The British government—in response to the Abu Ghraib torture and prisoner abuse scandal and the 2 Pakistani terrorists from the LeT who were captured by the SAS in Operation Aston and were flown out of Iraq for interrogation at the US facility at Bagram Air base unknown to the British, there were no interrogators in Iraq that had the linguistic skills to screen the detainees —decided that they could no longer hand over detainees to JSOC if they were going to be flown elsewhere. The SOF shaping included sophisticated feints to mislead the insurgents as to the direction of the final assault, close target reconnaissance and direct-action missions where a logistics node or IED factory was targeted.
Shortly before the battle, MI6 visited JSOCs TSF Temporary Screening Facility at Balad to question a suspected Iraqi insurgent, following the visit, concerns were raised about the detention conditions of the cells and the condition of some of the detainees. During the course of to early , the technology, people and ideas at the heart of JSOC's war had coalesced. Its centrepiece was a basketball-court-sized control room known as the JOC, three large screens relayed live pictures from different operations as well as other information that was needed for desk officers from operations, intelligence, aviation, medical etc.
People who worked at the JOC often referred to it as the ' Death Star ' because 'you could reach out with a finger and eliminate somebody'; the liaison team from the NSA had its own private room for the US eavesdropping operation; TF changed its codename to Task Force In January , JSOC contributed to the arrest of a master bomber responsible for bombing the Canal Hotel and other vehicle bombings in —aimed at police stations, recruiting offices and markets.
There are different versions of what followed: By early , JSOC had a clear focus deriving from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld , McChrystal's command had built a regional laydown, which was designed to allow rapid response to intelligence anywhere that Zarqawi or key associates might be found. The Laydown consisted of: JSOC leaders devoted the best intelligence-gathering individuals and the UKs share of resources to this aim, however the UK opted out owing to its concerns about American actions, the resumption of full cooperation between US and UK was dependent on work to improve the condition of the prison cells at Balad.
In April , the Battle of Abu Ghraib took place; on 13 April up to insurgents including 3 vehicle suicide attacks mounted a sustained assault on a Marine base near the Syrian border at al-Husaybah , the attack was beaten off by airstrikes and helicopters, the attack was attributed to al-Qaeda; and on April 29, al-Qaeda staged 14 car bomb attacks in a single day most of them in Baghdad. These events disturbed General George Casey due to the capabilities shown in these attacks that he formally upgraded AQI to be the Coalition's principal enemy in Iraq.
The JSOC task force operating from Balad, successfully obtained a large proportion of the ISR Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms in the hunt for Zarqawi, this meant not only control of Predator UAVs, but other technical means such as satellites and aircraft used to intercept and locate mobile telephones, this huge taking of resources caused tension with Casey and with commanders of regular battalions and brigades that were still taking a large amount of casualties.
Casey and other commanders increased pressure on JSOC for results, McChrystal began to shift emphasis of his operations in Iraq, now that AQI was the target of the whole coalition force, he needed to do more to take on the local militant networks that were killing and wounding many US troops. McChrystal exploited the growing information flow from drones and cell phones to target the entire al-Qaeda network from top to bottom with particular focus on middle.
By the first half of , JSOCs commander put forward three tactical concepts that were central to Operation Snake Eyes, they advocated: The US characterised these places as stopovers on the infiltration routed of foreign fighters from Jordan or Syria to the capital; in many of these communities, regular troops came up against well-organised paramilitary groups armed with everything from small arms to mortars or surface-to-air missiles. As these operations went ahead during the summer of , JSOC mounted dozens of takedowns against suspected local militants and middle managers in the guerrilla organisation—exposing McChrystals men to determined heavily armed opposition that stood and fought rather than retreating in classic guerrilla fashion.
After Delta Force took casualties in the summer of , McChrystal asked the then UK Director Special Forces for assistance, however he refused, citing the treatment of detainees and the conditions of JSOC detention facility at Balad and other operational issues such as rules of engagement, so a second Delta Force squadron flown in and Delta pressed on with its operations.
Due to the extremely high tempo and hazardous nature of their operations, JSOC's Task Force generally served three-month rotations. During the Basra prison incident , the Colonel who was the-then Delta Force commander that ran JSOCs operation in Iraq, offered the services of a Delta squadron and scrambled a Predator from Baghdad to assist, the incident was eventually resolved by British forces. During late and early , the change of allegiance of tribes and small towns on the outskirts of Baghdad added militants to the Jihadists groups faster than JSOC could take it down.
By coincidence, 6 Sunni insurgent groups formed the Mujahedeen Shura Council , they were cells that embraced the Salafist ideology of AQI—wanting to declare an oppressive Sunni caliphate in the western Iraq believing it would require increased violence against the Shia, the Coalition and even Sunnis. JSOC would broaden its takedowns against the AQI leadership, carrying out more missions against mid-level terrorists pinpointed by ground-hold units, giving US Army and Marine units greater access to precious assets such as drones.
In nigh-time raids on April 8 and on April 13, , in a town near Yusufiyah , operators from B squadron SAS and B squadron Delta Force killed 7 insurgents 5 on April 8 and 2 on April 13, who the intelligence agencies claimed were foreign jihadists, the intelligence gathered in these raids gave JSOC a clear intelligence picture of a group of Al-Qaeda cells around Baghdad, suggesting that their tactics had evolved.
Operation Larchwood 4 was part of an intense series of operations in the Triangle of Death , most of which were carried out by Delta Force and other US forces, with each mission the intelligence picture on the AQI networks was becoming clearer. The mission took place in broad daylight because the Delta Force squadron commander "allowed aggression to get the best of him", a fierce firefight ensued, 5 Americans were wounded and 2 were killed when their AH-6 little bird was shot down, whilst more than 25 terrorists were killed and 4 captured, a number of civilians were also wounded; B squadron's commander was relieved of his command.
JOC called in two FCs that dropped lbs bombs on the farmhouse, US troops from a regular unit nearby recovered Zarqawi, who was severely wounded from the ruins, he soon succumbed to his wounds; President George Bush told reported that he called McChrystal and congratulated him—marking the first official acknowledgement that JSOC was engaged in Iraq. That night 14 high-priority targets were added to the already-scheduled raids—each target that had been uncovered as part of Zarqawi's and al Raham's network Operations continued throughout summer , with the aim of dismantling al-Qaeda faster than it could regenerate, which meant sacrificing some target development in the interest of getting raids themselves to produce intelligence and were also willing to launch raids on a single 'trigger' or piece of intelligence.
The Coalition mounted raids in little more than a week—operations on a scale that was beyond the resources of JSOC and its Task Forces. In November , a new secret directive sanctioned by President Bush had allowed US forces in Iraq to kill or capture Iranian nationals if they were engaged in targeting Coalition forces due to Hezbollah success in the Lebanon War and Iran's defiance on its nuclear issue ; the new mission was known by its acronym CII Counter Iranian Influence.
Since , there had been growing human intelligence about the training of Iraqi insurgents in Iran as well as financial backing for attacks on Coalition forces; finds of mortars rounds or rockets with recent Iranian markings had multiplied. It was essential to maintain the pressure of nightly raids on al-Qaeda, The Pentagon 's solution was to keep Delta Force's commander working through the JOC against Sunni extremists changing its name from TF to Task Force 16 ; whilst a new command based around the headquarters of an Army Special Forces group was formed, codenamed: Task Force 17, they were given the CII missions.
TF 17 early operations netted an intelligence treasure trove, analysts used the same networking mapping and phone record techniques that they were employing against the jihadists; in December a Quds Force officer had been found in the compound of the leader of SCIRI whom it was long believed that they and its armed militia, the Badr Brigade were agents of Iranian influence. As they cleared the building they found its staff trying to destroy records and change their appearance, the 6 men that were captured had fake ID cards and one would test positive for handling explosives, they didn't find the two men they were looking for.
Analysis of papers and phones from the raid and the arrest of the Quds Force officer by TF 17 revealed that the Iranians were assisting a much wider variety of insurgent groups including evidence of connections with Ansar al-Sunna as well as elements within the Mahdi Army. Biden said, "I believe the present authorization granted the president to use force in Iraq does not cover that, and he does need congressional authority to do that.
I just want to set that marker. They also found critical documents: There were Memos to about attacks on British forces in Basra and large financial payments based on performance against the Coalition, Daqduq revealed that he had been brought into Iraq by Quds Force leadership to be a sort-of insurgent management consultant. The mission made a strategic impact, Task Force 17 stepped up its raids against Iranian targets. By early JSOC estimated that it had killed 2, members of the Sunni jihadist groups as well as detaining many more; TF 16 was mounting 6 raids per night.
Over 2 years JSOCs intelligence database had grown with each terrorist network it eliminated, agent networks within the al-Qaeda cells were providing good information, millions of Iraqi's had mobile phones that JSOC could monitor and a steady increase in number of drones available for surveillance increased the operational. In summer and fall of JSOC continued to eliminate insurgent groups against the ' anvil ' of conventional forces; the CII missions succeeded in forcing Muqtada al-Sadr , the leader of the Mahdi Army, to flee to Iran, where in August he declared a ceasefire with the coalition.
These operations included seizing members of Al-Quds, the commando arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard , and taking them to Iraq for interrogation, as well as the pursuit, capture or killing of high-value targets in the war on terror. The Bush administration allegedly combined the CIA's intelligence operations and covert action with JSOC clandestine military operations so that Congress would only partially see how the money was spent.
By March , the climate for mounting aggressive special force operations was changing due to the Sunni insurgency waning rapidly, a hundred thousand defectors from Sunni militants were enrolled in the Sons of Iraq. By May , of around 11, to 12, insurgents that JSOC removed, around 3, had been killed, JSOC had captured or killed al-Qaeda members faster than they could recruit new ones—breaking al-Qaeda and its associates in Iraq.
The covert offensive against both al-Qaeda and Iranian influence had played an important role in bringing the country back from the brink of anarchy. Although the wider JSOC and CII campaign against Shia militants demonstrated that Iran could be deterred from further escalation of its covert activities and the militias checked. But since Iran was Iraq's neighbouring country and the Shia would form a majority of Iraq's population, these efforts could only achieve containment rather than the 'knockdown punch' JSOC inflicted on al-Qaeda.
In an October leak published on the WikiLeaks website, U. Ambassador to Pakistan, Anne W. Patterson , states the Pakistani Army approved the embedding of U. Special Operations Forces, including elements from the Joint Special Operations Command, with the Pakistani military to provide support for operations in the country. This goes beyond the original claims of the U. Special operations carried out in North Africa are under the codename: In , southern Libya remained a 'melting pot' of armed militias and jihadists.
Special operations carried out in Somalia are conducted under the codename: After several days of surveillance of Awlaki by the Central Intelligence Agency, armed drones took off from a new, secret American base in the Arabian Peninsula, crossed into northern Yemen and unleashed a barrage of Hellfire missiles at al-Awlaki's vehicle. Samir Khan , a Pakistani-American al-Qaeda member and editor of the jihadist Inspire magazine, also reportedly died in the attack. In , the UAV's operating out of the base were moved to a remote desert airstrip—which increased operational security and allayed local fears after a UAV and its Hellfire missile crashed in a Djibouti suburb; JSOCs predators supported the French during the Bulo Marer hostage rescue attempt.
Preliminary evidence suggested that one of them was Ibrahim Ali also known as Anta , an explosives specialist known for his skill in building and using homemade bombs and suicide vests. The reluctance partly centered on questions of whether Al-Shabaab—which has not tried to carry out an attack on American soil—could legally be the target of lethal operations by the military or the CIA. In May , the White House announced that it would carry out targeted killing operations only against those who posed a "continuing and imminent threat to the American people.
Despite a ban on military drone operations the Yemen government allowed CIA drone operations to continue. In April , a JSOC Lieutenant Colonel and a senior CIA SAD officer were off-duty and having a haircut in the expatriate area of Sanaa , when a group of gunmen attempted to kidnap them, the two officers responded with their sidearms, shooting dead two of their attackers and sending others fleeing. During the hostage rescue operations in Yemen , a JSOC medical unit inserted with the DEVGRU assault team and went to work stabilising the wounded hostages while the assault team secured the site to allow them to be extracted.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. It is not to be confused with JSpOC. Re-issue of Time's Special Edition: Archived from the original on 27 February Retrieved 14 March The New York Times. Archived from the original on 28 March Retrieved 11 July Archived from the original on 15 June Retrieved 13 March Archived from the original on 30 March Retrieved 10 April Retrieved 13 November Archived from the original on 5 May American Heroes in Special Operations.
Archived from the original on 1 April Retrieved 30 December Retrieved 16 May Retrieved 15 May Archived from the original on 30 October Retrieved 26 October The battery commander designates a recorder. The recorder is seated beside the telephone operator. Inspect mat6riel, observe the functioning of the pieces, and make such repairs as can be made properly at the position. To distinguish pyrotechnic signals; to operate rocket boards; to call, "Barrage" immediately upon seeing the barrage signal; and to report other signals in accordance with his orders.
During action, casualties are replaced as follows: Permanent assignments and reassignments are made by the battery commander as appropriate. Casualties are reported to higher authority daily or at such times as called for. Under the direction of the battery commartder, the executive, assisted by the ammunition sergeant, supervises the ammunition supply.
The battery commander makes a daily ammunition report to the battalion. Organization of the position is the systematic performance at the firing battery position of all functions which contribute to the prompt opening and delivery of accurate fire and to the concealment and protection of personnel, mat6riel, and ammunition. Organization begins when the position is selected and is continuous through occupancy. All carriages are unlimbered or uncoupled and prepared for action. The pieces may be placed in line at regular intervals or they may be placed irregularly, in which case they are said to be "staggered.
When the pieces are in line and the interval between muzzles is 20 yards, they are said to be at "normal" intervals. When a position is occupied after dark or positions have been selected for each individual piece, the executive designates to each chief of section the position for his piece and the direction of fire. Each chief of section conducts his section individually to the position designated. Where practicable, in order to avoid a multiplicity of tracks, the position is occupied from the march formation.
The position is approached from a flank in section column. The executive checks communication at the battery and posts the telephone operator at the position from which he will normally give commands. The executive lays the battery as commanded by the battery commander, or, if no commands have been received, lays it parallel in the direction indicated by the gun marker.
To refer a piece which has been laid for direction, an aiming point is announced and the deflection is measured and recorded. The command for referring is, for example: A common aiming point used for referring should be fixed, continuously visible, and as distant from the battery as possible. It should contain a clearly defined vertical line or a definite point on which the gunners can lay.
When a common aiming point is used, aiming stakes should be set up for emergency use at such a time as does not interfere with the firing. When a common aiming point is not used, the executive orders the aiming stakes set up as soon as the position is occupied. Two aiming stakes are used for each piece. One stake is set up at a convenient location at least yards from the piece; the other stake is set up at the midpoint between the first stake and the piece. Both stakes are set up so that they and the sight of the piece are on the same straight line.
Whenever aiming stakes are used, the pieces are also referred to an auxiliary aiming point which is used in case the aiming stakes are knocked down during firing. During darkness, a light is attached to each aiming stake, the near light lower than the far light. Each light is completely screened except for a narrow vertical slit visible through the sight.
The correction is made by the gunner who:. Lateral displacement is most likely to occur when the axle of the piece is not level. This is particularly true of materiel equipped with pneumatic tires. Lateral displacement may be prevented by placing sandbags against the outside of each wheel. If the pieces are staggered, the executive determines the interval from No. These intervals are recorded and used for forming the sheaf as explained in paragraph As soon as each piece is established in position and laid in the direction indicated by the gun marker, the executive causes the minimum range or elevation to be measured.
The foregoing is a rapid method providing a satisfactory safety factor for clearing an unoccupied crest. The battery commander normally will advise the executive as to the probable sector of fire and require a report as to the minimum elevation throughout the sector.
A few probable critical points can be selected readily by Inspection and the minimum elevations determined for them. In this way, accidents will be avoided in instances where the mask is very irregular. The executive may be required to determine minimum elevation for a particular projectile, charge, and fuze; further, he may be required to determine it for each piece. Pieces are not fired at a quadrant elevation less than the minimum elevation or that corresponding to the minimum range setting and site as determined by the executive. If a fire command includes an elevation or range less than the minimum elevation or range , the executive reports to the battery commander, "Minimum elevation so much " or "Minimum range so much.
When the above operations have been completed, the executive reports to the battery commander, "Battery ready. If complete fire commands are received before these operations have been completed and if it is obviously safe to fire, the opening of fire takes precedence. Further steps in the organization of position are completed as rapidly as possible provided they do not interfere with the fire. AS time permits, such of the following improvements are carried out as are appropriate for the type of mat6riel: Positions should be concealed from enemy ground and air observation.
Measures for concealment must not delay preparations for promptly opening fire. Passive means, such as camouflage, cover, and concealment, are used. Construction work must harmonize with the camouflage scheme and ordinarily be executed at night. All personnel must be instructed in defensive measures and selected individuals taught gas protection.
Sentinels are posted at the pieces when the latter are not actually firing, the remainder of each gun crew being allowed to rest in sheltered positions near by. In the notebook he keeps data of semipermanent value to his piece, such as calibration corrections, base deflection, and data for defensive fires.
The ammunition report is prepared from this record. Extract copies of fire missions or fire schedules may be furnished by the battery commander to each chief of piece section and complete copies to the recorder. All schedules are carefully preserved. Firing is not interrupted because of casualties. Available first aid is administered immediately. Fire commands are commands which convey all the information necessary for the commencement, conduct, suspension, and cessation of fire, and activities incident thereto.
Firing data are the elements of a fire command which prescribe the settings of instruments and fuzes in the firing battery. The base piece is the piece usually No. Fire commands originate with the battery commander. They are sent to the firing battery by telephone, radio, signal flags, signal lamp, voice relay, or messenger. The executive repeats the commands of the battery commander to the gun squads, except as noted herein. Fire commands are not repeated by any member of the firing battery except on request of a subordinate or when a fire command has manifestly been unheard or misunderstood.
Repetitions are prefaced by "The command was so and so.
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The fire commands for the first firing from a position must contain all the elements necessary to cause instruments and fuzes to be set and the pieces to be laid, loaded, and fired. When firing more than one piece, a change for an individual piece or pieces will be preceded by the command NO. For the executive, the indication to fire is the battery commander's command for the range or elevation, except when otherwise specified herein. By the gunner during fire at moving targets with direct laying.
See the pertinent manual in the FM 6-series for the Service of the Piece. The pieces are left loaded and the laying conforms to the schedule. When fire may be delayed more than a minute, the battery commander should command: The commands FIRE and. A fire command will be followed by all pieces unless it includes NO. This command may be given as the first element of the fire command or may follow any other element of the command except the range or elevation.
At the command NO. The commands for ceasing and suspending fire may be given at any appropriate place in the sequence. When the command REFER is to be used as an element of a fire command, it follows the announcement of the aiming point. The first two are not repeated verbatim to the gun squads. The battery commander may direct the initial laying of the battery for direction by commanding: After the battery has been laid for direction initially, the battery commander announces changes in direction by commanding: It is an order to use direct laying.
Each gunner is assigned his part of the target by his chief of section; the latter also corrects the direction of his piece during firing. The battery commander commands: When the aiming point is not visible from all pieces of the battery, the executive may set the announced deflection on an aiming circle, sight on the aiming point, using the lower motion, and lay the battery as described in paragraph The executive does not repeat this command. The instrument should be at least 30 yards from any masses of metal which might deflect the needle.
With the prismatic compass. He holds the compass to his eye and gives the following command to the gunner: The execution of this command lays the piece on the prolongation of the line: The executive measures the compass reading of this line by reading to the sight of the piece. The remaining pieces are laid parallel by reciprocal laying on the base piece par. With the aiming circle. After clamping the needle, he lays each piece reciprocally on the aiming circle par.
The result is the firing angle for the base piece, using the aiming circle as an aiming point. The battery commander commands, for example: If the orienting line runs through the sight of the base piece, the executive commands, for example: The remaining pieces are laid parallel to the base piece by any convenient method. He then lays each piece reciprocally on the aiming circle par. The aiming circle is set up in a position suitable for use as an aiming point and the , line is established in the proper direction as described in paragraphs 54, 55 b, and With panoramic sights, 3, mils must be subtracted from readings which exceed 3, The executive commands, for example: This method should be considered only an emergency means of forming a parallel sheaf for use when an aiming circle is not available.
The base piece having been laid for direction, the executive may command, for example: When the pieces have been laid, the executive announces an aiming point and causes the pieces to be referred. The deflection announced is that of the base piece. After establishing the direction for the base piece, the battery commander may cause the others to be laid parallel by the command: If the battery commander desires to control distribution directly, following a command for direction he announces a command for deflection difference; for example: If the battery commander desires to control distribution indirectly through the executive, he will give a command for convergence par.
The command given by the battery commander is: He then determines the individual corrections to converge Nos. On occupation of position, the executive may prepare a convergence table as follows: He tabulates these results. For the mm gun, French, M, the command is: The command for shell is: I or other type designation ; the use of shrapnel is directed by the command for corrector setting.
For charges termed normal, reduced, or supercharge, the charge is designated in a fire command only when other than the normal charge is to be used. When a change is to be made from either of the two above charges to the normal charge, the command is: When using shrapnel or time shell , the command for a corrector setting is: When the fuze setter is graduated for corrector and time, the commands are: When using fuze setters graduated for corrector and range, the fuze range is the same as the range setting unless otherwise announced.
When pieces are laid at an elevation rather than at a range setting, the fuze range is announced initially; thereafter, whenever changed. TO fire the battery, the command is: To fire one platoon, the command is: To fire any other combination of pieces, the command is: When a change in pieces to fire or the method of fire, or both, is to be made, the commands for both elements are given. The methods of fire are salvo fire, volley fire, volley fire sweeping, continuous fire, by piece at my command, fire at will.
Joint Publication Jp 3-10 Joint Security Operations in Theater 03 February 2010
This interval will be used until the method is changed or another interval announced. If one or more pieces are apparently in error or are very slow, they are called out and the remaining pieces fired. Fire is opened at the executive's command FIRE, given immediately after the range or elevation. There are three exceptions to the above, as follows:. Each round is fired at the executive's command.
When the last round of the sweep has been fired, the gunner traverses the piece back to the original laying. The execution is the same as for normal sweeping, except that even-numbered pieces sweep to the right. Changes of data are applied so as not to stop the fire or break its continuity. By piece at my command. This method is used for firing at a target attacking or about to attack the battery.
The laying is as prescribed in the pertinent manual of the FM 6-series for the Service of the Piece. If the battery commander does not desire the pieces to be loaded, he commands: If the battery commander desires the pieces to be loaded but the opening of fire to be held, he commands: The command is not repeated by the executive. When the pieces are ready to fire, the executive reports, "Battery is ready.
FIRE, which is repeated by the executive. The command to use or discontinue using the gunner's quadrant is announced immediately before the range or elevation. The command for range is the announcement of the range setting, as, "4,"; for elevation' the elevation setting, as, " The command for the executive to fire a series of ranges in a definite sequence is ZONE, followed by the range bound if other than yards and the limiting ranges. The executive does not repeat the command but gives commands to fire at the following ranges: The ranges fired for the first command given above are 4,, 4,, 4,, 4,, 4, If it is desired to fire through a zone two or more times, appropriate commands are repeated as necessary.
The command for the range or elevation always is given in each series of fire commands when it is intended that pieces be loaded and fired. Written data for concentrations and standing barrages usually are sent to the executive by command sheet. When time limits are shown for missions other than a rolling barrage, the executive causes the fire to start at the designated time.
The normal barrage may be started by the piece sentinels par. Sufficient ammunition for several complete barrages is stored in a place convenient for prompt use. When not engaged in firing, the battery is kept laid on its normal barrage. If the initial laying was by compass, the battery commander may order the executive to "Report the adjusted compass. The gunner of the base piece refers to the executive's instrument and announces the deflection. The executive reports, "Adjusted compass so much. This amount plus the declination constant of the aiming circle is the adjusted compass. He is thus able at any subsequent time to lay the , line of his instrument in the direction of the base point, provided he does not move his instrument.
The position of the instrument should be marked by a stake. Subsequent -use of instrument direction. For the foregoing command, sets the azimuth and micrometer scales at 6, 6, without disturbing the lower motion. And continues the mission ordered. To measure an instrument-direction shift. The base piece having been laid for direction, the battery commander commands, for example: At the first round of a salvo or similar series of fire, the telephone operator reports to the battery commander, "On the way.
On the completion of the salvo or series, the operator reports, "Round completed. Aiming point and deflection, battery in line at regular intervals. Compass, registering on a base point. He then lays the battery reciprocally on the aiming circle par. Using an aiming point and deflection, the battery being in line at regular intervals, when the battery commander desires to control distribution directly, he commands: Having recorded base deflection, to begin a precision adjustment on a target, the battery commander commands: Having completed the previous mission, to begin a bracket adjustment, the battery commander commands: Edit page New page More.
Integrate Joint Doctrine with the following: Army doctrine is at: The problem with continuing a search past apparently good-enough information to the best information is that such searches must continue for ever because a person can never be certain that better information will not be found if the search continues. That being the case, predictability of search "Repositories The notion is that if a person finds a document such as "DataComms. These can then be use to seek out new sources of information. This approach addresses the "unknown unknown" problem. As for your question about how joint doctrine is used: It is a structure of information that provides predictable search.
Those who maintain joint doctrine don't realize this because while they understand some of the reasons that joint doctrine is absolutely essential they are unaware of other equally important reasons joint doctrine is important. If I search by Google for field artillery I get: Activity-based Information I am sending the attached to you because the article presents the intelligence community as being in need of your big-data approach and methods. Slide 5 Information Meeting on Joint Doctrine http: Slide 6 Joint Electronic Library http: Slide 12 Conclusions and Recommendations.
Research Notes Peter Morosoff Comments Your simple and obvious request proved much harder to respond to than I ever dreamed it would be. The terminology defined in [9], for examp- le, was created by selecting terms and definitions from a wide range of sources. No common rules for definitions were employed, and so there is no way of checking even for simple logical consistency of the resulting artifact.
We believe, however, that such conformity is not only indispensable if unified action between human warfighters and IT systems is to be achieved, but further that it would bring multiple significant benefits to military IT systems themselves, and thus also to the developers of such systems, because it would provide a benchmark for interoperability.
Distinguish between general terms and proper names. All general terms should be singular in number. Thus a definition of a general term A should have the two- part form: For example from [16]: Returning to JP we can now, following rule 5, define: Starting, for example, from the definition: The second, in accordance with rule 5, adds a representation of the appropriate parent term here, trivially, operation to yield: The most general categories in military doctrine are: OBO Foundry strategy for modular coordination Nowhere is it stated explicitly in military doctrine that these are the basic categories of the reality of war.
The creation of an ontology for each JP n-m then follows three steps: Common Core and associated domain ontologies. Define architecture as integrated and systems architecture as an architecture of a system yielding taxonomy part of ontology How does ACC do it? Sample terms see definitions: Joint Doctrine Ontology Thursday morning: High speed, big data analytics, etc.
Ontologies everywhere and after building knowledge bases. Joint Doctrine will help, I believe we we need this, etc. Examples of Potential Benefits 1. The Joint Publications Source: Personnel Series Doctrine for planning, coordinating, and providing personnel support to joint operations.
JP , Legal Support to Military Operations,17 August This publication provides joint doctrine and information for the planning, preparation, and execution of legal support to joint military operations. JP , Religious Affairs in Joint Operations, 20 November This publication provides doctrine for religious affairs in joint operations. JP , Financial Management Support in Joint Operations, 02 March This publication provides doctrine for financial management in support of joint operations, to include multinational and interagency financial coordination considerations.
Intelligence Series Doctrine for conducting joint and multinational intelligence activities across the range of military operations. JP , Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 05 January This publication provides doctrine for joint and national intelligence products, services, and support to joint military operations. Operations Series Provides the doctrinal foundation and fundamental principles that guide the Armed Forces of the United States in the conduct of joint operations across the range of military operations. JP , Countering Air and Missile Threats, 23 March This publication provides doctrine for joint counterair operations and protection against air and missile threats across the range of military operations.
JP , Amphibious Operations, 18 July This publication provides overarching joint doctrine to plan, conduct, and assess amphibious operations. JP , Joint Interdiction, 14 October This publication provides doctrine for planning, preparing, executing, and assessing joint interdiction operations. JP , Joint Shipboard Helicopter and Tiltrotor Aircraft Operations, 06 December This publication provides doctrine for planning, coordinating, and conducting joint shipboard helicopter and tiltrotor aircraft operations from United States air-capable ships.
JP , Special Operations, 16 July This publication provides overarching doctrine for special operations and the employment and support for special operations forces across the range of military operations. JP , Joint Urban Operations, 20 November This publication provides joint doctrine for the planning, execution, and assessment of joint operations in an urban environment. JP , Stability Operations, 29 September This publication provides doctrine for the conduct of stability operations during joint operations within the broader context of US Government efforts. JP , Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, 24 June This publication provides joint doctrine for the coordination of military operations with US Government agencies; state, local, and tribal governments; intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector.
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JP , Joint Fire Support, 12 December This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance for planning, coordinating, executing, and assessing joint fire support during military operations. JP , Joint Security Operations in Theater, 13 November This publication provides doctrine for the planning and execution of joint security operations. JP , Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments, 04 October This publication provides doctrine for planning, conducting, and assessing military operations in chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear environments.
JP R , Cyberspace Operations, 05 February This publication provides joint doctrine for the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of joint cyberspace operations across the range of military operations. JP , Information Operations, 27 November - Change 1, 20 November This publication provides joint doctrine for the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of information operations across the range of military operations.
JP , Space Operations, 29 May This publication provides joint doctrine for planning joint space operations. JP , Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations, 17 June This publication provides doctrinal guidance for planning and executing barrier, obstacle, and mine warfare for joint operations as they relate to strategic, operational, and tactical mobility and countermobility across the range of military operations. JP , Multinational Operations, 16 July This publication provides doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States when they operate as part of a multinational force.
JP Air Mobility Operations, 30 September This publication provides joint doctrine for planning, employing, and assessing air mobility operations across the range of military operations. JP , Joint Forcible Entry Operations, 27 November This publication provides joint doctrine for planning, executing, and assessing joint forcible entry operations. JP , Counterinsurgency, 22 November This publication provides joint doctrine for the planning, execution, and assessment of counterinsurgency operations. JP , Counterterrorism, 24 October This publication provides joint doctrine for planning, executing, and assessing counterterrorism operations across the range of military operations.
JP , Homeland Defense, 29 July This publication provides joint doctrine for homeland defense across the range of military operations. JP , Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 31 July This publication provides overarching guidelines and principles to assist commanders and their staffs in planning, conducting, and assessing defense support of civil authorities DSCA. JP , Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, 03 January This publication provides joint doctrine for planning, executing, and assessing foreign humanitarian assistance operations.
JP , Command and Control of Joint Air Operations, 10 February This publication provides joint doctrine for the command and control of joint air operations across the range of military operations. JP , Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations, 07 August This publication provides doctrine for the command and control of joint maritime operations across the range of military operations.
JP , Joint Task Force Headquarters, 30 July This publication provides joint doctrine for the formation and employment of a joint task force JTF headquarters to command and control joint operations. JP , Joint Engineer Operations, 30 June This publication provides doctrine for the planning, command and control, execution, and assessment of joint engineer operations. JP , Deployment and Redeployment Operations, 31 January This publication provides joint doctrine and principles for planning and executing deployment and redeployment operations.
JP , Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, 31 October This publication provides guidance and the basis for the planning and execution of military activities to counter weapons of mass destruction. JP , Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management, 21 June This publication provides joint doctrine for the military response to mitigate the effects of a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear event or incident. JP , Joint Airspace Control, 13 November This publication provides joint doctrine to plan, execute, and assess airspace control during joint operations across the range of military operations.
JP , Civil-Military Operations, 11 September This publication provides joint doctrine for planning and conducting civil-military operations CMO by joint forces, employing civil affairs forces, conducting civil affairs operations, and coordinating with departments, agencies, or other organizations during the execution of CMO. JP , Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations, 07 December This publication sets forth the joint doctrine for the planning and execution of meteorological and oceanographic operations in support of joint operations throughout the range of military operations.
JP , Public Affairs, 25 August This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance for public affairs support to joint operations. JP , Detainee Operations, 13 November This publication provides guidelines for planning and conducting detainee operations. JP , Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, 23 December This publication provides doctrine for planning and conducting joint noncombatant evacuation operations throughout the range of military operations.
Logistics Series Doctrine for joint logistic operations and a framework within which joint logistics can be planned, executed, and controlled effectively. JP , Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System, 06 June This publication provides joint doctrine for the planning, command and control, and employment of resources within the Defense Transportation System.
JP , Health Service Support, 26 July This publication provides doctrine for the planning, preparation, and execution of health service support across the range of military operations. JP , Joint Bulk Petroleum and Water Doctrine, 09 December This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance for providing bulk petroleum and water in support of US military operations.
JP , Joint Mobilization Planning, 21 February This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance for the planning and conduct of joint military mobilization and demobilization, force expansion, use of volunteers, and Presidential Reserve Call-up. JP , Mortuary Affairs, 12 October This publication provides joint doctrine for mortuary affairs support in joint operations.
JP , Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations, 21 February This publication provides joint doctrine for the planning and execution of US logistics in support of the Armed Forces of the United States during multinational operations. JP Distribution Operations, 19 December This publication provides doctrine for the planning, execution, and assessment of joint distribution operations.
JP , Operational Contract Support, 16 July This publication provides doctrine for planning, executing, and managing operational contract support in all phases of joint operations. Planning Series Doctrine for conducting joint, interagency, and multinational planning activities across the full range of military operations. Communications System Series Doctrine for communications system support to joint operations and guidelines to our commanders regarding information systems and networks as a part of the Global Information Grid.
JP , Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations, 20 March This publication provides doctrine for joint electromagnetic spectrum management operations organization, planning, preparation, execution, and assessment in support of joint operations. SCOPE This chapter covers duties of personnel of the firing battery except those duties prescribed for the service of the piece and prescribes fire commands with explanation of their execution.
During prolonged firing, it is desirable to rest each piece at least 5 minutes of each hour. Ammunition is not tossed, rolled, or dropped. Tampering with or disassembling any component of a round is prohibited. Any ammunition exposed to gas is wiped off immediately with an oiled rag. Personnel handling chemical projectiles are provided with gas masks and gloves. All rounds are examined before loading. GENERAL Individuals at the firing battery are dismounted; they are not restricted to posts designated herein when their duties require their presence elsewhere.
Executives The post of the executive is a position near the pieces from which he can best supervise the firing battery and be in communication with the battery commander. His principal duties are to: Establish the firing battery in position. Comply with the fire commands of the battery commander. Supervise and check the work of gun squads,. To identify and point out to the gunner the aiming point, the referring point, or the target.
To execute prearranged fire when a written schedule for it is furnished him. To conduct the fire of his section in fire at will and at other times when so directed. To keep the data for the gun book and data pertaining to his piece. To enforce strict compliance with safety precautions. Have charge of such ammunition at the position as is not issued to the sections. Receive, inspect, sort, and care for ammunition not delivered directly to sections.
Issue ammunition to piece sections, dividing each lot equally among them. Keep the executive informed as to the amount and kinds of ammunition on hand. Dispose of ammunition left at positions, making the necessary reports. His duties are to: Have charge of and operate all telephone communication at the position. Record all fire commands and messages. Tabulate his record so that he can instantly give the executive the setting for any piece. Record the minimum elevation or range and the base deflections.
Joint Publication Joint Security Opearations in Theater
Keep a file of fire schedules. Assist the ammunition sergeant. Their duties are as follows: The correction is made by the gunner who: The following records are kept: Except as prescribed no records of fire commands are made. By the chief of section during schedule fire and in fire at will. The prescribed sequence of fire commands is: Y-Azimuth The battery commander commands: The executive then commands, for example: Each gunner refers and announces the referred deflection for his piece. For numbered charges the command is: When using shell except time shell , the command for the fuze is: There are three exceptions to the above, as follows: The executive- 1 Gives the necessary commands to have the other pieces laid approximately parallel to No.
Direct laying l Initial commands: The executive repeats the above command, and, at the proper time, adds: Base angle, recording base deflection without adjusting. Shift from base deflection and zone fire, staggered position. When the required number of rounds has been fired: To adjust for direction with a high burst and to fire through a zone. Elementary ballistics and dispersion. Preparation of fire with instruments. Survey operations, plans, and procedure.
Preparation of fire from firing charts. Adjustment with sound-and-flash units. Conduct of fire with air observation.
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Conduct of fire by air observation methods, using ground observers. Support by observed fires. Page statistics view s and 81 edit s Social share Share this page? Tags This page has no custom tags. Joint Pubs to be consolidated or deleted pending development or revision of superceding publications. Joint Operation Planning Joint Communications System Military Support Ops Foreign Internal Defense Joint Task Force Headquarters Defense Trans System Electromagnetic Spectrum Ops Sealift Support 2.
Joint Intel Prep of the Operational Environment Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation Countering Threat Networks Deployment and Redeployment Terminal Operations 5. Logistics in Multinational Ops Joint Fire Support Shipboard Helicopter Ops Close Air Support Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare Health Service Support Operational Contract Support Security Ops in Theater Counter IED Operations Defense Support of Civil Authorities Petroleum and Water Air Mobility Operations C2 for Joint Air Operation