well to the developments on the ground, and few were accompanied by the necessary means and resources for implementation.
This placed the UN Secretariat, and the peacekeeping and peacemaking missions in the field, in a very difficult situation. As a political organ, it is inevitable that the Security Council should respond politically to the competing pressures on its decision-making process. On the other hand, if the present trend continues, it could seriously erode the credibility of the Council. The authority of the Security Council ultimately depends on its capacity to adopt measures that are credible, carry weight and have prospects of implementation.
Generating a Collective Will: Building Domestic Support for International Action A critical challenge faces the international community as a whole today. In the face of pressing domestic preoccupation, budgetary constraints, low tolerance for risks of casualties and a creeping sense of crisis fatigue, how can we build domestic political constituencies in support of collective inter- national action? In part this is the challenge of relating what has hitherto been a narrow concept of national interest to the broader imperatives of an increasingly independent world.
Traditionally, national security was organ- ized to respond to a particular conception of threats, usually military and territorial in nature or relating to strategic and geopolitical interests. These threats emanated from particular sources, with country-specific targets.
This vision of national security may have worked well in the past, especially during the Cold War, but today it is too narrow and not an adequate response to emerging global realities. Today, there is a growing list of transnational threats which are general in scope and unpredictable in their evolution. This list includes the spread of nuclear weapons and materials as well as other weapons of mass destruction; terrorism, both domestic and cross-border; the production and consumption of narcotic drugs; life-threatening epidemics; galloping population growth relative to diminishing resources; mass migration of peoples; armed conflicts; and natural as well as human-caused humanitarian catastrophes.
These problems stand out because they defy the traditional logic of state boundaries and state-centric solutions. To tackle them effectively requires concerted international action. Global interdependence is here to stay - it is an inescapable fact of modern international life. This basic reality needs to be articulated more clearly and consistently. Beyond interdependence, there are specific interests that tend to shape national responses to international crises. Among the interests at play are the following: Direct interests of major powers.
When the vital interests of the major powers are at stake, as was the case in the Gulf crisis, international action is easier to mobilize because of the highly motivated leadership on the part of the countries directly affected. The need to avoid regional instability as well as the desire to demonstrate good regional citizenship can often provide a strong incentive for countries to contribute to peace initiatives and operations within their region.
France and the United Kingdom have contributed the largest peacekeeping contingents for the former Yugoslavia, while the United States and several Latin American countries have spearheaded the operation in Haiti. In a similar way, the countries of West Africa were propelled by the force of events in neighbouring Liberia to mount the ECOMOG operation; this was in effect a subregional self-help project.
Civil wars may rage for the most part within the borders of particular countries in remote corners of the globe, but it is impossible to throw a cordon sanitaire around them. Local conflicts have a tendency, sooner or later, to spill across national borders, spreading violence and refugees in their paths and destabilizing entire regional neighbourhoods. Thus, the war in Rwanda has caused instability in, and imposed a major humanitarian burden upon, the neighbouring countries of Burundi, Tanzania and Zaire.
Similarly, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia could spread to engulf most of the Balkan region, and war in Chechnya could affect stability in the Russian Federation as well as some of the neighbouring former Soviet republics. It is sometimes the case that the fate of a particular country in conflict is unable initially to arouse much external concern. But the stakes soon change when the same conflict expands to affect neighbouring countries whose stability has greater impact on international relations.
Collective international action provides a framework for sharing the political, financial and human costs of an operation. The burden of the enforcement action against Iraq, the peacekeeping operations that restored peace to Cambodia and Mozambique, and the operation in the former Yugoslavia would have been difficult to bear without broad-based international cooperation. It is also important to emphasize that the earlier collective action is engaged, the cheaper is the cost in all respects.
There are some situations where the primary impetus for international action remains humanitarian concern. Such was the case in Somalia in and in Rwanda in the aftermath of the genocide in The pressure of public opinion, especially in democratic societies, often makes it difficult for governments to abstain from some measure of response to major humanitarian tragedies.
That being said, public opinion is by nature unpredictable and sways both ways, providing at different times either a spur or a brake on international action. Leaders' perceptions of public opinion also play a role in defining policy. A multilateral response can also serve the purpose of providing internal as well as external legitimacy for difficult and politically risky undertakings.
Both Japan and Germany have also invoked the legitimacy conferred by the United Nations to allay public disquiet about their involvement in any military-related engagements abroad. Yet there is need for vigilance here. The broader legitimacy of the United Nations would suffer if the organization was viewed too much as a vehicle for providing multilateral blessing for "pre-cooked" national projects. In which situations relating to international norms or human welfare is the international community prepared to undertake enforcement action as a matter of collective obligation?
It is one thing to express moral outrage, but quite another to translate such sentiment into concrete action. It remains very difficult to mobilize sufficient collective will to take action primarily on the basis of a moral imperative, without a compelling coincidence of direct national interests being at stake as well, as was the case in the Gulf crisis.
However, in the case of Somalia international action was mobilized on humanitarian grounds. Ironically, it is in no small part the disastrous experience of Somalia which has led, at least for the time being, to a retreat from such engagements. This is what we have witnessed in the cases of Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Another important factor in shaping national response is the role of information and the part played in it by the media. Wars and scenes of mass suffering tend to attract extensive media coverage. But averting, mediating or ending a conflict is not nearly as news creating. Public awareness and reaction are largely dependent on what is received through the media.
This underscores the importance and responsibility of the media in providing a more balanced coverage of conflict situations. It also highlights the responsibility of the United Nations to convey a clearer picture of peacekeeping, its possibilities and constraints, its successes and failures, as well as its objectives and costs.
Providing Leadership At a given moment any of the factors outlined above can combine to define a state's response to particular international crises. But these factors do not operate independently. Their function and impact are in turn shaped by political leadership. An adequate multilateral response to the growing peace and security agenda will require political imagination and leadership at the national as well as international level.
At the domestic level, leadership needs to articulate the nexus between national interest, broadly conceived, and international responsibility, by explaining how national well-being can ultimately be affected by seemingly faraway dangers. This is the reality of interdependence. Furthermore, there exists a largely untapped reservoir of humanitarian concern in many societies.
The question is whether national leaders are prepared to galvanize this resource and channel it in support of international action. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union have thrust the United States into a position of unparalleled pre-eminence. The United States is presently perhaps the only nation in a position to project its power in a sustained fashion on a global scale. This raises a challenge.
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To what political ends is the United States prepared to project this considerable influence? What kind of leadership is the United States prepared to offer the world today? The United States acting alone cannot lead the world. But the role of the United States, acting in concert with others, providing leadership through engagement and the force of ideas, is crucial to the viability of any major multilateral enterprise today. But a general mood of political reticence seems to have descended on the United States. There appears to be little political support in the country for the financial costs or human risks of international engagement, except when vital American interests are involved.
Fundamentally, this is a debate about the international vocation of the United States now that the Cold War is over. This debate is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. In the meantime, however, we must not overlook other levels of contribution that the United States could provide right away in support of multilateral peace and security activities. Selecting Priorities for UN Engagement The proliferation of conflicts which call for some form of UN involvement stands in sharp contrast to the limited capacity and resources of the organization.
In view of these contradictory pressures, the United Nations will have to determine more systematically where, when and to what degree to get involved. These are questions concerning the breadth, the depth and the timing of UN engagement. In general, the United Nations should invest its political and material resources where they are needed most and where they are likely to create the greatest benefit.
However, political realities, combined with the difficulty of formulating any objective criteria for applying such a policy, means that decisions will in practice be made on a case-by-case basis. Such an ad-hoc method of decision-making is in danger of becoming hostage to the fortunes and vagaries of the political process. The challenge for the Security Council in this regard is to apply, and be seen to apply, similar policies in similar situations.
While selective engagement is perhaps a necessary response to the present realities, it also poses a serious moral predicament as a long-term policy. Under selective engagement, conflicts will inevitably fall into one of two categories: These latter conflicts would be left to run their course and would effectively constitute the forgotten tragedies of the world.
This moral predicament provides a poignant reminder of the necessity to encourage, as a matter of priority, preventive action, and to build the capacities of regional organizations to assume more responsibility for peace and security in the world. A Regime of International Norms: The Evolution of Sovereignty The issue of state sovereignty will continue to be both central and contro- versial. When and how can international action be reconciled with the principle of non-interference in matters deemed to be essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of states Article 2, paragraph 7 of the UN Charter?
This question becomes acute when a country is faced with a massive humanitarian crisis which demands some form of international response. A collective response to a human rights or humanitarian catastrophe can take several forms. These may be divided into five broad categories: The issue of interference is not so sensitive as long as an operation is being conducted with the consent and ongoing cooperation of the competent national authorities. But in the absence of consent, two principles come into competition. On the one hand, the stability of the present international system depends in large measure upon accepting and respecting the sovereign rights of states.
On the other hand, there is a major evolution in thinking at the level of international public opinion that can no longer accept that massive suffering should go unchallenged behind the walls of national sovereignty. The search here is for an acceptable threshold. When is the level of human suffering within a given country of such magnitude as to warrant an energetic international response? This problem cannot be resolved through a juridical design. The appropriate threshold is more likely to emerge slowly over a period of time, through judgement on a case-by-case basis.
This judgement needs to be informed by some general considerations. First, national sovereignty has always been a relative rather than an absolute principle. The growth of global interdependence, human rights standards and humanitarianism in general have further accentuated the relative quality of this principle. In effect, the very notion of what constitutes the domestic affairs of a state is shrinking.
Furthermore, sovereignty is under pressure simultaneously from forces of both integration and fragmentation. The movement towards globalization and regional integration is chipping away at sovereignty from above, while devolutionist pressures, internal fragmentation and collapse undermine it from below. Second, the concept of national security has traditionally been confined to the narrow sphere of the security of the state.
Because of this contradiction, there is need for a broader concept of security, one that encompasses the well-being of the citizens of a country as well as the legitimate security needs of a democratic state. Third, there is the need for a sense of measure. It is not just any incident of human rights violation or an act of petty repression that must give rise to a dramatic international response. Forceful international intervention is a drastic move; it should be applied as a measure of last resort, only when all other means of inducing change have failed to yield results.
Fourth, there continues to be a North-South cleavage on this issue.
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This cleavage arises in part because the Security Council, as the principal decision-making organ on these questions, is dominated by the major Western powers, while the "recipient countries" are predominantly located in the South. One way to counter this imbalance is to ensure that greater efforts are made to arrive at decisions which command broad support within as well as outside the Security Council. Finally, there is a growing paradox surrounding the question of intervention today. In the past, this issue was marked by apprehensions of unilateral intervention by the major powers of the West and the East.
Although this tendency has not disappeared, the greater danger today may come from the opposite direction - the prospect of too much disengagement, if not outright indifference. This is due in part to the proliferation of apparently intractable armed conflicts, particularly those raging within states. Another reason is the fact that, with the end of the Cold War, the major powers have redefined their interests and shifted their focus to domestic preoccupations. Building a Community of Values It is difficult to build an effective and sustainable framework for preserving peace and security without some kind of a normative underpinning.
In the past this seemed less apparent because everything was subordinated to the logic of the Cold War. Today, the task of constructing appropriate peace and security mechanisms needs to be related to the challenge of building a community of values at various levels of the international system. At the global level, the United Nations has been instrumental in the development and dissemination of a core of normative standards, covering such areas as human rights, environmental ethics, the peaceful settlement of disputes, women's rights and minority rights.
These universal principles can best be taken seriously when applied at lower levels of the international system. A regional organization or a subregional arrangement can provide a more concrete and local framework for the application of universally accepted principles of governance. The core principles might comprise the following: A formal and common commitment to these principles would then become the basis for assessing good citizenship within a particular region or subregion as well as the criteria for participation in the regional association.
The idea here is to create a form of regional "code of conduct" by which the actions and policies of member governments can be judged. Unless translated into regional commitments of this kind that can give rise to regional discipline and peer pressure, universal norms can seem remote and abstract. Today the experience of Europe reflects the most advanced efforts at building a community of values at the regional level. The Helsinki Final Act of led to a long political process that culminated in the Charter of Paris of November This sets out a common pan-European commitment to certain basic principles of democratic governance and a regime of rights.
In Western Europe, with its well-rooted democratic tradition, this may not be breaking any new ground. But more important is the fact that the states which have just emerged from the former communist bloc should accept to be judged by these same standards, even as they struggle to put them into practice. This includes a common regional commitment to change governments only through democratic elections, which was successfully invoked to challenge the military junta in Haiti that had toppled the democratically elected government in September This is a phenomenon which must not be underestimated or regarded as a simple left-over of the past.
It demands serious interpretation, and a closer examination on the levels of anthropology, ethics and law. This tension between the particular and the universal can be considered immanent in human beings. By virtue of sharing in the same human nature, people automatically feel that they are members of one great family, as is in fact the case. But as a result of the concrete historical conditioning of this same nature, they are necessarily bound in a more intense way to particular human groups, beginning with the family and going on to the various groups to which they belong and up to the whole of their ethnic and cultural group, which is called, not by accident, a "nation", from the Latin word "nasci": The human condition thus finds itself between these two poles — universality and particularity — with a vital tension between them; an inevitable tension, but singularly fruitful if they are lived in a calm and balanced way.
Upon this anthropological foundation there also rest the "rights of nations", which are nothing but "human rights" fostered at the specific level of community life. A study of these rights is certainly not easy, if we consider the difficulty of defining the very concept of "nation", which cannot be identified a priori and necessarily with the State.
Such a study must nonetheless be made, if we wish to avoid the errors of the past and ensure a just world order. A presupposition of a nation's rights is certainly its right to exist: This fundamental right to existence does not necessarily call for sovereignty as a state, since various forms of juridical aggregation between different nations are possible, as for example occurs in Federal States, in Confederations or in States characterized by broad regional autonomies.
There can be historical circumstances in which aggregations different from single state sovereignty can even prove advisable, but only on condition that this takes place in a climate of true freedom, guaranteed by the exercise of the self-determination of the peoples concerned. Its right to exist naturally implies that every nation also enjoys the right to its own language and culture, through which a people expresses and promotes that which I would call its fundamental spiritual "sovereignty".
History shows that in extreme circumstances such as those which occurred in the land where I was born it is precisely its culture that enables a nation to survive the loss of political and economic independence. Every nation therefore has also the right to shape its life according to its own traditions, excluding, of course, every abuse of basic human rights and in particular the oppression of minorities.
Every nation has the right to build its future by providing an appropriate education for the younger generation. Foremost among these duties is certainly that of living in a spirit of peace, respect and solidarity with other nations. Thus the exercise of the rights of nations, balanced by the acknowledgement and the practice of duties, promotes a fruitful "exchange of gifts", which strengthens the unity of all mankind. During my pastoral pilgrimages to the communities of the Catholic Church over the past seventeen years, I have been able to enter into dialogue with the rich diversity of nations and cultures in every part of the world.
Unhappily, the world has yet to learn how to live with diversity, as recent events in the Balkans and Central Africa have painfully reminded us. The fact of "difference", and the reality of "the other", can sometimes be felt as a burden, or even as a threat. Amplified by historic grievances and exacerbated by the manipulations of the unscrupulous, the fear of "difference" can lead to a denial of the very humanity of "the other": We are all very familiar today with such situations; at this moment my heart and my prayers turn in a special way to the sufferings of the sorely tried peoples of Bosnia-Hercegovina.
From bitter experience, then, we know that the fear of "difference", especially when it expresses itself in a narrow and exclusive nationalism which denies any rights to "the other", can lead to a true nightmare of violence and terror. And yet if we make the effort to look at matters objectively, we can see that, transcending all the differences which distinguish individuals and peoples, there is a fundamental commonality.
For different cultures are but different ways of facing the question of the meaning of personal existence. And it is precisely here that we find one source of the respect which is due to every culture and every nation: The heart of every culture is its approach to the greatest of all mysteries: Our respect for the culture of others is therefore rooted in our respect for each community's attempt to answer the question of human life.
And here we can see how important it is to safeguard the fundamental right to freedom of religion and freedom of conscience , as the cornerstones of the structure of human rights and the foundation of every truly free society. No one is permitted to suppress those rights by using coercive power to impose an answer to the mystery of man. To cut oneself off from the reality of difference — or, worse, to attempt to stamp out that difference — is to cut oneself off from the possibility of sounding the depths of the mystery of human life.
The truth about man is the unchangeable standard by which all cultures are judged; but every culture has something to teach us about one or other dimension of that complex truth. Thus the "difference" which some find so threatening can, through respectful dialogue, become the source of a deeper understanding of the mystery of human existence. In this context, we need to clarify the essential difference between an unhealthy form of nationalism , which teaches contempt for other nations or cultures, and patriotism , which is a proper love of one's country.
True patriotism never seeks to advance the well-being of one's own nation at the expense of others. For in the end this would harm one's own nation as well: Nationalism, particularly in its most radical forms, is thus the antithesis of true patriotism, and today we must ensure that extreme nationalism does not continue to give rise to new forms of the aberrations of totalitarianism. This is a commitment which also holds true, obviously, in cases where religion itself is made the basis of nationalism, as unfortunately happens in certain manifestations of so-called "fundamentalism".
Freedom is the measure of man's dignity and greatness. Living the freedom sought by individuals and peoples is a great challenge to man's spiritual growth and to the moral vitality of nations. The basic question which we must all face today is the responsible use of freedom , in both its personal and social dimensions. Our reflection must turn then to the question of the moral structure of freedom , which is the inner architecture of the culture of freedom.
Freedom is not simply the absence of tyranny or oppression. Nor is freedom a licence to do whatever we like. Freedom has an inner "logic" which distinguishes it and ennobles it: Detached from the truth about the human person, freedom deteriorates into license in the lives of individuals, and, in political life, it becomes the caprice of the most powerful and the arrogance of power. Far from being a limitation upon freedom or a threat to it, reference to the truth about the human person — a truth universally knowable through the moral law written on the hearts of all — is, in fact, the guarantor of freedom's future.
In the light of what has been said we understand how utilitarianism , the doctrine which defines morality not in terms of what is good but of what is advantageous, threatens the freedom of individuals and nations and obstructs the building of a true culture of freedom. Utilitarianism often has devastating political consequences, because it inspires an aggressive nationalism on the basis of which the subjugation, for example, of a smaller or weaker nation is claimed to be a good thing solely because it corresponds to the national interest. No less grave are the results of economic utilitarianism, which drives more powerful countries to manipulate and exploit weaker ones.
Nationalistic and economic utilitarianism are sometimes combined, a phenomenon which has too often characterized relations between the "North" and the "South". For the emerging countries, the achievement of political independence has too frequently been accompanied by a situation of de facto economic dependence on other countries; indeed, in some cases, the developing world has suffered a regression, such that some countries lack the means of satisfying the essential needs of their people. Such situations offend the conscience of humanity and pose a formidable moral challenge to the human family.
Meeting this challenge will obviously require changes in both developing and developed countries. If developing countries are able to offer sure guarantees of the proper management of resources and of assistance received, as well as respect for human rights, by replacing where necessary unjust, corrupt, or authoritarian forms of government with participatory and democratic ones, will they not in this way unleash the best civil and economic energies of their people?
And must not the developed countries, for their part, come to renounce strictly utilitarian approaches and develop new approaches inspired by greater justice and solidarity? Yes, distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen! The international economic scene needs an ethic of solidarity , if participation, economic growth, and a just distribution of goods are to characterize the future of humanity.
The international cooperation called for by the Charter of the United Nations for "solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character" art. This charter took effect on 24 October , when the UN began operation. The UN's mission to preserve world peace was complicated in its early decades during the Cold War between the United States and Soviet Union and their respective allies.
Its missions have consisted primarily of unarmed military observers and lightly armed troops with primarily monitoring, reporting and confidence-building roles. Since then, 80 former colonies had gained independence, including 11 trust territories, which were monitored by the Trusteeship Council. After the end of the Cold War, the UN shifted and expanded its field operations, undertaking a wide variety of complex tasks.
The UN has six principal organs: The organization, its officers and its agencies have won many Nobel Peace Prizes. Other evaluations of the UN's effectiveness have been mixed. Some commentators believe the organization to be an important force for peace and human development, while others have called the organization ineffective, corrupt, or biased. In the century prior to the UN's creation, several international treaty organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross was formed to ensure protection and assistance for victims of armed conflict and strife.
President Woodrow Wilson became a vocal advocate of this concept, and in he included a sketch of the international body in his point proposal to end the war. Two months later, the Allies met with Germany and Austria-Hungary at Versailles to hammer out formal peace terms. President Wilson wanted peace, but England and France disagreed, forcing harsh war reparations on their former enemies. On January 10, , the League of Nations formally comes into being when the Covenant of the League of Nations, ratified by 42 nations in , takes effect.
But all of them realised that it had failed and they began to re-arm as fast as possible. During , Britain and France tried negotiating directly with Hitler but this failed in when Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia. When war broke out in , the League closed down and its headquarters in Geneva remained empty throughout the war. The earliest concrete plan for a new world organization began under the aegis of the U. State Department in It incorporated Soviet suggestions, but left no role for France. Soong , of China, signed a short document which later came to be known as the United Nations Declaration and the next day the representatives of twenty-two other nations added their signatures.
One major change from the Atlantic Charter was the addition of a provision for religious freedom, which Stalin approved after Roosevelt insisted. Having subscribed to a common program of purposes and principles embodied in the Joint Declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of Great Britain dated August 14, , known as the Atlantic Charter,. Being convinced that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands, and that they are now engaged in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world,.
The foregoing declaration may be adhered to by other nations which are, or which may be, rendering material assistance and contributions in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism. During the war, "the United Nations" became the official term for the Allies. To join, countries had to sign the Declaration and declare war on the Axis. Soong, and Mister Gromyko for Mister Molotov. The first meetings of the General Assembly, with 51 nations represented, [c] and the Security Council took place in Methodist Central Hall , Westminster , London beginning on 10 January Its site—like UN headquarters buildings in Geneva , Vienna , and Nairobi —is designated as international territory.
Though the UN's primary mandate was peacekeeping , the division between the US and USSR often paralysed the organization, generally allowing it to intervene only in conflicts distant from the Cold War. On 29 November , the General Assembly approved a resolution to partition Palestine , approving the creation of the state of Israel. With the spread of decolonization in the s, the organization's membership saw an influx of newly independent nations. In alone, 17 new states joined the UN, 16 of them from Africa. With an increasing Third World presence and the failure of UN mediation in conflicts in the Middle East , Vietnam , and Kashmir , the UN increasingly shifted its attention to its ostensibly secondary goals of economic development and cultural exchange.
After the Cold War, the UN saw a radical expansion in its peacekeeping duties, taking on more missions in ten years than it had in the previous four decades. Though the UN Charter had been written primarily to prevent aggression by one nation against another, in the early s the UN faced a number of simultaneous, serious crises within nations such as Somalia, Haiti, Mozambique, and the former Yugoslavia. Beginning in the last decades of the Cold War, American and European critics of the UN condemned the organization for perceived mismanagement and corruption. In the late s and s, international interventions authorized by the UN took a wider variety of forms.
The Millennium Summit was held in to discuss the UN's role in the 21st century. Progress towards these goals, which were to be met by , was ultimately uneven. The World Summit reaffirmed the UN's focus on promoting development, peacekeeping, human rights, and global security. In addition to addressing global challenges, the UN has sought to improve its accountability and democratic legitimacy by engaging more with civil society and fostering a global constituency. Guterres has highlighted several key goals for his administration, including an emphasis on diplomacy for preventing conflicts, more effective peacekeeping efforts, and streamlining the organization to be more responsive and versatile to global needs.
The UN system is based on five principal organs: Below the six organs sit, in the words of the author Linda Fasulo, "an amazing collection of entities and organizations, some of which are actually older than the UN itself and operate with almost complete independence from it". The UN obey the Noblemaire principle , which is binding on any organization that belongs to the UN system. This principle calls for salaries that will draw and keep citizens of countries where salaries are highest, and also calls for equal pay for work of equal value independent of the employee's nationality.
The General Assembly is the main deliberative assembly of the UN. Composed of all UN member states , the assembly meets in regular yearly sessions, but emergency sessions can also be called. When the General Assembly decides on important questions such as those on peace and security, admission of new members and budgetary matters, a two-thirds majority of those present and voting is required.
Each member country has one vote. Apart from approval of budgetary matters, resolutions are not binding on the members. The Assembly may make recommendations on any matters within the scope of the UN, except matters of peace and security that are under consideration by the Security Council. Draft resolutions can be forwarded to the General Assembly by its six main committees: The Security Council is charged with maintaining peace and security among countries.
While other organs of the UN can only make "recommendations" to member states, the Security Council has the power to make binding decisions that member states have agreed to carry out, under the terms of Charter Article The ten temporary seats are held for two-year terms, with five member states per year voted in by the General Assembly on a regional basis.
The UN Secretariat is headed by the Secretary-General , assisted by the Deputy Secretary-General and a staff of international civil servants worldwide. The Secretary-General acts as the de facto spokesperson and leader of the UN. The position is defined in the UN Charter as the organization's "chief administrative officer".
The Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly, after being recommended by the Security Council, where the permanent members have veto power. There are no specific criteria for the post, but over the years it has become accepted that the post shall be held for one or two terms of five years.
The ICJ is composed of 15 judges who serve 9-year terms and are appointed by the General Assembly; every sitting judge must be from a different nation. It is based in the Peace Palace in The Hague, sharing the building with the Hague Academy of International Law , a private centre for the study of international law. The ICJ's primary purpose is to adjudicate disputes among states. The court has heard cases related to war crimes, illegal state interference, ethnic cleansing, and other issues.
The council has one annual meeting in July, held in either New York or Geneva. Viewed as separate from the specialized bodies it co-ordinates, ECOSOC's functions include information gathering, advising member nations, and making recommendations. ECOSOC's subsidiary bodies include the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues , which advises UN agencies on issues relating to indigenous peoples ; the United Nations Forum on Forests , which co-ordinates and promotes sustainable forest management; the United Nations Statistical Commission , which co-ordinates information-gathering efforts between agencies; and the Commission on Sustainable Development , which co-ordinates efforts between UN agencies and NGOs working towards sustainable development.
ECOSOC may also grant consultative status to non-governmental organizations; [] by , more than 2, organizations had received this status. The UN Charter stipulates that each primary organ of the United Nations can establish various specialized agencies to fulfil its duties. The UN performs most of its humanitarian work through these agencies.
Examples include mass vaccination programmes through WHO , the avoidance of famine and malnutrition through the work of the WFP , and the protection of vulnerable and displaced people for example, by UNHCR. With the addition of South Sudan 14 July , [] there are UN member states, including all undisputed independent states apart from Vatican City.
Chapter II
In addition, there are two non-member observer states of the United Nations General Assembly: The Group of 77 at the UN is a loose coalition of developing nations, designed to promote its members' collective economic interests and create an enhanced joint negotiating capacity in the UN. Seventy-seven nations founded the organization, but by November the organization had since expanded to member countries. The group held its first major meeting in Algiers in , where it adopted the Charter of Algiers and established the basis for permanent institutional structures.
The UN, after approval by the Security Council, sends peacekeepers to regions where armed conflict has recently ceased or paused to enforce the terms of peace agreements and to discourage combatants from resuming hostilities. Since the UN does not maintain its own military, peacekeeping forces are voluntarily provided by member states.
These soldiers are sometimes nicknamed "Blue Helmets" for their distinctive gear. In September , the UN had peacekeeping soldiers deployed on 15 missions. It compared efforts at nation-building by the UN to those of the United States, and found that seven out of eight UN cases are at peace, as compared with four out of eight US cases at peace.
The UN has also drawn criticism for perceived failures. In many cases, member states have shown reluctance to achieve or enforce Security Council resolutions. Disagreements in the Security Council about military action and intervention are seen as having failed to prevent the Bangladesh genocide in , [] the Cambodian genocide in the s, [] and the Rwandan genocide in In addition to peacekeeping, the UN is also active in encouraging disarmament. Regulation of armaments was included in the writing of the UN Charter in and was envisioned as a way of limiting the use of human and economic resources for their creation.
One of the UN's primary purposes is "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion", and member states pledge to undertake "joint and separate action" to protect these rights.
To the General Assembly of the United Nations (October 2, ) | John Paul II
The document proclaims basic civil, political, and economic rights common to all human beings, though its effectiveness towards achieving these ends has been disputed since its drafting. Jacques Fomerand, a scholar of the UN, describes this organization's mandate as "broad and vague", with only "meagre" resources to carry it out.
Millennium Development Goals []. Another primary purpose of the UN is "to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character". The UN Development Programme UNDP , an organization for grant-based technical assistance founded in , is one of the leading bodies in the field of international development.